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INTRODUCTION

The German Labor Administration fi ts uneasily into the traditional periodiza-
tion and concerns of modern German history. Th e Arbeitsverwaltung demon-
strated remarkable continuity and received unusually broad support in its am-
bition to remake the country’s workforce. Across regime changes from the end of 
the Kaiserreich, through the Weimar Republic and Nazi dictatorship, and into 
the early West German democracy, its nationwide network of several hundred 
local labor offi  ces dominated the labor market. Th e administration claimed a 
de facto monopoly in job placement and vocational counseling, after its main 
competitors, commercial agencies and employer-run offi  ces, were shut down in 
the Weimar period. Between the late 1930s and 1960, roughly 90 percent of Ger-
man boys and girls leaving school visited their local Arbeitsamt for advice and a 
job. Likewise, the vast majority of employers obtained their personnel through 
the same offi  ces.
Beyond a monopoly, the Administration aspired to the complete control—
Totalerfassung—of all movements in the labor market. No one should fi nd a job, 
no employer a worker, without its intervention. However, its ambitions extended 
in potentially incongruent directions, not merely toward static control, but also 
toward dynamic improvement. For in the Weimar and Nazi periods, the Ad-
ministration played a pivotal role in channeling ever more young Germans into 
skilled apprenticeships, thus launching the “German skills machine.” Th e Labor 
Administration aimed to bring workers under central, “organized” control, but 
also to give them skills and let them go. Ultimately, these goals grew from dif-
ferent visions of optimization, the possibilities of centralized knowledge, and the 
role of the individual in society.
Th is German project resembled eff orts in other major industrial countries to 
bring labor markets under public control and improve human capital—but also 
diff ered from them in crucial ways. Both France and Britain wrestled with the 
same labor force problems as did Germany. In some regards, economic philoso-
Notes for this section begin on page 8.
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phy and government policy constrained action in these countries. Th us, in Brit-
ain, from the late nineteenth century on there were widespread laments about the 
deteriorating quality of the workforce. However, the reigning liberal economic 
doctrine and the government’s reticence to intervene in individual contracts be-
tween employers and workers or to mandate and fund more public education 
meant that eff orts to improve worker training remained haphazard.1 In other 
regards, though, before World War I, France and Britain adopted quite similar 
policies to Germany, in fact, often even more expeditiously and decisively than 
their rival. Th us, France passed a law in 1904, six years before Germany, which 
was designed to stifl e commercial placement agencies, to the benefi t of public of-
fi ces. Britain created a national network of local labor offi  ces in 1909, seven years 
in advance of wartime Germany; its pioneering unemployment insurance law of 
1911 antedated the German one by sixteen years.
However, after the war these countries did not pursue their labor force policies 
with anything like the German determination. Th ough France and Britain sub-
jected commercial and interest group job agencies to various political pressures, 
neither established a true monopoly for their public offi  ces, let alone anything 
resembling the German Totalerfassung. Nor did either country pursue a coordi-
nated vocational program at the national level. In Britain, vocational training 
remained the prerogative of individual fi rms. Vocational counseling remained 
primarily under the authority of Local Education Authorities and was not part 
of the national network of labor offi  ces, which remained devoted mainly to job 
placement. France’s local labor offi  ces concerned themselves with vocational coun-
seling from 1921 on, but those offi  ces themselves were not united in a national 
system. Finally, in both countries, job placement and vocational counseling re-
mained decoupled from unemployment insurance systems (assuming such a sys-
tem even existed, which was not the case in France until 1958). In fact, it was 
only after World War II that both France and Britain began to take some of the 
decisive steps the Germans had taken after the previous confl ict: in 1945 and 
1948, respectively, they created unifi ed national systems of job placement and 
vocational counseling, which enjoyed monopolies and aimed at “complete inclu-
sion.” Within a decade, however, the great postwar economic boom would begin 
to undermine the newfound public control of the labor force.2
Th e German Labor Administration thus not only stands out in modern Ger-
man history for its continuity across regimes and unusually broad support. It also 
illustrates, in particularly heightened form, the widespread ambition of public 
authorities in the early and mid twentieth century to shape their workforces.
Despite its importance, the German workforce project has received almost no 
scholarly attention.3 One reason for this dearth of research has been the focus 
on just one side of the Labor Administration, its unemployment wing, and in 
particular on the political confl icts in which that wing became enmeshed soon 
after the Administration was established in 1927. Th e creation of a system of 
unemployment insurance after decades of reform discussion and years of political 
wrangling has been regarded as the belated culmination and completion of the 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
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insurance policies inaugurated by Bismarck in the 1880s.4 Historians have also 
researched the unemployment insurance system because struggles over the levels 
of welfare spending, and in particular of unemployment contributions, contrib-
uted to the collapse of the last parliamentary government in Weimar. Th e onset 
of the Great Depression only two years after passage of the bill creating the Labor 
Administration—and the role of this economic upheaval in paving the way for 
the rise of the Nazis—has kept attention focused on this side of the Administra-
tion. By contrast, the Administration’s role in steering the country’s labor supply 
and shaping its workforce has remained largely unexamined.
General trends in German historiography have played an important role in di-
verting attention from the Administration. Th e predominant interest in National 
Socialism has colored, for obvious reasons, nearly every aspect of the historiogra-
phy of modern Germany. It has directed attention to the fundamental political 
and economic tensions in an often divided society. From this vantage point, areas 
of German life in which consensus dominated have seemed less germane—unless 
the consensus could help to explain features of National Socialism. Moreover, the 
interest in National Socialism has tended to split all of German history, even on 
less obviously political topics, into epochs defi ned by political regime. Organiza-
tions and trends crossing one of these divides—not to mention several—often 
have been overlooked.
Th e very continuity of the Labor Administration across such diff erent regimes 
as well as through war and peace is one of the aspects that most cries out for ex-
planation. How could this system, whose skeleton was laid down in World War 
I, grow to maturity in the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany, and survive into 
the second decade of the Federal Republic?
Scholars such as Gerald Feldman and Charles Maier have analyzed the emer-
gence of a new form of corporatist politics under the pressure of total war, re-
covery, and industrial concentration.5 Corporatism depended on the settlement 
of basic economic and social questions not by parliament, but by compromise 
among major interest groups. While these scholars pay attention to the role of 
ideas, their accounts emphasize the “new primacy of interest politics and the 
eclipse of ideology.”6 Several of the Labor Administration’s features do point to 
the centrality of such a basic compromise between interest groups—industry and 
labor—over labor policy. Th e 1916 Auxiliary Service Law that fi rst established 
a national network of rudimentary labor offi  ces depended on signifi cant accom-
modation of organized labor by the state and industry.7 Set up after the war, the 
governing structure of the Labor Administration exemplifi ed this balance of in-
terests. Th e Administration was not part of the state apparatus, strictly speaking. 
Rather, representatives of industry, unions, and public authorities shared power 
in the governing boards at each of the three levels of the bureaucracy—local, 
state, and national. Th e labor offi  ces’ role in the labor market also bespoke com-
promise. On the one hand, their monopoly status as providers of job placement 
and vocational counseling fulfi lled the socialist unions’ long-standing demands 
for eliminating commercial and employer placement agencies. On the other, the 
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Arbeitsämter could not compel youths or companies to use their services or to 
accept their recommendations. Th erefore, in practice, they had to earn the trust 
and cooperation of individuals and, most importantly, local employers. Th e in-
terests we must examine will thus include not only the national groups, but local 
actors as well.
Despite the importance such corporatist compromise had in the history of 
the Labor Administration, however, it cannot provide a complete account of this 
organization and its surprising continuity—unless we revise our understanding 
of corporatism’s origins. Already before the war—the event usually thought to 
have launched the coordination between industry, unions, and state—important 
steps leading to public control of the labor market had occurred. Most notably, in 
1910 the Reichstag unanimously passed a Job Placement Law with the intention, 
as the Interior Minister put it, that “public offi  ces dedicated to the general welfare 
will become ever stronger and eventually achieve predominance.”8 Th is remark-
able consensus at a time usually characterized as one dominated by great interest 
group tension suggests either that some of the building blocks of corporatist 
compromise, in particular that between industry and labor, predated the war—or 
that we must look beyond such interest-based solutions for an explanation.
Th e limits of an account revolving solely around corporatist interests become 
apparent if one considers the postwar development of the Labor Administration. 
By 1923, hyperinfl ation, resurgent unemployment, and electoral losses had di-
minished labor’s power, leading employers to back out of the Central Working 
Association, the central institution of early postwar corporatism. Yet the Labor 
Administration, put on fi rm legal ground only in 1922 with the Labor Exchange 
Law, was strengthened by the 1927 Law on Job Placement and Unemployment 
Insurance. Th e nearly unanimous passage of this landmark bill by the Reichstag, 
which otherwise was so bitterly divided, hardly seems to fi t with an account of 
the eclipse of parliament by interest groups. Th e rare unanimity suggests the 
diminished role of ideological confl ict, at least in this one area, but not necessar-
ily that of ideology per se. Similarly, though the Nazis abolished its corporatist 
governance structures, the Administration operated in the Th ird Reich much as 
it had in Weimar, for example, in continuing to seek the willing cooperation of job-
seekers and, especially, employers. Finally, and conversely, a corporatism-based 
account struggles to explain why the Labor Administration’s dominance of the 
labor market ended around 1960, when a second round of corporatism was still 
in its heyday.
We might begin resolving these puzzles if we add the undiminished impact, 
institutionally, strategically, and psychologically, of World War I to the undeni-
able role of corporatist compromise. Th e war was, of course, the most immedi-
ate source of the Labor Administration’s institutionalized national network. In 
the crucial postwar years (1918–22), wartime workforce policies and programs 
served as templates for the structures that the new regime forged. Th is war-in-
spired Labor Administration then survived for decades thanks to bureaucratic 
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inertia. Th is argument for the role of path dependence after the war could be 
modifi ed or complemented by pointing to ways in which the entire period from 
1918 to roughly 1960 shared important traits with the years of total mobiliza-
tion in World War I. Above all, Germany was—Germans felt their country to 
be—embattled, either in a direct military sense or in terms of harsh domestic 
and international economic conditions. Th e pivotal role played by Germany’s 
loss in World War I is underlined by the fact that the trajectory of the German 
human economies now diverged from the path taken in France and England. In 
the victorious powers, the disparate projects of workforce improvement, which 
before the war had paralleled and even preceded developments in Germany, were 
not fused into a concentrated national program as they were in Germany. Such 
an explanation relying on the long term impact of the war, we should note, places 
less emphasis on interest groups, and more on ideas and perceptions and the na-
tional condition they addressed.
Th ere is another aspect of the Labor Administration that strengthens the claim 
that World War I was decisive. It also suggests that interests alone are insuffi  cient 
to explain the development and continuity of the Labor Administration. Th is is 
the insistence on achieving Totalerfassung, which can only be inadequately trans-
lated as “complete registration or inclusion.” Th at is to say, the goal of the Labor 
Administration was not merely monopoly—excluding all competitors from job 
placement and vocational counseling. Rather, it was the “complete inclusion” of 
all job seekers and all employers by the Administration itself. Th is aspiration to 
Totalerfassung was not merely incidental to the Labor Administration, a minor 
and separable element. From beginning to end, the leaders and supporters of the 
Labor Administration saw “complete inclusion” as a sine qua non, an essential part 
of their mission.
Totalerfassung palpably breathes the spirit of the total mobilization of the 1916 
Hindenburg Program and its Auxiliary Service Law. Yet it also—both as a phrase 
and, more importantly, as an idea—predates the war. In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, numerous calls were heard for the registration and the 
conscious, most effi  cient use of all resources—from Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 
“scientifi c management” of factories to urban reformers’ plans for preventing 
contagion or stamping out invidious habits among the poor. Total war amplifi ed 
this kind of thinking and applied it more broadly than ever before, but it did not 
invent it.
A second, central aspect of the Labor Administration confi rms the need to 
probe beyond interest-based politics and even beyond the impact of the war. 
In addition to controlling the labor market and matching workers and jobs, 
the Arbeitsverwaltung aimed to create a specifi c type of German workforce, a 
highly skilled one. Its vocational counseling offi  ces did all they could to encour-
age young people to forego the quick money of unskilled work and instead un-
dertake apprenticeships. In the second half of the 1920s and then again in the 
1930s, it cooperated closely with industry to produce a uniform national system 
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of vocational training, testing, and certifi cation. As a result of this coordination, 
by the late 1930s, more than half a million young Germans were entering ap-
prenticeships each year.
Th is skilling program was certainly not incompatible with the corporatist 
compromises between industry and labor unions. Th e latter, after all, drew their 
core membership from skilled workers and lent generic support to vocational 
training from the 1920s to the 1960s and beyond. Yet, as the unions admitted 
at the end of World War I, their focus on wages and working hours, and gener-
ally on standing up to employers, had led them to ignore vocational training 
for too long.9 Even after this admission, however, especially after a vocational 
training law foundered on political diff erences between left and right, leaving 
apprenticeships a prerogative of employers, the unions never took the initiative 
on the issue.
Coordinated counseling and training programs were also compatible with the 
Labor Administration’s monopoly status and goal of “complete inclusion.” In-
deed, the promoters of a skilled workforce within the Administration became at 
times the strongest advocates of “complete inclusion.” At deeper levels, however, 
tensions existed. Labor administration and complete inclusion assumed given 
inputs and then manipulated them; it was basically a static undertaking—op-
timization by calculation. Vocational training forged new qualities; it was basi-
cally dynamic—optimization by facilitation. Labor administration and especially 
Totalerfassung revolved fundamentally around centralized control. Vocational 
counseling and training, on the other hand, while intermittently relying on the 
same control, prepared society for a fundamental decentralization in the form 
of embourgeoisement, a workforce with its skills as its property and with pride 
in its vocations. Th ese were at heart diff erences of vision. And just as ideas of 
Totalerfassung predated the war, so too did an incipient program of skilling and 
embourgeoisement.
Th is study explains the emergence and remarkable durability of the Labor 
Administration, with its complete inclusion and vocational system, in terms of 
political and economic compromises—but also in terms of the long-range power 
of ideas. To emphasize the infl uence of ideas is to challenge prevailing assump-
tions about Wilhelmine and Weimar politics. Scholars of these periods debate 
whether German politics was defi ned more by milieus or by camps. Common 
patterns of socialization and positive group identifi cation separated the Social 
Democrat, Catholic, and Liberal and Conservative Protestant milieus from each 
other. Each camp, on the other hand, found common ground primarily through 
its opposition to a common enemy, with the primary fault line running between 
the socialists on the one hand, and all the middle class parties, on the other.10 
Th e present study recognizes the importance of these categories rooted in deep 
psychological structures of socialization and friend-foe distinctions. However, it 
demonstrates that powerfully attractive ideas could draw actors together across 
milieus and even camps. In light of the long-range power of this attraction and 
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the loose, but eff ective coalitions it produced, we introduce a third category to 
the debate and speak here of ideational constellations.11
Th e fi rst and by far most compelling idea, attracting leaders and intellectuals 
from across the political spectrum, was that of “organization”—solving problems 
by centralizing knowledge and control. Its appeal drew on the momentous suc-
cesses of science and the seemingly inevitable rise of democratic political engage-
ment, two of the dominant forces of the day, as well as on the ongoing experience 
of forging a new nation-state and on the very real successes of such organizations 
as the railroads and mammoth business corporations. Th e corporatist compact 
itself was not merely a balance of interests, but an expression of this dominant 
mode of thinking. Th e other main idea, weaker than and often contradicting or-
ganization, was that of individuality and individual independence deriving from 
economic independence. It was sustained, before it spread more widely, in en-
claves of the urban Bürgertum.
Th ese ideas were not static platonic entities, of course, but rather existed in the 
minds of real people—politicians, social reformers, bureaucrats, and common 
people. Th e strength of their appeal underwent changes depending on circum-
stances, as did the product of their intermingling and implementation in the 
Labor Administration. We therefore must pay close attention to the evolution of 
the ideas of organization and individual independence through the diff erent eras 
of affl  uence and exiguity, peace and war.
Th e fi rst two chapters of the book address the attempts to manage Germany’s 
transformative and turbulent fi rst economic miracle in the decades before 1914. 
Chapter 1 examines the eff orts to maintain domestic stability by “organizing” the 
labor market, which culminated in the 1910 law promising public labor offi  ces 
predominance. Th e following chapter considers the comparatively halting steps 
authorities and industrialists took to create a skilled workforce, which would 
sus tain Germany’s international competitiveness, while also fostering a diff erent 
basis of domestic stability. Chapter 3 shows how the experience of “total war” put 
its stamp—politically, institutionally, and intellectually—on the new national 
Labor Administration created in the war and perpetuated after it. Th e following 
chapter turns to vocational counseling and training under the dire domestic and 
economic conditions after World War I. It shows, fi rst, how public authorities 
sought to breathe life into the project of creating a skilled workforce. Second, it 
explains the decisive shift in industry’s views of its own workers, a “reframing” 
of the skilled worker that allowed the subsequent creation of the German skills 
machine. Chapter 5 shows how the Nazis, partly by intent and partly by acci-
dent, helped to consolidate both the Labor Administration and the rest of the 
vocational system. Th e fi nal chapter explains, fi rst, why the Labor Administration 
was restored in the anxious years after 1945 to its earlier form. It then shows how 
and why the system of public dominance of the labor market that had emerged 
from World War I and the even older age of organization fi nally ended around 
1960, in the second economic miracle.
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Chapter 1
“ORGANIZING” THE LABOR MARKET 
IN THE DYNAMIC KAISERREICH

In the years before World War I, Germany’s highest authorities and major po-
litical parties made no secret of their intention to assume public control of the 
labor market. A Job Placement law passed unanimously by the Reichstag in 1910 
decisively tilted the balance against commercial job-placement agencies and in 
favor of public labor offi  ces. Th e Minister of the Interior explained the ultimate 
purpose of the law’s stipulation that private agencies would only receive a license 
if no adequate public offi  ce existed in the area: “Th is requirement will mean that 
in the course of time private job placement will become ever rarer and in its 
place public offi  ces dedicated to the general welfare will become ever stronger 
and eventually achieve predominance.”1 Th is milestone on the road to national 
“organization” of the labor market came about only after a development that 
began decades earlier with grassroots, heterogeneous eff orts to confront problems 
in Germany’s rapidly expanding industrial economy. In that development, the 
1890s were a turning point, as control of the labor market now became a vital 
stake in the political struggles between agriculture and industry and between 
employers and unions.
Germany’s First Economic Miracle
Germany’s dynamic economic growth around the turn of the twentieth century 
set the stage for all that followed with the Labor Administration. Already expand-
ing since the 1850s, Germany’s economy grew even more rapidly, though un-
Notes for this section begin on page 34.
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evenly, in the decades after unifi cation. Particularly in the twenty years between 
1895 and the outbreak of the Great War, Germany experienced nearly uninter-
rupted growth at an unprecedented rate. In this “fi rst economic miracle,”2 the 
country’s GDP increased by an average of 3.2 percent annually, which resulted in 
an economy nearly 90 percent bigger in 1913 than it had been just two decades 
earlier.3 With a growth rate second only to that of the other major rising power, 
the United States of America, Germany, by the turn of the century, was chal-
lenging England for second place among the great economic powers. While the 
agricultural sector itself became more productive, it was industrial expansion, at 
a 4 percent annual rate, that fueled this growth. Already in the 1890s, industry 
and crafts surpassed agriculture in terms of gross value produced. In the words of 
a heated contemporary debate, Germany was fast turning from an “agrarian” to 
an “industrial state.”4
Th is economic transition and expansion occurred, however, by no means 
smoothly. Sharp downturns interrupted the general upward trend. Undoubtedly, 
the most severe downturn occurred in the two decades after the stock market 
crash of 1873. Th e years of zero or even negative growth were particularly fre-
quent in the decade between 1873 and 1882. While it is now widely recognized 
that the period from the mid 1870s to the mid 1890s cannot be described in 
terms of a “great depression,” as an earlier generation of historians postulated,5 
there can be no doubt that this period had a profound psychological eff ect on 
many Germans. Th e cycles of growth punctuated by sharp slowdowns and even 
occasional declines of production, stock collapses, and spikes of unemployment 
helped shake the confi dence in the idea, never widely or fi rmly held in Germany 
in any case, that the free market could regulate itself. Th ey greatly strengthened 
the hand of those calling for a greater public role in economic aff airs. Among 
employers, the instability contributed to eff orts to minimize risk through cartels 
and employer organizations.
Even the years of extremely rapid, nearly uninterrupted, expansion from 1895 
to 1914, while boosting Germans’ confi dence (and even feelings of superiority), 
could not eliminate that potential sense of insecurity. Th e very success of most of 
the period made the few setbacks seem all the more unsettling. Relatively short, 
mild recessions in 1900–1902 and 1907–1908 sparked exaggerated, gloom-
laden reactions.6 Th ese shocking reminders of the economy’s vulnerability would 
strengthen the movement that arose before the war to bring the labor market 
under public control.
In addition to this interruption of rapid overall growth by occasional down-
turns, diff erences in sectoral growth rates were another salient feature of the 
Kaiserreich’s economy. Agriculture’s aforementioned loss of relative position to 
industry and craft production was but the most general of these shifts. Within 
manufacturing itself, the varying fortunes of and within the sectors had signifi -
cant political, economic, and also intellectual ramifi cations. Th e broad category 
of Handwerk, encompassing craft enterprises from the one-man or family bakery 
to machine-building fi rms with dozens of journeymen and apprentices, experi-
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enced a range of fates. Craftsmen who competed directly with industrial enter-
prises, such as cobblers, suff ered a steady decline. Th ose, however, who could 
compete on quality or who complemented industry in various ways, for example, 
in repair work, survived and often even thrived.7
Still, even if Handwerk as a whole did not decline, and in fact expanded, like 
agriculture, it too faced a relative loss of importance. Th e fastest growing, increas-
ingly dominant sector of the economy was large-scale industry. Mining and iron 
and steelmaking, aided by political-territorial gains after the Franco-Prussian war, 
technological breakthroughs, and the seemingly insatiable demand for the build-
ing blocks of the newly united nation’s infrastructure, grew at prodigious rates.8 
More dynamic still were the largely export-oriented fi rms of the “second indus-
trial revolution” in chemicals and electrical products, along with the engineering 
sector. In the last two decades before the war, innovations by BASF, Hoechst, 
Bayer, and numerous smaller fi rms in such processes as artifi cial dies and phar-
maceuticals propelled the chemicals industry to more than an annual 6 percent 
growth rate.9 After Siemens’ breakthrough in the long distance transmission of 
electricity around 1890 opened the door to the widespread dissemination of elec-
trical generators, machines, and appliances, the electrical industry experienced a 
massive boom. Exports drove the explosive growth of the machinery industry. 
In the two decades between 1893 and 1913, these grew ten-fold,10 vaulting the 
sector into fi rst place in this regard. Firms’ revenues in its core area, machine tool 
production, soared more than 200 percent between 1897 and 1912.11 Th is most 
dynamic of German industries would play a key role in launching the country’s 
vocational training system, as we will see in the next chapter.
Despite the expectations of many political economists at the time and the 
assessments of later historians, German industry’s growth in the decades around 
1900 followed no simple pattern, for example, with large-scale enterprises invari-
ably squeezing out medium- and small-sized fi rms.12 Not only did parts of Hand-
werk manage to stay afl oat, adapt, and even fl ourish. Industry proper, as recent 
scholarship has shown, varied greatly according to region and structure. Th e large 
fi rms in the mining, iron, and steel producing sectors often pursued “autarkic” 
policies in relatively infrastructure-weak regions, and some companies in chemi-
cal manufacturing, electrical manufacturing, and machine building did the same 
as well. But many of the latter, especially in machine-building, where the borders 
with Handwerk were fl uid, thrived in regions of decentralized production with 
traditions of cooperation and political provision of infrastructure.13 Th e open-
ended nature of Germany’s industrial development left room, then, for infl uences 
from interest groups and governments.
Wilhelmine Germany’s rapid industrial growth not only added to the coun-
try’s overall wealth and began to overturn the previous balance among economic 
sectors, it also provoked a massive, unprecedented redistribution of Germany’s 
workforce. Germany’s burgeoning new factories and companies and even whole 
new industries exerted enough of a demand for workers to redirect the fl ood of 
Germans emigrees, who since the early decades of the century had sought to es-
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cape crushing rural poverty and dissolving social ties at home by going overseas. 
Instead, by the 1890s, an even greater number of Germans were migrating inter-
nally. Between 1880 and 1914, in the “greatest mass-movement of German his-
tory,”14 millions of Germans moved within the Empire’s borders, overwhelmingly 
from rural regions in the east to the burgeoning industrial centers around Berlin 
and the Rhine and Ruhr rivers.15 Th is fl ight from the land, as worried observers 
called it, changed the basic composition of the German workforce, turning mil-
lions of former peasants or farmhands into factory workers. Whereas in 1882, 42 
percent of the workforce had been in agriculture and only 35 percent in industry, 
25 years later the proportions were more than reversed, with only 28 percent in 
agriculture and 42 percent in industry.16 Th e growth of employment within in-
dustry was not evenly distributed, but occurred at the fastest rates within “metal 
working,” which included electrical products and machinery. Siemens-Schuck-
ert, for example, one of the two leading electrical products companies in the 
country, expanded its workforce between 1890 and 1913 nearly twenty-fold.17 If 
the metal-working sector had employed 356,000 workers, or 5.6 percent of the 
industrial workforce, in 1882, on the eve of World War I, its 1.9 million workers 
constituted 17 percent of the industrial labor force, making it the single largest 
sector in industry.18 Machine-building, in particular, showed a peculiar dynamic. 
One of the fastest growing sectors in terms of output, it relied less than other 
burgeoning fi elds on increased energy and capital inputs and more on a rapidly 
expanding workforce. Between 1895 and 1907, the number of employees in the 
machine-building industry more than doubled from 443,000 to 908,000.19
Th is economic dynamism, though not alone and not always immediately, un-
derlay the widely held feeling in Wilhelmine Germany that many realms were in 
a state of fl ux. Everything from politics to economics itself to social relations and 
culture seemed to require, depending on one’s point of view, defense, reform or 
overturning.20
Finding Jobs, Finding Workers
Germany’s dynamic economic growth after 1870 posed challenges for workers 
and employers, while the accompanying waves of migration and urbanization 
seemed to threaten public order. People seeking jobs, especially immigrants from 
the countryside, needed help fi nding positions amidst the confusion of new 
kinds of work and in unfamiliar settings. Many depended simply on the haphaz-
ard method of “knocking on the factory gate” or gathering at informal “open air 
labor markets.”21 Firms needed to fi ll their expanding workforces; municipali-
ties had to manage the diffi  culties posed by unprecedented urbanization. In re-
sponse, a variety of forces sprang up in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
at fi rst mainly at the local level, to organize job fi nding and worker selection. 
Th ese ranged from commercial agencies and newspaper ads to craft-, union-, and 
industry-run labor exchanges, and philanthropic and municipal offi  ces. Before 
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1914, however, assisted job-placements of whatever kind still made up prob-
ably less than half of all job entries, and perhaps far less than that.22 So while 
the trend, especially from the 1890s, was away from diverse local solutions to a 
narrower range of more comprehensive ones, and ultimately to public control, 
before the war the organization of the labor market still aff ected only a minority 
of people looking for work.
Commercial agencies placed more people in work than any other kind of 
offi  ce, though their preeminence faced increasingly severe challenges from the 
mid 1890s onward. Th e liberal Trade Regulations of 1869 had freed commercial 
job-placement agencies from state regulation, and their numbers grew rapidly, 
particularly in the big cities. Th ese Makler spanned the range from large estab-
lishments with comfortable offi  ces and large staff , to one-man operations based 
in train stations where immigrants from the countryside set their fi rst foot in the 
cities. In 1894, the more than 5,000 such agencies in Prussia accounted for nearly 
two-thirds of all registered job-placements.23 Between 1895 and 1907, the num-
ber of commercial agencies in the entire Reich rose from 6,077 to 7,205.24 No 
data exists on the number of placements they performed in Germany as a whole; 
however, reports from Bavaria and Baden indicate that the commercial agen-
cies were able to maintain, or even slightly increase, the number of job-seekers 
they placed.25 By now, however, tough legal controls and the fl ourishing of other 
forms of job-placement agencies had almost certainly reduced the commercial 
enterprises’ share of all placements.
A variety of non-commercial services competed with the commercial agencies. 
Th e single most important kind of non-commercial exchange and the only one 
aside from the employer exchanges eventually to achieve more than a 10 percent 
share was the public municipal labor offi  ce. Of all the public and non-commercial 
bodies, municipal associations and governments were closest to the front lines 
of upheaval caused by industrialization, migration, and economic liberalization. 
Even before rapid industrialization changed the nature of work and created new 
challenges for city governments, the ending of restrictions on immigration to 
cities—in Prussia in 1810, and in the rest of Germany later, generally in the 
1850s and 1860s—exposed them to burdens for which they were ill-prepared. 
In the fastest growing regions of the Rhine-Ruhr area, the onrush of job-seekers 
now burst the limits of old communities and even spawned brand new urban 
settlements.26
Before industrialization began to absorb great numbers of workers in the 1870s 
and 1880s, the fl ood of rural paupers and urban dispossessed seeking work or aid 
in the cities overwhelmed municipal budgets. Poor relief—the usual measure 
in response to unemployment—was the responsibility of the local community. 
Th is fi nancial burden, which became especially acute during economic down-
turns, would provide a major incentive for municipal authorities to establish 
labor exchanges and other services to complement or replace individuals’ inde-
pendent searches for work. Such fi scal crises, in combination with the Bürgertum’s 
growing concerns about the revolutionary implications of the “worker question,” 
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further energized urban reform movements that were already promoting civic 
improvements.27
Bürgerlich associations pioneered the development of neutral, non-specialized la-
bor exchanges. Even before 1848, humanitarian associations in Dresden, Leipzig, 
Dusseldorf, and Frankfurt an der Oder had begun to try to match job-seekers 
with employers. Above all, they dealt with indigent and unskilled workers—a de-
fi ning characteristic of the municipal labor offi  ces well into the twentieth century. 
Th eir basic method was to collect lists of openings and available workers, who 
were referred in the order of their appearance. In contrast to these philanthropic, 
middle-class undertakings, the establishment in 1865 of a labor exchange offi  ce 
in Stuttgart by the joint eff ort of employers and workers’ association signaled the 
possibility of new organizational forms.28 It was only thirty years later, however, 
that other cities would begin to adopt Stuttgart’s parity-model. Until the 1890s, 
then, an array of commercial, philanthropic, municipal, and other organizations 
played a limited role in matching workers and jobs.
Th e Politics of the Labor Market
Th e 1890s, it is now widely agreed among historians, opened a tumultuous new 
chapter in the Kaiserreich’s history.29 After another wrenching recession at the be-
ginning of the decade, the economy in 1895 entered a twenty-year phase of un-
precedented, booming growth. Emigration overseas dwindled to a trickle, while 
the stream of migrants into and between cities swelled to a fl ood. Managing 
these fl ows became a matter of public order. Politics, too, came to be played in a 
new key. Economic interests—the Social Democrats (SPD) and socialist unions, 
especially after the lapsing of the Anti-Socialist law in 1890, employers’ organiza-
tions, peasant leagues, a revived Handwerk movement, and others—mobilized as 
never before to infl uence ministerial bureaucracies, the Reichstag, and the public 
sphere. Th e end of Bismarck’s long domination of German politics in 1890 and 
the rise of young Kaiser Wilhelm II, who promised a “new course” in social 
policy, also contributed to the mounting hope—or fear—of dynamic change and 
impending choices for the country.30 Not coincidentally, the 1890s were also a 
turning point for the organization of the labor market. Control of the workforce 
became the object of multifaceted political contention, while urban reformers 
and elements of state and national government promoted a burgeoning move-
ment to bring the labor market under public control.
From the 1890s onward, contention over the labor market became engulfed in 
the increasingly confrontational struggle between business and labor. Th e growing 
size and assertiveness of the socialist movement after the end of the discrimina-
tory legislation, the backlash by employers, and, after 1895, growing labor short-
ages made control of jobs and workers a volatile issue. Unions and employers’ 
organizations were interested in establishing labor offi  ces for the sake of their 
respective members, but also for the purpose of gaining leverage over the op-
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posing camp. In contrast to the municipal labor offi  ces, which overwhelmingly 
served low or unskilled workers, both the unions’ and the employers’ bureaus 
placed skilled workers.
Since their inception in the 1860s and 1870s, labor unions had recognized the 
potential political role of labor offi  ces. It was only after their reorganization in 
1889 and the lapsing of the Anti-Socialist law in 1890, however, that the unions 
began to establish labor exchanges in greater numbers.31
Soon, employers and their associations were founding labor exchanges at an 
even faster rate. Th ey thus responded both to the political threat from potential 
union control of the labor supply and to the general problem of securing a stable 
and capable workforce in times of mounting labor scarcity and high turnover 
rates. Th e fi rst employers’ labor exchange conference, in 1901, identifi ed a “well-
trained, reliable, and capable labor force that is as little subject to fl uctuation 
as possible, as an absolute necessity of an industrial economy.”32 By 1904, the 
employer exchanges had garnered a 21.1 percent share of the non-commercial 
placements, nearly double the union fi gure of 10.9 percent. Eight years later, the 
employers’ proportion had grown substantially, to 33.5 percent, drawing them 
nearly even with the leading share of the public municipal exchanges (36.1 per-
cent), while the union exchanges had slipped to 9.8 percent.33 In the face of these 
trends, the unions around the turn of the century abandoned their aspiration 
one day to have sole control of all labor exchanges and accepted exchanges run 
jointly with employers as the best they could expect to achieve. Around the same 
time, the Social Democrats in the Reichstag began demanding the establishment 
of a national labor offi  ce (Reichsarbeitsamt) to centralize control of public labor 
exchanges.
Th is confl ict between the two industrial camps was not the only political strug-
gle for control of labor. Agrarian interests, which themselves had become better 
organized in this period, especially with the founding of the Agrarian League 
in 1893, saw it as a matter of collective life and death. Th e migration of hun-
dreds of thousands of former agricultural laborers to the booming industrial cit-
ies deprived agriculture of suffi  cient hands. Much of the blame for this “people 
shortage” was placed by agriculture on ostensibly unscrupulous commercial job-
placement fi rms and agents, who lured people from the land with false promises. 
Farm interests responded by establishing more agricultural placement agencies, 
though this proved slow going.34 Above all, they attacked their putative adversar-
ies: in 1894, the German Agricultural Council launched the fi rst salvo in what 
would become a fi fteen-year campaign by agricultural interests to impose restric-
tions on, and even eliminate, commercial agencies.35
Public Infl uence in the Labor Market
Finally, the other major eff ort of this decade to “organize” the labor market op-
posed both partisanship and commercialism. Th e municipal labor exchange move-
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ment that took off  in the early 1890s hoped to replace employers’ labor exchanges 
as well as commercial agencies with neutral public offi  ces. Th e immediate inspira-
tion for the surge in founding municipal labor exchanges emerged from a crisis of 
public order. Th e economic downturn that began in 1890, which placed munici-
pal poor-relief budgets under severe strain, made cities amenable to new thinking 
about addressing economic and social challenges. Riots by unemployed Berlin-
ers in February 1892 even had been addressed by the Prussian cabinet, which 
encouraged the local labor offi  ce to try to place the unemployed in agricultural 
jobs.36 Th is Prussian pressure, in turn, may have inspired the head of the Berlin 
offi  ce, Richard Freund, to send copies of its annual report to all of the major 
towns of the country as encouragement to set up their own labor exchanges.37
Th e German Bürgertum and its response to modernization have been the fo-
cus of intense historiographic debates and revisions for at least three decades.38 
While some scholars continue to describe urban citizens as purely defensive and 
backward looking, detailed case studies of nineteenth century German cities have 
built a convincing case for viewing urban citizens as actively, if cautiously, shap-
ing the new conditions.39 A common feature of the cities under study was that 
the local elites and broader middle classes did not simply reject the encroach-
ments brought about by the end of the political ancien régime and by industri-
alization, but rather drew on local traditions to strike their own balance between 
change and stability. In regard to social policy, in particular, there is ample evi-
dence that many German urban middle classes engaged with the challenges of 
industrialization. Th anks to their restricted franchises, German city governments 
were still dominated by the middle and upper classes long after manhood suff rage 
had been introduced in Reichstag elections. Feeling less threatened by the rise 
of the socialists than did their counterparts in the Reichstag, Bürger-dominated 
administrations turned their cities into a “fi eld of experimentation for the emerg-
ing interventionist state.”40 Th e sheer numbers seem to bear this out, however 
crudely. Over the course of the Kaiserreich, cities’ expenditures rose eleven-fold, 
and in the two decades before World War I, their budgets grew considerably 
faster than those of either the states or the national government.41 Numerous 
foreigners came away highly impressed by German cities. British and US social 
reformers such as William Dawson and Frederic Howe sang eff usive praises to 
their administrations and social policies.42 Offi  cial delegations, including ones 
by William Beveridge, Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill in 1907 and 1908, 
often returned home with specifi c new inspirations for municipal reform.43
In the early 1890s, national politics established propitious conditions for 
urban reformers to expand public involvement in the labor market. Th e 1893 
elections to the Reichstag, in which the SPD increased its number of seats from 
35 to 44, seemed to indicate the failure of the Emperor’s New Course to un-
dermine support for the socialists—and hence the need for a new tack. Social 
reformers in Frankfurt am Main took the initiative, thereby sparking a broader, 
national movement to found municipal offi  ces. Th e western German city had 
pioneered municipal reforms since the 1870s.44 In October 1893, the Frankfurt 
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reformers invited leading men of business, labor, communal politics, and social 
science from across Germany to discuss “unemployment and labor exchanges 
in industrial and commercial cities.”45 A unanimous declaration at the end of 
the conference called for setting up labor exchanges by communities, regular 
contact among the exchanges, free service, and equal representation of labor-
ers and employers on a supervisory board—the parity arrangement pioneered 
by Stuttgart in 1865.46 Urban reformers would contribute various impulses to 
the Labor Administration, including their emphasis on the central importance 
of vocation (as we will see in chapter 2). At the conception of the national move-
ment to create public labor offi  ces in 1893, however, other concerns were para-
mount. As the inspiration for the conference—worries about the fi nancial and 
social implications of signifi cant unemployment—and the principle of labor-
capital parity adopted there suggested, maintaining public order and tamping 
down political confl ict were priorities.
Within a year of the Frankfurt conference, Esslingen, Heilbronn, Erfurt, El-
berfeld, and Trier all had implemented the recommendations,47 and within sev-
 eral years, more than fi fty cities had followed suit. By 1912, 44 percent of Ger-
man cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants had their own Arbeitsnachweis.48 
Some were organized on a parity-basis, with workers and employers having an 
equal number of seats on the supervisory boards, while others were run purely 
as public offi  ces. In the same year, the public exchanges accounted for a third of 
all non-commercial job-placements, putting them in fi rst place just ahead of the 
burgeoning employer offi  ces.49 Th e model recommended at the Frankfurt con-
ference and implemented in the following years would become the basis, at the 
municipal level, for the national system of labor and vocational counseling offi  ces 
established after World War I.
Th e municipal offi  cials who established these local exchanges also followed 
another principle advocated at Frankfurt. Th ey began to connect the local ex-
changes to each other in regional and statewide networks, with the aim of facili-
tating workers’ movement between high and low unemployment areas. Networks 
were established in Baden in 1896, in the Rhine-Main area in 1898, for Bavaria 
in 1900, and for Th uringia, East Prussia, and Posen in 1913. Before the outbreak 
of war, nearly all of the regions of Germany were covered by at least regional 
labor exchange networks.50 From 1897 onward, Ignatz Jastrow, an associate pro-
fessor at the University of Berlin and leftist editor of the leading reform journal 
Social Practice, began to compile statistics from the numerous labor exchanges 
in order to obtain the fi rst statistical record of the labor market for the entire 
nation.51 Early in the process of coordination, in 1898, a national association of 
labor exchanges was founded and began publishing its own journal, Th e Labor 
Market.52
Th e regional, and especially the national, labor exchange associations created 
by 1900 brought together academics and municipal reformers.53 Initially, one of 
their main goals was to improve the fl ow of information about labor market con-
ditions. Periodic economic crises, such as the recession just after the turn of the 
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century, in which some regions had very high unemployment while others barely 
suff ered, galvanized the associations toward greater centralization of data.54 Th e 
associations also acted as political lobbies and conduits to authorities in Berlin 
for public labor exchanges. Th e statistical reporting to the Imperial Bureau and 
a small grant from the Reich Interior Ministry established the fi rst offi  cial ties 
in 1903.55 A couple of years later, the Association of German Labor Exchanges 
would play a very vocal and infl uential role in the campaign for a law restricting 
commercial placement agencies. Yet before the war, regional and national asso-
ciations hardly facilitated interregional labor placements.56 Th e daily business of 
matching men and jobs remained a local aff air.
Social Reformers and State Interventions: 
Th e Appeal of “Organization”
Th e seminal Frankfurt conference of 1893 and subsequent grassroots organizing 
revealed connections between municipal social policy and two other important 
contexts: Germany’s vibrant social reform movements and Prussian and national 
government interventions in the economy. Of course, the distinctions between 
the three realms are in many ways artifi cial ones. Frankfurt’s reforms, for example, 
inspired numerous other cities and infl uenced the national debate about the so-
cial question at least as much as did the writings of the “socialists of the lectern.” 
Th e city’s offi  cials, such as the mayors Johannes Miquel and Franz Adickes, and 
administrator Karl Flesch, and philanthropists, preeminently Wilhelm Merton, 
pioneered the local public provision of medical care and housing, as well as the 
institution of industrial courts to bring workers and employers together to adju-
dicate their confl icts. By taking such steps as setting up the Association of Ger man 
Industrial Courts in 1892 and hosting the seminal conference on labor exchanges 
the following year, Frankfurt’s reformers helped to build national structures from 
the bottom up. Merton’s Institute for Public Welfare, its national progeny, and 
his leading reform journal Social Practice shaped the national debate about social 
policy.
Social reformers engaged not only in “anti-politics,” as Kevin Repp has argued; 
many sat in Berlin ministries with their hands on or at least near the levers of 
power. A review of social reform ideas and state policies will help us better under-
stand how the various local responses to the turbulent labor market, and political 
battles over it, were channeled in particular directions and became national policy. 
As a comparison of this section on the theme of “organization” and the follow-
ing chapter’s treatment of the contrasting paradigm of individual improvement 
suggests, scholarship on German social policy has focused on one dichotomy of 
social reform while overlooking another of at least equal importance.
Recent scholarship in these fi elds has revealed not only the vibrancy of think-
ing about social reform in Wilhelmine Germany, but also the power of ideas to 
shape policy. Concerned less with fi nding antecedents to Nazism than earlier 
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gen erations of scholars were, Kevin Repp, Rüdiger vom Bruch, Franz Josef Steg-
mann, Renate Zitt, Gangolf Hübinger, Manfred Hettling, and others have ex-
plored the vast, fl ourishing landscape of reform groups, thinkers, and advocates.57 
Th ese groups varied greatly in scope—from the narrowly focused Garden City 
associations to the Association for Social Policy and Society for Social Reform, 
whose names revealed the breadth of their concerns. In their philosophical prov-
enance as well, they were quite distinct, with Catholic (Worker Welfare, Caritas) 
and Protestant (Inner Mission, Evangelical-Social Congress) groups operating 
alongside, and often competing with, secular-academic ones (the Association for 
Social Policy, the Society for Social Reform). Th e walls separating Germany’s dif-
ferent “milieus,” for example the one between Protestants and Catholics, often 
remained high.58
Nonetheless, the impermeability of the milieus, especially between the bürger-
liche groups, can be exaggerated. Another approach by scholars has discerned 
“camps” defi ned primarily by their common enemies and bringing together sev -
eral milieus.59 Uniting nearly all of the middle-class reformers was the goal of 
staving off  the radical break of a socialist revolution. From the 1890s, when com-
mercial and military rivalries with European powers and the US escalated, poten-
tial foreign enemies joined the domestic ones. Many reformers now began to see 
their task in terms of promoting national fi tness as well.60
Beyond the perception of a common foe, as Kevin Repp has convincingly 
shown, deep-seated assumptions and aspirations often bridged ostensible divides, 
channeling reformers’ thoughts and actions in the same direction.61 Indeed, as 
we suggest in this section and in the following chapter, common ideas—visions 
of desirable and achievable ends and paradigms of the best means—could prove 
to be just as powerful and long-lived as milieus or enemies in forging working 
coalitions. Like gravity, the force of ideas was not always perceptible over short 
distances or times, but formative in the long term.
Perhaps the most infl uential of the ideas relevant to solving Germany’s social 
problem around the turn of the century was that of “organization.” A sense of in-
evitability pervaded this line of thinking. Surveying the “new German economy” 
of mammoth businesses and bureaucracies, the infl uential left liberal reformer 
Friedrich Naumann, who hoped to preserve “individuality,” nonetheless descried 
(and even welcomed) the coming trend.
All relations are pervaded by the thought of organization, that is, the regulation of the 
masses. It will be a man’s pride to belong to great associations, societies, unions, syndicates, 
to serve in great enterprises, to be drawn into extended ties. Often this pride is mixed with 
a painful look back to past times, when the individual by himself meant something. But 
what’s the use?62
If organization would dominate, as Naumann and many others were certain, 
the most important remaining question was what exactly this entailed. A com-
mon distinction since the 1860s in regard to the social question was that between 
“state-help” and “self-help,” i.e., worker cooperatives and unions. Th e premier 
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social reform group, the Association for Social Policy, was divided precisely along 
these lines, with the dominant wing under Gustav Schmoller and Adolf Wagner 
favoring some kind of “state socialism” and a minority around Lujo Brentano 
advocating worker associations. Naumann himself suggested a symbiosis of the 
principles of “monarchy” and “democracy.”63 Beyond the common sense of in-
evitability of organization, each of its two variants tapped into powerful faiths of 
the time: science and democracy, respectively.
Th e technocratic fascination with centralized knowledge and control in the 
decades around 1900 had many roots and could be found in all advanced coun-
tries.64 Germany’s deep Cameralist tradition predisposed its academics, bureau-
crats, and reformers to be especially fond of informed administrative control.65 
For the generation that came of age after 1870, in particular, recent discoveries 
and trends exalted their confi dence in centralized knowledge.66 Th e development 
of correlational methods in statistics promised to illuminate previously unsus-
pected causal connections. Th e dramatic growth in these years of statistical sur-
veys as a research method attested to the hunger for more, and more reliable, 
information about all manner of social conditions.67 In addition to economics 
and statistics, fi elds focusing more directly on human nature and behavior, above 
all physiology, anthropology, and psychology, fl ourished as well.68 Th e explana-
tions of social problems off ered by these sciences shifted responsibility for parlous 
conditions from the individual’s failure or God’s plan to causes that often were 
amenable to relief. Education, living conditions, and hygiene might be improved; 
even cases with ostensibly hereditary origins might be dealt with more eff ectively. 
In each of these areas, discoveries of apparent causal regularities inspired growing 
confi dence—and often overconfi dence—in how much further research might 
uncover. Especially for the Protestant educated middle class (Bildungsbürgertum), 
among whom traditional religiosity was eroding, science was becoming an ersatz 
faith.69
Th ese advances were but one part of the march of science in the late nine-
teenth century. Scientifi c truths, it seemed, were building toward a single, unifi ed 
picture of the world; in time, nothing would be left unaccounted.70 Seeking a 
total grasp of reality had become plausible, and, indeed, obligatory.
Real triumphs of centralized organization both reinforced this “cult of sci-
ence”71 and manifested its practical utility. Th e young German Reich had been 
busy since 1871 asserting sovereign control: unifying laws, institutions, and bu-
reaucracies. In the economic sphere, as Alfred Chandler has argued in the case 
of the US, the creation and operation of the massive infrastructure of a national 
railroad system required coordination on an unprecedented scale, with ramifi ca-
tions in numerous other spheres.72 Th ese organizational triumphs by railways 
and business corporations inspired a widespread confi dence in planning per se.73 
Refl ecting the intense interest in centralizing knowledge and control, the US 
engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor’s paeans to “scientifi c management” were 
translated quickly into German and published in multiple editions in the years 
before World War I.74 If Germany continued to import theories of centralized 
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“organization,” it was already exporting practical applications. A young Winston 
Churchill returned highly impressed from a visit there in 1908 and recommended 
that the Liberal Party subscribe to Germany’s principles of “social organization” 
and “network of State intervention and regulation.”75
Enlightened central control found eager advocates throughout the German 
social reform world. Within city governments, experts increasingly displaced lo-
cal notables from the 1890s, which was part of the broader transformation and 
intensifi cation of German politics referred to earlier.76 In Frankfurt am Main, for 
example, the Institute for Public Welfare, founded in 1890 by the industrialist 
Wilhelm Merton, provided a platform for myriad social science inspired reform 
endeavors.77 Many of these had an impact far beyond the western German city. 
For example, the Institute’s journal Social Practice became one of the leading fo-
rums of the national reform debate after its founding in 1897.
Nonetheless, it was among the academics and other Bildungsbürger leading 
the national reform groups that the enthusiasm for expert knowledge and cen-
tralization was most palpable.78 Th e strongest faction among the “socialists of the 
lectern,” that faction who in 1872 founded the Association for Social Policy, be-
lieved their investigations would contribute to a “rationally steered” and just so-
lution of the social question.79 According to Schmoller, only the leadership of the 
“monarchy and civil service … these most appropriate representatives of the idea 
of the state, the only neutral elements in the social class war,” operating under 
the rule of law and in combination with the “best elements of parliamentarism,” 
could hope to solve the social question.80 From the 1890s onward, as the po-
litical confl icts over economic and welfare policy mounted, the drift of thought 
within the Association and many other reform organizations moved steadily in 
the direction of public, “neutral” control. In the years just before the war, senior 
members of the Association were pushing to have private entrepreneurs replaced 
by public offi  cials.81
Alongside centralized control, advocates of working class “self-help,” such as 
Lujo Brentano, embodied the other major strand of organizational thinking. Like 
its state-centered counterpart, the idea of collective self-help had many roots. Th e 
German Bürgertum’s own history and values provided important supports. Each 
of the two major confessions esteemed community for its own reasons. For Prot-
estantism, the communal ideal was ultimately rooted in the Reformation prin-
ciple of a “priesthood of all believers.”82 Since the Enlightenment and the growth 
of liberal Protestantism (Kulturprotestantismus), the association and cooperation 
of free individuals for common purposes, as manifested in the explosive growth 
of associations (Vereine) during the nineteenth century, became one of the pillars 
of Protestant identity.83 In social policy, the Protestant emphasis on self-guided 
cooperation could be found at the center of the thinking of both the moderate, 
infl uential government offi  cial and leading fi gure of the Inner Mission Th eodor 
Lohmann and the more charismatic “reform entrepreneur” Friedrich Naumann. 
Both men thought that “democratizing” factories and the economy generally was 
necessary to bring social peace.84
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Among Catholics, similar ideas about collective self-help were gaining ground, 
as part of a broader reorientation of thought. Catholic social doctrine had long 
revolved around the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity,85 but, in the late 
nineteenth century, thinking about community emphasized new, smaller units. 
Under the infl uence of neighboring Belgian and French liberal Catholic thought 
and the dramatic industrialization of the last third of the century, leading Rhine-
land Catholics such as Georg von Hertling and Franz Hitze repudiated the con-
servative emphasis on the sole importance of good morals and the restoration of 
an entirely corporatist social order. Instead, they accepted a capitalist, industrial 
society and worked out the details of a moderate welfare state. Groups such as 
Worker Welfare, founded by Catholic employers in 1880, and the Popular As-
sociation for Catholic Germany, founded as a mass organization a decade later, 
agitated for various measures to allow workers to improve their own lot in a 
capitalist order. Interest focused on English-inspired associational plans. Th e pro-
gressive Catholics embraced Schulze-Delitzsch’s call to allow craftsmen to pool 
resources in the face of competition from industry, as well as Ferdinand Lassalle’s 
call to help make even industrial workers property owners, in part through profi t 
sharing and giving them a say in running their fi rms. Especially after the end of 
the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf, as the Catholic Center Party became the most 
important “governmental” party, the attitudes of the Catholic reformers to the 
state’s role in these welfare measures softened.86
For the urban Bürgertum, in particular, it was undoubtedly the vivid, recur-
ring experience of governing their own urban aff airs that made the paradigm 
of collective self-help so attractive. Especially in the half century after 1815, as 
many cities struggled to maintain their prerogatives in the face of increasingly 
assertive central states, urban Bürger conceived of their own form of constitu-
tionalism as an attractive model for the larger polity; in their eyes, maintaining 
local self-governance may have ranked above even economic liberalization and 
parliamentarization.87
Workers’ own past and present also could suggest the feasibility and attrac-
tiveness of self-governance or self-help.88 Memories of the recently disbanded 
guilds were still fresh. In the present, trade unions, especially the moderate ones 
in Britain to which Brentano looked with great admiration,89 provided one con-
temporary template for stability-enhancing worker organization and self-help. 
A slightly diff erent one followed from the movements, led by Schulze-Delitzsch 
and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiff eisen, to establish consumer, producer, and fi nancial 
cooperatives among people threatened by the competition of big business, such 
as farmers, craftsmen, and industrial workers.
By 1900, a powerful caucus within the bürgerliche social reform movement had 
come to see securing labor union rights as the key to solving the country’s most 
serious domestic problem. Over the previous decade it had become clear that 
other forms of social policy, including Bismarck’s insurance programs and work-
place regulations, were not slowing the growth of the SPD or socialist unions. 
Many middle-class reformers’ own sympathies for collective self-governance and 
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self-help made them amenable to, and even enthusiastic about, the unions’ de-
mands for full recognition. Conversely, the internal socialist debate about Eduard 
Bernstein’s “revisionism” seemed to hold out the prospect of rapprochement be-
tween moderate socialists and bürgerliche social reformers.
Although the SPD disappointingly rejected proposals to cooperate, in 1900, 
politicians from the Center, National Liberal, and Left Liberal parties, and prom-
inent academics from the Association for Social Policy launched a major new 
initiative of social reform. Given its prominent leadership, including the former 
reformist Prussian Minister of Trade Berlepsch, and its support from a wide array 
of groups, the Society for Social Reform quickly became the most infl uential re-
form group in the country.90 Refl ecting the degree to which support for economic 
democracy had penetrated, as Werner Sombart put it, “ever further into circles 
of the bourgeoisie,”91 this catholic group made union rights the centerpiece of 
its demands. Th e hopes reformers attached to unions were two-fold. On the one 
hand, the democratic practices and procedures within the unions, for example, in 
deciding whether to strike, would inculcate these habits within the proletariat.92 
On the other, the collective power of the unions would allow them to counteract 
the concentrated power of the employers, which had made a “fi ction” out of the 
free labor contract.93
Th e single most prominent fi gure among the reformers after 1900, Friedrich 
Naumann, also made democratic organization of the economy the lynchpin of 
his program. A student of Brentano’s during the 1880s and an observer of Frank-
furt am Main’s social policies during his time there in the 1890s as pastor in 
the Inner Mission, Naumann worked tirelessly—launching a new political as-
sociation, editing a journal, writing books and articles, and fi nally reuniting the 
fi ssiparous Left Liberals—to create a reform coalition from the National Liberal 
Bassermann to the Socialist Bebel. According to Naumann, economic democ-
racy would operate through multiple channels, including strong unions able to 
stand up to employers, but also factory parliaments representing management 
and workers.94 In addition to the intrinsic appeal of these democratic elements, 
the pastor Naumann, more than any other reformer, was moved by a prophetic 
sense of the inevitability of “organization” permeating all parts of society.
Contemporary scholars, adopting the terms of the debate between Lassalle 
and Schulze-Delitzsch in the 1860s, often have focused on the dichotomy be-
tween the two answers to the social problem that we have just surveyed: Staats-
hilfe vs. Selbsthilfe, the state or strong unions and economic democracy.95 And 
certainly, the divide was important, one we will encounter later in the struggles 
over state or corporatist control of the labor offi  ces and administration. However, 
the attention paid to the tensions between Staatshilfe and one particular form 
of Selbsthilfe—collective self-help—has obscured the central element they shared: 
a common commitment to “organization,” i.e., collective, political decision-
making of one kind or another. Th is commonality helps explain the widespread 
support for public organization of the labor market after 1900, which is a central 
theme of this book. It could also manifest itself in the thinking of somebody such 
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as Naumann, for whom both technocracy and democracy held magnetic appeal.96 
Th e conceptual reduction of Selbsthilfe to collective self-help explains the fact that 
the scholarly literature has overlooked the commonalities between the two vari-
ants of organization and instead emphasized only the diff erences.
Social reformers infl uenced public policy both directly and indirectly. Th eir ties 
to government offi  cials and parliamentarians were often personal or even ones of 
identity, blurring the boundaries between the groups. In the early 1890s, the “so-
cialists of the lectern” Schmoller and Wagner counseled Th eodor Lohmann, who 
wielded enormous infl uence from the second-tier of the Prussian Trade Ministry, 
as he crafted the worker protection legislation. Both men used their seats in the 
Prussian Upper Chamber, contacts to numerous members of the Lower House 
and Reichstag, and (at least in Schmoller’s case) close acquaintance with Reich-
Chancellor Bülow to infl uence legislation in the 1900s.97 Th e Trade Ministry 
offi  cial Lohmann himself bridged the milieus, as both infl uential civil servant 
and leading fi gure in the Protestant Inner Mission.98 Berlepsch no longer may 
have been Prussian Trade Minister when he helped found the Society for Social 
Reform in 1900, but his presence helped attract parliamentarians from the Cen-
ter, National Liberal, and Left Liberal Parties and opened numerous doors for the 
group in Berlin. For example, dynamic offi  cials from the Trade Ministry, whose 
eff orts on behalf of an individual-centered reform strategy we will encounter in 
the next chapter, contributed to the Society’s publications.99 Th e semi-offi  cial 
Prussian Central Bureau for Popular Welfare (before 1906, the Central Bureau for 
Organizations for Worker Welfare) provided a forum for nearly all major reform 
groups to interact with government offi  cials, in some cases off ering the latter the 
chance to test out their proposals for new legislation.100 At the level of vibrant 
municipal reform, a fi gure such as Karl Flesch not only shaped Frankfurt’s social 
policy, but also initiated or joined coordinating and advocacy groups, such as the 
Association of German Industrial Courts101 and Association of German Labor 
Exchanges,102 and contributed to such leading reform journals as Social Practice.
Th e indirect impact of the social reformers, the gravitational pull of their ideas, 
could be even greater. Th e highest Reich authorities often cited their arguments 
when they proposed new legislation. Less obvious were the profound ways in 
which the reformers set the agenda and the terms of debate in social policy, among 
the general public and within the government. Th e “socialists of the chair,” in 
particular, dominated the public sphere through their publications, prominence, 
and near-monopoly of university economics departments. Th anks, in no small 
part, to them many liberals abandoned their faith in “laissez faire.”103 Holding 
nearly all economics chairs from the 1890s onward, they also shaped the views of 
a generation of offi  cials who passed through their seminars. Th rough these and 
other channels—“specialized seminars, model institutions, statistical archives, 
petition drives and protests”—the reformers provided government authorities at 
all levels with common models of thought and action.104 Above all, these close 
interactions of experts and offi  cials encouraged the latter to view social problems 
as amenable to solutions based on detailed knowledge and “organization.”
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Th e state economic and welfare policy initiated and carried out by those gov-
ernment offi  cials was the other crucial background piece for the development of 
national policy on the labor market. Here, too, recent scholarship has demon-
strated the importance of ideas. Older studies, which treated Prussian and Reich 
governments largely as the puppets of economic interests, in particular heavy 
industry and agriculture, have made way for a new emphasis on the fragility of 
economic coalitions and the independent interests of the state and its functionar-
ies.105 Th ese interests centered on developing Germany as a powerful, and hence 
ultimately industrial, nation, while maintaining social stability. If the ministries 
in Berlin could agree broadly on these goals, however, there was still considerable 
disagreement about the balance between growth and stability, what they entailed 
more concretely, and the means to achieve them. As a number of recent studies 
of particular aspects of the German welfare state have shown, the German state 
was itself hardly a monolithic entity. Diff erent ideas about the paths to national 
strength and well being competed to shape policy.106
Predominant ideas regarding the “social question” infl uenced government 
policy in discrete stages, each one resulting from the apparent failure of its prede-
cessor to achieve success. In the 1880s, Bismarck introduced pioneering insurance 
programs against the risks of illness, accident, and invalidity or old age in order 
to attach the growing working class to the state. Th e massive Ruhr miners’ strike 
in 1889 and SPD successes in the Reichstag elections the following year led not 
only to Bismarck’s dismissal and the end of the Anti-Socialist law, but also to a 
“new course” in social policy under Wilhelm II and his Prussian Trade Minister 
von Berlepsch.
During this veritable springtime of hope among social reformers,107 the Reich 
government superceded the Bismarckian paradigm of social policy in a couple of 
directions, one in the spirit of Staatshilfe and the other of collective Selbsthilfe. 
First and foremost, the state initiated or deepened its involvement in worker 
protection: the budget for factory inspections was signifi cantly increased; labor 
protection laws prescribed working hours and conditions for women and chil-
dren, if not for men; factories had to publicize their internal work rules, which 
had to be approved by the local police; and, the basis was laid for a national labor 
census.108 Second, the government sanctioned, if only very cautiously, elements 
of economic democracy: cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants gained the 
right to set up “industrial courts,” with an equal number of worker and employer 
representatives and under a “neutral,” usually public, chairman, to adjudicate 
disputes.109 Also, for the fi rst time, a revised industrial code gave a public role and 
sanction to the “worker committees” that already had existed in some fi rms to 
help run company welfare programs and also set up new committees in publicly 
owned works.110
Again, it was the apparent failure of one set of policies to “solve” the core of 
the social problem, as refl ected in the growing strength of the socialist movement, 
which opened the door to a new approach. Worker unrest in the early 1890s and, 
especially, the SPD’s electoral successes in the 1893 elections, brought the New 
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Course to an abrupt end. Contrary to otherwise exemplary accounts,111 however, 
this did not spell the end of all positive measures of social policy. In fact, it was 
precisely in these years that the Prussian and Reich governments began to involve 
themselves in a new fi eld of social policy, labor exchanges and job placement.
Toward Public “Predominance”: Th e 1910 Law on Job-Placement
Th e Reich Law on Job-Placement of 1910 marked a turning point on the road 
to the Labor Administration. Even before the transforming experience of World 
War I, the German state committed itself to helping the public exchanges even-
tually “achieve predominance” in the entire labor market. Th e origins of the 
Job-Placement law reveal the interests and ideas pressing toward “organization.” 
Among those ideas, both Staatshilfe and collective Selbsthilfe played galvanizing 
roles, channeling reform in a particular direction once early, tentative measures 
proved disappointing.
Th e apparent failure of the New Course to stem the growth of the SPD set the 
stage not only for the seminal grassroots initiative at Frankfurt, but also for na-
tional eff orts to infl uence labor markets. It was another political problem, how-
ever, the accelerating fl ight from the land—the rush of agricultural workers to 
the booming cities—which fi rst triggered expanding public oversight of the labor 
market. Th ese early eff orts extended worker protection and the protecting hand 
of the state, beyond the workplace, out into the labor market.
Already in 1892, the central authorities had responded to large-scale unem-
ployment and urban unrest, especially among recent immigrants from the coun-
tryside, by advocating a greater role for local labor exchanges. It was only the 
sustained campaign, beginning in 1894, by agricultural interest groups against 
commercial job-placement agencies that prompted some state governments and 
the Reich to action, if at fi rst only cautiously.112 Th e Prussian Trade and Interior 
Ministries in 1894 encouraged towns to establish such offi  ces, but refrained from 
material support.113 Some states, such as Wurttemberg, took it upon themselves, 
once municipal exchanges had been set up locally, to unify them into a broader 
association, thereby obviating local initiative and control of the broader network. 
Th e Reich Interior Ministry’s request for information from the states on abuses 
by the commercial agents and on any regulations the governments had imposed 
revealed a variety of limited restrictions—for example, that the agencies had to 
maintain records of their placements—but no great sense of urgency about re-
form.114 Nonetheless, in some quarters in Berlin there was a hunger for bolder 
action. Johannes Miquel, who as mayor of Frankfurt in the 1880s had been a lib-
eral reformer, but since becoming Prussian Finance Minister in 1890 had moved 
to the right, expressed his support for an “advancing organization of labor” to be 
headed by “a member of the authorities.”115
By the end of the decade, intense battles over the renewal of the liberal Caprivi 
tariff s had further mobilized agricultural interests and created a political climate 
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more conducive to their concerns. Agriculture’s persistent drumbeat of criticism 
of the placement agents now led to greater public supervision of the labor mar-
ket. A petition by the Rhenish-Prussian agricultural association to the Bundesrat 
in 1897 demanded the introduction of mandatory licenses for commercial place-
ment agencies.116 Th e following year, a majority of the Reichstag endorsed the 
association’s demand,117 Prussian authorities encouraged local offi  cials to crack 
down on unsavory agents, and they announced that a new law was in the works.118 
At this time, the government still rejected demands for a so-called “necessity re-
quirement,” which would have made a license for a placement agency dependent 
on there being no extant public labor offi  ce. As the Prussian cabinet concluded, 
such a step would “create a bone of contention between industry and agriculture 
and would give the authorities improper infl uence upon the competition of the 
workers.”119 At this stage, the authorities in Berlin were still resisting the calls 
by interest groups and political parties to assume a greater responsibility for the 
labor market.
By 1899, however, after the failure in the Reichstag of a repressive bill directed 
at the SPD, Reich Interior Minister Posadowsky had abandoned his laissez faire 
commitments and inaugurated his own New Course, albeit with less fanfare than 
the one begun nearly a decade earlier.120 Posadowsky’s new thinking and policies 
demonstrated the possibility of a surprisingly easy symbiosis between Staatshilfe 
and collective Selbsthilfe. Still viscerally opposed to international socialism, Posa-
dowsky nonetheless insisted that “if one wants to pursue social political goals, 
the strong hand of the state must be present, in order to carry out the laws and 
thereby to maintain order and calm in the land.”121 Between 1900 and 1906, he 
expanded the state’s role in worker protection, funding workers’ housing, in-
troducing a merchant marine code, and extending child labor laws to cottage 
industry.122 On the other hand, with the help of the Center Party in particular, 
the Interior Minister promoted policies of worker self-help by, in 1901, making 
industrial courts mandatory in cities with more than 20,000 residents, intro-
ducing legislation to liberalize the laws governing unions, and proposing parity-
based chambers of labor.123
Th e revised Commercial Code passed by the Reichstag in 1900 contained the 
fi rst national regulations regarding job-placement. Th ese compelled private agen-
cies to obtain licenses, as agricultural interests had been demanding, and allowed 
the states to impose further regulations, such as those promulgated in Prussia in 
the following year. Th ese regulations obliged the commercial agents to keep re-
cords of all of their transactions, limited them to working out of clearly marked 
offi  ces, and forbad them from soliciting workers to change jobs.124
Within a few years, however, the 1900 regulations were widely deemed to be 
inadequate. Unabating complaints by agriculture, an energetic campaign against 
the agents by the public labor offi  ce movement, and, above all, the intensifying 
battle between employers and unions for control of the workforce overturned the 
government’s previous reticence about further interventions in the labor market. 
In the face of continuing urban disorder and of the now multifaceted political 
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struggle for infl uence over the workforce, some form of public administration of 
the labor market became Berlin’s long-term goal.
Licensing and the state regulations permitted by the 1900 legislation, critics 
of the private placement agencies argued, soon proved inadequate to the task. 
Th e number of agencies continued to grow, jumping 16 percent between the 
years 1895 and 1907.125 Th ey found creative ways to circumvent regulations, for 
example, by collecting the notices in newspapers of job openings and selling such 
lists. Furthermore, the variation in state regulations was said to impede improve-
ment.126 As the economy kept growing at a dizzying pace, migrants continued to 
stream from farms into factories. Th e Prussian government now even considered 
such drastic legal barriers to the fl ight from the land as laws hampering contract 
breaking127 and banning the placement of rural workers in city jobs.128
Th e public labor offi  ce movement, which had established a national umbrella 
organization and media forum in 1897–98, signifi cantly expanded its organiza-
tional work and attacks on private placement agencies after the turn of the cen-
tury.129 Th e recession of 1900–1902, which, though quantitatively mild, spread 
waves of anxiety throughout a country that had begun to expect uninterrupted 
growth, was a catalyst.130 For the fi rst time, Reich and Prussian authorities ex-
tended offi  cial aid. Th e Reich Statistical Offi  ce began to collect monthly reports 
from local labor offi  ces, and the Interior Ministry now contributed a stipend to 
support the Association’s hiring of an employee in order to get more local of-
fi ces on their feet and to coordinate between all of them.131 A perceived crisis of 
domestic stability had for the fi rst time given the state a role in the Association 
of German Labor Offi  ces.
In 1905, the Association launched “a major off ensive” against the commercial 
agencies.132 At its annual conference, participants bemoaned the inadequacies of 
the existing regulations and the main speaker, Franz Ludwig of Lübeck, presented 
a scathing 150-page booklet on Th e Commercial Labor Exchange.133 Ludwig de-
tailed the putative failings of the agencies: the du bious backgrounds and personal 
qualities of many agents, the exorbitant fees they charged, the false promises they 
made, and, above all, the unnecessary job changes they promoted. He and the 
others also pointed to labor market reforms in other countries. In some American 
states, in Hungary and, just the year before, in France, authorities had banned 
commercial agencies. Th ese arguments no doubt impressed German offi  cials and 
social reformers who (like their counterparts in other European countries) were 
keenly interested in learning from—and surpassing—the reforms of their neigh-
bors and rivals.134 Ludwig called for an outright ban on commercial agencies, 
or at least a tightening of the licensing requirements so that they would only be 
permitted if no adequate public offi  ce already existed. As the Frankfurter Zeitung 
noted, in the long run this would amount practically to the same thing as a ban. 
Th e campaign launched at the 1905 conference garnered widespread and gener-
ally quite positive attention from the media.135 Its criticisms of the for-profi t 
agencies and advocacy of a “necessity requirement” would be cited frequently in 
the eff orts that led to the 1910 law on job-placement.
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Another development after the turn of the century played an even more im-
portant role in creating a conducive atmosphere for such a law. After the SPD’s 
resounding success in the 1903 Reichstag election and the resumption of rapid 
economic growth the same year, confl ict between labor and industry became 
even more massive than before. Th e number of workers organized in unions had 
risen already from 256,000 in 1895 to 888,000 in 1903, and the average number 
of strikes per year had more than quadrupled from 104 between 1894 and 1898 
to 476 between 1899 and 1903.136 Inspired by the Russian revolution in 1905, 
radicals within the SPD propagated the idea of the general strike as a weapon 
of revolution. Particular labor confl icts, such as the month long strike of tex-
tile workers in Crimmitschau in 1903 and the Ruhr coal miners’ strike of 1905 
involving a quarter of a million workers, brought about a change in industry’s 
policy. Alarmed by the obvious strength of labor, and by the public’s support and 
the government’s tolerance of their opponents, employers more actively began 
organizing themselves. In 1904, heavy industry and manufacturing set up the 
Headquarters of German Employers’ Associations and the Association of Ger-
man Employers’ Associations, respectively, to better coordinate their interests. 
One of their main activities was to promote employer-run placement agencies, 
which between 1904 and 1912 increased their share of non-private placements 
by more than 50 percent, going from just over one-fi fth to more than one-third. 
Employers’ and unions’ placement offi  ces now sought to exclude the other side 
from control of the workforce. Even more than in the 1890s, infl uence over job 
placements became, after 1903/5, the object of intense partisan dispute.
Both sides’ fears of losing out drove them into the arms of a “neutral” public 
solution. As already mentioned, since about 1900 the socialist unions consistently 
had been calling for centralized public control of the labor offi  ces. At least some 
employers also perceived the benefi ts of public control. In the face of mounting 
worker turnover, the electrical giant Siemens, for instance, called in 1906 for a 
state-run “distribution of workers.”137
Simultaneously, however, the other strand of “organization,” collective self-
help, was also being swept forward by strong political tailwinds. As we saw above, 
a broad and infl uential coalition of social reformers, gathered most prominently 
in the Society for Social Reform, had come by the turn of the century to see 
“economic democracy” as the key to assuaging working class discontent. Among 
the non-socialist parties, the Left Liberals had repeatedly demanded the legal 
clarifi cation of the status of unions.138 Th e government’s most reliable support-
ers in the Reichstag on domestic policy, the Center Party, also strongly backed 
workers’ committees and non-socialist unions.139 Posadowsky, too, wanted to 
complement extended worker protection with steps toward more “economic de-
mocracy.” Th us, when, in 1904, the Center social policy expert and Reichstag 
representative Karl Trimborn offi  cially asked about the government’s plans in 
regard to the legal status of unions and to the creation of “chambers of labor,” in 
which workers and bosses could negotiate their diff erences, including control of 
labor offi  ces, the Interior Minister enthusiastically seized the initiative.140
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By the middle of the fi rst decade of the century, then, signifi cant pressure had 
built up to “organize” the labor market. Booming industrial cities continued to 
draw farmhands in from increasingly depopulated rural areas. On top of the long-
simmering tensions between industry and agriculture in regard to the limited 
supply of workers, the mutually exclusive claims of industry and the unions to a 
predominant infl uence over the workforce now added a further, potentially even 
more troublesome, dimension to the confl ict. Conversely, a newly assertive pub-
lic labor offi  ce movement expressly defi ned itself as being above the partisan fray. 
Th e overall political environment was also quite favorable to legal intervention. 
After the lull of the late 1890s, both Staatshilfe and collective Selbsthilfe seemed 
to be in the ascendant again. Th ough Chancellor Bülow, after 1906, would turn 
his back on the Catholic Center Party, which had been a reliable backer of social 
policy, the new Reich Interior Minister, Th eobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, also 
advocated a judicious use of Sozialpolitik as part of a cautious modernization 
strategy.141 In this Bethmann-Hollweg had an invaluable ally in the Chancellor 
himself. In the Reichstag and the German public, a veritable “social policy bloc”—
stretching from the Left Liberals to the Center and the SPD—supported public 
interventions as the best or only means to alleviate the ills of modern society. On 
the particular issue of curtailing private job placement agencies and bolstering 
public ones, even the Conservatives, increasingly the mouthpiece of rural in-
terests, were among the strongest advocates of state intervention. Revealing just 
how deeply support for public “organization” of economic life had penetrated 
the middle classes, National Liberals, too, favored the expansion of public labor 
offi  ces.142
Under these auspicious conditions, the Reich Interior Ministry began the 
push to establish public predominance over the labor market, at this point still in 
connection with legislation on chambers of labor. It recommended “using legal 
measures to work toward the displacement of commercial by public labor offi  ces, 
if at all possible.”143 Specifi cally, the Interior Minister rejected—“at least for the 
time being”—an outright ban on the private agencies, in part because this would 
mean, as it had in France, paying exorbitant compensation. Instead, he took up 
a proposal that had been broached by the Association of German Labor Offi  ces, 
but ultimately rejected in the negotiations leading up to the 1900 regulations. 
In 1906, the Berlin police director revived the idea that would become the cen-
tral mechanism by which public authorities would try to smother commercial 
agencies: introducing a “necessity test.” Commercial placement agencies would 
receive operating licenses only if a public offi  ce was nonexistent or somehow de-
fi cient. Th e goal of the measure was plain. As the Berlin police director had put 
it, the necessity test, in conjunction with “robust police and fi nancial support” 
of the best public labor offi  ces, should lead to the “eventual extinction” of the 
commercial agencies.144
In addition to maximum fees and the necessity test, the Interior Ministry in 
June 1907 suggested expanding the state’s role into a new realm. Th e law under 
consideration not only aimed to stifl e private job-placement agencies, but would 
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also allow states to regulate non-commercial offi  ces—above all, employer and 
union bureaus, as well as the various forms of “public interest” offi  ces.145 Th is as-
piration to expand state infl uence to all job-placement activities represented a 
signifi cant and telling turnaround from just a few years before. In 1903, a Berlin 
court had ruled against an employers’ placement offi  ce for operating without a 
license, thus extending the 1900 regulations for the fi rst time to non-commercial 
exchanges.146 At the time, the Reich Justice Ministry, state governments, and the 
parties in the Reichstag all had criticized roundly the judicial ruling as exceed-
ing the original intent of the 1900 regulations.147 Just four years later, after the 
worst labor strife in recent memory, the Reich government itself pushed for such 
an extension of political oversight. Public authorities now claimed an interest in 
maintaining order not only between industry and agriculture, but also between 
labor and business.
In the negotiations that followed and that led to the 1910 law on job place-
ment, the Interior Ministry eventually found “the basic agreement of nearly all 
state governments.”148 Doubts about the current quality of the public offi  ces found 
expression in a revised necessity clause: only if “suffi  cient” public offi  ces existed 
in a locality could the private agency be turned down for a license.149 Another 
modifi cation to the same clause specifi ed explicitly the public nature of the pre-
ferred offi  ces; rather than identifying these more generally as “offi  ces serving the 
general welfare”—which included philanthropic agencies—the law’s language 
now talked more narrowly of “public offi  ces serving the general welfare.”150
As these negotiations went on, a fl ood of condemnations of the private agen-
cies poured in from the public and press, drowning out the isolated supportive 
voices and the commercial agents themselves.151 Th e critical materials gathered 
for the Association of Labor Offi  ces by Franz Ludwig in his 1906 booklet Th e 
Commercial Labor Exchange continued to provide ammunition against the private 
agencies, even meriting a citation by the Interior Minister, when he presented the 
bill to the Reichstag and subsequent references to it in the ensuing parliamentary 
discussion.152 Th e infl uential Society for Social Reform called for a blanket ban on 
new licenses for commercial agencies so they would be “placed on a natural path 
to extinction.”153 A commentator in Social Practice drew attention to the more 
recent, complementary justifi cation for the bill: its role in dampening confl ict 
between employers and unions and thereby ensuring domestic political stability. 
Along with labor courts and arbitration offi  ces, he wrote, job placement was one 
of the two most important problems arising from the labor contract, “this funda-
ment of our national economy, our law, and therefore of our entire public life.” 
As a monopoly in this matter would confer tremendous power, job placement 
was “a problem of social welfare, demanding public and state interest.”154
In contrast to the deluge of vociferous denunciations of the commercial ex-
changes, critics of the proposed law stood out for their rarity and timidity. Th e 
fact that almost no one made a principled defense of the free market or ques-
tioned the advantages of “organization” suggested just how widespread support 
for the latter idea had become.
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By this point, the job placement bill had become disconnected from the more 
comprehensive chambers of labor legislation, the legislation for which had become 
deadlocked. Th is did nothing, though, to hold up passage of the job placement 
law.
When Interior Minister Delbrück presented the law to the Reichstag on 15 
February 1910, he wove together the various conditions and motivations into a 
single justifi cation of the bill.
Freedom of movement, railroad travel, the international connections of some businesses 
with their shifting seasonal demands … the attraction of the large cities, the rising demand 
for workers in industry, the lack of workers in agriculture, the increasing employment 
of foreign workers in agriculture.… the development of employee- and employer labor 
exchanges, which have gradually become weapons in the labor market: all of this presses 
toward a comprehensive organization of job placement and labor exchanges on the basis of 
public law and under the direction and supervision of the state.155
Th e government’s proposal squeezed commercial placement agencies from 
several sides. It forbade them simultaneously to operate related businesses, such 
as off ering accommodations to job-seekers, as they tended to do. It allowed states 
to set the fees they could charge, and more broadly to “regulate and supervise the 
agencies beyond these general stipulations.” Most importantly, the government’s 
bill required that commercial agencies obtain a license, which would only be 
given to “unsullied, reliable people.”
Beyond these particulars for cleaning up an ostensibly dirty business, the pro-
posed law delineated the steps toward a radically diff erent labor market of the fu-
ture. Commercial agencies would be able to obtain a license only when there was 
a need for such a placement agency. According to this “necessity clause,” the very 
existence of an “adequate” public offi  ce obviated the need of a commercial place-
ment agency. Th e Interior Minister expressed the government’s expectation that 
the law, and especially its necessity clause, “should lead in the course of events 
to private job placement becoming increasingly rare and in its place public job 
placement dedicated to furthering the general welfare becoming ever stronger 
and eventually achieving predominance.”156 Th e law targeted not only commer-
cial agencies, but also potentially all partisan, non-public offi  ces. Th e bill’s “most 
important provision,” according to Delbrück, allowed states to decide whether 
and to what extent the regulations also applied to union and employer labor 
exchanges, among others. If Delbrück spoke openly only about the public offi  ces 
one day achieving predominance over commercial agencies, the Reich Interior 
Minister also implied that a farther-reaching monopoly over all job placements 
was conceivable.
Th e government’s bill met with nearly universal enthusiasm, and, indeed, with 
calls for even bolder action, in the Reichstag. Only the small Polish party and the 
Radical People’s Party, whose free market roots had weakened but not completely 
withered since Eugen Richter’s death in 1906, expressed reservations about the 
bill’s apparent intent to eliminate commercial agencies, while still acknowledg-
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ing the need to combat abuses.157 Th e SPD, on the other hand, demanded the 
outright elimination of the commercial agents (as well as employer offi  ces), rather 
than the gradual suff ocation implied by the bill.158 All of the other parties, includ-
ing the Center, the Conservative parties, the National Liberals, and the Radical 
Coalition, embraced the government’s proposal with enthusiasm, while pressing 
for even tougher action. In committee, these parties “very considerably” stiff ened 
some of the bill’s provisions. More openly than the Interior Minister had, these 
parties embraced the prospect of eliminating all partisan labor exchanges and giv-
ing the public labor offi  ces a monopoly. Along with these measures to suppress 
commercial and partisan labor offi  ces, all of the parties (with the exception of the 
Poles) called for signifi cantly expanding Reich and state aid to the public ones.
In the end, all of the Reichstag parties voted for the bill—a most rare and 
remarkable instance of consensus in Imperial Germany and testimony to the by 
now nearly universal appeal of “organization” as a solution to social problems.159 
Not only the “social bloc” parties of Catholic Center, SPD, and Left Liberals, 
and even the National Liberals, supported the goal of defusing social confl ict 
by “organization,” whether through neutral administration or parity-control. In 
defense of their agrarian base, so too did the Conservatives. It was telling that at 
a time when the Reichstag parties were bitterly divided over fi nance reform, they 
could agree unanimously on the merits of “organization.” Th e now widespread 
support for this goal combined with particular interests to mark a milestone on 
the way to public control of the labor market.
Almost immediately the law, which came into eff ect on 2 June 1910, began 
achieving Delbrück’s purpose: the number of commercial offi  ces plummeted 
and the number of placements fell as well, if more slowly.160 Th e public offi  ces, 
on the other hand, began to rebound from the setbacks they had suff ered since 
the employers organized more eff ectively in 1904/5. In Prussia, for example, the 
number of public offi  ces had fallen from 288 in 1905 to 256 in 1909 and the 
number of placements had risen modestly from 460,000 in 1906 to 538,000 in 
1909. In the four years between the passage of the job placement law and World 
War I, both numbers surged. Th e number of offi  ces jumped more than 40 per-
cent to 376, and that of placements rose two and a half fold to 1.3 million.161 
Commercial agencies received a blow and public offi  ces a signifi cant boost from 
the government’s eff orts to “organize” the labor market.
In the quarter century before World War I, Germany’s dynamic industrial 
growth made control of the labor market seem to be an urgent political task. 
Rapid urbanization and bouts of mass unemployment threatened to overwhelm 
city services and undermine order. Agriculture’s loss of manpower to industry led 
the former to mobilize increasingly eff ectively from the mid 1890s onward in 
order to seek redress from the authorities. A decade later, the confl ict between a 
surging, newly self-confi dent, labor movement and defensive employers increas-
ingly turned labor offi  ces into political weapons. Under these conditions, munic-
ipal offi  cials in the Association of Labor Offi  ces, intellectual advocates of social 
reform, agrarian and union interest groups, and authorities in Berlin, especially 
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in the Ministry of the Interior, could press successfully to begin transforming a 
more or less free labor market into an “organized” one. Th is process would be 
vastly accelerated by World War I and then carried to completion in the 1920s.
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Chapter 2
PROMOTING A SKILLED WORKFORCE

Maintaining order and containing political confl ict by means of public “organi-
zation” of the labor market was but one strand of the German project to optimize 
the workforce. Another one—institutionally anchored elsewhere and inspired by 
diff erent ideas—aimed to create a high-skills workforce. As with public control of 
the labor market, these eff orts began locally. Th ey also coalesced around a guiding 
vision, in this case not that of organization, but of the independent, responsible 
worker and citizen. And, like the steps to bring the labor market under public 
control, the program of creating a high-skills workforce only subsequently be-
came the focus of greater attention from Berlin authorities, though in this case a 
decade later, from 1900 to 1910.
For municipal authorities, social reformers, and interest groups in the late 
nineteenth century, Germany’s rapid but uneven industrialization and tumultu-
ous urban growth not only posed the challenge of helping people fi nd work, any 
work, it also raised the question of what work they should go into, what kinds of 
workers, and even what kind of citizens, they should become. Th ese changes were 
increasingly disrupting previous patterns of fi nding work and vocation. While 
migration and job changing earlier had been by no means unfamiliar phenom-
ena,1 in the pre-industrial age town or village, children usually had grown up in 
family-run businesses, including, of course, on farmsteads, or at least in neighbor-
hoods small enough to give them some idea of their future work. Th e older paths 
to a vocation and position—following in the footsteps of the father or uncle, rely-
ing on local guilds—now became increasingly irrelevant. Th e new factories and 
industries produced their wares outside the ear- and eyeshot of households; the 
worlds of work and daily life increasingly became separated. Moreover, within 
Notes for this section begin on page 62.
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the factory walls, the number and variety of new jobs and vocations multiplied 
rapidly. Th e invention of new materials and products, technological progress, 
and the increasing division of labor in large-scale factories transformed many 
craft-based positions beyond recognition and created new ones, both skilled and 
unskilled. As a result, the choice of a particular line of work—whether through 
an apprenticeship in a vocation or paid labor—was itself increasingly haphazard. 
In the eyes of the reform-minded Central Association for the People’s Welfare, 
which devoted its 1911 conference to vocational training:
everything that appears necessary for an appropriate selection of a vocation and apprentice 
position is today to the greatest extent not considered and impossible to consider. Not 
only the disappearance of all tradition, but also the lack of any relationship to business life 
makes a vocational choice based on genuine inclination impossible…Th us it is chance that 
dominates everything.2
All too often, chance meant that young Germans chose unskilled work—which 
paid a wage immediately—over apprenticeships, whose rewards only accrued 
over time. Such decisions aff ected not only individual life chances, but also the 
nation’s domestic politics and international standing.
Urban Reformers’ Abiding Vision of a Deproletarianized Society
For some decades already, alarmed urban reformers had been at work trying not 
only to bring more order into vocational choice, but in particular also to steer 
young people away from unskilled work. Th e municipal concern described in the 
previous chapter to “organize” the labor market, especially for the unemployed or 
unskilled, was but one strand of local reform. Another strand centered on skilled 
work. While the urban reform movement would direct, over time, its attention 
and eff orts to an ever-growing number of realms, vocation remained at the core 
of civic reform. What vision inspired their abiding commitment to the skilled 
worker? What concrete forms did it take?
Again, research on Frankfurt, one of the best studied Wilhelminian cities, 
gives us a sense of the German Bürgertum’s vision of reform and role in improv-
ing the German workforce.3 Frankfurt’s reforms, like those at the national level, 
refl ected a range of means and sustaining ideals, including top-down protection 
and guidance of the weak (for example, in the form of a city doctor or public su-
pervision of wayward children) and, especially, the encouragement of economic 
democracy (i.e., industrial courts or parity-based labor offi  ces). However, the 
city’s middle-class leaders most insistently aspired to a society of economically 
independent citizens. Such wherewithal, in their eyes, formed the very bedrock 
of citizenship.
As early as the 1830s and 1840s, when debates about free trade became acute, 
a broad consensus had formed in the Frankfurt Bürgertum around a “mediating” 
policy—neither simply protectionist nor laissez-faire, but one of helping crafts-
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men adapt to the new competition and incipient industrialization. A cooperative 
bank was set up to help with productivity-enhancing investments, but most of 
the attention went into educational measures coordinated by an “industrial asso-
ciation.”4 Th roughout the second half of the century, various measures promoted 
“mechanization, specialization, and improved quality” among artisans and the 
small industry that dominated the city’s economy.5 From the 1890s, Frankfurt 
encouraged the adoption of the small electrical motor, which promised to level 
the playing fi eld for small, independent producers.6
Th e Frankfurt Bürgertum applied their vision of fostering an economically 
independent citizenry very broadly—not only to craftsmen, but also as much as 
possible to the fl ood of unskilled industrial workers pouring into the booming 
city—and especially to future workers, i.e., schoolchildren. In addition to the 
mea sures geared generally to education,7 Frankfurt reformers promoted voca-
tional training in particular. Th e philanthropic organization Youth Welfare in 
1888 began combining apprenticeship-placement with individual counseling.8 
In the same years, a decade before the reform pedagogue Georg Kerschensteiner 
raised the issue nationally, the city’s continuation schools off ered schoolchildren 
craft and drawing lessons, through which, it was hoped, they would gain insight 
into their own “endowments, inclinations, and abilities.”9 Th e city’s children’s 
nurseries followed suit.10 Despite the city’s fi nancial constraints, its welfare offi  ce 
off ered indigent families an annual sixty-mark stipend if they enrolled their sons 
in apprenticeships rather than putting them to work in unskilled positions.11 
In 1890, the city set up, alongside the already extant, privately run Polytechnic 
Association, an industrial continuation school, which boys could attend after 
fi nishing basic schooling at age fourteen. It was hoped that this institution would 
channel them away from unskilled work and into a Beruf. Th e Frankfurt re-
formers advocated skilled work as both good economic and good social policy 
to much broader audiences as well. When he was in the directorate of the As-
sociation of German Labor Exchanges, Karl Flesch, more consistently than any 
other member, pressed labor exchanges to expand beyond their usual clientele of 
unskilled workers, and into placing apprentices.12
Manfred Hettling’s impressive study of bürgerliche political ideas in a city on 
the other end of the Reich, Breslau, suggests that a program built around the 
central importance of economic independence was not limited to Frankfurt.13 In 
the Silesian city, whose economy and politics, much like Frankfurt’s, was domi-
nated by trade and small-scale industry and left-liberalism, “the individual Bürger 
was still the basic element of the bürgerliche social model even at the end of 
the [nineteenth] century,” despite coming under increasing strain.14 Th e Breslau 
Bürgertum’s individualism “manifested itself in the suggested answers with which 
they wanted to respond to the social problems of individual groups.” Th ough 
Hettling does not explore the social policies toward the working class, he suggests 
that in regard to craftsmen, at least, Breslauer middle classes, especially the domi-
nant Left Liberals, advocated associations and improving education and training, 
much like in the city on the Main.15
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Th ese detailed case studies of particular cities suggest that, in parts of Imperial 
Germany, the old Bürger concern to preserve and foster individuals’ economic 
independence, including even that of the incipient proletariat, survived into the 
early twentieth century. Th ey off er clues to the motivations of urban reformers 
elsewhere, who were taking similar steps to educate and train young people. As 
early as the fi rst decades of the nineteenth century, philanthropic and business 
circles in some German cities, particularly in the southwest, established polytech-
nic associations, which among other things off ered practical training to youths 
just out of school. By the 1870s, some cities had converted these associations into 
public institutions. In the same decade, a few German cities and states even were 
making attendance at continuation schools mandatory.16 In Prussia, the legal 
basis to make attendance obligatory was lacking. However, the Prussian Trade 
Ministry, drawing explicitly on southern German models,17 became a power-
ful advocate of such schools. All German states witnessed a rapid expansion of 
the number of such schools and of their attendees between 1885 and 1910. No-
where was the growth so rapid as in Prussia, however, as we will explore further 
below.
Many municipal offi  cials and social reformers came to see industrial continu-
ation schools and public labor exchanges by themselves as insuffi  cient. Off ering 
basic vocational schooling, even mandating it, and helping match adult workers 
to job openings, the reformers concluded, did not by themselves lead to high 
levels of skilled workers. Rather, experience suggested that the “free choice” of the 
youths in deciding what work or training to seek produced undesirable results. 
It led, according to participants at the 1911 conference on the apprenticeship 
system, already mentioned above, to vocation “by chance”18 and the absolute pre-
dominance of “external economic infl uences.”19 Too many youths, lured by the 
prospect of earning money right away, became unskilled laborers. When they did 
choose an apprenticeship, it was often in a line of work that promised to provide 
them with fancy clothing or social prestige.20 Due to such temptations and to 
the widespread ignorance of the working world, too few youths made a proper 
choice of a vocation, as the reformers saw it—one based on genuine inclination 
and hence likely to contribute to long-term individual prosperity and social sta-
bility.21 Firmer guidance of vocational choice would be therefore necessary.
For nearly two decades, urban institutions and private associations already had 
been at work, attempting to correct the perceived fl aws of free vocational choice. 
In many reformers’ eyes, the schools were the natural site for vocational guidance. 
Schoolteachers, it was thought, could best evaluate the abilities and interests of 
their students and should point them toward a suitable vocation. School physi-
cians could determine whether they had the physical aptitude for particular lines 
of work. Increasingly after 1900, boys’ crafts class gained popularity as a means 
of familiarizing youths in school with materials and tools that they might use in a 
later vocation, so that they might make more informed vocational choices.
Besides the urban initiatives in places like Frankfurt, organizations within the 
burgeoning women’s movement were pioneers. In 1898, the Association of Ger man 
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Women (Bund Deutscher Frauen) operated an “information center for women’s 
occupations” in Berlin, which, in 1907, expanded its activities to include what 
was now called, for the fi rst time, “vocational counseling.”22 In 1903, Hanover’s 
Protestant Women’s Association opened a “Central Offi  ce for Job Placement for 
Educated Ladies” that also dispensed advice on vocational choice.23
Whereas schools and philanthropic associations pioneered eff orts to infl uence 
vocational choice, public labor exchanges began to extend their activities to this 
fi eld only after the turn of the century, and even then only haltingly. For the most 
part, they served unskilled workers, “calling them up” in the order in which they 
had registered. In part, they began to concern themselves with vocational choice 
because companies, strategically the most important “clients” of the offi  ces, were 
beginning themselves to care more about selecting workers with particular pro-
fi les. Several public labor offi  ces extended their concerns beyond simply matching 
adult workers to jobs and began to coordinate youth apprenticeship-placement 
centrally, fi rst in Munich in 1902, then in Strassburg in 1905, and soon there-
after in other cities.24 Th ese urban examples soon inspired offi  cials at the state 
level to establish the same institutions.25 By the end of the decade (1908), the 
fi rst city had taken a step beyond job and even apprenticeship-placement. In 
Halle, the director of the labor exchange operated what he termed a “vocational 
offi  ce,” which drew on inputs from schools, businesses, and unions in order to 
administer “organized vocational choice.”26 By 1911, however, no other public 
Arbeitsnachweis had followed Halle’s example. In a sign of the still inchoate situ-
ation, several of the social reformers at the conference of the Central Association 
for the People’s Welfare in that year reacted coolly to the degree of centralization 
in Halle.27 Still, they all agreed that one of the urgent tasks ahead was to apply 
“planned organization” to vocational choice.28
In the same years, both the journal Th e Labor Market and the national As-
sociation of Labor Exchanges expressed similar convictions about the desirability 
of guided vocational choice. Yet their steps in this direction were tentative. In 
1910, several authors in Th e Labor Market called for “order-bringing activity in 
the choice of a vocation” or for “vocational advocates” in the labor exchanges.29 
Yet, until the end of 1913, the journal continued to discuss youth-related mat-
ters under the rubric of “apprenticeship exchanges,” while “vocational counsel-
ing” only appeared on the margins. Similarly, the national Association of Labor 
Exchanges discussed “apprenticeship placement” at its 1910 meeting—but not, 
however, vocational counseling. Th e latter was to be the topic of the conference 
scheduled for the fall of 1914. Th e events of that year overtook the plan, but 
the Association’s new guidelines in 1915 described “apprenticeship exchange and 
vocational counseling” as being worthy of advancement through the labor ex-
changes.30 Th us, the Labor Offi  ces took tentative steps to expand their services 
beyond their main clientele, the unskilled.
On the eve of the war, a variety of parties contemplated subjecting vocational 
choice to greater “organization.” For the urban reformers behind these eff orts, 
steering as many youths as possible into skilled work would contribute to middle-
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class stability in a rapidly changing society. However, no one as yet had taken 
decisive action on a national scale.
“Help to Self-Help”
Th ese eff orts by municipal reformers and national lobbying groups would have 
been less consequential if they had not converged with new thinking in other 
camps about the social problem. Just as the idea of “organization” attracted a 
broad coalition of social reformers and state offi  cials, an emphasis on helping 
workers help themselves within a broadly capitalist framework, and especially 
helping them to some kind of independence, gained ground in important quar-
ters around 1900. Th e progressive Catholic social reform movement and Prot-
estant reformers not only lent support to workers’ collective self-help in the form 
of unions and economic democracy, as discussed in the previous chapter. Less 
conspicuously, but nonetheless signifi cantly, they also backed eff orts to encour-
age economically independent individual workers. In contrast to Staatshilfe and 
collective self-help, this strand of helping individuals help themselves has been 
overlooked in the literature. After 1900, these religiously inspired movements, 
especially the Catholic one, would join hands with the Prussian Trade Ministry 
to pioneer the Prussian, and then German, creation of a high-skills workforce.
In Protestant thought, of course, the independent individual retained a very 
central position.31 But also among the progressive Rhineland Catholics, the new 
social thinking represented by Georg von Hertling and Franz Hitze could push 
the redefi nition of solidarity and subsidiarity so far that it became a kind of in-
cipient Christian liberalism.32 For both Protestants and Catholics, the common 
goals of “deproletarianization” and the creation of responsible, more indepen-
dent workers and the common means of “self-help” could point, among other 
mea sures, toward steps to encourage individual improvement. Th e Protestant 
pastor Friedrich Naumann and the Catholic social reform politician Karl Trim-
born exemplifi ed the complex ways in which individualistic strands were often 
interwoven with projects of collective (and even state) help. Naumann not only 
propagated economic democracy in the form of strong unions and constitutional 
factories, but, in 1907, he also helped establish the Werkbund, an organization 
dedicated to preserving and advancing “quality work,” which, it was hoped, would 
restore individuals’ “joy in work.”33 Likewise, Trimborn was pivotal in promot-
ing the Center Party’s agenda of economic democracy, for example, pressing the 
government in 1904 on its plans in regard to new union laws and chambers of 
labor.34 In precisely the same years, however, a legislative initiative by Trimborn 
also gave the Prussian Trade Ministry the opportunity to become the pacesetter 
of eff orts to create a high-skills workforce (as we will see below). Th ese individu-
alistic strands within both the Protestant and Catholic social reform circles would 
signifi cantly augment the abiding urban vision of a deproletarianized society of 
economically independent Bürger.
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Th e Prussian Trade Ministry’s Program to Create 
a High-Skills Workforce
Vocational counseling itself did not undergo the kind of national regulation be-
fore the war that job placement did in the 1910 Job Placement law. However, es-
pecially after the turn of the century, the Prussian Ministry of Trade took the lead 
in promoting a Prussian, and de facto a national, policy of creating a high-skills 
workforce. If the Reich Interior Ministry transposed urban reformers’ concern 
for achieving stability through neutral control to the national stage, the Prussian 
Trade Ministry did the same for their emphasis on achieving stability through 
worker improvement. Even more than social stability, however, the Trade Minis-
try aimed with its program of creating a high-skills workforce to strengthen the 
country’s economy in an era of growing global competition.
Germany’s eff orts to respond to late-nineteenth century globalization by im-
proving its workforce have remained largely unrecognized in the scholarly liter-
ature. Attention has focused instead on the country’s defensive recourse to pro-
tectionist tariff s.35 It is time to correct this imbalance. Understanding the Trade 
Ministry’s sustained program of improving the workforce requires a revision of 
our thinking about the Reich and Prussian governments’ industrial policies, es-
pecially those regarding Handwerk.
According to Sonderweg historians of the 1960s and 1970s, landed interests 
( Junkers) and heavy industrialists tried to shore up their hold on power by appeal-
ing to the backward-looking, defensive strata of shopkeepers and craftsmen. Th e 
concessions to this so-called old Mittelstand, culminating in the 1897 restoration 
of modifi ed guilds, fi t into this defensive political strategy. Much scholarship of 
the past three decades has cast doubt on these claims. Studies have shown con-
vincingly that the crafts sector was far more heterogeneous than earlier thought, 
with many segments surviving and even thriving amidst growing industry. Its 
moderate strand no longer rejected the trend toward large-scale capitalism, but 
wanted to adapt to it. Likewise, the ostensible wire-pullers of policy, the Junkers 
and heavy industrialists, were not nearly as united as once claimed.36 Th e state 
itself, other scholars have demonstrated, was hardly the mere instrument of inter-
est groups; ministers and bureaucrats pursued policies for multiple reasons, in-
cluding what they believed was in the interest of a modernizing, powerful state.37 
David Blackbourn expresses the current revisionist synthesis when he writes that 
“[i]f there is a red thread that runs through state policy, it is … the recognition 
that a modern, effi  cient industry was indispensable for a successful great power.” 
In this context, Mittelstandspolitik, including measures to shore up craftsmen, 
was “an exercise in rhetoric, not a policy designed to succeed.”38
Recent work, however, suggests that this last claim about Germany’s Mittel-
standspolitik itself now stands in need of revision. A number of scholars have 
made a convincing case that at least part of the policy toward the crafts sector was 
not only designed to succeed, but in fact did succeed.39 Th is reconceptualization 
of the Kaiserreich’s economic policy draws, in turn, on the recently growing ap-
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preciation of the varieties of capitalism and, in particular, of the incentives prob-
lems connected with the creation of a high-skills workforce.40 In the following 
pages, we build upon these arguments to grasp the purpose behind the Prussian 
Trade Ministry’s workforce policies.
Th e Trade Ministry’s eff orts to improve worker quality had unfolded, since 
the 1880s, against the backdrop of overall Reich and Prussian policy on the “la-
bor question,” which initially focused on other priorities.41 In the 1880s, when 
Bismarck himself headed the Prussian Trade Ministry, Germany’s pioneering so-
cial insurance programs were the dominant concern. During the “New Course” 
of the early 1890s, which represented a response to the great miners’ strike of 
1889 and generally the failure of repressive policy to hamstring the SPD, Trade 
Minister Berlepsch concentrated on augmenting labor protection regulations and 
introducing labor courts.42
Yet alongside these more openly political measures, from the mid 1880s on-
ward, the Prussian Trade Ministry showed a growing interest in vocational train-
ing, schooling, and counseling. Th e disastrous reception of German products at 
the 1876 World’s Fair in Philadelphia—where the Berlin engineering professor 
Franz Reuleaux famously judged many of them to be “cheap and shoddy”—
helped to crystallize growing worries about the country’s competitiveness vis-
à-vis the US and other European powers. Th is stimulated a discussion already 
underway among social reformers about improving worker training, as discussed 
earlier. More concretely, concerns about Germany’s economic, and ultimately 
strategic, power prompted the Trade Ministry in 1884 to wrest control over the 
state’s Industrial Continuation Schools from the Education Ministry.43 Practical 
training, rather than general learning, was henceforth to be the schools’ focus.44 If 
a concern for die gute Polizei and domestic order represented one stand of Cam-
eralist thought, this emphasis on developing the country’s resources represented 
another.
In these decades, the Prussian Trade Ministry became the national pacesetter of 
the schools’ expansion. Th e state’s expenditures on vocational schooling increased 
twenty-fold between 1880 and 1905.45 Th e number of Prussian industrial con-
tinuation schools more than tripled, rising from 664 in 1885 to 2,162 in 1910, 
and the number of enrollees increased six-fold, from 58,400 to 352,000. By com-
parison, the number of students in Bavaria and Wurttemberg roughly doubled 
in the same period.46 Th ough the schools’ curricula initially included a variety 
of subjects, over time the schools focused increasingly on their main task: giving 
their charges practical training that could prepare them for a skilled trade.47
From the mid 1890s onward, after the end of Berlepsch’s “New Course,” the 
Trade Ministry made the vocational training system its top priority,48 at precisely 
the same moment when Prussian and Reich authorities began to turn to the reg-
ulation of the labor market. Even more than in the previous decade, concerns 
about German industry’s competitive position with other countries, including 
Japan, and social Darwinian thought provided a major spur to increased state ac-
tivity in this fi eld.49 A major step occurred with the revision of the industrial code 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
50   |   Optimizing the German Workforce
in 1897, which reestablished modifi ed craft guilds. For Sonderweg historians, this 
piece of legislation epitomized the reactionary, politically motivated nature of 
German Mittelstandspolitik, and, even for revisionists such as David Blackbourn, 
it only amounted to political gesturing meant to mollify the crafts sector, but not 
to address any real economic problems.50 As Hal Hansen has shown, however, 
an appreciation of the incentives problems connected with any worker training 
scheme allows one to see the 1897 legislation in a completely new light.51 Con-
trary to appearances, the reestablishment of modernized guilds belonged, at least 
in part, to a liberal economic strategy on the part of a German state intent on 
creating a high-skills workforce.
At the root of the “apprenticeship crisis” that had plagued Handwerk since the 
1870s was an incentives problem. Th e German Empire’s liberal industrial code 
of 1871 had abolished the guilds, which, while already in decline, had nonethe-
less still regulated apprenticeships and overseen certifi cation of masters, however 
inadequately. In the absence of any authority to retain their apprentices at the 
end of their training period, masters were now even more likely than before to ex-
ploit their charges as cheap labor; with ever greater frequency, apprentices, seeing 
few prospects in being trained and being tempted by the initially higher wages 
and less onerous supervision in large industry, broke their contracts early; and, 
industrial employers had little way of judging the skills of those they hired away 
from Handwerk. As this game-theory informed approach teaches us, the incen-
tive problems handicapping German vocational training in the fi rst decades of 
the Kaiserreich were problems of any liberalized labor market.
Th e 1897 legislation began to address precisely these problems. Less than three 
decades after having been abolished, a modifi ed form of the handicraft guild was 
reestablished at the regional level throughout Germany. Drawing on models in 
the southwest German states of Baden and Württemberg, these modernized guilds 
could establish standards for training, supervise apprenticeships and new appren-
ticeship contracts, and certify the results of qualifying exams. Th e legislation was 
meant not to protect Handwerk from competition, but rather to give artisans a 
chance of succeeding in the market. Th e system of standardized certifi cation gave 
youths and handicraft masters the incentive to engage in vocational training. For 
the former, the certifi cates were portable, and hence valuable, attestations of the 
skills they had acquired. For the masters, the certifi cate system, coupled with 
new apprenticeship contracts, meant that they could count on their apprentices 
not running away and that, even if they could not retain them after their exams, 
any journeymen they hired from outside would have a similar level of training. 
Th e only apparently illiberal restoration of guilds thus provided a means of partly 
overcoming the disincentives to train and be trained inherent in a completely 
liberalized labor market.52
Yet if this model of collectively certifying training provided a blueprint for 
the future of the entire German vocational system, its realization in 1897 was 
only a partial success. Th e law established a patchwork of regional guilds, but no 
national framework, for agreeing on and enforcing collective training standards. 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
Promoting a Skilled Workforce   |   51
Over the subsequent years, the restored bodies made eff orts to forge ever-broader 
associations, but this was slow going. A much more signifi cant limitation of the 
1897 reforms, however, was the fact that they applied only to handicrafts and 
not to industry. Th e main employer of skilled labor and the trainer, by 1907, of 
fully one-third of all skilled workers53 played no role in collectively setting and 
certifying skill levels. Th is was partly due to the mistrust between handicrafts 
and industry,54 and partly to industry’s ambivalence about the future role of the 
skilled worker (see below). Th ese limitations, however, should not obscure the 
1897 legislation’s real successes. In the short term, it began to alleviate the “ap-
prenticeship crisis” in Handwerk. In the long term, the 1897 legislation’s certifi ca-
tion procedures would provide a model for a general solution to the incentives 
problem of creating a high-skills workforce, one that would be implemented 
starting in the late 1920s.
Th e revival of the guilds in the modifi ed industrial code hardly exhausted 
Prussian/German eff orts to create a high-skills workforce. Th e next decade and 
a half witnessed a sharp rise in the activities of the Prussian Trade Ministry, even 
as the disputes over training and youths, between crafts and industry, and within 
the Prussian government grew fi ercer. Th e founding of a Prussian State Industrial 
Offi  ce (Landesgewerbeamt, LGA) in 1905 was a milestone, for the LGA quickly 
became the general staff  coordinating eff orts to develop a skilled workforce. Both 
the origins of the LGA, which stemmed from an initiative of the ostensibly con-
servative Center Party, and its progressive staff  and policies compel a further revi-
sion of our thinking about the Prussian and German Mittelstandspolitik. Th ey 
demonstrate both the surprising breadth of support for these policies across the 
political spectrum and their basic orientation to the market.
A motion by the Center Party’s Karl Trimborn gave the initial impulse for set-
ting up the Industrial Offi  ce. In the Prussian Lower House in 1902, he proposed 
the “systematic encouragement of small business by a central state organ.”55 Trim-
born’s purpose was neither politically reactionary nor merely rhetorical. Rather, 
he hoped to allow Handwerk and small industrial fi rms to compete with large-
scale industry, to encourage them “to adapt as much as possible to the demands 
of modern business ways.”56 Pointing to the successes of such an offi  ce and the 
“new style of industrial policy” in Austria since 1892, Trimborn insisted that a 
central agency was needed to systematize the previously disparate programs and 
to develop new initiatives. Of special importance were various steps to encourage 
craftsmen to introduce machinery into their shops, the pooling of resources in 
cooperatives, and measures to improve vocational training. Although there were 
diff erences of opinion over details, Trimborn’s proposal garnered an unusually 
wide spectrum of support. All of the parties in the parliament approved of the 
thrust of Trimborn’s ideas, as did the Trade Minister, who promised to personally 
attend the commission meetings tasked with working out the particulars.
Th e Prussian State Industrial Offi  ce that emerged three years later under the 
aegis of the Trade Ministry aimed to promote a “generation that thanks to proper 
education is technically and theoretically, productively and commercially well 
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developed. It must be capable, and place great confi dence in itself and its abilities, 
and remain aware of the limits of its capacity to compete with large-scale pro-
ducers.”57 As Trimborn had envisaged, the LGA brought focus and heightened 
attention to the Prussian state’s eff orts to improve the training of both young and 
established workers, including responsibility for continuation schools of vari-
ous kinds, industrial exhibitions, vocational training—and eventually vocational 
counseling.
In its choice of personnel for the LGA, the Trade Ministry proved to have an 
eye for exceptionally capable men who combined energy, vision, and (for the 
most part) political sensibility.58 Nor did it shy from controversy in pursuit of its 
goal of modernizing Handwerk. Th e LGA’s staff  included Hermann Muthesius, 
a prominent engineer-architect who had helped to found the Werkbund.59 In an 
indication of the LGA’s overall approach, Muthesius commented in an article 
on one branch of industry, that Germany needed “to have mass furniture of 
high quality and great simplicity, exactly as a well organized machine produc-
tion could achieve.”60 When some craft organizations launched a loud campaign 
against Muthesius, accusing him of demeaning the “perfectly justifi ed, healthy, 
conservative element in Handwerk,”61 the LGA and the Trade Minister person-
ally backed the reformer.62 In the two decades between the LGA’s founding in 
1905 and the crucial steps in the mid 1920s to create a nationwide vocational 
training system, the Prussian offi  ce would play a decisive role. Even as ministers, 
Reichstag coalitions, and regimes changed, the men of the LGA—capable, com-
mitted to promoting a high-skills workforce, and with an esprit de corps—pro-
vided essential continuity.63 Th eir expertise, as well as that of other non-political, 
mid-level offi  cials, often “far exceeded that of ministers and deputy ministers,” 
granting them “an extraordinarily strong infl uence.”64
Despite Handwerk’s centrality in the origins of the LGA, the new offi  ce and 
the Trade Ministry concerned themselves with worker training in the broadest 
terms. When disputes over training arose in the following years between handi-
crafts and industry, the Trade Ministry intervened repeatedly, coaxing the two 
sides to work together.65
By the second half of the decade, pressure was growing for more decisive 
steps in Prussia’s policy toward young workers. In 1906, the Trade Ministry was 
concerned enough about the supply and movement of skilled workers between 
Handwerk and industry to conduct a sample survey of skilled workers in indus-
try.66 Th e following year’s comprehensive occupational survey, the fi rst since 1895, 
revealed the dramatic changes Germany’s rapid industrialization was causing in 
the workforce, especially the rising numbers of unskilled and female workers.67 
Th e percentage of skilled Facharbeiter had declined from 65 to 58 percent.68 At 
the same time, the highest levels of Prussian government were taking a greater in-
terest in the political implications of the “youth question.” Alarmed by the SPD’s 
increasing inroads among the young, but rejecting repressive measures, Prussian 
Minister President Bülow and Interior Minister Bethman-Hollweg called on their 
cabinet colleagues in late 1907 to develop a “positive” youth cultivation policy.69
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How, precisely, to achieve this general aim became the object of bitter debate 
within the Prussian government over the following three years. On the one side, 
conservatives in the Culture, Interior, and War Ministries wanted to imbue the 
young with patriotism and religious values, inoculating them against the allures 
of socialism. To this end, they proposed making continuation schools mandatory 
and shifting their focus from practical training to political and moral indoctrina-
tion. Opposing this group were the Ministers of Trade and Agriculture. While they 
agreed that socialism must be combated, they insisted that the best way to do this 
was indirectly, by giving young people a stake in society. Th e schools’ emphasis 
should be on “education for profi ciency, for pleasure in productive work, and for 
sympathy for the importance of our … polity, the traditions and institutions of 
which give every citizen a secure existence and the opportunity freely to exercise 
his creative abilities.”70 Th e values learned by training for skilled work—“indus-
try, care, conscientiousness, perseverance, attention to detail, honesty, patience 
self-discipline, devotion to a clear goal standing outside ourselves”71—would also 
constitute a form, indeed the best form, of “citizenship education,” Trade Min-
ister Reinhold Sydow argued.72 By encouraging individual economic develop-
ment, one would strengthen social stability. Moreover, economic success per se, 
and not political education, was the most important purpose of these schools. 
“[O]ur commerce, our artisanate, and our industry” all depended on the practical 
training the continuation schools provided.73
Th is clash within the Prussian government prompted the Trade Ministry to 
become even more active in advancing its own vision of political order and eco-
nomic progress. Partly in response to the conservatives’ charge that the continua-
tion schools were not reaching enough young people, the Trade Ministry in 1907 
proposed a bill compelling all municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants 
to establish compulsory institutions. Although disagreement over conservatives’ 
demands that these schools include more religious instruction ultimately scuttled 
the bill in 1911, the Trade Ministry continued with its piecemeal eff orts to ex-
tend vocational schooling.74 It also played a catalytic role in industry’s fi rst steps 
to organize its own vocational training, as we will see below.
Th e Trade Ministry’s encouragement of a high-skills workforce, as refl ected 
in such measures as the creation of certifi cation procedures, the establishment 
of an energetic State Industrial Offi  ce, and the cooperation with industry, also 
extended to vocational counseling. Since the turn of the century, the grassroots 
labor exchange movement and social reformers had discussed infl uencing young 
people’s choice of work and had even taken a few tentative steps in this direction. 
After 1900, several municipal, and subsequently state, labor offi  ces had expanded 
their eff orts to include apprenticeship placement, and at least one had begun to 
collect information from schools, employers, and unions for the sake of “orga-
nized vocational choice.” Within the Prussian Association of Labor Exchanges, 
the Frankfurt social reformer Karl Flesch consistently prompted the offi  ces to 
concern themselves with skilled workers, and hence vocational choice. Women’s 
groups also had set up offi  ces to counsel girls on future vocations.
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By 1910, the Prussian Trade Ministry began to lend offi  cial encouragement 
to such activities. In a major programmatic article, the high-ranking offi  cial Al-
fred Kühne made the case for planned vocational counseling and placement. Th e 
proper choice of a vocation had important consequences for the individual—for 
his “joy in work and fortune in life”—but even more so it had “great macro-
economic signifi cance.”75 Above all, the choice separated the unskilled and the 
skilled. Of the former—who composed 31 percent of the boys between fourteen 
and eighteen years old in industry and 44 percent in commerce, and 52 percent 
and 48 percent respectively, of girls of the same age—there were “many, far more 
than one would wish for a healthy national education.” Th e unskilled faced the 
greatest risks: they lacked the “salutary eff ects of a regular vocational education”; 
they spent their earnings on morally dubious entertainments such as “alcohol, 
dancing, cinema, smutty literature, and worse”; all too easily, they could fi nd 
themselves on a slippery slope downward and end up in reform school. And it 
was not only the un skilled who suff ered from a lack of proper vocational coun-
seling. Th ose who overestimated the availability or attractiveness of offi  ce work, 
and those who were misled by the overly pessimistic prognoses for Handwerk, 
could also benefi t from informed choice. Such matters, Kühne continued, had a 
profound impact on the country’s economic success: “Th e competitiveness, the 
future of Germany’s industry depends on superior quality, and this in turn pre-
supposes a well-trained workforce.” Th is programmatic article suggested the close 
linkage, in the eyes of the Trade Ministry, between the challenges of domestic 
social order and national economic success.
Germany therefore must not let the number of unskilled workers increase 
even more, Kühne continued. To this end, the Trade Ministry welcomed contri-
butions from several sources. Parents must assume greater responsibility; school 
doctors and teachers had a role to play, as did, for the unskilled, the continuation 
schools. Yet none of these resources promised the comprehensive and concen-
trated guidance that the Trade Ministry representative advocated. For that, “an 
offi  ce is necessary that is capable of judging the prospects of particular vocations 
and the labor market and that if possible can also place them in apprenticeships 
and work.” In fact, such offi  ces existed already, in the form of the municipal labor 
offi  ces organized on a parity basis in such southern German cities as Munich and 
Strassburg. In the Bavarian capital, for example, the labor offi  ce and teachers con-
sulted; while the teachers invited the children and parents to the school to talk 
about the importance of the matter, the labor offi  ce sent families surveys to be 
fi lled out by them and the teachers. Th e city’s doctors would determine whether 
the children were suitable for various skilled professions. Meanwhile, the labor 
offi  ce would collect lists of open apprenticeships and have the craft guild vouch 
for the trustworthiness of the fi rms. Th is kind of coordination by the southern 
German labor exchanges, Kühne suggested, was “immediately exemplary.”
Th e Prussian offi  cial’s endorsement of a centrally organized vocational coun-
seling and placement offi  ce anticipated the institutional framework that would 
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become reality after World War I. His concerns also adumbrated a telling shift in 
thinking among advocates of a skilled workforce, a partial blending of the “orga-
nizational” and individual improvement strands. Namely, it was no accident that 
while justifying the program primarily in terms of Germany’s economic vitality, 
Kühne emphasized the necessarily comprehensive nature of vocational counsel-
ing and steering. National goals, it seemed, justifi ed more compulsory measures. 
It would be a short step to the Trade Ministry’s advocacy toward the end of the 
war of legally binding “complete inclusion” for a national system of vocational 
counseling and training.
In 1910, however, attention still focused on local offi  ces. Furthermore, the 
appreciation of public labor exchanges’ importance did not prevent the Trade 
Ministry from also pursuing other avenues toward its goal of a high-skills work-
force. Th us, later in the same year, Kühne strongly encouraged the industrial-
ists organized in the German Committee on Technical Education (see below) to 
systematize vocational choice, as Handwerk was beginning to do, but he did not 
specify the means.76 By the eve of the Great War, however, advocates of publicly 
organized vocational counseling had taken the fi rst, tentative steps to coordinate 
and mobilize support for their plans. In 1913, the quasi-public, reform-minded 
Central Association for the People’s Welfare founded a German Committee on 
Vocational Counseling, which brought together many important advocates of 
public vocational counseling, including industrialists, craftsmen, social and ped-
agogical reformers, as well as a representative of the Prussian Trade Ministry. 
Th ough the committee’s work would be cut short by the outbreak of the war, the 
chairman, Johannes Altenrath, who was also director of the Central Association, 
delineated its consensus, thereby anticipating later developments:
Today one strives for a planned organization of vocational counseling and placement pri-
marily in the interest of the youths. Th ey should be placed whenever possible in beginning 
positions and apprenticeships that accord with their abilities and inclinations and in which 
they can obtain an education and vocational training matching their age and natures. On 
the other side, however, general economic considerations are also decisive. Th e various 
branches of industry should receive an appropriate selection of new workers necessary for 
the increase of their productivity.77
Rationalization versus Quality Production: 
Th e Ambiguous Future of German Industry
Th e success of these government programs to keep the number of unskilled 
workers as low as possible and create a broad class of skilled workers depended 
on the cooperation (or at least tolerance) of important social actors, including 
Handwerk, the unions, and industry. Th e crafts movement had, of course, long 
clamored for public support. Th e unions, especially the socialist Free Trade Union, 
with their eye on political matters such as strike laws and collective bargaining 
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arrangements, tended to overlook vocational training until the Weimar period.78 
Above all, if Germany’s rapidly growing industry did not commit itself to the 
skilled Facharbeiter, no amount of public support would matter in the end. In 
the decades before the outbreak of the Great War, however, considerable ambiva-
lence about its future production methods and kind of workforce characterized 
German industry. Rapidly evolving labor demographics, mounting domestic po-
litical and international economic challenges, and—crucially—the availability 
of alternative models of industrial production undercut consensus. In regard to 
their workforce and production methods, German industrialists were, to use 
Charles Sabel’s and Jonathan Zeitlin’s distinction,79 not merely maximizing, but 
also strategizing actors—they did not simply accept the institutional environ-
ment as it was, but tried to shape it as well.
Th e source and nature of the industrial workforce had not been a particularly 
salient problem during the fi rst decades of the Kaiserreich. In matters of voca-
tional training—as in all economic areas—the liberal 1869/1871 Trade Regu-
lations established the legal framework for all subsequent developments in the 
Kaiserreich (and, indeed, well beyond 1918). Th e regulations had abolished the 
guilds, which had previously controlled vocational training and certifi cation, and 
left these matters to the free play of market forces. In the following decades, 
both the lack of an overarching legal framework for vocational training and the 
piecemeal attempts to address perceived detrimental eff ects of the same shaped 
the course of German employers’ policies on worker training.
Despite the abolition of guilds and all regulations pertaining to apprentice-
ships, craft masters continued to train the vast bulk of the German economy’s 
skilled workers—including those required by the rapidly expanding industrial 
sector. Industrial fi rms, after all, had themselves often grown from handicrafts 
roots and since then had continued to rely on the training provided in smaller 
workshops; industrial production techniques and those techniques craftsmen 
could teach still largely overlapped, at least at fi rst. Worker protection laws also 
contributed to industry’s reluctance to train its own workers: an 1878 statute 
limiting the working hours of youths meant that large-scale manufacturers, in 
whose factories instruction was more clearly separated from production, would 
have to pay more dearly for the lost productivity.80 Another, perhaps more seri-
ous, reason militating against widespread worker training by industrial fi rms was 
the possibility that other fi rms would poach skilled workers, thus depriving the 
original fi rm of its investment. Handwerk did not face the problem of lost invest-
ments in nearly the same degree, as handicrafts fi rms could integrate instruction 
and production to a far greater extent than could industry, and as their small size 
and still relatively intimate setting allowed the masters to bind at least a mini-
mum number of apprentices to them. As the few studies of an industrial fi rm’s 
production/labor market strategies in this period have shown, companies cared a 
great deal about preserving a stable core of skilled workers81—a fact which made 
them even more leery of losing workers they themselves had trained.
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In the 1870s, when an ostensible “apprenticeship crisis” occupied the educated 
public,82 at least some manufacturers took part in discussions about revamping 
training.83 Th e discussion of the crisis focused not only on the complaints of 
Handwerk masters, who lamented their loss of authority over their trainees since 
1869/71, but more generally on recent and alarming signs that the quality of 
German products had fallen behind that of other nations.84 In the following 
decade, several of the largest industrial companies established their own worker 
training facilities and programs, when the growing divergence between craft and 
industrial production methods made the transition between the two increasingly 
diffi  cult.85 Still, fi rms such as Krupp, Bosch, and Siemens were exceptional in 
starting their own training programs before the 1890s.
As with the struggles over control of the labor market and the Prussian pro-
gram to develop a high-skills workforce, the return of rapid and sustained eco-
nomic growth in the mid 1890s marked a turning point here as well. Sporadic 
and desultory interest in the kinds of workers industry needed gave way to more 
sustained—though by no means harmonious—attention. Th e often explosive 
growth of new industries and fi rms—Siemens’ workforce alone increased by 400 
percent in the decade after 189586—raised questions about how the new workers 
were to be integrated into increasingly massive production facilities, how they 
were to be trained and to work, and who would supervise them. If previously 
hiring the sons of employees allowed fi rms to count on a disciplined core work-
force,87 the infl ux of immigrants from Germany’s rural reservoirs made this in-
creasingly diffi  cult. Th e sheer growth of German industry began to turn a surplus 
of labor into a defi cit. In the two and a half decades before World War I, unem-
ployment averaged 2.6 percent.88 Even with the infusion of cheap, largely Polish 
foreign labor, employers could no longer count on a virtually unlimited pool 
of cheap labor. Economic good times and the resulting low levels of unemploy-
ment contributed to a much more rapid turnover of the workforce, especially 
among the unskilled, but also among trained workers looking to move up.89 Such 
poaching between employers signifi cantly raised the costs of worker training. Th e 
increased contacts between workers in diff erent fi rms and regions could also add 
to employers’ political headaches, by paving the way for unionization.90 In light 
of both the economic problem of screening and retaining capable workers and 
the political one of keeping unions out, employers at their inaugural job place-
ment conference in 1901 identifi ed a “well-trained, reliable, and capable labor 
force that is as little subject to fl uctuation as possible, as an absolute necessity of 
an industrial economy.”91
Th e pressure to make better use of the workforce came not only from these 
domestic changes, but also from an increasingly competitive international envi-
ronment. If German manufacturers had in the meantime restored their reputa-
tion damaged by the devastating critiques of their shoddy work made at the 
1876 World’s Fair, they now faced an array of competitors, especially from the 
US, in precisely the key areas of the “second industrial revolution”: electronics, 
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chemicals, and machine tools. In the 1890s and 1900s, the pressure from foreign 
competitors became considerably fi ercer. In particular, US fi rms such as General 
Electric and Westinghouse in the electrical industry, DuPont in chemicals, and 
a host of smaller fi rms in machine tools began to threaten German companies’ 
positions domestically and in world trade.92 While the German electrical giants 
Siemens and AEG, for example, had dominated world sales into the 1890s with-
out serious challenge, by 1913, US companies nearly had matched their output.93 
American innovations in mass production threatened German quality produc-
tion with cheap prices (and suffi  cient quality). It also appeared to off er some Ger-
man manufacturers an attractive model of their own future.
In the two decades before World War I, no consensus response to these chal-
lenges emerged. Th e 1897 reconstitution of craft guilds, whose certifi cation proce-
dures would provide a general model after World War I for solving the incentives 
problem of worker training, in the short-term mobilized parts of manufacturing 
industry, but it also divided it. Th e legal privileging of Handwerk led immediately 
to demands for equal treatment of the growing number of workers trained by 
industry. However, the issue revealed divisions among industrialists about how 
equal access should be guaranteed, and even whether it mattered. As represen-
tatives of the General Association of Metal Producers and of the Association 
of German Machine-Builders reported with regret in March 1914, “currently 
the views within industry on the usefulness and organizational form of exams 
[equivalent to those in Handwerk] are still far apart.”94
It was no accident that machine-producing and metal-working fi rms stood at 
the forefront of eff orts to institutionalize industrial training of skilled workers. 
By their very nature, these fi rms were closer to crafts: more dependent on indi-
vidualized work and less capable of standardized mass production. After 1900, 
the number of engineering companies maintaining their own training workshops 
and company schools for apprentices, though still only a small minority, also 
grew rapidly.95 By 1907, while Handwerk still trained the bulk of all apprentices, 
industry’s share had already risen to a third.96
More important in the long-term than these steps by individual companies 
was the eff ort to create common standards for worker training, even in the ab-
sence of a legal framework. Under the prodding of the Prussian Trade Ministry, 
the Association of German Engineers (VDI), the Machine-Builders Association, 
and others in 1908 established the Deutsche Auschuss für technisches Schulwe-
sen (DATSCH)—the German Committee on Technical Education.97 Th ough 
founded for the purpose of establishing and disseminating uniform norms for 
engineers’ education, DATSCH’s purview quickly expanded to include the entire 
vocational training system. Anton Rieppel and Fritz Frölich, directors of the large 
engineering fi rm MAN and longtime advocates of industry’s vocational training, 
were among the most forceful promoters of a broader mandate.98 By the fall of 
1909, DATSCH had put apprenticeship training on its agenda.99 One of its main 
goals was to agree on clear vocational descriptions and uniform training methods. 
In this program to create uniform standards for skilled workers lay the origins 
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of the German vocational system as it took shape after 1925. Th e very fi rst of 
DATSCH’s “guiding principles” from 1912 expressed the nature and signifi cance 
of what the Association now perceived as its main task, as well its motivation:
Th e mechanical industry is compelled to an ever greater degree, especially as a result of 
competition with foreign [industry], to perform high-value work. Th is requires constant 
progress in the education and training of young skilled workers. For this reason, it is one of 
the most important tasks of industry to ensure good training of a suffi  cient number of ap-
prentices and to secure its due infl uence over the shaping of apprentice training. An orderly 
apprentice training also promotes the education of the worker as national citizen.100
As pioneering as DATSCH’s eff orts to coordinate industry’s own training pro-
gram would later prove to be, however, for the time being they faced serious 
obstacles. Not only did DATSCH’s recommendations lack legal standing, but 
outside of the machine-building industry, the issue of worker training continued 
to fi nd little resonance. A survey conducted for the industrial umbrella organiza-
tion CVDI in 1913 produced:
very meager results … Industry generally, except for the engineering branch, where the 
question has already been thoroughly discussed, is still cool to the whole thing and is 
reluctant to commit itself by expressing a [public] opinion before having come to its own 
judgment … Th e majority of respondents are of the view that there are enough apprentices 
in industry, and that these apprentices are well trained.101
DATSCH’s program to promote and systematize industrial training had to 
overcome more than mere apathy, however. A rival view of Germany’s industrial 
future challenged it, a vision of rationalization drawing largely on US technology 
and principles. During the nineteenth century, US ingenuity and conditions—a 
vast middle class with unusually homogeneous consumer tastes, seemingly un-
limited natural resources, a scarce supply of skilled labor, and the infl ux of mil-
lions of unskilled immigrants—helped to spawn an “American system” of mass 
production.102 Quickly trained workers used single-purpose machines to produce 
interchangeable parts that were then combined into cheap, standardized goods for 
a mass market. In the other rapidly industrializing power—Germany—manufac-
turers facing similar challenges of shortages of skilled workers and an abundance 
of the unskilled began employing US special machines in incipient mass con-
sumer industries such as sewing machines and bicycles.103 Even more resolutely, 
however, they embraced the spirit of the US innovations. A comment by the head 
of Siemens refl ected this euphoria as early as the 1870s, even in an industry that 
had always had a high proportion of skilled workers:
We have … assiduously been attempting since a year to make everything, as the Americans 
do, with special machines … It has worked out brilliantly … Now we are all convinced that 
our future salvation lies in the application of the American work-methods and that we have 
to change our entire business practices accordingly.104
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In practice, the vision of introducing “American methods” in all spheres 
proved to be anything but easy to implement. Some of the reasons included: the 
relatively low number, and the specialized wishes, of the customers—especially 
for large electrical motors and machine tools; the high cost of the new machines; 
the rising cost of human labor, especially after the turn of the century; resistance 
by skilled craftsmen; and diffi  culties in establishing industry-wide norms.105
Th ese problems of implementation hardly dimmed the tantalizing promise 
embodied in the American methods, especially after further technical innova-
tions and intellectual-programmatic systematizing after 1900. US engineer Fred-
erick Winslow Taylor’s invention of methods for more precisely cutting steel 
signifi cantly expanded the possibilities for using interchangeable parts in even 
complex products. US companies also introduced “norming offi  ces” to coordi-
nate centrally the division of labor. Th e intellectual synthesis and apotheosis of 
the drive for effi  ciency appeared in the decade before World War I with Taylor’s 
advocacy of “scientifi c management.” His books Shop Management (1900) and 
Th e Principles of Scientifi c Management106 (1911) presented an enticing vision of 
a comprehensively rationalized system of production.107 A central bureau, after 
having determined the “one best way” to carry out work processes, should dis-
tribute raw materials, tools, and workers in the most effi  cient manner.
Enterprising German engineers, such as Georg Schlesinger of the Ludwig Löwe 
machine-tool company, became the prophets of Taylor’s gospel of effi  ciency through 
centralized, systematic control. Schlesinger’s journal Workshop Technology (Werk-
stattstechnik), launched in 1907—a year before the founding of DATSCH—be-
came a crucial medium for spreading new ideas about technology, norming, and 
factory organization.108 In the years before World War I, Schlesinger and like-
minded engineers enthusiastically promoted Taylor’s ideas about “scientifi c man-
agement,” even if little as yet was implemented.109
German industrialists’ and engineers’ growing enthusiasm for “scientifi c man-
agement” could lead easily to a denigration of the “human factor” in production. 
Th eir appreciation of the material and organizational components of company 
success—“on the cutting edge of steel,” Schlesinger had aphorized in 1911, “sit 
the dividends”110—could induce the engineers to view the worker as a secondary 
or even tertiary element, one which had to be fi tted to the physical capital as best 
as possible—and even himself somehow needed to be selected or shaped to fi t a 
norm.111
Yet the two aspects—scientifi c management and investment in the work-
ers—were not necessarily mutually exclusive. In a seeming paradox, Schlesinger’s 
company, Ludwig Löwe, was also one of the pioneers of industrial vocational 
training, having been one of the founding members of DATSCH. Schlesinger’s 
journal, Workshop Technology, sheds light on this apparent contradiction. In his 
introduction to the new journal, Schlesinger paid tribute to the intermeshing of 
all of the elements, including workers, which could contribute to “the best, fast-
est, and cheapest” work:
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Th e highest degree of work capacity is reached when people who are capable, enjoying their 
labor, and satisfi ed work in purposefully designed rooms at the best machines with superior 
tools and equipment; in rooms that correspond to the kind of work and the work process 
of a particular object, that have the appropriate cranes inside and suffi  cient connections 
between them and that guarantee company offi  cials easy supervision.112
In the general terms of Schlesinger’s introduction, then, there was no appar-
ent confl ict between the claims of effi  cient central management and a skilled 
workforce. Yet the content of Workshop Technology revealed a far diff erent picture. 
Despite Schlesinger’s promise to provide “a complete picture of the workshops 
in their essential parts, as we described them above,” the engineers who wrote 
the vast bulk of the contributions focused almost exclusively on technical and 
organizational—that is, on Taylorist—questions.113 In this emphasis, despite the 
initial promise of balance, was refl ected the strong temptation to bring all mat-
ters under centralized control. Schlesinger and the Ludwig Löwe Company, pio-
neers of both worker training and “scientifi c management,” personifi ed German 
industry’s ambivalence in the early twentieth century about its future production 
methods and workforce needs. As Gary Herrigel puts it, in the decades before the 
war, “there was tremendous ambiguity concerning the kind of production strat-
egy producers seemed to be pursuing, even within individual fi rms.”114
Th e incipient program to create a high-skilled German workforce did not 
achieve the clear resolution that the eff orts to organize the labor market did with 
the 1910 Job Placement law. Before the war, the pressures to reach a solution 
in regard to worker training were weaker than they were in the realm of public 
order, where the stakes were so high. Th e threat of foreign economic competition 
still seemed less salient, especially during economic boom times, than that com-
ing from strikes, lockouts, and agricultural interest groups’ protests.115 A skilled 
workforce’s contribution to domestic stability, as well as to economic vitality, 
would manifest itself only over years, if not decades. On the other hand, the 
restriction of private and partisan job placement to the benefi t of public offi  ces 
could produce immediate eff ects, as we saw in the previous chapter.
Additionally, within the Prussian administration there was not yet a consen-
sus about the purpose of youth education. Th e mistrust between industry and 
handicrafts permitted only a partial, if promising, resolution of worker training 
questions in the form of the 1897 Handwerk law. Th e Prussian Trade Ministry 
encouraged training in various ways, but these eff orts did not yet amount to 
national policy. Internally, too, industry was divided between those fi rms, es-
pecially in the machine-building and metal-working industries, which had the 
greatest interest in fostering a large group of skilled workers, and other manu-
facturers, who were indiff erent or opposed. For many in the latter category, the 
alluring vision of US-style rationalization kept fi rms from committing to worker 
training.
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Chapter 3
TOWARD TOTALERFASSUNG
Creating the National Labor Administration

Before 1914, Reich authorities had given no thought to mobilizing the country’s 
resources, including its workforce, for an extended war. Even during the confl ict’s 
fi rst two years, their steps remained extremely hesitant. From 1916 on, however, 
with the commitment to “total war,” Berlin began to intervene in the labor mar-
ket in radical ways. Th ese measures, their practical design and motivating spirit, 
did not spring ex nihilo, but rather were built on prewar trends. Nonetheless, war 
socialism altered those trajectories in signifi cant ways, casting the German labor 
force projects of the next four decades in distinctly military form.
In this chapter, we show how the Great War imprinted itself on these projects, 
above all through the creation of a rudimentary national labor administration in 
1916 under the conditions of total war and its elaboration after 1918, when the 
Social Democratic ascendancy and the necessity of surviving a victor’s peace cre-
ated propitious conditions for centralized control.
Desultory Adjustments and Political Maneuverings
Th e fi rst two years of the war witnessed only minor changes in the still variegated 
landscape of labor offi  ces that had emerged since the 1890s. Swept up in the era’s 
enthusiasm for planning, the German General Staff  had designed a detailed blue-
print for victory against France in exactly 42 days, to be followed by an equally 
decisive campaign against lumbering Czarist Russia.1 Th e “friction” of real battle 
(about which Clausewitz had warned) quickly made moot the prewar planning, 
Notes for this section begin on page 102.
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however. By November, the Germans found themselves bogged down in a static 
war of trenches in the west, while simultaneously engaging seemingly limitless, 
though poorly equipped and motivated, Russian forces in the east. Instead of 
quick, relatively painless victory, they now had to contend with a longer war of 
attrition.
German military and civilian authorities had given no thought to reorganizing 
the country’s economy for such a war. Th e confl ict’s immediate impact on the labor 
market was a sudden spike in unemployment for manual workers, as consumer 
production was curtailed in the summer of 1914, to more than 20 percent.2 In 
the fi rst month of fi ghting, the Interior Ministry and Statistical Offi  ce established 
coordination and informational clearing houses, respectively, both initiatives that 
quickly petered out.3 By the spring of 1915, once war production had begun to 
absorb ever-greater numbers of workers, unemployment among manual workers 
had returned to its prewar level.4 For the fi rst two years of the war, the Imperial 
government, still anticipating a quick conclusion of the confl ict and reluctant to 
intervene in the still politically delicate question of the labor exchanges, contin-
ued to take only cautious, haphazard steps to infl uence the labor market.
Th e Prussian authorities also were reluctant to introduce major reforms among 
the labor exchanges and limited themselves to encouraging greater cooperation 
between municipal and other non-commercial exchanges. Saxony took its cue 
from Prussia, while the southern states had already introduced greater centraliza-
tion among public exchanges (Baden and Wurttemberg) or now went further by 
compelling exchanges to report on their activities to the central state network 
(Bavaria).5
Military authorities, whose intervention in the labor market after 1916 would 
play the decisive role in preparing the ground for a national labor administration, 
also proceeded cautiously during the fi rst two years. By the fall of 1914, after the 
short period of adjustment-induced unemployment had ended, the shortage of 
manpower and its distribution between the army and industry had become in-
creasingly central and contentious issues of the German war eff ort. Exemptions 
from military service for essential skilled workers and employees’ freedom to seek 
better working conditions were key issues. But for the fi rst two years of war, the 
War Ministry’s interventions remained hesitant: the Ministry only encouraged 
employers to desist from competing for workers and to employ more youths and 
women to replace skilled males inducted to fi ght; it advocated, but did not man-
date, “war boards” modeled after the pioneer version in the Berlin metal-working 
industry, on which workers and employers jointly supervised workers’ petitions 
to change jobs and adjudicated complaints about working conditions.
More than any other kind of organized job placement, the municipal labor 
offi  ces benefi ted from the war economy. Numerous cities and towns, for the fi rst 
time, erected labor exchanges, thus continuing and accelerating a trend of the last 
two prewar decades. In part, they responded to state encouragement, but more 
generally cities took the initiative in response to the chaotic conditions of their 
local labor markets. Th e number of municipal labor offi  ces jumped from 361 in 
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1912 to 702 in the fi rst year of the war and to 731 in 1916.6 Extant offi  ces com-
bined in regional networks, which multiplied from 22 in 1912 to 188 in 1916.7 
Th ese increases, however, did not translate necessarily into irreversible gains in 
terms of the number or overall share of job placements. In Prussia, the number of 
placements by public offi  ces actually dropped, from 1.31 million in 1914 to 1.16 
million and to one million in the following two years.8 Nationally, the prewar 
trend of concentration within the realm of not-for-profi t exchanges continued, 
with public exchanges’ share of this category of placements rising between 1913 
and 1915 from 53 percent to 65 percent and 72 percent. In 1916, though, it fell 
again to 62 percent.9
Most other kinds of labor exchange, whether for profi t or not, fared even 
worse. As war production ramped up and companies scrambled to fi nd increas-
ingly scarce workers, the vast majority of people easily could fi nd work on their 
own. Because of the conscription of their own personnel, commercial job agen-
cies suff ered a severe blow.10 For the municipal offi  ces’ other main competitor, 
the employer-run agencies, the war likewise meant a serious setback. Th is resulted 
both from state action and, more importantly, from the breakdown of collective 
action under intense competition for labor. As early as 8 August 1914, the lead-
ing industrial organizations formed a joint War Committee of German Industry, 
one of whose functions was to be the distribution of workers among the sectors 
and fi rms.11 Within months, however, companies’ frantic search for workers, es-
pecially skilled ones, had undermined earlier professions of solidarity and even 
reduced the eff ectiveness of employer labor exchanges compared to other non-
profi t agencies. Additionally, sporadic bans by military authorities crippled some 
employer-run agencies.12 Th ough their share of all non-commercial placements 
eventually stabilized at 15 to 20 percent, this represented a signifi cant drop from 
prewar levels of more than 30 percent.13 Th us, both of the principal rivals of the 
municipal offi  ces lost ground during the war, as the latter grew rapidly in number 
and increased their share, if not their number, of placements.
From an early stage, advocates of public job placement—above all, the social-
ist unions and the public labor offi  ce movement—saw an opportunity to press 
their case. Despite the authorities’ only tentative measures to intervene in the 
labor market between 1914 and 1916, these advocates maneuvered to gain politi-
cal advantage from the wartime circumstances. Th e unpreparedness of the gov-
ernment at the beginning of the war and the resulting chaos of the “adjustment 
crisis” became one of their main arguments for greater public involvement in the 
transition to peace—and beyond. Th e public labor offi  ces (and their associations) 
welcomed the chance to work more closely with Prussian and Reich authorities. 
Indeed, they were even more eager to gain the government’s backing than the 
lat ter was to give it. At the fi rst meeting of the Prussian Association of Labor 
Exchanges since the outbreak of the war, the leadership unsuccessfully pressed 
the Prussian authorities to compel non-commercial exchanges to report their 
activities to the public offi  ces in order to provide the latter “a comprehensive view 
of the labor market.”14 Th e public labor exchange advocates eagerly embraced 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
70   |   Optimizing the German Workforce
the Prussian authorities’ call in October 1914 for the “substantial internal and 
external” development of public labor offi  ces into “an irreplaceable factor in the 
labor market.”15
Th e war, the boosters believed, had created especially propitious conditions 
for promoting the public offi  ces. Th e accelerated movement of workers into loca-
tions, fi rms, and vocations necessary for the war industry strengthened support 
for municipal labor offi  ces. While the iron was hot, the still numerous small, 
part-time placement offi  ces needed to be converted into full-fl edged, municipally 
run and funded, bureaus. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, the 
boosters sought to convince the Trade Ministry that seed money was crucial to 
overcome the cities’ initial reluctance to invest.16 By the following fall, in fact, the 
Prussian Finance Ministry had approved 80,000 marks for the “expedited exten-
sion of the network of local labor offi  ces.”17
Th e war also provided the public labor offi  ce boosters a welcome opportunity 
to expand the scope of their work. Since the turn of the century, some advocates 
had been pushing the labor exchanges to look beyond their focus on placing 
the unskilled worker in the fi rst job available, in particular by catering to skilled 
workers. Th e thousands of war-wounded, who streamed steadily from the front-
lines back to Germany beginning in the fall of 1914, now provided the labor 
offi  ces another opportunity to showcase their value. Roughly 5 percent of the in-
jured soldiers could not be made fi t to return to military service, but could still 
work again in some capacity.18 Th e leaders of the Prussian Labor Exchange As-
sociation urged their members to claim a role in the burgeoning fi eld of “war 
cripple welfare.” At their January 1915 meeting, which was devoted primarily to 
this topic, the chairman assessed the new tasks:
For the labor exchange, a broad, new, diffi  cult, but promising, fi eld can open up, if it is well 
prepared by the best healing-treatment and by counseling and psychological infl uencing of 
the wounded, as well as by vocational adaptation. [Th e labor offi  ce] must secure for itself 
infl uence over these preconditions, but above all improve its own capabilities, and [the vari-
ous offi  ces] need to appear on the scene in time and as simultaneously as possible.19
In addition to these eff orts behind the scenes to expand the scale and scope 
of public labor offi  ce work, the advocates also joined a more public campaign to 
reorganize the labor market led by the social-democratic unions. Th e “domestic 
truce” between all parties, the indispensability of industrial workers for the war 
eff ort, and the general ethos of a great national endeavor together had embold-
ened socialist leaders to press their advantage. Th e unions’ problems in wartime 
also reinforced their demands for a national labor organization. Union-run labor 
agencies, which already had been losing ground to the employer exchanges well 
before 1914, were hit hard by the outbreak of war. It will be recalled that ever 
since the turn of the century, the unions gradually had abandoned hopes for their 
own predominance in this fi eld and increasingly favored publicly run offi  ces with 
both union and employer participation as the next best alternative. During the 
war, the unions foreswore strikes, and in any case inductions and mass fl uctua-
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tions led to a severe weakening of local union power. As a result, union exchanges 
suff ered the greatest reduction in placements per exchange.20 Th ese setbacks fu-
eled the unionists’ determination to promote public organization of the labor 
exchanges.
On the initiative of the socialist unions, in March 1915, all of the major 
union groups, the infl uential Society for Social Reform, and the Association of 
German Labor Exchanges presented their proposals for a national organization of 
the labor market. Th ey demanded a national network of local and county labor 
exchanges to be run jointly by union and employer representatives and to be 
supervised by an Imperial Labor Offi  ce. In each district, the public labor offi  ce 
would supervise all of the others. Th ese steps were to culminate in the creation of 
“an encompassing organization in which job placement can develop in a unifi ed 
direction and which leads to an orderly cooperation of all labor exchanges.”21 In 
1910, all the parties of the Reichstag had supported the long-term goal of bring-
ing the labor market under the control of local public offi  ces, and the Social 
Democrats furthermore had emphasized the importance of centralization. Five 
years later, under the impact of the war, support for a centrally organized na-
tional labor organization, run jointly by the main economic interests and public 
authorities, extended beyond the union and Social Democratic camps. With the 
votes of the Social Democrats, Center, and Left Liberals—which was dubbed the 
“social policy bloc” and in 1919 would constitute the fi rst government of the new 
German Republic—the Reichstag recommended the proposal to the Imperial 
government. In the midst of the great national war eff ort, even some National 
Liberals and Conservatives, who reassured themselves that a public network of 
exchanges would in no way impinge on the other forms of labor offi  ce, overcame 
doubts to support the measure.22
At a major conference of all parties at the end of April, the government char-
acterized a new system of labor exchanges as “premature,” which dampened the 
prospects of immediate change, but left open the possibility of its accession to 
major reform over the long-term. Th e dissatisfaction of the unions and social 
reformers with what they perceived to be insuffi  cient measures led to a further 
appeal to the Reichstag a year later. Since a labor exchange law seemed to them 
to be nowhere in sight and the local approaches threatened to diverge ever more, 
they demanded a “temporary regulation,” including mandating labor exchanges 
in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants, regional information centers, and 
state offi  ces for job placement. Again the Reichstag recommended the measure 
to the Imperial government. Finally, in June 1916, the Bundesrat empowered 
the states to oblige communities to establish “neutral” labor exchanges. Only Ba-
varia, before the war already one of the more vigorous states in promoting labor 
exchanges, availed itself of the new option; Baden and Wurttemberg had gone 
further already on their own; Prussia gave discretion to its Regional Governors; 
and Saxony chose to do nothing.23
Th e fi rst two years of the war, then, saw the public labor exchanges gain at 
the expense of their main rivals, with persistent political maneuvering by their 
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backers, but only modest and tentative responses from the Prussian and Reich 
authorities. All of this changed in 1916.
Mobilizing for Total War
Th e ongoing military stalemate, exacerbated by unprecedentedly costly battles at 
Verdun and the Somme, brought about major changes in Germany’s war eff ort 
in the third year of confl ict. Th e new military leadership of Paul Hindenburg 
and Erik Ludendorff  wanted to ramp up materiel production and fully mobilize 
the country’s resources for what Ludendorff  now called “total war.” A new era of 
human confl ict was dawning: industrialized societies would steer all possible re-
sources toward victory. A lynchpin of the Hindenburg Program was the introduc-
tion of compulsory labor service through the Auxiliary Service Law, which the 
Reichstag passed in December 1916. Th is military innovation gave the German 
labor force projects a military cast for the next four decades.
Th e Auxiliary Service Law marked a turning point in the country’s social poli-
cies. In exchange for the unions’ acquiescence to universal labor duty for all men 
between the ages of 15 and 60, the employers had to permit the presence of 
labor boards, with extensive rights of consultation, in companies with more than 
50 employees. Th is step did not just prepare the ground for the epochal agree-
ment between labor and employers at the end of the war—the Central Working 
Association (Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft, ZAG) of 15 November 1918—and for 
the Weimar Constitution’s guarantee of workers’ boards in industrial companies. 
More crucially for our purposes, the Auxiliary Service Law and corollary decrees 
for the fi rst time created a national network of labor offi  ces, if only in rudimen-
tary form. Th ough the Service Law proved a disappointment in many ways and 
the labor offi  ces never worked as effi  ciently as planned, this precedent played a 
formative role in the construction of the postwar labor administration.
Th e Service Law for the fi rst time created a single national hierarchy of labor 
offi  ces, which it put at the service of the war eff ort. Th e War Ministry explained 
the need for an encompassing organization:
Th e need for consolidation of all non-commercial job placements becomes ever more ap-
parent. Th e requirement that the agencies report [their activities] no longer suffi  ces; it 
needs to be complemented by an organization that encompasses all offi  ces involved in sup-
plying the labor market and which gives them the opportunity to exploit entirely all their 
labor material for the labor market.24
Th e War Offi  ce’s regional bureaus (Kriegsamtsstellen) assumed offi  cial respon-
sibility for job placement. State and regional information exchanges (Zentra-
lauskunftstellen) were set up, to which local offi  ces were obliged to report. Non-
commercial exchanges could continue doing their work; however, the law created 
a new offi  ce in each locality, the Auxiliary Service Station (Hilfsdienstmeldestelle), 
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which, thanks to its role in placing those aff ected by the law, became the core of 
the new network. Consultative boards, including employers, union representa-
tives, and other interest groups, advised each of the new offi  ces. In towns and 
dis tricts with several extant non-profi t exchanges, they would all have to agree 
on the “most appropriate” agency to assume the role of Auxiliary Service Station; 
otherwise the War Offi  ce would appoint the public exchange to that role.25
Public labor exchanges benefi ted immensely from these measures. At the ex-
pense of their rivals, they achieved unprecedented offi  cial sanction and coordina-
tion. Th e backers of the public labor exchange movement, however, responded 
only ambivalently. On the one hand, they approved of the general trend toward 
public control of the labor market and called “above all for closer contact di-
rectly between the military authorities and the job placement associations.” Yet 
on the other, these largely municipal offi  cials disliked the imposition of “sche-
matic” regulations for the entire country, including the mandatory establishment 
of advisory boards.26 Calling upon the power of the central state, it was becoming 
increasingly clear, was a double-edged sword.
Th is incipient national labor administration embodied the drive for “organiza-
tion” and especially comprehensive control, the dawning aspiration of “complete 
control” (Totalerfassung). Before 1914, the promise of “organization” had exerted 
a powerful appeal for growing circles of bureaucrats and social policy advocates.27 
Now, domestic wartime politics and the imperative of victory—and even more 
so the specter of national collapse—vastly amplifi ed this kind of thinking. Again, 
both democratic and technocratic impulses pressed toward organization and 
complete inclusion. Th e deep, emotional appeal of national unity, fi nally achieved 
after decades of domestic strife, produced a massive wave of support for the idea 
of a “common economy” (Gemeinwirtschaft), as outlined by Wichard von Moel-
lendorf and Walther Rathenau, in which all interest groups would cooperate.28 In 
addition to this domestic, quasi-democratic appeal of organization, technocratic 
imperatives of effi  ciency vis-à-vis the goal of strategic victory loomed even larger, 
at least for the government offi  cials actually running the war eff ort.
Th e War Raw Materials Offi  ce, set up in the fall of 1914 at the suggestion of 
Moellendorf and Rathenau and led by the latter, aimed fi rst to survey (erfassen) 
all available resources and then decide on their distribution.29 Th ese early steps 
pointed the way toward ever broader measures of central planning, what became 
known as “war” or “state” socialism. As early as January 1915, a year and a half 
before Ludendorff ’s preparations for “total war” and three years before Walter 
Rathenau sketched the outlines of the postwar “new economy,” the Reich and 
Prussian Interior Minister responded to the English blockade by telling his col-
leagues: “Th e English starvation strategy must be opposed by the purposeful 
organization of all of economic life.”30 Similarly revealing of the connection be-
tween the war and ideas of Totalerfassung was the justifi cation of a law regarding 
the military preparation of youths. According to this, the voluntary youth wel-
fare programs were insuffi  cient since they “failed to include the entire popula-
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tion.”31 Th e Hindenburg Program and Auxiliary Service Law of 1916, inspired 
by the goal of conducting a “total mobilization” of resources, aimed to carry these 
ideas into practice. Government offi  cials and social reformers had become, by 
the second half of the war, so enamored of bureaucratic “organization” that Max 
Weber felt compelled to launch a blistering attack.32 Th e experience of national 
unity and the singular focus of a war of national survival, then, signifi cantly re-
inforced the earlier appeals of organization, especially in the comprehensive form 
of Totalerfassung.
Vocational Counseling’s Tasks in the War
While the war increased the number of public labor offi  ces and integrated their 
networks more tightly, it also allowed or compelled many of them to expand 
their activities, including forms of vocational counseling. Because of the unusual 
circumstances of war, however, vocational counseling, which aimed to promote 
regular apprenticeships, developed more haltingly and became the object of in-
tense interest only in the last year of the confl ict.
At the beginning of the war, the sharp spike in unemployment led municipal 
exchanges to actively search out open positions, to provide workers with neces-
sary accoutrements (transportation and clothing, for example), and to make work. 
However, the return of invalids from the front and, from the spring of 1915, the 
worsening labor shortage inspired myriad eff orts in other directions. With the 
growing length and human costs of the war, the future role of the war-wounded 
became a humanitarian and national economic issue of great import. Estimates 
of the percentage of war-wounded who would be unable to return to their earlier 
line of work ranged wildly, from 5 to 75 percent.33 As we have seen, the lead -
ership of the public labor offi  ce movement perceived the reintegration of war-
wounded into work as a “broad, new, diffi  cult, but promising, fi eld.” Even with-
out encouragement from above, many labor offi  ces had joined spontaneous, 
broad-based eff orts at the local level to address the challenge. As a representative 
of the Prussian Trade Ministry told a meeting of county offi  cers in July 1915 after 
a tour of the Rhineland and Westfalia,
Vocational counseling occurs in small localities through vocational counselors from all cir-
cles of the educated classes that have suffi  cient contact with practical life. In larger towns, 
special vocational counseling committees have been set up, which usually consist of doc-
tors, directors and teachers from trade schools, representatives of employers and employees 
from the particular vocation of the wounded person, representatives of professional associa-
tions, and of the labor exchanges.34
War-welfare offi  ces also established vocational counseling services. At the 
opening ceremony for one such offi  ce in Upper Silesia in May 1916, for ex-
ample, the region’s industrial inspector Friedrich Syrup, who after the war would 
become the fi rst head of the national labor administration, insisted that expert 
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vocational counseling be the foundation for the reintegration of the wounded 
into the working world and the Volksgemeinschaft.35
Amidst these myriad initiatives, the Trade Ministry sought to strengthen the 
role of the public labor offi  ces. When vocational counseling worked hand-in-
hand with the labor offi  ces, the Trade Ministry offi  cial impressed on the county 
representatives in July 1915, it was especially eff ective at placing war-wounded 
back in their old lines of work.36 Partly for this purpose, the Trade Ministry pushed 
(successfully) to increase funding substantially for the public offi  ces.37
Public labor offi  ces also began to evaluate healthy job seekers. In order to 
make up for the loss of skilled workers inducted to fi ght, industry was increas-
ingly drawing women and youths into the factories. Due to the importance of 
maintaining war production, the drastic reduction or even abolition of the ap-
prenticeship period, and the desire to reduce fl uctuation to a minimum, labor 
exchanges sought to evaluate the workers before placing them with a fi rm. Vo-
cational counseling offi  ces sprang up, on local initiative, in numerous cities, for 
example, in Magdeburg, Elberfeld, Halle, Nuremberg, Leipzig, and Breslau.38 
Under the circumstances—it was generally thought that the new workers would 
only be employed for the duration of the war and the work that they did was 
usually un- or semi-skilled—these offi  ces wanted to direct workers, on the basis 
of self-evaluations and evident physical characteristics, to positions where they 
could be productive, or at least to prevent egregious mismatches.
Such vocational offi  ces, inspired by the long-term goal of maintaining Ger-
many’s skilled workforce, also sought to steer young people into regular-length 
apprenticeships. For this, however, as the association responsible for Berlin and 
Brandenburg reported in early 1918, times were not propitious. Th e high sala-
ries paid for low-skilled factory work in the armaments industries and the high 
cost of living convinced a growing number of young people to forego training.39 
Th e war was exacerbating the very tendency the Prussian Trade Ministry sought 
to combat before 1914—youths opting for immediate fi nancial gratifi cation in 
unskilled work at the expense of a lifelong Beruf. Nonetheless, the public labor 
offi  ces made suffi  cient inroads in placing apprentices to turn this into a bone of 
contention (among several) in their struggle with employers’ exchanges, which 
fl ared up again after 1916.40
Direct military intervention played a more decisive role. Just as the Auxiliary 
Service Law was instrumental in creating a national infrastructure of public labor 
offi  ces, an important precedent in the establishment of a national network of 
vocational counseling offi  ces was the War Offi  ce’s order, on 29 February 1917, to 
all Auxiliary Service Stations to open vocational counseling offi  ces.41
Th e war’s exigencies, then, inspired numerous local eff orts to steer invalids and 
the unskilled into appropriate positions. For the standard vocational counseling 
of candidates for regular apprenticeships in skilled work, however, wartime con-
ditions were far from ideal. It remained to be seen whether the military’s estab-
lishment of vocational counseling offi  ces in the Auxiliary Service Stations would 
be carried over into the postwar.
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New Production Strategies, New Workers?
Th e direction and success of Germany’s labor force projects, we argued in the 
previous chapter, also would depend crucially on private interests, especially on 
industry and its production strategies, need for particular kinds of workers, and 
training programs. Th e war clearly shaped industry’s short-term behavior, but it 
also, more subtly and ambiguously, altered perceptions about the longer-term.
Over the course of the war, the composition of Germany’s industrial work-
force changed substantially. Th e army’s demand for male recruits, many of whom 
were skilled workers, compelled industry, especially after the turn in 1916 to total 
mobilization, to employ growing numbers of low-skilled women and youths. Be-
tween 1913 and 1918, the number of women and youths (of both sexes) younger 
than sixteen working in mid- and large-scale enterprises42 rose 52 percent and 
6 per cent respectively, while that of adult males fell 25 percent.43 Th e thorough 
training of apprenticed skilled-workers, which in the years before 1914 had be-
come more widespread in industry, generally fell victim to the exigencies of war 
production.44
Th e curtailing of production for civilian consumption and export and the 
increases of war-related output meant reorganizing production within companies 
and consolidating whole industries. Firms responded with various measures to 
what they considered to be only temporary disruptions of their normal produc-
tion patterns. Many companies tried to obtain exemptions from military duty 
for their skilled workers.45 When such eff orts proved to have only limited suc-
cess—as, in the long run, was almost always the case—companies had to adjust 
to an infl ux of low-skilled female and youth workers. Numerous fi rms developed 
programs of rapid on-the-job training. Whenever possible, these programs were 
fl anked by eff orts to simplify production processes by dividing skilled work into 
simpler, separate tasks and to introduce automated machinery.46 Th e nature of 
war materiel, especially of ammunition—identical pieces required in enormous 
quantities—lent itself to such low- or semi-skilled, automated work.
Th e enormous production increases mandated by the Hindenburg plan accel-
erated the shifts in manpower. Between the spring of 1916 and 1917, the skilled 
and semi-skilled share of the workforce at the machinery fi rm Borsig, for ex-
ample, dropped from 61 to 50 percent, while that of women, who were generally 
unskilled, jumped from 20 to 37 percent.47 Industrial associations, engineering 
organizations, and the War Offi  ce cooperated closely to facilitate the necessary 
adjustments. Negotiations between the Machine-Builders’ Association (VDMA) 
and the War Offi  ce led, in March 1917, to “guidelines for the training of assis-
tants for skilled work,” whose very fi rst injunction was “the greatest possible use 
of [mass production] so that skilled workers are mainly needed in preparatory 
and machine building work.”48 Th e VDMA, whose ranks were being swelled by 
mid-sized and small fi rms seeking shelter during turbulent times, spelled out the 
new priorities: due to the Hindenburg Program, war needs now had the highest 
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priority, and peacetime production simply would have to be postponed.49 Under 
the auspices of the Berlin branch of the Association of German Engineers, repre-
sentatives from leading fi rms subsequently held a series of well-attended meetings 
to disseminate best practices regarding “the use of unskilled workers by means 
of simplifying production … means for quickly training workers … and experi-
ences with female labor.”50 Th ey energetically pursued questions of rationalizing 
production more generally. Topics included fi xed-cost and unit-wage calculations, 
bookkeeping, the organization of supplies, precision work in workshops, and 
reducing waste in mass and series-production. Likewise on the initiative of the 
War Offi  ce, the Engineers’ Association (VDI) established a Norming Committee 
of German Industry in December 1917.51
Th ere is little evidence that companies viewed many of these often hastily 
improvised measures as directly relevant for the resumption of their normal pro-
duction in the postwar period. In addition to the extraordinary nature of pro-
duction for the army, whose needs often had little relation to civilian goods, the 
conscription into the army of numerous company engineers, technicians, and 
managers, whose expertise would be indispensable for a more permanent transi-
tion, meant that companies viewed many of the wartime improvisations as only 
temporary.52
Yet even as German industrialists adjusted to the immediate demands of the 
war economy, their thoughts turned to scenarios for the postwar world. Like their 
countrymen, few businessmen initially expected the war to last long. However, as 
early as the fi rst year, speculation that the war would cost Germany many skilled 
workers and hurt its industry’s standing sparked a heated debate among industri-
alists, exposing some early anxieties about the postwar.53 Anton Rieppel and Fritz 
Froelich, two of the prewar leaders of eff orts to organize industry’s vocational 
training eff orts, disputed the pessimistic assessment about damage to German 
industry. However, they too recognized that there likely would be shortages of 
skilled workers, shortages which would have to be compensated for by improve-
ments in the “inner organization” of production and by the mechanization of 
transport and support services.54 
By the third year of the stalemated war, industry’s angst about the postwar re-
mained, but it also remained within bounds. On top of concerns about a reduced 
supply of skilled workers, the war’s interruption of trade relations also brought 
fears about lost markets and new competitors, such as Japan.55 VDMA mem-
bers, the chairman Kurt Sorge reported, expected the postwar economy to be 
“diff erent.”56 Much attention focused on the likelihood that in the increasingly 
competitive international environment, German industries like machine-build-
ing, which had maintained an exceptionally broad palette, increasingly would 
have to specialize.57 In regards to the makeup of the workforce, machine-building 
fi rms foresaw a more variegated composition than before. Th ey reported having 
had “the most unfavorable experiences” with unskilled youths. And while they 
had some doubts about the precision and endurance of female laborers, as well as 
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about their broader political impact, they agreed that “working women will not 
disappear all that quickly. Th e rows of welding women created by the war will 
remain a phenomenon of peacetime for some time to come.”58 Th e prospect was 
not especially worrisome: the chairman of the VDMA reported that the major-
ity of fi rms, at least in the spring of 1917, still expected a “favorable” economic 
climate after the war.59
Indeed, the wartime pressure for mass production coincided with a genuine 
eagerness for rationalization on the part of many German industrialists and engi-
neers that built on prewar interest in the same. Th e veritable explosion of coop-
erative eff orts in the last year of the war is otherwise hard to explain. If the War 
Offi  ce launched these initiatives with war production in mind, civilian authori-
ties and industrialists embraced them with an eye to peacetime production. In 
the spring of 1918, the newly created Reich Economics Offi  ce of its own accord 
encouraged the Engineers’ Association to investigate the rationalization of pro-
duction. Th e participating Berlin fi rms expressly viewed the work not primarily 
as part of the war eff ort, but as necessary in light of the anticipated problems of 
the postwar economy, especially the heightened international competition.60
Unlike the often-improvised eff orts to incorporate new workers and methods 
at the company level, these cooperative endeavors, launched by the War Offi  ce 
and enthusiastically pursued by (Berlin) industrialists, had a more lasting impact 
on the evolution of the labor force projects. Th e enthusiasm for reducing work 
to its simplest possible components, but especially for cooperating in establishing 
industrial norms and rationalizing various aspects of the organization of produc-
tion, focused German industrialists’ interests on the possibilities of technical and 
organizational improvements. War production, then, gave an enormous intellec-
tual and organizational boost to eff orts by fi rms to cooperate on “rationalization” 
measures and on implementing national industrial norms, steps that had been 
pursued increasingly by individual fi rms since at least the turn of the century.
Industrialists’ commitment to mass production was neither universal nor un-
ambiguous, however. Even for the sake of war production itself, some employers 
allowed for little possibility or desirability of replacing skilled workers. Th e meet-
ings organized from March 1917 by the VDI in Berlin to consider rationalization 
measures revealed a split among participants. While one grouping wanted to 
re duce the number of skilled Facharbeiter as much as possible and utilize un-
skilled workers for mass production, another one “emphasized the diffi  culties 
and pointed to the impossibilities [of doing this] in some parts of the machine-
building industry.”61 Th ese disagreements over production for the war echoed 
the longer-term ambivalence about the future direction of Germany’s production 
and workforce that we saw earlier. During the national emergency, the advocates 
of skilled work organized in DATSCH had suspended, for all practical purposes, 
their activities.62 If many individual companies made eff orts to preserve as much 
of their core skilled workforces as possible, it was only in the last year of the war 
that collective eff orts to promote vocational training began again—largely on the 
initiative of the Prussian Trade Ministry, as we will see below.
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Battling over the Postwar
Nobody knew, of course, when or how the war would end. But especially after 
the crises over war aims and domestic reform in mid 1917, preparations acceler-
ated for the return of some kind of peace. More pressing than the question of 
the nature of the postwar society was that of the transition, and in particular of 
the demobilization and reintegration of millions of soldiers. Looming over the 
deliberations was the widespread expectation that organized labor would play a 
much larger role after the war.
Even assuming a German victory and hence greater control over the condi-
tions of transition, which were common starting points for all of the planners, 
the demobilization of six million soldiers and the conversion from war to civilian 
production would be a daunting task.63 It would also be tremendously impor-
tant: the hordes of returning soldiers might pose a severe threat to public order, 
and failure to reintegrate them could threaten the country’s economic well-being. 
Th e chaos of the adjustment crisis in 1914/5 served as a powerful stimulus to 
prepare more thoroughly for the reverse transition. Staff  in the Reich Economics 
Offi  ce, which had been hived off  from the Interior Ministry in October 1917 
and favored the continuation of some kind of state socialism, and the War Offi  ce 
drew up assessments of how quickly civilian industries would recover and be able 
to absorb their former workers. Imbalances would be unavoidable, including un-
employment due to a postwar depression alongside scarcity of workers in some 
sectors. Th e key, the planners thought, was to manage in as orderly a manner as 
possible a return to something like the status quo ante distribution of workers. As 
one War Offi  ce Board expressed this extension of the wartime mobilization men-
tality into demobilization, “the entire reconstruction of the German economy 
depends mainly on the proper allocation of the labour at our disposal.”64
Even as the Economics and War Offi  ces and others drew up plans for an or-
derly demobilization, other ministries, politicians, and interest groups debated 
what would come after that transition. In regard to the labor market, at least, a 
measure of consensus existed about some general contours of the postwar situ-
ation: the working class, whose cooperation had been decisive in the war eff ort, 
likely would enjoy more infl uence, and public authorities would be even more 
prominent than earlier. However, even among those parties and interests support-
ing these general positions, telling diff erences remained about what they would 
mean in practice. Th is applied both to job exchanges, which were now discussed 
in relation to comprehensive chambers of labor (as they had been in 1909–10) 
and to vocational counseling.
Support for some kind of public labor exchange system, or at least the tol-
eration of it, had spread beyond the “social policy bloc” of Socialists, Catholics, 
and Left Liberals. Since late 1917, industrialists, who regarded cooperation with 
organized labor as less objectionable than greater state interference in the econ-
omy, had been negotiating with the unions, among other things, over the future 
system of labor exchanges. In 1917, the industry-friendly National Liberals had 
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joined nearly every other party in the Reichstag in support of a resolution calling 
for parity-based labor exchanges. Even Conservatives in the Prussian Parliament, 
taking their cue from Handwerk’s volte-face (see below), had shown themselves 
open to negotiation on public labor offi  ces.65 If, in the 1910 legislation restricting 
commercial job agencies, all of the major parties only indirectly had expressed 
support for public labor offi  ces, four years of war had produced a consensus of a 
more explicit kind.
Yet, a general agreement that public labor offi  ces would be more important 
after the war than they were before it hardly resolved numerous divisive ques-
tions about particulars. Would the local offi  ces be independent or subordinate 
to a national hierarchy?66 What role would public authorities play as opposed 
to employers and unions? Would the public offi  ces have a monopoly, or would 
others—in particular, the employers’ exchanges—continue to function?67 More 
generally, to what extent would the letter or spirit of the Auxiliary Service Law 
shape the peacetime labor administration?
Negotiations taking place outside of parliament provided at least some pre-
liminary answers by the fall of 1918. As the German army’s position on the west-
ern front deteriorated with increasing rapidity, power within Germany shifted 
away from the government and toward major interest groups, above all the la-
bor unions. Th e bargain reached in November between the socialist unions and 
industry—the Central Working Association (ZAG)—would form part of the 
“real framework of the Weimar Republic”68 and its corporatist compromise. In 
return for the unions’ acceptance of a basically capitalist economy, the employ-
ers granted their counterparts offi  cial recognition, the promise of an eight-hour 
workday, and arbitration committees to hammer out industrial social policy.
Since April 1918, representatives of the employers and unions also had met 
with the Imperial Economic Offi  ce to discuss the future system of labor ex-
change.69 In early October, the Economic (or now Labor) Offi  ce wrote the Prus-
sian Ministry of Trade to request the latter’s views on a draft of a law on labor 
exchanges agreed on by labor and employers at a meeting on September 28. Th e 
brief draft foresaw exchanges run on a parity basis by labor and employers, with-
out addressing other questions.70
By this date, however, at the request of the employers and unions, a new offi  ce 
with far-reaching powers had been created to supervise the potentially chaotic 
transition from a war- to a peace-footing: the Imperial Offi  ce for the Economic 
Demobilization.71 Its impact on the long-term nature of the labor exchange sys-
tem remained to be seen.
In the meantime, signifi cant progress had been made in regard to vocational 
counseling, at least in Germany’s dominant state. As we have seen, the war econ-
omy’s disruption of regular apprenticeships had left little room for the Trade 
Ministry’s program of promoting skilled work. However, in late 1917, a political 
initiative of crafts representatives provided the Prussian Ministry for Trade with 
the welcome opportunity to plan more consciously the postwar system of voca-
tional counseling.
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Th e occasion for the Trade Ministry’s eff orts came from Handwerk. Th e war 
economy, by steering demand away from smaller producers of civilian goods and 
toward the large-scale suppliers of military hardware, had caused the crafts sec-
tor particular hardship and exacerbated its sense of vulnerability to industry.72 
At their convention in 1917, the Crafts and Business Chambers had abandoned 
their long-standing opposition to outside interference and called on the state to 
create a system of vocational counseling that would steer a suffi  cient number of 
youths to apprenticeship positions in the crafts. As the unions and even some in 
industry had done before the war in regard to labor offi  ces, a particular group’s 
weakness now led it to seek redress through the ostensibly neutral authority of 
the state. In mid November 1917, the Conservative Party in the Prussian House 
of Representatives proposed a bill based on the Crafts Chambers’ demands, 
which would establish public offi  ces at the local, regional, and state levels for 
the purpose of providing vocational counseling. Craft representatives would be 
guaranteed “an outstanding infl uence.”
However, if the motivation for the bill was sectarian, its spirit was hardly a 
narrow one. Contrary to the still prevalent view of Prussian Conservative eco-
nomic policy as invariably defensive-minded and backward looking, the legis-
lation’s sponsor, Representative Hammer, justifi ed it in terms of a broadminded 
national strategy. After the war, he said, Germany would have to rely on sell-
ing “high quality goods on the world market.”73 Th is was precisely the strategy 
of modernizing Germany’s handicrafts sector in the interest of exporting high-
quality goods, which the Center Party, led by Karl Trimborn and the Prussian 
Trade Ministry, had been promoting for two decades.
After the Conservative Party conceded an equal voice in the local commit-
tees to other industrial interests, the Prussian House of Representatives voted 
unanimously for the bill calling on the Prussian authorities to create a system of 
universal vocational counseling.74 Coming at a time of growing concern about 
the war’s eff ects on the fabric of German society, these parliamentary discussions 
about integrating youths into the economy resonated widely.
Th e Conservative initiative on vocational counseling was most welcome, of 
course, to the Trade Ministry. Before parliamentary negotiations had taken place, 
the Ministry took the opportunity of the Conservatives’ motion to pursue a “fun-
damental” discussion of vocational counseling.75 Th e Ministry’s position, as fi rst 
laid out by the head of the State Industrial Offi  ce (LGA), began by arguing in 
broad terms for the imperative of a new “ordering of the labor market.” Th ese 
arguments made the case for the failure of a system of purely free trade and, in-
stead, proposed a signifi cantly expanded role for the state in ensuring the quality 
of Germany’s workforce. Th is position paper represents the fi rst exposition of the 
rationale and scope of at least part of Germany’s future labor force project. In 
particular, it showed how the war had brought the individualistic and “organiza-
tional” strands of thought much closer together.
Th e paper opened with a consideration of the necessary limits to economic 
freedom:
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Th e present order of labor is based since the Stein-Hardenberg legislation on the funda-
ment of commercial freedom. Th e hope of an earlier time that economic life would regulate 
itself for the best through the free play of forces has not been fully fulfi lled. Substantial 
reductions of freedom, therefore, became necessary for the protection of the common good 
and the weak. What remains are the foundations of legal equality, free movement, and 
the freedom to choose a vocation. Th e individual can search out the position in economic 
life that seems to him to be the best and to be achievable.… Th e individual must himself 
support the success of his economic work. With vocational counseling it cannot be a mat-
ter of relieving the individual and his family of this responsibility; quite the opposite, one 
must try to enable the counseling to stand, much more than at present, with professional 
advice at the side of the individual, who has no idea how to take advantage of the almost 
unlimited possibilities.
It then distinguished the modern developments relevant for vocational choice:
[W]hile in rural and small-town conditions the young person knows his future vocational 
work through his own activity or at least through his own observations, in the big city 
this is no longer the case. Workplace and home are usually separated and the factory walls 
almost totally close off  the most important work places from youths. Especially the rural 
workers who look for work in the city do not know [their] future living and working condi-
tions. Above all, people who are entering a vocation and their parents lack an overview of 
the labor market, working conditions, and economic prospects of the individual vocations. 
Individual fashionable vocations (such as machinist, electro-technician, and during the 
war also food trades) are preferred. Th e crush into untrained work, which promises rapid 
earnings but correspondingly poor future chances, is overly large. Desk jobs are sought 
since they are seen as refi ned. For other promising branches, including especially crafts, the 
next generation is missing. In choice of vocation the particular requirements placed on the 
physical and mental suitability are often disregarded.
Th e ramifi cations could be severe, both for the individual and for the society as 
a whole.
Th e consequence of such an ill-considered vocational choice is that economic damages for 
the apprentice and the master occur, that the health of the young people is endangered 
above and beyond the unavoidable, and that much good will is wasted and the hoped-for 
success of the apprenticeship does not materialize. Th e damages thus infl icted on economic 
life and on the Volk cannot be quantifi ed, but they are undoubtedly extraordinarily great.
Th e war now made it all the more imperative to address these problems, in par-
ticular by distributing workers effi  ciently.
[T]he construction of our economy after the war demands the most purposeful distribu-
tion of labor possible and a vocational selection which brings the most suited into the right 
vocation. Th is means, fi rst of all, obtaining the necessary number of workers for agricul-
ture, who can replace the work of the fallen and the badly-wounded and who make the 
work of the prisoners-of-war unnecessary. Furthermore, the crafts branches urgently need 
more young people, as due to wartime conditions the number of apprentices has dwindled 
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and the quality of training has suff ered gravely. Equally, industry must insure that a suffi  -
ciently numerous stock of trained workers is created, which can adapt quickly and produce 
high-quality work. Furthermore, it will be necessary to give good advice to those women 
who may need to change vocations in case their work becomes available thanks to the re-
turn of the men from the fi eld, and to make sure that they can be used in the right place in 
agriculture, household-work, trade or business. For all of these tasks, a planned vocational 
counseling is absolutely necessary.76 
Th e Trade Ministry’s paper articulated the program it had pursued for at least 
the past twenty years. It wanted to prevent as many young people as possible 
from taking the “easier” route into unskilled work and into sectors that distorted 
the balance of the economy. Instead, it aimed to lead them into skilled work, 
where they could contribute to high-quality production.
However, in addition to these obvious continuities, some new emphases had 
emerged under the impact of the war. Th e Trade Ministry now acknowledged 
more frankly than before the necessary limits to economic freedom. It also ad-
opted an “organizational” and “distributionist” way of thinking: as with raw ma-
terials or soldiers for the war, workers needed to be put in the proper place. Th ese 
latter tendencies would only be amplifi ed when the defeat in the war made the 
economic recovery considerably more diffi  cult.
Th e position paper went on to delineate the “tasks of vocational counseling”:
Seen from the standpoint of the economy as a whole, vocational counseling is a matter of 
purposefully fi tting people into the vocational world. For a start the basic principle of sup-
ply and demand is decisive; above and beyond that a distribution should be sought that, 
according to the principle of vocational selection, directs the most suitable workers to the 
individual vocations.
Again, the Ministry acknowledged the potential confl ict between the needs of 
the individual and of the collectivity.
Seen from the point of view of the individual, vocational counseling has the task of supply-
ing to each person as much as possible the position in economic life that best corresponds 
to his inclinations, his abilities, and his economic situation and that off ers advantageous 
possibilities of development. Both purposes can undoubtedly come into confl ict.
It assumed, however, that economic circumstances—in short, the economy’s 
need for particular kinds of workers and the individual’s need for security—would 
overcome any discrepancies: within the limits set by their abilities, workers would 
choose—or could be guided to—the most materially rewarding work, regardless 
of their “inclinations.”
In reality, the opposition will only rarely become sharply apparent for vocational counsel-
ing, since for the individual as well as for the totality normally the economic situation 
will be of decisive importance. Th is [situation], therefore, must be observed above all by 
vocational counseling.
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Finally, the memo expressed the Ministry’s views on the necessarily compre-
hensive scope of the program: it needed to be established on the basis of “com-
plete inclusion” (Totalerfassung).
[All people entering the vocational world must undergo vocational counseling.] Only thus 
will it be possible to work to keep the number of untrained workers as low as at all possible 
given the economic situation, to prevent ill-considered changes of vocation, and to assure 
a purposeful choice of new work.
And the memo justifi ed achieving Totalerfassung by law. Without legal com-
pulsion, the Ministry argued, the development of a system of vocational counsel-
ing “would take years and years.” As early as its 1910 position paper advocating 
expansion of vocational counseling, the Prussian Trade Ministry had argued for a 
“comprehensive” approach. Still, before the war there was no overt call for “com-
plete inclusion.” By 1918, however, the wartime example of the mobilization of 
the country’s resources for total war and the much more tangible sense of the 
threat to the nation had converted the advocates of individual improvement into 
fervent supporters of a legally mandated Totalerfassung.
Th e paper laid out plans for the organization of comprehensive vocational 
counseling. A nationwide system of uniform vocational counseling stations should 
be created. Th ese needed to exist not only in large cities, but most crucially in the 
countryside as well, which still needed to maintain a farm population, but which 
would in the coming years transfer laborers to industry.
Important questions, however, remained unsettled even in the Ministry’s eyes. 
Th e question of fi nancing would be decisive, the paper noted tersely. Th e memo 
argued for a three-tiered structure: fi eld and provincial bureaus, as well as an Im-
perial Offi  ce. However, the memo only suggested that the national offi  ce might 
be associated with the Imperial Offi  ce for Labor Statistics. As for the fi eld sta-
tions, the paper limited itself to noting several possibilities: they could be part 
of the youth offi  ces now in planning (though the task of the latter seemed quite 
diff erent); or part of the labor exchanges; or they could exist as independent 
institutions. On this matter, the other departments of the Ministry expressed 
their only signifi cant disagreement with the State Industrial Offi  ce’s analysis: vo-
cational counseling, they argued, should be associated with the labor exchanges. 
Th eir reasoning was, above all, pragmatic: the labor offi  ces already existed in the 
countryside.77
Th e Trade Ministry acted quickly to capitalize on the new consensus in sup-
port of vocational counseling. Within days of the Prussian Lower House’s ap-
proval of the bill authorizing the establishment of universal vocational counseling 
on 10 March 1918, the Trade Minister informed the regional governors that “in 
order to counteract the threatening spread of unskilled labor among the young 
and to promote the supply of apprentices to the crafts, industry, and trade, I in-
tend to promote the planned expansion of vocational counseling stations.”78
Key Prussian ministries met on September 11 to hammer out a proposal for 
a Federal Council Order—or at least for a Prussian solution. Representatives 
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from the Ministries of Trade, Finance, Education, and Agriculture all agreed on 
key elements: a Federal Council Order, which after the war was to be replaced 
by a Reich law in conjunction with one on a national system of labor exchanges, 
would mandate vocational counseling centers that were to be attached to labor 
exchanges. Th eir purpose would be to encourage the young to begin skilled ap-
prenticeships and, conversely, to limit land-fl ight and entry into unskilled work.
In addition to these ministerial maneuverings over labor administration and 
vocational counseling, the last year of the war also witnessed eff orts, however 
modest, to revive the prewar project of coordinating industry’s vocational train-
ing. Th e Prussian Trade Ministry took the initiative. In October 1917, its In-
dustrial Offi  ce (LGA) invited the managing director of DATSCH and VDMA, 
Friedrich Froelich, to discuss its worries that, after the war, young industrial 
workers would not receive suffi  cient training because industry would be facing 
stiff er international competition and hence not have the resources to support 
training. Among other things, it broached the possibility that, under the auspices 
of the Trade Ministry, larger fi rms might contribute to a fund allowing medium 
and small-sized fi rms to train young workers.79 Th e Trade Ministry furthermore 
secured the agreement of the Prussian and Reich fi nancial ministries that endow-
ments established for such a purpose would be tax deductible,80 and applied re-
newed pressure on Handwerk to cooperate with industry in the perennially tricky 
issue of testing and certifying apprentices.81
In the last year of this transformative war, then, it became increasingly clear 
that some kind of national (or at least Prussian) systems of public labor exchanges 
and vocational counseling would dominate the postwar. Yet many particular fea-
tures, above all regarding the degree of central control and the balance between 
interest groups and government, remained undecided. How strongly would the 
Auxiliary Service Law, the embodiment of military subordination, also infl uence 
peacetime? Even less clear was whether German industry would develop a coher-
ent policy in regard to its workforce. All of these plans and measures assumed 
a German victory in the war and a more or less controlled demobilization. It 
remained to be seen how the labor force projects would develop when events 
turned out otherwise.
Defeat, Demobilization, and National Survival
Germany’s military and then political collapse in the fall of 1918 came unexpect-
edly for most Germans, including the authorities. Th e rapid dissolution of the 
army and then armistice on November 11 confronted the authorities with enor-
mous practical problems. Above all, they had to demobilize six million soldiers 
and help place them back in work, while facilitating the economy’s shift from 
war- to civilian production. As the authorities had only drawn up demobilization 
plans for the aftermath of a German victory, all of these measures had to be im-
provised under the most diffi  cult of circumstances.82 For all that, the transition 
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occurred remarkably smoothly: unemployment did jump quickly, but at its peak, 
in January 1919, it still amounted to only 6 or 7 percent of the workforce. Five 
months later, it had fallen to 2.5 percent.83 Th e Reich Offi  ce (later Ministry) for 
the Economic Demobilization, created in November 1918, and endowed with 
far-reaching powers, resorted to many of the measures the government had used 
in August 1914 to combat that surge of unemployment: it sought to “stretch” 
the available work by limiting working hours, creating make-work programs, 
and eventually compelling employers to rehire their former workers who had re-
turned from the war. Th ough the central Demobilization Ministry was dissolved 
in April 1919, the measures described above, as well as others regulating company 
behavior, remained in eff ect longer, some until as late as 1924.84 Th e demobiliza-
tion regulations, which in eff ect extended aspects of the wartime control of the 
economy several years into peacetime, conditioned the establishment, between 
1919 and 1922, of the centralized labor offi  ce system. Many of the practices of 
the Auxiliary Service Law, in other words, survived the end of the war.
If the demobilization procedures applied wartime controls, often in ad hoc 
ways, to the practical problems of transition, Germany’s political and economic 
travails in the postwar also promoted grander visions of national salvation, rein-
forcing the tendency to perpetuate wartime institutions and mentalities. Even for 
many of the Germans who welcomed the prospects of constitutional and social 
reform, the shock of defeat engendered a persistent, terrifying sense of the vulner-
ability of the nation. Th e moderate German Democratic Party captured the bleak 
mood in its December 1918 election rally: “Th e old governmental system in Ger-
many has collapsed. Th ree million dead and invalids, the sacrifi ce of the greater 
part of our national wealth, the losses of our merchant fl eet and foreign trade, 
hunger and misery—all this characterizes the fi eld of rubble that a failed foreign 
and domestic politics has left us with.”85 Such despair off ered fertile ground for 
promises of comprehensive recovery.
Th e political upheavals of postwar Germany that began in the fall—from 
parliamentarization of government in October to the fundamental agreements 
between the Social Democrats and the Army, and between the unions and the 
employers in the Central Working Association (ZAG), and the soldiers’ and 
workers’ revolts across the country and subsequent proclamation of a republic in 
November—facilitated the establishment of a vocation-centered reform program 
in several ways. For the business community, as for the entire bürgerlich camp, 
the prospect of a political lurch into socialism seemed deeply troubling, if no 
longer avoidable. While the agreements of November suggested that the Social 
Democrats and socialist unions were intent on compromise and not revolution, 
the specter of socialism continued to haunt the bourgeoisie. Th e Spartacists and 
the new German Communist Party (KPD), radicalized by the war, revolution 
in Russia, and the cautious and conciliatory policies of the mainstream Social 
Democrats, rallied revolutionary forces throughout Germany. In the winter of 
1918/19, radicals took power in numerous cities, asserted control of factories, 
and fought on the streets. Opposition to these radicals united moderate Social 
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Democrats and Free Trade Union, represented by men such as Friedrich Ebert 
and Carl Legien, with the bourgeois parties. Furthermore, both the moderate 
Social Democrats and the middle-class parties traced much of the support for 
radicalism to the untrained youths whose numbers had proliferated during the 
war. Th ey agreed that allegiance to a vocation—the prescription that had been at 
the heart of municipal and academic reformers’ and the Prussian Trade Ministry’s 
vision since the Kaiserreich and which the skilled workers who dominated the 
Free Trade Union supported—could stem the tide toward revolution. Compre-
hensive vocational counseling, they thought, could be an essential element in 
restoring the order that so many Germans longed for after 1918.86 In such cal-
culations, central control of such a program often appeared—even to bourgeois 
elements otherwise opposed to planning—as a necessary component.
In fact, centralization and planning per se attracted adherents from well be-
yond the socialist left, as they already had before 1914. Th e war had evoked a 
schizophrenia in this regard among the German public and its moderate political 
parties. At war’s end, most individuals yearned to be free of the particular com-
pulsory measures (food rationing, job restrictions) they had lived with since 1914 
or 1916.87 Yet when it came to debates over the future economic order, there 
was considerable public pressure in the form of press commentary and street 
demonstrations for Vergesellschaftung—socialization—of some kind.88 Th e bürger-
liche parties in the Weimar coalition—the center and the left liberal DDP—were 
themselves riven over the future organization of the economy, with a considerable 
fraction especially of the Center supportive of a new direction.89 Th e strongest 
single party, the Social Democrats, of course, advocated moving toward social-
ism in principle, but in practice the party had given little thought to concrete 
economic questions, and its leadership vacillated—leaving plenty of room for 
bureaucratic inertia and initiative.90
Plans to nationalize heavy industry were buried in a commission, but un-
til mid 1919, the Economics Ministry propagated Wichard von Moellendorf ’s 
ideas for an immediate transition to a corporatist “common economy.”91 While 
the SPD itself ultimately rejected Moellendorf ’s ambitious plans, in July 1919 
it nonetheless called for the socialization of those industries ready for it and for 
monopolization of others.92 Th e Weimar Constitution of August 1919, which 
had to strike a balance among the divergent views of the three coalition partners, 
promised a considerable growth of centralized power and the welfare state, as well 
as a diminution of owners’ prerogatives, and it held the door open for economic 
coordination on a national scale (through a Reich Economic Council). Both the 
possibility of far-reaching socialization and the actual, in their eyes exorbitant, ex-
pansions of the welfare state and encroachments on managerial sway contributed 
to a bourgeois sense of vulnerability. However, the possibility of state interference 
in the economy could make corporatist cooperation with the unions appear to be 
the lesser of two evils in employers’ eyes.93 As we shall see when we consider the 
creation of the Labor Administration, this calculation made restrictions on the 
free market for labor more palatable to the industrialists.
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Even more than the political threats to order, however, it was Germany’s dire 
economic situation after the war that dramatically intensifi ed visions of cultivat-
ing the nation’s human resources. Th is was especially the case after the imminent 
threat of revolution had been banished by the spring of 1919. Even before the 
Versailles Treaty, many costs of the war were apparent, and they reinforced the 
widely held sense that Germany, and in particular its postwar economy, would 
bear a heavy burden. Between 1914 and 1918, Germany had spent or squan-
dered its wealth in various ways: most obviously, in terms of its physical capital, 
its people, its trade connections, and the value of its money. Th e conversion from 
civilian to war production and the imperative of immediate output had distorted 
and run-down Germany’s machine-park.94 Besides the war dead, the most visible 
reminder and instance of the costs of war, however, were the roughly 2.7 million 
war-wounded with a permanent disability,95 who would require either a pension 
or help in reentering the workforce. Th e war had also severed Germany’s ties to its 
export markets, which had fueled the economic expansion of the Kaiserreich and 
whose restoration remained uncertain. Finally, the government’s fi nancial poli-
cies during the war had reduced the value of the German mark by nearly three-
quarters.96 Th is infl ation, which continued after 1918 and would reach far more 
dramatic proportions in 1923, undercut the fi nancial maneuvering-room of the 
state and the ability of industry to make capital investments.97 Each of these 
losses, to its physical capital, people, trade, and currency, signifi cantly reinforced 
the old German, and especially Prussian, conviction that the country would have 
to utilize most economically its remaining resources.
Th e Treaty of Versailles, which the Germans reluctantly agreed to in July 1919, 
dramatically strengthened this grim conviction. With the exception of the radical 
left, Germans united in excoriating the terms of the “diktat.” In addition to the 
war-guilt clause and the drastic reduction in the size of its army, the immedi-
ate and longer-term economic costs seemed to many Germans to threaten the 
very survival of their country. Germany lost signifi cant portions of its territory, 
including the Polish Corridor and part of industrial Silesia in the east and the 
ore-rich Alsace-Lorraine and coal-endowed Saarland in the west; the Rhineland 
would be occupied for fi fteen years.98 From this lessened material base, Germany 
would have to pay war reparations over seventy years that were initially pegged 
at 269 billion marks, or nearly thirty times the annual GDP.99 Even before these 
fi gures had been determined, the joint condemnation of the treaty by the em-
ployers and unions of the ZAG suggested both the depth of bitterness to the 
terms of the peace and how that opposition could draw diff erent German camps 
to a common position:
Th e industrious Volk stands deeply shaken under the impression of the enemy’s peace con-
ditions … Before us … we see the death sentence of German economic and collective 
life. Th e theft of our colonies and all of our foreign possessions as well as a hundred other 
stipulations of the peace conditions deprive us of our rights internationally. Th e taking of 
the most indispensable German raw materials areas and of our trading fl eet, along with the 
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other aspects of the paralyzing of our economic life, deprives us of work. Th e tearing away 
of great and fertile territories, the imposition of monstrous burdens, and the cutting-off  
from the world market deprives us of bread.100
Th is dire situation produced and sustained that rarest of things in polarized 
postwar Germany: a broad consensus. Almost without exception, political parties 
from across the spectrum, interest groups, the press, and public acclaimed the op-
timal use of Germany’s most signifi cant remaining resource—its people and their 
labor—to be of vital national interest. When all of the parties in the Prussian 
parliament agreed in 1920 to increase the funding for vocational counseling, for 
example, a representative of the SPD put the measure in the context of Walther 
Rathenau’s ideas on the “new economy”: under current circumstances, the head 
of the electrical giant AEG and leading planner of Germany’s wartime central-
ized economy had argued, “no machine may pause, no material resource may go 
unused, no hand may rest.”101 Th e widespread conviction of the vital national 
importance of the conscious husbanding of Germany’s human wealth found ex-
pression through the suddenly ubiquitous—and apparently immediately com-
prehensible—terms “human economies” (Menschenökonomie) and “economizing 
with people” (mit Menschen wirtschaften). Th e former term was, in fact, not new. 
In 1908, Rudolf Goldscheid had coined the phrase in the title of his book De-
velopment Value Th eory, Development Economics, Human Economies: A Program, 
in which the reform-minded sociologist had argued against the utilization of hu-
man labor for maximal short-term gains, and instead pleaded for a broader and 
longer-term conception of productivity and human well being. As we argued in 
earlier chapters, the idea of utilizing Germany’s resources more—or most—effi  -
ciently had gained ground in numerous spheres, especially since the 1890s. After 
World War I, however, these and similar phrases became a universal leitmotiv of 
German thinking. Th ey appeared frequently and with wholly positive connota-
tion in the literature of the employers’ associations, of the free unions, of leading 
social reformers, in the popular press, and in government circles.102
Th e ideas these terms expressed and the elements of the human economies 
were expressly linked to the most serious questions of Germany’s future: while 
before the war, vocational counseling had been seen primarily in terms of youth 
welfare, the head of the Labor Offi  ce explained in September 1920, now “seri-
ous macroeconomic considerations” had to be considered.103 Th at his comment 
in fact misrepresented the motives of earlier reformers, especially in the Prus-
sian Trade Ministry, suggests the perceived direness of the current situation: it 
was inconceivable that they previously had faced such a crisis. Somewhat later, 
the Labor Offi  ce’s position paper on a draft of the Labor Exchange Law started 
from the “recognition that the distribution of work according to the principles 
of economic purposefulness and social justice is a question of vital importance 
for our Volk.”104
Compared to earlier, the war boosted the confi dence among German govern-
ment authorities, especially in the Prussian Trade Ministry and the Reich Labor 
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Ministry, as well as union and employer representatives within the Labor Admin-
istration, that optimizing the labor force—Menschenökonomie—was a key to na-
tional salvation. In the leadership and policies of these ministries, the revolution 
and transition to democracy brought surprisingly little change. Th e fi rst Labor 
Minister was the moderate Social Democrat August Müller. His successor, the 
Catholic union leader Heinrich Brauns, in offi  ce from 1920 to 1928—the key 
years for the Labor Administration—was a staunch advocate of working-class 
interests, yet unlike the Social Democrats, he favored consensus over confronta-
tion. In the area of labor administration, at least, he would fi nd ample grounds 
for agreement. Th e Prussian Trade Ministry was led, except for the period 1921 
to 1925, by ministers from the left liberal German Democratic Party, which en-
joyed support among moderate business interests. Between the stabilization of 
Germany’s economy in 1924 and the onset of Depression in 1929—the period 
when the Labor Administration and industry made signifi cant strides in voca-
tional counseling and training, as we will see in chapter 4—the foreign minister 
and single most important parliamentary leader, Gustav Stresemann, and the 
president of the Reich Bank, Hjalmar Schacht, helped to sustain a favorable cli-
mate for these workforce projects. Th ey believed that the key to Germany’s reha-
bilitation lay not in renewed military confrontation, but in a return to economic 
strength and reintegration into the world economy.105
Just as important as the ministers on top, long-serving deputy ministers and 
directors—men such as Friedrich Syrup, who had served as a factory inspec-
tor for the Trade Ministry and became the fi rst, long-serving head of the Labor 
Administration (1920/1922–1945), Alfred Kühne, and Ernst Schindler, both of 
whom served in the Trade Ministry—ensured substantial continuity from the 
Kaiserreich into the Weimar Republic.
However, turning the general idea of “human economies” into laws, institu-
tions, and real policies could sometimes be a more fractious process. Power over 
the incipient labor force projects was at stake, as were diff erent visions of how to 
apply or develop Germany’s human capital. Creating the program would require 
compromises between unions, employers, the state, and political parties. Th e rest 
of this chapter analyzes in detail the emergence of the institutions of national 
systems of job placement and vocational counseling.
Demobilization and the Labor Exchanges
Th e development of the labor exchange system, which backers of vocational 
counseling regarded as the most promising institutional support, naturally had a 
profound eff ect on the fortunes and prospects of vocational counseling and ap-
prenticeship placement. Th at system began to emerge under the pressures of de-
mobilizing and reintegrating soldiers into a peacetime economy. In its fi nal form, 
it represented a compromise between two potentially contradictory principles—
labor-industry coordination, a form of economic democracy, on the one hand, 
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and bureaucratic control, on the other. Both of these, however, represented the 
major models of “organization,” which shared much in common, as we have seen.
In the immediate postwar period, the main factors shaping the labor exchange 
system were the agreement between labor and employers sanctifi ed in the ZAG 
and state intervention in the labor market in the context of conversion to a peace-
time economy. Industrialists, anticipating greater union participation in economic 
decision making in the future and regarding it as less objectionable than further 
encroachments by the state, had begun negotiating with labor representatives at 
the end of 1917. Th e collapse of the old regime in November 1918 and the threat 
of radicalization of the revolution then drove the industrialists into the arms of 
moderate labor leaders. In the Stinnes-Legien pact of 15 November 1918, which 
set the parameters for economic cooperation in the coming order, the unions 
and employers had agreed on “the common settlement and parity-based admin-
istration of the labor exchange.”106 With this, the decades-old struggle over the 
labor exchange as political weapon in the labor market came to an abrupt end. 
Employer-run offi  ces, for years the main rival to the public exchanges, shut down 
operations or switched to a parity basis, as did the less successful union-led of-
fi ces. But, in fact, few of the jointly run exchanges fl ourished, largely for fi nancial 
reasons and due to the chaotic conditions, thus leaving an ever-greater share of 
total placements to the exchanges run by municipal offi  cials.107
Just as the state had favored the public exchanges during the war (particu-
larly in the Auxiliary Service Law), so too did it throw its weight behind them 
in the demobilization. Th e Demobilization Ministry and its regional and local 
subsidiaries cooperated closely with public exchanges to carry out their dirigiste 
and distributive measures: for example, dictating whom employers had to let 
go and whom they had to rehire.108 After the Labor Ministry in May 1919 had 
assumed the responsibilities of the now disbanded Ministry for Economic De-
mobilization, it took the initiative in creating a more eff ective national network. 
In contrast to its predecessor, which had disavowed any “grand and visionary 
ideas” about the economy’s future and instead hoped only to restore the status 
quo ante 1914,109 the Labor Ministry was, along with the Economics Ministry, 
much more sympathetic to ideas about “state socialism.” Perhaps more important 
in this regard than its moderate Social Democratic Minister, August Müller, were 
the offi  cials inherited from the Reich Interior Ministry, who had been devoted 
to maintaining domestic order, and the ideas and experiences of war socialism. 
Drawing largely on models and organizations from the wartime control of la-
bor, the Ministry established Provincial Offi  ces for Labor Exchange (Prussia) and 
State Offi  ces for Job Placement (outside of Prussia) by absorbing the infrastruc-
ture of the Labor Exchange Associations and the wartime Central Information 
Offi  ces.110 In 1919, preparations also began for a national offi  ce; a Reich Offi  ce 
for Job Placement was established within the Labor Ministry in January 1920, 
which on May 5 became an independent Offi  ce. Th e new German republic was 
taking a decisive step in extending the centralized wartime control of the labor 
offi  ces to peacetime.
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Th anks to the offi  cial support under the peculiar conditions of demobilization, 
public exchanges dramatically increased the number of job placements from 1.64 
million in 1913 and 1.98 in 1918 to 4.75 in 1919, thus capturing 84 percent 
of all placements by labor exchanges.111 But the success of such high numbers 
came at a price. In many cases, the Labor Ministry later acknowledged, the labor 
exchanges’ implementation of demobilization policy seemed like a “command 
economy”112—which did not please the many Germans, workers and employers 
alike, who had grown weary of outright state control.113 As a result, the public 
labor exchanges never gained the trust of many employers and workers. Th us, as 
Labor Ministry offi  cials discussed the consolidation of a national network of la-
bor exchanges, they returned to the idea of a far-reaching and equal participation 
of the unions and employers. From this early point on, the German Labor Ad-
ministration embodied a dual basis, and potential tension, characteristic of much 
of Weimar social policy: corporatist cooperation and state power. In the eyes of 
the proponents of vocational counseling, this potential concession may have eased 
some doubts about an alliance with the labor offi  ces, which seemed necessary in 
any case. Yet those offi  ces’ complicity in the “compulsion economy,” along with 
their longstanding reputation for serving the unskilled worker and for working 
bureaucratically, made cooperation with them still appear fraught with danger.
Th e 1922 Labor Exchange Law
In the absence of clear or consistent guidance from the cabinets of the Weimar co-
alition or its fi rst bürgerliche successors as to the economic order, it was often left 
to individual ministries to begin to hammer out the contours of the postwar and 
post-transition world.114 Th is was the case with the 1922 Labor Exchange Law 
(Arbeitsnachweisgesetz, ANG), which established the permanent structure of the 
Labor Administration, one that the 1927 Law on Job Placement and Unemploy-
ment Insurance preserved even as it gave it a new fi nancial basis. Th e ministerial 
in-fi ghting and the interest group and parliamentary debates over the 1922 law, 
its terms, and its impact therefore deserve careful study. Th e dilemma in which 
(the largely Prussian) advocates of vocational counseling found themselves—on 
the one hand, favoring an institutional home in the already extant network of 
labor offi  ces, but on the other, keen on insulating vocational counseling from the 
poor reputation of those offi  ces as bureaucratic people-shuffl  ers—emerged full 
blown during the negotiations over a Labor Exchange Law from 1919 to 1922.
Th e language of the Reich Labor Offi  ce’s fi rst draft of the law (November 1919) 
revealed the vast scope of the proposed system as well as its roots in the war- and 
postwar command economy: “Th e labor exchanges are responsible for job place-
ment, vocational counseling, labor distribution, and labor creation in accordance 
with this law.”115 Th e most fundamental question was whether the compulsory 
measures that had been adopted frequently in the transition to peacetime would 
become a permanent feature of the labor exchanges: these included, most im-
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portantly, a monopoly for the public labor exchanges, mandatory use by all job 
seekers, and mandatory reporting of open positions by companies. Th e socialist 
unions and the Association of Labor Exchanges, since the fi rst decade of the 
century allies in demanding public control of the labor market, were the most 
enthusiastic backers of these proposals.116 Only on this basis, the representative 
of the socialist umbrella union (ADGB) argued at a meeting in the Labor Min-
istry in September 1920, could Germany achieve a “strict planned economy of 
people.”117 Employers’ organizations objected strongly to what they perceived to 
be the socialists’ attempt to gain control of the economy by means of the labor 
exchange, as well as to the “schematism” and “bureaucracy” that would stifl e the 
economy’s dynamism.118 Importantly for the outcome of negotiations, the Chris-
tian unions, who favored cooperation over compulsion, and the powerful white-
collar union DHV, whose own labor exchange functioned increasingly well, 
joined the employers in opposing compulsion.119
Th e Labor Ministry shared the socialist unions’ long-term goal of achieving 
a comprehensive economy of people. Remarkably little changed after the June 
1920 election, which dealt the original Weimar coalition a resounding defeat and 
introduced a series of weak bourgeois governments. Th e new Labor Minister, the 
Center politician Heinrich Brauns, would encourage cooperation between social 
groups rather than state compulsion.120 As much as possible, such reforms had 
to be accepted by all sides: thus, the Labor Ministry, echoing an argument made 
by the Prussian Trade Ministry’s Ernst Schindler in another context,121 insisted 
that rather than relying on legal compulsion, the labor exchange should “gain 
the trust” of those involved.122 Yet it was on Brauns’ eight-year watch as Minister 
that the Labor Administration would be created. Long-serving, knowledgeable 
bureaucrats from the Kaiserreich’s Interior Ministry, who had implemented the 
policies of war socialism, helped to sustain continuity in the Weimar Ministry 
of Labor.
Th e expository paper the Ministry’s bureaucrats sent in December 1920 to 
the Reichstag explaining the proposed law presented a sweeping vision for the 
future. It argued for the vital importance of a centralized, encompassing system: 
the distribution of labor according to the principles of economic purposefulness 
and social justice were matters of life or death for the German Volk. Th e proposed 
central Reichsamt would bind together the whole network, ensuring the smooth 
working of central planning of the labor market.
Th rough this unity, through the encompassing overview of the situation of the labor mar-
ket that the central agency possesses and constantly updates, emerge the possibilities of 
equilibrating from vocation to vocation, from place to place, from region to region, pos-
sibilities for a generous and planned vocational transition, for a suffi  cient foresight and care 
in the transfer of laborers.
Th e paper repeatedly emphasized the importance of an “encompassing” system 
and explicitly supported the goal of universal coverage.123 Th e diff erence from 
the comparatively tentative steps in regard to public “organization” of the labor 
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market in the 1910 law and the echoes of the wartime Auxiliary Service Law are 
unmistakable.
Th e bill proposed to ensure the public labor offi  ce a monopoly by integrat-
ing into it all other nonprofi t exchanges and by eliminating—after a ten-year 
grace period intended to forestall indemnity claims—commercial agencies and 
newspaper classifi eds. Furthermore, on the question of the labor offi  ces’ relations 
to employers—a matter of crucial importance to any form of labor administra-
tion—the proposed law did not directly compel employers to report all of their 
job openings. It would, however, have given state governments the power to do 
so. Finally, contrary to the wishes of the socialist unions and in acknowledgement 
of the changed political landscape since the election, the proposal did not make 
use of the exchanges mandatory for all job seekers. However, it left little doubt 
about the Labor Ministry’s long-term goals, as it characterized the goal of manda-
tory use as “desirable.”124
Th e proposed law’s reserve on the matters of compelling employers and job 
seekers refl ected a number of factors in addition to the vociferous objections 
of the employers and the socialists’ losses in the election. Along with Heinrich 
Brauns’ preference for consensus, the parlous condition of many labor exchanges 
suggested restraint. In response to wartime legislation, numerous exchanges had 
been created on paper but still lacked adequate infrastructure or personnel.125 In 
the vast majority of offi  ces, job placement still occurred by the “calling out” of 
openings, rather than by individual matching. Th e responsibility of administer-
ing jobless benefi ts, which after the war had been assigned to the public labor 
exchanges, increased the pressure on offi  ces to give highest priority to those who 
had been unemployed longest, not to those most suited for a particular job. In 
the years 1920 and 1921 and thereafter, not only the industrialists complained 
about “intolerable conditions” in the exchanges, even a senior counselor in the 
Labor Ministry could despair:
Th e increased diffi  culty of individual placement, the destructive eff ect on the psyche of the 
unemployed of simply monitoring [their availability for work] without the simultaneous 
possibility of placement, the long distances, the expensive commutes and the hours of wait-
ing in the labor exchange, the danger of a collection of great masses of unemployed—lead 
one really to ask where the advantages of public labor offi  ces lie.126
Such political and practical considerations shaped the Labor Ministry’s more 
cautious tactics, even as the long-term goal remained complete control of the 
labor market. In a similar fashion, the Prussian Ministry of Trade, whose offi  cials 
consulted closely with the Labor Ministry during the negotiations on the Labor 
Exchange Law, balanced their long-term goal—the central control of vocational 
counseling and apprenticeship placement—with the immediate possibilities.
We must briefl y describe the Labor Exchange Law as it was passed on 22 July 
1922 and the system it established, as well as the modifi cations eff ected by the 
1927 creation of the Reich Agency for Job Placement and Unemployment Insur-
ance. In mid 1922, economic and political conditions might not have appeared 
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to be ideal for legislation extending central control and planning. Th anks largely 
to the government’s infl ationary policies, unemployment was practically non-
existent.127 Th e elections two years earlier, while not leading to stable cabinets, 
had produced a center-right, bürgerlich Reichstag. Th e recent rapprochement be-
tween the SPD and moderate Independent Socialists, after the left wing of the 
Independents had gone over to the Communists earlier in the year, alarmed the 
middle-class parties, and seemingly made compromise on economic and social 
matters all that much harder.128 And in fact, the Reichstag took an equivocal 
view of the elements of a command economy contained in the draft of the ANG. 
On the one hand, the bürgerlich parties rejected the public exchanges’ monopoly 
position, insisting that this would lead, in the words of the Center Party, to the 
“uniformization and schematization” of the labor exchange system.129 Th us, in 
the law passed, existing nonprofi t exchanges were explicitly safeguarded. Under 
particular circumstances, new ones might even be created. On the other hand, 
the weak position of the nonprofi ts deprived this protection of any real signifi -
cance. Also, all exchanges were to operate according to guidelines written by the 
Labor Offi  ce (in consultation with the groups) and supervised by it. As the Labor 
Ministry proposal had suggested, the law phased out commercial job agencies 
and newspaper ads—the most serious competition for the public exchanges—by 
1931. Th e power to compel companies to report their openings was preserved 
(though only for the Reich Labor Minister, not the state governments). Th ough 
the Ministry never invoked this prerogative, its threat to do so in 1923 pressured 
the employers into a more conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the public exchanges.130
Th e Reichstag thus accepted much, though not all, of what the Labor Min-
istry had proposed, demonstrating the degree to which belief in “organization” 
and planning had over the previous four decades permeated nearly the entire 
political spectrum. While the 1922 Labor Exchange Law expressly protected phil-
anthropic and other non-commercial exchanges, it promised to eliminate the 
public offi  ces’ most serious remaining competition—the commercial agencies 
and newspaper ads. By keeping open the possibility of compelling employers to 
report all openings, the law implicitly endorsed the Labor Administration’s ul-
timate goal of a centralized, universal control of the labor market. Even within 
the Labor Administration and related circles, there were a variety of views on 
how this goal was to be achieved, but consensus on that ultimate purpose. With 
the 1922 law, the Reichstag created a German Labor Administration with more 
limited powers of compulsion than some desired—but with ample opportunities 
to pursue its vision of centralized and comprehensive control of the labor market. 
By the middle of the decade, the public labor offi  ces dominated placement activ-
ity. Th ey accounted for 81 percent of all placements, while the other, still-tolerated 
non-commercial offi  ces claimed 10 percent, and the commercial agencies, whose 
licenses would expire in six years, captured 9 percent.131 A de facto, if not de jure, 
monopoly for the public offi  ces had been achieved.132
Th e 1922 law established the contours of the German Labor Administra-
tion, as it has existed to the present day. Th e Administration was to consist of a 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
96   |   Optimizing the German Workforce
three-tiered hierarchy. Each local administrative district (town or rural county) 
was to have a labor offi  ce; above them, state offi  ces (Landesämter, within Prussia 
Provinzialämter) would coordinate and supervise; fi nally, the Reich Offi  ce for Job 
Placement (Reichsamt für Arbeitsvermittlung) would unify the entire structure. 
Th e resolution of the competing claims of the unions and business, on the one 
hand, and public authorities, on the other, came in the form of a compromise: 
at each level an administrative board, composed of representatives of employ-
ers, labor, and the public authority, would oversee the “operational direction” of 
the offi  ces. In practice, the communal authorities, who appointed the director 
and offi  cials of the labor exchange, always had the upper hand, while the ad-
ministrative boards remained feckless.133 Eff ective local control meant that lo-
cal conditions—traditions of labor offi  ces, economic structures, and municipal 
fi nances—played a decisive role in the establishment of the labor administration 
until 1927.
Th e 1927 Law on Job Placement and Unemployment Insurance marked a 
watershed in regard to Germany’s social insurance system.134 Job placement and 
vocational counseling, however, remained clearly within the paradigm estab-
lished by the 1922 ANG. Resolving a decades-long struggle over unemployment 
insurance, the 1927 law maintained the essential components of the earlier law: 
the Labor Administration’s tripartite hierarchy and the role of unions, employ-
ers, and public authorities in the governing bodies at all levels. Compared to the 
Reich Offi  ce for Job Placement, the Reichsanstalt created in 1927 did gain greater 
independence vis-à-vis the Reich Labor Ministry; however, the latter still main-
tained important “supervisory rights” over the Reichsanstalt, which would remain 
a bone of contention over the coming decades. Shortly after its founding in 1927, 
the Reichsanstalt would sacrifi ce a good deal of its independence when the Great 
Depression undercut its fi nancial solvency and the National Socialists imposed 
further restrictions.135
By tying the job placement wing (and within it vocational counseling) to 
unemployment insurance—and hence to insurance contributions—the 1927 
law for the fi rst time put the labor offi  ces on a more secure fi nancial footing.136 
Th e new fi nancial basis weakened the infl uence in the labor offi  ces of municipal 
authorities, who between 1922 and 1927 had used their budgetary powers to 
restrict expenditures. However, as we shall see, for a number of reasons, central 
control of the local labor offi  ces remained tenuous even after 1927, and the local 
offi  ces continued to pursue policies suited to their districts—especially to the 
demands of local employers.137
Th e Prussian Development of a System 
of Comprehensive Vocational Counseling
We now return to the immediate postwar and to the second labor force project, 
the development of a system of comprehensive vocational counseling. In the last 
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year of the war, the Prussian government had taken the fi rst steps to establish a 
system of vocational counseling, which the Trade Ministry envisaged as a crucial 
element of Prussia’s—and Germany’s—postwar economy. Th ese eff orts did not 
originate in the war, which only had heightened the apparent importance of a 
longer-term goal of the Prussian Trade Ministry, and, in the form of handicrafts’ 
change of heart, provided a crucial political opening. Nor did the change in 
political system or the general divisiveness after the war disturb the continuity 
of thinking and eff ort within the Prussian Trade Ministry. As we have noted, the 
leadership of the ministry lay until late 1921, that is during much of the nego-
tiations over the ANG, in the hands of the German Democratic Party, which 
pursued a generally business-friendly line, and for several years thereafter the 
leadership lay with a moderate SPD minister, himself a former skilled metal-
worker. More importantly, the same group of energetic sub-ministerial bureau-
crats as before 1918, especially Alfred Kühne and Ernst Schindler, continued to 
exert decisive infl uence. Th e preparations for implementing a system of voca-
tional counseling, begun in early 1918, continued apace.
Negotiations over the precise nature of Prussia’s vocational counseling un-
folded under the most trying of circumstances. In its order of 9 December 1918 
on labor exchanges, the Imperial Offi  ce for Economic Demobilization had in-
cluded a provision that permitted the states to issue laws compelling the public 
labor exchanges to perform vocational counseling, partly at the insistence of the 
Prussian Ministry.138 On 18 March 1919, the Trade Ministry as primary ministry 
issued a historic directive that would form the basis for vocational counseling in 
Prussia and, ultimately, throughout Germany. Th e directive instructed all Prus-
sian counties (Kreise) to establish vocational counseling offi  ces; in industrial areas, 
the direction was to be granted to the parity-based labor exchange, but “care is 
to be taken that the vocational offi  ce is developed as an independent agency.” 
In largely rural areas, where no labor exchanges existed, the directive recom-
mended that the vocational offi  ce be joined to the youth welfare organization 
(Jugendamt)—a reminder that the Trade Ministry saw the labor offi  ces as mere 
instruments serving its priority of vocational counseling.
Th e Prussian system of vocational counseling and apprenticeship placement 
was to serve ambitious purposes. As the Trade Ministry position paper from early 
1918 had suggested, it was to be comprehensive and to assume an important dis-
tributive function. Not only was the vocational counseling network to span all of 
Prussia; it was to evaluate and counsel all job seekers, those entering both skilled 
and unskilled work. Its purpose was to “strive for a distribution of the labor 
power in a way that corresponds to the macro-economic situation and for a pur-
poseful utilization of the existing apprenticeship opportunities and to promote in 
vocational choice the appropriate regard for the physical and psychic fi tness, the 
inclination, and the economic situation of the one choosing.” Th us, despite the 
disruptions of the revolution and postwar and the failure to achieve a nationwide 
regulation, Prussia quickly had realized its designs for a comprehensive vocational 
counseling system—at least on paper.
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In a period of bitter dispute, indeed even armed confl ict, about the country’s 
future political and economic direction, the Prussian creation of a system of vo-
cational counseling enjoyed rare, almost universal, support. Handwerk’s reversal 
had, of course, provided the occasion for the Trade Ministry’s “fundamental con-
sideration.” Th e socialist unions, acknowledging that previously they had given 
all questions of vocational training short shrift,139 had become fervent support-
ers of comprehensive vocational counseling. At its 10th Congress, held in June 
1919, the Free Trade Union (ADGB) recommended:
In cooperation with other appropriate bodies (teachers, physicians, psychologists), appro-
priate measures for vocational counseling should be taken in such a way that every child is 
advised before it leaves school about which vocation is appropriate for it on the basis of its 
physical and psychic fi tness as well as being especially suitable for economic reasons.140
Around the same time, a debate in the Prussian Constitutional Convention 
on greater state support for vocational counseling, particularly in the face of the 
overcrowded professions and the reintegration of millions of soldiers, revealed 
astonishing accord. Despite minor diff erences, the SPD and the more radical 
USPD found themselves concurring with the conservative DNVP in support of 
the Catholic Center Party’s motion to “organize vocational counseling on a wider 
basis with help of the state and including the establishment of a central institute 
for the entire vocational counseling system.”141
Th us, the Prussian Trade Ministry seemed to face an exceptionally favorable 
political climate, despite the general political uncertainty and strife. Numerous 
issues remained unresolved, however. Th e Ministry intended universal vocational 
counseling to be but one part of a larger reform including vocational training. It 
remained unclear how the political contention surrounding these further-reach-
ing proposals, which eventually ended in stalemate (see chapter 4), would aff ect 
vocational counseling. Further questions pertained to how, in fact, the Prussian 
directive would be implemented, i.e., which offi  ces would conduct the counsel-
ing? In which form? Would the Prussian system be extended throughout Ger-
many? Th e establishment of the Labor Administration in the 1922 ANG played 
a critical role in answering these questions.
During the ministerial deliberations over the ANG, signifi cant rifts had 
emerged between the Reich Labor Ministry and the Offi  ce for Labor Placement, 
on the one hand, and the Prussian Trade Ministry, on the other, over the guide-
lines for vocational counseling. In the Trade Ministry’s eyes, the Labor Ministry’s 
priorities remained too closely tied to those of the Interior Ministry from which 
it had emerged: above all, Labor seemed to care most about control and order, 
rather than development and improvement. For the Arbeitsministerium disap-
pointingly rejected the Trade Ministry’s demand to make vocational counseling 
offi  ces mandatory.142 Its draft law furthermore subordinated vocational coun-
seling offi  ces administratively and fi nancially to the labor exchanges.143 Finally, 
the Labor Ministry proposed to issue detailed regulations without consulting 
key constituencies such as crafts, industry, and labor.144 More broadly, the Trade 
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Ministry accused the Labor Ministry of lacking the necessary ambition in regard 
to developing a productive workforce.145 Th ese disagreements precluded a uni-
form national system of vocational counseling for another fi ve years and ham-
pered Prussia’s pioneering eff orts.
By contrast, as these criticisms implied, the Trade Ministry’s own vision fo-
cused on these latter goals: a system of vocational counseling that encompassed 
all youths and matched individual and jobs in the interests both of a macro-eco-
nomically optimal distribution and of individual contentment and development. 
As we shall see in chapter 4, these comprehensive vocational counseling and ap-
prenticeship placement programs were to be complemented by other elements, 
including a vocational training law being prepared at this time. Crucially, how-
ever, all aspects of the eff orts to create a skilled workforce were to be achieved, 
not by force, but with the willing support of the economic interests. In order to 
gain and maintain this support, the vocational system’s development, the Trade 
Ministry reiterated, was to be “gradual.”146 Th is emphasis on constituents’ free 
cooperation and the necessarily slow realization of the program contrasted, of 
course, with the Trade Ministry’s earlier position, as expressed in the “fundamental 
considerations” of January 1918, in which the ministry had argued for immedi-
ate and legally compulsory Totalerfassung. While a fi nal explanation of the Trade 
Ministry’s equivocations between 1918 and 1922 eludes us, it seems plausible 
that the Labor Ministry’s and nascent Labor Administration’s own designs for 
centralized control may have induced the Prussian ministry to return to its origi-
nal, more liberal position.
Th e bitter disagreements in the fall of 1922 over the institutions and rules of 
the system of public vocational counseling revealed lingering mistrust between 
the authorities supervising the national labor exchange network, within which 
vocational counseling would operate, and those Prussian offi  cials most commit-
ted to the idea of vocational counseling. Apparently, it did not matter that many 
in the new Labor Administration, such as its head, Friedrich Syrup, had them-
selves originally come from the Prussian Ministry of Trade. Th e Prussians’ doubts 
reached such levels that the Ministry “expressly” confronted the Reichsamt with 
the question whether the latter intended to “eliminate vocational counseling.”147 
Even as they became administratively intertwined, the diff erent visions of Men-
schenökonomie – of optimizing the workforce - could still clash.
Th e 1923 Prussian Guidelines
Th e 1922 Labor Exchange Law permitted the states to issue more extensive guide-
lines on vocational counseling. With the Reich Labor Offi  ce rejecting nearly all 
appeals for modifi cation, the Prussian ministry determined to act on its own in 
order to promote as skilled a workforce as possible, at least in the largest German 
state. It thus began to prepare directives for the Prussian territories that would 
implement the Labor Exchange Law and Labor Offi  ce guidelines in the most 
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expansive way and, in some cases, even bypass them.148 Prussia would make voca-
tional counseling stations obligatory for all labor exchanges; within the exchange, 
the vocational counseling offi  ce would have its own budget and distinct designa-
tion; advisory councils would be mandatory.
Th e Prussian proposal elicited mixed reviews from important economic and 
political interests. All sides agreed on the necessity and importance of vocational 
counseling; they disagreed on the best organization. While the Prussian Confer-
ence of Municipalities approved the draft without reservation, the Association of 
Rural Communities insisted that the costs must be borne by the Reich and Prus-
sia. With a couple of important exceptions, interest groups criticized the Prussian 
proposal, though for diff erent reasons. Th e Chambers of Trade expressed support 
for the proposal, as did, most crucially, handicrafts. Yet both the Social Demo-
cratic General Free Association of White Collar Employees and the indepen-
dent Associated Union of White Collar Employees, as well as the socialist Free 
Trade Union and the Christian German Trade Union Association, objected to 
the plan, in particular to the obligation of all labor exchanges to open vocational 
counseling offi  ces. Echoing the Reich Labor Offi  ce, they noted the dire straits 
of many labor exchanges and predicted their almost certain inability to carry 
out vocational counseling and, in consequence, the discrediting of the whole 
idea of vocational counseling. Th e German Employers’ Association, increasingly 
emboldened in its opposition to the ZAG with the unions, now returned to its 
earlier position and strenuously opposed the proposal, but for a diff erent reason: 
vocational counseling and apprenticeship placement, the employers argued, must 
be kept separate from job placement, as the former demand “individual” treat-
ment and knowledge of the diff erent vocations, coupled with statistical overviews 
of the vocations and an “appropriate vocational policy in the interest of the entire 
Volk”—prerequisites which were simply not given in the “mass treatment” of 
the labor exchanges. Even if vocational counseling could not be transferred to an 
entirely diff erent institution, but instead remained within the labor exchange, it 
should enjoy there maximal independence.149 Th e fact that the Prussian Trade 
Ministry pressed ahead with its proposal refl ected not just the tactical importance 
of the approval of handicrafts, which still trained two-thirds of all skilled work-
ers. By 1923, hyperinfl ation and the resulting breakdown of economic order was 
undermining both unions’ and employers’ bargaining positions. Th e Prussian 
Trade Ministry’s action underlined its strategic determination to promote its vi-
sion—even over particular objections of various interests—of an economy of 
skilled workers placed in the “right” vocations.
Th us, when the Labor Offi  ce promulgated its own guidelines on vocational 
counseling in May 1923, the Prussian Trade Ministry was prepared to establish a 
more ambitious framework. On May 15, three days after the national policy was 
announced, the Prussian ministry asserted its right to craft more specifi c rules. As 
in previous cases, this Prussian ordinance tried to balance the goals of a unifi ed 
system and willing cooperation of all parties; it sought to ally vocational counsel-
ing with the network of labor offi  ces, and also to preserve the former’s autonomy. 
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All labor offi  ces in Prussia were obliged to perform vocational counseling and 
apprenticeship placement, though the Prussian ordinance acknowledged that, 
es pecially in the countryside, conditions might warrant a temporary suspension 
of this principle. On the one hand, all other vocational counseling offi  ces (for 
example, those attached to youth offi  ces) were to be absorbed into the labor of-
fi ces; on the other, this should be done “to as great an extent as possible” with 
the cooperation of these offi  ces, and the absorption should preserve elements of 
the previously independent offi  ces. Within the labor offi  ce, vocational counsel-
ing and apprenticeship placement would require the greatest possible freedom. 
Th ough offi  cially the new guidelines made older ones moot, the Prussian Min-
istry noted, the “tried and tested” principles of the March 1919 regulation still 
con tained “the essential elements for the establishment, activity, and range of 
tasks of the vocational offi  ces.”150
Th e swift action by the Prussian government demonstrated its resolve to press 
ahead with universal vocational counseling, a resolve rooted in the Trade Min-
istry’s decades-old program. Until 1927, when the law on the Reich Agency 
adopted the Prussian model for the entire Reich (at least on paper), Prussia re-
mained the pioneer in vocational counseling. Still, the struggles over the Labor 
Exchange Law and its codicils revealed that, despite broad consensus on the need 
for public administration of the labor market, the Prussian Trade and Reich La-
bor Ministries disagreed on the tactics to pursue.
Much of the substance of the labor force projects, including their institutions, 
purposes, and formative ideas, we argued in chapters 1 and 2, had been develop-
ing in pre-1914 Germany, if still somewhat inchoately. Th e war imposed its own 
rigid form on this substance, especially in regard to labor administration. Th e 
great challenges to Germany, in waging a new kind of war, now connected the 
optimization of the workforce to national purposes more directly and exclusively 
than had been the case even in the period since the 1890s. Th e projects were sub -
ordinated more decisively to a single, overriding purpose: marshalling the na-
tion’s workers for victory in war. “Organization” became the universal solution to 
all problems and the mobilization for “total war” entailed a Totalerfassung of all 
resources, including people.
During the confl ict, the networks of neutral labor offi  ces that had been ex-
panding and connecting from the bottom up were turned, from above, into a na-
tional Labor Administration. Th e wartime Labor Administration persisted even 
after the end of the war. Th e confl ict’s central impact on the balance of power in 
German society—strengthening labor at the expense of business—tilted politi-
cal conditions in favor of a monopolistic Labor Administration. Th e sometimes 
confl icting principles embedded in the Weimar constitution—interest group co-
ordination or state socialism—both pointed toward “organization” of the labor 
market. But even after the balance of power shifted again back toward industry, 
a remarkably broad intellectual constellation sustained organization as the best, 
indeed, the only, solution to the country’s problems. Since the war, the nature of 
those problems and of the Labor Administration’s purpose had shifted somewhat: 
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from victory in confl ict to effi  ciency and orderly survival in defeat. Regardless, 
the national infrastructure of the Labor Administration and its vision of Totaler-
fassung lived on.
With some misgivings, the advocates of vocational counseling and training 
allied themselves with the network of labor offi  ces. Th e Prussian Trade Ministry 
became, at least for a time, one of the strongest advocates of Totalerfassung. Th e 
harsh economic conditions of the postwar seemed to demand more authoritarian 
measures. How the ministry would achieve complete inclusion in practice—and, 
more importantly, how it would encourage training in skilled work—remained 
to be seen. Th e Trade Ministry’s hopes for creating a nation of skilled work-
ers would depend to a great extent on the policies of German industry. During 
the war, with its emphasis on mass production of armaments, many employers 
had become more enamored of the potential for rationalization at diff erent lev-
els (industry, company, individual). Like the elaboration of universal vocational 
counseling, the further development of industry’s labor policies during a diffi  cult 
peacetime was another important question in regard to the optimization of the 
German workforce. It is with them that the next chapter is concerned.
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Chapter 4
TOWARD THE GERMAN SKILLS MACHINE 
Establishing Vocational Counseling and Training

In December 1921, at just the second meeting of representatives from all of the 
state and provincial vocational offi  ces, Paul Knoff , the infl uential head of the 
Brandenburg offi  ce, spared no words in his critique of the state of vocational 
counseling: “Th e numbers of extant vocational counseling and apprenticeship 
placement centers leave the impression that vocational counseling has already ac-
complished much. If one looks more closely, however, one notices that in many 
cases one can hardly speak of real vocational counseling.”1 Observers of vocational 
training saw things almost as dimly: disagreements between labor and industry 
were blocking progress on a national law on training; DATSCH, the manufac-
turers’ organization that before the war had pioneered coordination of training, 
was moribund; and only isolated companies showed much interest in training.2 
In the early postwar years, as we saw in the previous chapter, much energy had 
gone into the legal, institutional, and fi nancial establishment of the Labor Admin-
istration. As the offi  cials of the Prussian Trade Ministry had learned in the bitter 
struggles over the Labor Exchange Law, these eff orts did not lead necessarily even 
to the merely formal creation of vocational counseling offi  ces on a national scale. 
Furthermore, if the movement to steer young people into skilled work was to 
succeed, the Labor Administration’s local offi  ces had to create the personnel and 
infrastructure of a whole new bureaucracy practically de novo. Th ey additionally 
had to establish themselves vis-à-vis the various constituencies shaping the work-
ing world. In the absence of a legal mandate, they needed to win the trust of the 
public, the schools, current and future workers, and, most importantly, the local 
employers. Once the general legal framework had been established in the early 
Notes for this section begin on page 134.
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1920s, much of the work of establishing a national system of vocational counsel-
ing would involve gaining ground vis-à-vis these local interests. But interests were 
not all that was required to gain ground. Industrialists’ thinking about production 
and the role of their workers in it remained, in the early 1920s, the major impedi-
ment to creating a high skills workforce. Once their ideas changed in the middle 
of the decade, the German skills machine began to take off .
A New Bureaucracy and Its Constituencies
Particularly between 1919 and 1921, and again after 1924, vocational coun-
seling briskly expanded. Th e Reichsarbeitsblatt reported with satisfaction that in 
1924/25, the number of vocational counseling offi  ces and of advice-seekers had 
“increased considerably.” While in the fi rst two years after implementation of the 
Labor Exchange Law, 1922/23 and 1923/24, the number of offi  ces had remained 
constant at roughly 380, in the third year it jumped more than 30 percent to a 
total of 518, though the Agency acknowledged that some of the increase could be 
due simply to more complete reporting. Th e number of school-leavers who came 
to vocational counseling rose from 140,000 in 1923/24 to 194,000 a year later, a 
jump of nearly 40 percent.3 Yet the quantitative growth fell far short of the “total 
inclusion” for which the national authorities aimed. Despite the absolute rise in 
cases, because the number of school graduates rose even faster, the percentage of 
school graduates “covered” by the offi  ces actually fell slightly, from 33.3 to 32.2 
percent.4
From their inception, the vocational counseling offi  ces suff ered from the de-
valuation of money. By 1922, when infl ation accelerated dramatically, provincial 
offi  ces in Prussia warned the central authorities that they faced “collapse.” Th e 
“continually increasing internal frictions” in the labor offi  ces arose principally 
from the “unresolved fi nancial questions.”5 In its appeal to the Reich Labor Min-
ister, the Prussian Ministry of Trade explained that the fi nancial “means of the 
cost-bearers, that is the provinces and the municipalities, are exhausted; and the 
legal situation is so dubious that real pressure cannot be exerted on the provinces 
and municipalities.”6 Th e end of the infl ation in late 1923 fi nally created a clear 
and stable monetary environment, but, in the eyes of the central Labor Admin-
istration, provincial governments continued to practice “excessive cut-backs” of 
vocational counseling personnel even a year after the end of the infl ation.7
Nor had the 1922 Labor Exchange Law, which many had hoped would create 
a clear and binding “legal situation,” satisfactorily resolved the fi nancial question. 
Th e fact that local authorities bore one-third of the costs of the local labor of-
fi ces and sat on the local administrative boards meant that local priorities—and 
often these favored saving money over funding a new, and as yet unproven, ser-
vice—gave little support to vocational counseling.8 Provincial authorities granted 
numerous requests from local authorities, particularly those in more rural areas, 
to exempt them from Prussia’s requirement that vocational counseling be estab-
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lished universally.9 Given the organizational and fi nancial structures of the Labor 
Administration and its offi  ces, even after the 1922 Labor Exchange Law, interest 
in vocational counseling still depended to a great degree on the particularities of 
the local and regional offi  ces, political forces, and economies.
Th e directors of the local offi  ces, who were usually at the same time in charge 
of job placement, often devoted the most attention to the immediately obvious 
tasks of administering unemployment aid10 and job placement for older workers 
who had lost their jobs. As the Ministry of Trade had feared, when vocational 
counseling was paired with job placement, the former got short shrift. Maintain-
ing public order had priority. Even in Prussia, in which vocational counseling 
had preserved greater autonomy within the labor offi  ces, such complaints were 
common. At a meeting of the state vocational offi  ces in March 1924, the fi rst of its 
kind in three years and hence also since the implementation of the Labor Exchange 
Law, all representatives emphasized “with great force” that vocational counseling 
could only fl ourish if it were placed on an equal footing with job placement.11
By the end of 1924, vocational counseling presented a mixed countenance. 
On the one hand, in the last year other states had followed Prussia in making 
vocational counseling offi  ces mandatory, or were about to do so: Wurttemberg 
(January 1924), Th uringia (June 1924), Bavaria (in preparation).12 Th e number 
of vocational counseling offi  ces and the proportion of school graduates visiting 
them had grown considerably over the previous years; the system of public voca-
tional counseling had assumed, in the words of its most important bureaucratic 
proponent, the Prussian Trade Ministry’s Schindler, “very considerable propor-
tions.”13 On the other hand, the Labor Administration’s fi rst national survey of 
the vocational counseling system painted a generally gloomier picture. “Th e de-
velopment of the local vocational counseling offi  ces varies greatly from state offi  ce 
to state offi  ce. It depends in part on the total structure of the district (population 
density, size of the city, degree of industrialization) and in part on the energy with 
which the state offi  ce … takes on the matter.”14 Th is vigor, the report continued, 
was sorely lacking:
Th e activity of the state offi  ces in the area of vocational counseling has suff ered quite con-
siderably due to the loss of personnel ... Open positions were often not fi lled again. Even 
where the vocational counselors themselves remained, they were so occupied by other work 
for the state offi  ce that their actual responsibilities had to take a back seat. Th is applies espe-
cially in the Rhine Province, Westphalia-Lippe, Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt. Especially 
the reduction in number of female vocational counselors or their being heavily burdened 
with other tasks makes itself felt (Saxony, Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, Münster, the Rhine 
Province, Schleswig-Holstein). No vocational counselors whatsoever exist in: the Free State 
Saxony, Hessen, Hessen-Nassau and Waldeck, Baden, Mecklenburg-Lübeck, Oldenburg, 
the Border Region.15
If vocational counseling’s fi nancing and organizational security remained pre-
carious and varied from district to district in the fi rst years of the Labor Admin-
istration, its relations to key actors in the labor world were at least as important 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
Toward the German Skills Machine: Establishing Vocational Counseling and Training   |   111
for its success—and at least as fragile. Vocational counseling’s most important 
relationships were with the parents of school graduates and the general public, 
with the schools, and with employers.
Even if the abstract idea of vocational counseling for the sake of optimizing 
the workforce, of Menschenökonomie, enjoyed support from nearly all political 
parties and much of the population, the vocational counseling offi  ces that sprang 
up in the years 1918 to 1924 were themselves, in the eyes of many, unfamiliar 
and unproven institutions. Without a legal means to compel all graduating stu-
dents and job seekers to use the offi  ces, vocational counselors had to earn the 
public’s and, especially, parents’ confi dence.
It was not accidental that, in the early years, a considerable portion of the 
vocational offi  ces’ eff orts went into “propaganda.”16 In a situation in which the 
vocational offi  ces were still coming into being and defi ning their roles, the par-
ticularly active counselor in Off enbach recommended, “it is fi rst necessary to 
propose to the public, and in particular the interested circles, as clear a picture as 
possible of our tasks.”17 Even when the public knew what vocational counseling 
offi  ces did, parents were often indiff erent or skeptical. In the Rhine district, for 
example, school authorities reported on the slow progress in convincing parents 
and students of the importance of vocational counseling: along with a certain ret-
icence about seeking advice and the parents’ knowledge of good apprenticeship 
positions, the need to earn money quickly (and hence to enter unskilled work) 
militated against getting advice.18 Such short-term calculations were, of course, 
precisely what the advocates of vocational counseling were trying to forestall.
A persistent, and for the Labor Administration particularly serious, source of 
the public’s caution vis-à-vis the vocational counseling offi  ces was their reputa-
tion for “bureaucratism.” Th is was the criticism most frequently leveled against 
their offi  ces in the press. Occasionally, the charge could implicate the ostensible 
(and indeed quite real) attempt of the Labor Administration to gain a monopoly 
on job placements.19 Far more frequently, however, the ultimate goal of “com-
plete inclusion” of the labor market met with widespread, and often impassioned, 
support.20 A far more prevalent complaint objected to the “bureaucratic” methods 
of the vocational counseling offi  ces. As the Prussian Trade Ministry had feared, 
vocational counseling suff ered from its close association with the labor offi  ces, 
whose “bureaucratic schematism” one paper characterized as “to some extent the 
unavoidable fate of a public entity committed to mass operations.”21 A vocational 
counselor visiting a school, another paper lamented in an article entitled “False 
and correct vocational counseling,” lectured to the school children for an hour 
and a half and left almost no time for questions at the end.22 What these parents 
and the critics of the bureaucratic aspects of vocational counseling explicitly or 
implicitly demanded was that the vocational counseling offi  ces become able to 
judge “the individual distinctiveness of the young people.”23
Both the central ministries concerned with vocational counseling as well as 
the local offi  ces responded to these criticisms in a number of ways. Each time 
a critique of vocational counseling appeared in the press, the central authorities 
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were quick to off er a rebuttal in kind. From 1925, favorable “propaganda for the 
ideas of vocational counseling” was also made by the new medium of radio.24 At 
least the most engaged vocational offi  ces—and here, as in many other areas, local 
variety was the norm—utilized regular “parent evenings” to gain the support of 
this important group.25 In addition to these forms of “advertisement,” vocational 
counselors, initially at the local and state levels, and later nationally, sought to 
address the most serious critiques of the current practices. In particular, in order 
to gain the support of the public and especially of parents, they wanted to combat 
the impression that vocational counseling offi  ces were bureaucratic institutions 
that treated school graduates as faceless numbers and were incapable of recogniz-
ing their “individual distinctiveness.”
At least as signifi cant as the support of the general public and of parents was 
the cooperation of the schools. Th us, the vocational counselor in Off enbach be-
gan his review of the offi  ce’s highest priority, “propaganda,” by noting: “First, 
we had to win the teachers for active participation.”26 Th e school’s importance 
to vocational counseling derived from three factors: the former’s proclivity to do 
counseling itself had to be eliminated; in the absence of a legal requirement that 
students visit vocational counseling, the schools would play a key role in “deliv-
ering” graduates to the labor offi  ces; fi nally, the teachers’ observations of their 
students—which, as was often emphasized, were based on a much longer ac-
quaintance than the vocational counseling offi  ces ever could achieve—ought to 
be an important element in the vocational offi  ce’s matching of “the right man 
and the right job.”
Even when the central ministries made promises to the contrary, the schools 
remained real, or at least potential, rivals to the vocational counseling offi  ces. Th e 
existence of a comprehensive network of schools, teachers’ often intimate un -
derstanding of their students’ personalities, and parents’ generally high regard for 
teachers—all of which had made the schools the basis for vocational counseling 
in most other western countries—meant that schools enjoyed signifi cant advan-
tages over the nascent Labor Administration. While the Labor Administration 
could boast that even before the Labor Exchange Law (1922) gave the labor offi  ces 
(primary) responsibility for vocational counseling, only 2.4 percent of vocational 
offi  ces had been affi  liated with schools (and, by contrast, 67 percent with labor 
offi  ces),27 numerous school teachers practiced an “unoffi  cial” counseling of their 
pupils. As the provincial offi  ce of the Prussian Education Ministry in the Rhine-
land reported in 1921, “[s]ince the vocational offi  ces for the most part are still 
failing or because the parents and students stay away from them and prefer to 
turn to the teachers, the schools undertake, in fairly large number, the vocational 
instruction of their charges.”28 For their part, many teachers objected to what they 
perceived as the labor offi  ce’s attempt “to deprive them of the right and the duty 
to concern themselves with the future of their departing students.”29 Even after 
passage of the Labor Exchange Law, and despite considerable eff orts on the part of 
the labor offi  ces to gain the unstinting support of the schools, teachers and school 
directors continued to counsel students and to place them with employers.30
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Beyond tamping down the brushfi res of teacher counseling, the labor offi  ces 
also sought more positive contributions from the schools, especially pivotal as-
sistance in achieving “complete inclusion.” An early dispute in Kassel between 
the school authorities and vocational counseling offi  ce raised the issue of how 
the schools should report on their children to the latter offi  ce. When the Kassel 
schools decided not to automatically send evaluations for all children, but only 
when their parents requested it, only eight children came to vocational counsel-
ing “of their own accord.”31 In response, the Trade Ministry insisted that provid-
ing school reports “for, if possible, all graduating students” remained necessary, 
for experience had shown that “if one made the fi lling-out of the questionnaires 
purely voluntary, vocational counseling would remain ineff ective.”32 By February 
1920, the Trade Ministry’s insistence on this point had resulted in the Educa-
tion Ministry instructing school authorities, “[g]raduating students should be 
urged at every suitable occasion to visit these vocational counseling offi  ces. If the 
school is sent questionnaires from the vocational offi  ce, the school director is to 
supervise the thorough response and to provide, for example, in accordance with 
his best knowledge and conscience, requested information on the probable voca-
tional suitability of students.”33 Of course, a directive from the central authorities 
often was insuffi  cient to guarantee compliance by the local authorities. In the ab-
sence of a legal mandate for Totalerfassung, the schools’ role in “delivering” their 
students to the labor offi  ces would become the labor offi  ces’ prime instrument for 
achieving “total inclusion” for much of the next four decades.
A third sphere of interaction between vocational offi  ce and school, in addi-
tion to eff orts to end teacher counseling and to enlist schools in the “delivery” of 
students to vocational offi  ces, was the design of the aforementioned vocational 
questionnaires. I will restrict myself here to noting a signifi cant constraint on the 
school form. Th e cooperation from teachers and school directors in answering 
the vocational offi  ce’s questions remained often halfhearted and (to the latter) 
unsatisfactory. Teachers—often nonplussed since they were now expected to aid 
the very institution that had usurped their role—complained repeatedly about 
the time- and energy-consuming “burden” of fi lling out the forms34 and about 
being “fl ooded” with demands for “bureaucratic writing and listing tasks.”35 Th eir 
refractoriness moved the Labor Administration to warn that the questionnaires 
“should not be too long or go beyond the most necessary aspects.”36 While the 
cooperation with schools would become smoother over time, the tensions over 
the school questionnaire contributed to new attitudes within vocational counsel-
ing about the school’s role and its own in evaluating job seekers.
More vital still to the practical success of vocational counseling than its rela-
tions with parents or schools was its standing with employers, who crucially re-
tained ultimate control over the hiring of workers and were not obliged to use 
the labor offi  ce’s services. As the offi  ce in Off enbach succinctly explained the 
nec essity of good relations with the employers, “If we control the apprenticeship 
positions, the youths and their parents will follow.”37 While the responses of 
employers to the current state of vocational counseling, like so many aspects of 
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the Labor Administration, varied according to local circumstances, the general 
tenor in the years 1918 to 1924 was one of mistrust. Most employers did not 
condemn vocational counseling per se, but rather condemned its close link to 
the bureaucratic, SPD-tinged labor offi  ces. In December 1922, the employers’ 
organization, by now feeling less and less bound by its prior pact with the unions, 
had condemned the ANG’s subordination of vocational counseling to the labor 
offi  ces in the harshest of terms: a “suitable vocational policy,” which required 
among other things “precise knowledge of the individual vocational qualities and 
necessities,” never could be achieved by the labor offi  ces with their “extreme mass 
operations.”38 At the local level, many employers’ mistrust of the “bureaucratic” 
labor offi  ces persisted. Th e vocational counselor in Off enbach reported:
Th e dislike of public job placement has been transferred in many places from the labor 
exchanges to the vocational offi  ces as well, particularly where the vocational counseling is 
handled in a section of the labor offi  ce [precisely the prescription of the 1922 ANG]. One 
can say—without wanting to diminish the valuable work of the labor offi  ces—that many 
employers only turn to the labor offi  ce if contracts with unions compel them to or if they 
can fi nd workers nowhere else.… As we know from experience, the vocational offi  ce is 
often regarded and treated like a “labor offi  ce for youths.”39
While the vocational offi  ce in Lübeck expressed a certain self-satisfaction a 
year later over the proportion of apprenticeships it helped bring about, it indi-
rectly admitted to frustrations similar to those in Off enbach: its “task” would be 
“more and more to gain the trust of the employers.”40 Handicrafts, in particu-
lar, which during the war was the inspiration for Prussia’s pioneering vocational 
counseling edict, but now had a surfeit of applicants and felt antipathy toward 
what it perceived to be Weimar’s socialist ethos, regarded public vocational coun-
seling and apprenticeship placement with “great mistrust” and expanded its own 
placement systems “by all available means.”41
As with the parents and public, the work of gaining the employers’ trust con-
sisted, in part, of active “propaganda”: letters to companies and visits to owners 
and even shop foremen, who often made the ultimate decision on engaging ap-
prentices. “We consider especially the personal contact with the companies,” the 
offi  ce in Off enbach emphasized, “to be very important.”42 Th ese appeals, how-
ever, would have been ineff ective, had the vocational offi  ces not simultaneously 
addressed the criticisms made by its most important constituencies. Parents and, 
even more importantly, employers regarded the vocational offi  ces with indiff er-
ence or even suspicion and hostility for similar reasons: both criticized the offi  ces 
for being “bureaucratic,” that is, for caring more about the number of visitors 
they advised than about the quality of the counsel, in particular in matching the 
individual qualities of each job seeker to the requirements of particular vocations. 
Th e program to promote skilled work was still caught between two goals that were 
diffi  cult to reconcile: being comprehensive and being eff ective.
A further serious impediment to the program arose from the still unsettled 
legal status of vocational training. After the war, the Central Working Associa-
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tion (ZAG) and then later the Reich Economics Ministry had drafted a bill that 
would have established uniform regulations on training for all branches of the 
economy, thus eliminating Handwerk’s special status and possibly mandating 
some form of universal training. However, political struggles between employers 
and unions over the control of training delayed passage of the law, especially as 
socialist power waned in the early 1920s.43 For the time being, at least, the de-
mand for training depended solely on the needs of Handwerk and industry.
Building the Personnel and Substance of Vocational Counseling
In his sobering assessment of the state of vocational counseling in December 
1921, Counselor Knoff  had emphasized problems with the quality and training 
of personnel, knowledge of the diff erent vocations, and the school questionnaire, 
which was the most important source of information on the youth. We now look 
at vocational counseling’s eff orts to improve in these areas, as well as another sub-
ject that Knoff  might have mentioned but did not: applied psychology.
Well before Knoff ’s critiques, local authorities in fact had begun to train their 
vocational counselors. Th e latter, whose very position was, of course, a new cre-
ation, had until recently been teachers, trade instructors, and civil servants. Of 
the roughly 600 vocational counselors in 1925,44 a survey revealed, 5 percent had 
had a profession requiring university training; nearly a quarter had been teachers 
of one sort or another; 55 percent had worked previously in other welfare offi  ces; 
and 7 and 8 percent, respectively, had been civil servants and business- or trades-
men.45 Th eir knowledge of particular vocations was thus often circumstantial, 
unsystematic, and limited in scope.
Th e earliest local and state-level courses for vocational counselors were of quite 
modest scale. In December 1919, the state labor offi  ce in Westphalia-Lippe of-
fered one of the fi rst.46 Over four days, labor exchange offi  cials and vocational 
counselors from the north-Rhine area, as well as interested others, heard lectures 
about a variety of topics, including “the development and tasks of vocational 
counseling, with special regard to the conditions created by the war” (by the Trade 
Ministry’s Schindler), “vocational counseling for women,” and “the collection of 
vocational information.” In the next years, numerous towns and state offi  ces put 
on conferences of similar length and subject matter.47
On a more permanent basis, the Prussian Trade and the Reich Labor Minis-
tries contributed funds to the Seminar for Job Placement and Vocational Coun-
seling at the University of Münster, which began instruction in May 1920, but 
remained too theoretical to be of practical use.48 At the Reich Labor Offi  ce’s fi rst 
major meeting on vocational counseling, held in November 1920, participants 
emphasized the importance of the training of the counselors and the “decisive 
signifi cance” of attracting “suitable personages to this offi  ce of high responsibil-
ity.” Currently, it was generally agreed, their training was “defi cient.”49 By late 
1921, concerns about the state of vocational counseling50 had mounted to such 
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an extent that “numerous and various sides” urged the Brandenburg offi  ce, which 
had taken a lead in reform eff orts, to call a meeting of Land labor and vocational 
offi  ces,51 at which Knoff  would make the pessimistic assessment cited earlier. In 
his “theses” for the meeting, Knoff  was even more damning: “Dilettantish occupa-
tion with vocational counseling, interest in the relevant questions, and good will 
alone cannot be regarded as suffi  cient prerequisites for vocational counseling.” 
In their place, he proposed the creation of a “well-ordered course of instruction” 
that would last—“for the time-being”—a year-and-a-half and conclude with a 
fi nal exam. But the proposal failed to gain broader backing as current circum-
stances made it fi nancially untenable. Th e municipal jurisdiction over vocational 
counseling meant that the Reich could not even promulgate unifi ed standards 
for counselor training. It was precisely such circumstances that would make the 
advocates of a comprehensive system of vocational counseling anticipate the salu-
tary eff ects of the Labor Exchange Law—and experience disappointment over 
its equivocations in this regard. In the end, the Trade Ministry’s Schindler only 
could promise to publish an essay on the matter in the journal Work and Voca-
tion, and “hope that through the public discussion the matter would be further 
clarifi ed.”52 Th e Trade Ministry had founded Work and Vocation in 1921, and the 
journal immediately became the fl agship of the vocational counseling movement, 
providing a forum for discussion, disseminating ideas and best practices, and 
boosting the esprit de corps of the tyro counselors.
By the late summer of 1923, a survey revealed that “despite the best of inten-
tions, which many vocational counselors demonstrate, success remains elusive due 
to insuffi  cient training.” Numerous state and municipal offi  ces off ered some form 
of training, but “the cost-issue” had so far prevented extensive courses, and qual-
ity varied greatly, from Wurttemberg, where the part-time counselors received 
books to read and later discussed them in Stuttgart, to the four-week course in 
Dusseldorf.
Th e complement to the training of vocational counselors and the second, of-
ten closely linked, area of reform was the systematic development of knowledge 
about the vocations. Eff orts to improve vocational knowledge followed a path 
somewhat similar to that of training reform, though in the former case the im-
pediments lay less in the pragmatic realm of fi nancing and jurisdiction, and more 
in the task itself. What was most important to know about a line of work? How 
should one fi nd it out? Even among backers of vocational counseling, there was 
disagreement about how precisely one could and should try to match a young 
person and a vocation.
As with the counselors’ training, the initiative to gain a better understanding 
of the various vocations came not from Berlin, but from those closer to the actual 
practice, from the provincial and state offi  ces. Two approaches vied for support. 
Brandenburg’s plan would encompass gathering information widely: on voca-
tional training, and its regulation by public offi  ces, organizations, etc.; on the 
development of the vocations; on wages and contracts; on vocational statistics; 
on the practice of vocational counseling; and on the relevant literature.53 Saxony-
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Anhalt’s model, which would become the standard for the Labor Administra-
tion’s “vocational profi les” for the next four decades, focused more narrowly on 
personal characteristics relevant for each vocation: those “necessary,” “excluding,” 
“particularly useful,” and “not excluding.” 
When a compromise between the two was reached, the central authorities, 
increasingly anxious not only about the fi nancial straits, but also about the poor 
quality and reputation of the vocational offi  ces, sought to develop national stan-
dards. At a meeting attended not only by representatives of the central and state 
offi  ces, but also by labor and business leaders, the Prussian Trade Ministry’s 
Schindler underlined the urgency of the matter:
[Along with the lack of suitable personnel for vocational counseling] there is a lack of 
content to be poured into a defi nite form. To that end, what is above all necessary is the 
creation of vocation-informational material and the completion of vocational research.54
Th e work, launched in late 1922, stalled for reasons both practical and theo-
retical. Hyperinfl ation of printing costs had just begun to soar. Th e desire to pro-
duce “scientifi c” vocational profi les confl icted with practical considerations of 
timeliness and general accessibility. Th e question of how specifi c vocational pro-
fi les—and recommendations—should be also refl ected the underlying debate 
over visions for optimizing the German workforce: what role would centralized 
distribution play? Since the war, the Trade Ministry had certainly incorporated 
this style of thought more fully into its own proposals. Yet compared to the most 
eager advocates of comprehensive knowledge and control, the Prussian ministry 
remained skeptical. Schindler, in commenting on demands to apply psychotech-
nics to vocational choice, dampened hopes for a precise distribution of workers:
Th e signifi cance of “vocational suitability” is exaggerated to a considerable degree among 
… psychotechnicians; one often overlooks the fact that most people are suited to several 
vocations and that the “suitability” will never allow itself to be measured as one measures 
height. I believe that the focus of vocational counseling lies largely in the areas of knowl-
edgeable information on the vocations, their prospects, essence, and demands; such infor-
mation is for the most part lacking. Th at at the same time a serious test of the vocational 
aspirant himself must occur—this seems to me self-evident; but the test will never have the 
result that with mathematical certainty “the” vocation can be determined.55
A third area of reform in the early years of vocational counseling—the school 
questionnaire—remained, despite its widely acknowledged importance, less trac-
table. More than in the other two realms, in matters of the school questionnaire, 
local and state level initiatives set the agenda; the central authorities remained 
exceptionally cautious.
Undoubtedly, the main reasons for the central authorities’ reserve were the 
simultaneous dependence of vocational counseling on the schools and the rivalry 
between schools and vocational counseling: unlike in the cases of counselors’ 
training and vocational profi les, if authorities wanted to improve the vocational 
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questionnaires, they would need the cooperation of another, at times ill-willed, 
institution. And yet, at least in this fi rst period, the Labor Administration per-
ceived the teacher’s evaluation as potentially the most valuable source of insight 
into the applicant. In a memo to the Labor Ministry, the Labor Offi  ce justifi ed 
the school questionnaires:
If vocational counseling is to take not only the economic aspect into account, then the 
counselor must try to gain insight into the personality of the advice-seeker. Opportunity 
for thorough personal observation will only present itself to the counselor in the rarest of 
cases; he therefore needs to rely on the observations of a third party [i.e., the school].56 
If the central authorities’ concern to foster good relations with the schools 
made them wary of precipitous reforms, local and state vocational offi  ces were less 
cautious. In the fi rst years of the vocational offi  ces, nearly all of the state offi  ces 
had developed questionnaires that they expected the teachers to fi ll out,57 as had 
the larger cities such a Berlin, Breslau, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich.58 Th ough 
some offi  ces reported a fruitful cooperation between the schools and counseling 
offi  ces in this regard,59 in most the results were inconclusive or disappointing.60
Th e most determined and ambitious eff ort to implement a uniform question-
naire, that of Saxony-Anhalt, and the Labor Offi  ce’s ambivalent reaction illustrate 
the thorny substantive and tactical questions involved. Th e early experience in 
Saxony-Anhalt pointed to two fundamental constraints on the school question-
naire: on the one hand, the fi rst questionnaire that had been introduced, which 
required the teacher to make a single evaluation at the end of the students’ school 
career, soon had proven to be inadequate and to require replacement by an evalu-
ation of the pupils “through time.” On the other hand, all previous attempts at 
such “continual questionnaires” seemed to be “too extensive.” A year later, after 
further consideration, Saxony-Anhalt proposed to implement its revised school 
questionnaire throughout the entire state. In addition to asking about the stu-
dent’s grades and physical health, the questionnaire solicited reports on the child’s 
“character and work habits” for each of his years in school. It provided a frame-
work for the teachers’ comments, but encouraged them to expatiate: the fi rst sub-
section, entitled “general abilities,” asked about the student’s “general behavior,” 
“interests,” “particular achievements,” and “other.” Th e second subsection, “work 
abilities,” required the teacher’s comments on the pupil’s “intellectual vigor,” 
“memory,” “independence,” “resilience,” “attentiveness,” “speediness,” “steadiness,” 
“adaptability,” “resistance to fatigue,” and “other.” By the end of his schooling, each 
student’s teachers—assuming they had dutifully fulfi lled their obligations—would 
have amassed comments on these qualities for each of eight or ten years.61
In its commentary to the Labor Ministry, the Reich Labor Offi  ce, while ex-
pressing gratitude for the general interest of the state offi  ces in school question-
naires, emphasized caution and criticized Saxony-Anhalt’s proposal, about which 
it “must raise objections.” Th e fi rst attempt to introduce a questionnaire on a 
large scale “ought not to involve such an extensive form.” If the public vocational 
counseling offi  ces did not proceed “quite gradually” on these matters, the teach-
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ers would not cooperate; before one could proceed with a wide-scale introduc-
tion, one would have to ascertain in smaller trials that the procedure was feasible 
and worthwhile, and also that the vocational counseling offi  ces could make use 
of them.
While Saxony-Anhalt’s eff ort was perhaps the most ambitious, it was not the 
only one. In the same period, other states attempted, or at least considered, the in-
troduction of similar uniform questionnaires.62 Th e central authorities continued 
to be cautious: in light of the resistance of many teachers, evaluations of students 
should be kept “as brief as possible and only retain that which is absolutely neces-
sary for the purpose of vocational counseling.” Specifi cally, experience had shown 
that such questionnaires had been introduced most successfully, “the more they 
restricted themselves to the capture of externally clearly identifi able things and, 
in addition, the more they encouraged the teacher to express himself freely.”63 
Each of these two qualifi cations, however, might confl ict with important goals 
of vocational counseling: the fi rst, because vocational counseling was particularly 
interested, not in external, but in inner qualities such as motivation and consci-
entiousness; the second, because “free expression” made systematization all but 
impossible. Th us, in the fi rst years of vocational counseling, the incorporation of 
the schools remained a particularly vexing and largely unresolved problem.
Th e advocates of universal vocational counseling had for some time expressed 
interest, however cautiously, in another way to improve their service: by turning 
to the emerging fi eld of applied psychology. Th e wartime successes of applied 
psychology, especially in selecting people who needed special, usually sensory 
motor, skills (airplane pilots, truck drivers, battlefi eld spotters, etc.), had helped 
to fuel a postwar wave of enthusiasm for “psychotechnics.”64 Universities devoted 
chairs and institutes to applied psychology; numerous new journals covered the 
fi eld; along with public authorities such as the railroad and armed forces, indus-
trial giants like AEG, MAN, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, and Zeiss all had their own 
testing stations to select workers.65
Soon, however, controversy and confl ict began to cast shadows on psychotech-
nics’ rapid growth. In both theoretical and applied psychology, methodological 
and substantive debates—among other things, about the role of quantitative test-
ing, the relationship between “elementary” attributes and human “wholes,” and 
the relative importance of abilities on the one hand and motivation or personal-
ity on the other—pitted schools against each other. In the rapid proliferation of 
psychotechnics stations, the infl ux of non-psychologists threatened more serious 
damage. Th e overwhelming enthusiasm for psychological testing, the Labor Ad-
ministration and government ministries noted with alarm, had inspired “dilet-
tantes and quacks” to try their hand at testing, whose extravagant claims and 
meager results would greatly harm legitimate psychotechnics.66
Th e Prussian Trade Ministry and the Reich Labor Administration, in particu-
lar, remained torn over applied vocational psychology. Especially for the Prussian 
Trade Ministry, applied psychology appeared to be a double-edged sword as a 
practical-political instrument of vocational counseling: useful in providing in-
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dividualized services and combating the offi  ces’ reputation for “bureaucratism,” 
but potentially harmful if the unproven techniques and practitioners tainted vo-
cational counseling itself. Such concerns framed the central authorities’ cautious 
policies toward applied psychology.
Reports from state and local labor offi  ces revealed an array of attitudes toward 
applied psychology, depending on personal conviction, but even more so on the 
local economic conditions. In the early 1920s, the great majority of labor offi  ces 
abstained from using psychological tests or evaluations, whether because they 
were still engaged in establishing more basic services, because austerity did not 
permit, or because they viewed psychotechnics with skepticism. Of those that did, 
many seem to have been motivated by genuine enthusiasm for the possibilities. 
In January 1923, the labor and vocation offi  ce of the Rhine Province informed 
the central authorities that, despite the fact that “in many places the endeavors 
of psychotechnics encounter resistance and that doubt is cast on its successes,” it 
would proceed to establish psychotechnical facilities. Th ey could draw on “good 
preparations and rich experiences,” and their program would be limited to narrow 
bounds.67 At nearly the same time, the Silesian vocational offi  ce expressed even 
more forcefully its determination. Since organizational matters could be regarded 
as nearly completed, the offi  ce wrote, it believed it was now “urgently necessary” 
to devote “special attention” to psychotechnical vocational counseling.68 
Further reports, in particular from local labor offi  ces, shed light on the rea-
sons for vocational counseling’s interest in applied psychology, in particular the 
close correlation between industry and psychological testing. In August 1923, 
the Off enbach offi  ce explained that it “performed the great majority of examina-
tions spontaneously, but in part also in commission of companies or wavering 
parents.” It highlighted the role of psychological testing in the offi  ce’s relations 
with local fi rms:
Th e preceding remarks have already revealed the importance we accord psychology, but 
also especially which successes the vocational offi  ce has achieved with industry thanks to 
psychology. Without exaggerating, it can be said that we have won large industry primarily 
through our institute.69 
After describing companies’ initial mistrust of the new bureaucracy, the Of-
fenbach report explained their change of heart:
Some skeptical employers were only won over, when we explained our methods—through 
personal exchanges, numerous slide shows, and tours of our institute. From this moment 
on, we are more capable than he, we are acknowledged experts. As “a man of practice” he 
can choose apprentices on the basis of school reports and external appearances better “than 
any bureaucrat”—now, however, he recognizes that the scientifi c method is better than his 
own, which is based on feelings, and he acknowledges the scientifi c method all the more 
when he, despite everything, retains freedom of choice in the fi nal selection.70
Th e Breslau vocational offi  ce reported a similar process of appeal to the lo-
cal business community and an even more positive response. In the summer of 
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1922, the director of the offi  ce had given a lecture “with slides” at a conference of 
Silesian employers, whereupon “funds were given to the vocational offi  ce for the 
purchase of a simple apparatus.” In the year since then, “personal appeals” by the 
director had moved numerous employers to donate further sums and equipment; 
with the help of the Silesian Central Employers’ Association, the Breslau offi  ce 
had set up a psychotechnical institute for testing.71
In these and other cases, the role of the vocational offi  ce’s psychological testing 
had evolved in a similar direction: in the absence of a legal mandate, psycho-
logical testing proved to be a useful tool for binding the local employers to the 
labor offi  ces. A meeting of vocational counseling leaders in 1924 confi rmed the 
strategic utility of testing: “Almost without exception [the directors of vocational 
counseling] expressed the conviction that vocational counseling must support 
vocational psychology in a determined way, if only for the reason that industry 
and crafts are placing more and more weight on it.”72
Even as the legal and institutional framework for a national labor administra-
tion and for statewide systems of vocational counseling was being set up, then, 
advocates of a comprehensive vocational counseling were at work on the sub-
stance of vocational counseling. In addition to their no doubt sincere desire to 
make vocational counseling a more eff ective tool for matching youths and jobs, 
the vocational counselors were responding to two challenges. While the 1922 
Labor Exchange Law gave a de facto monopoly on public vocational counseling 
to the network of labor offi  ces, other institutional rivals remained—in particular, 
the schools, but also other offi  ces of Weimar’s burgeoning welfare state. Th e ef-
forts to improve vocational counseling’s procedures were, in part, eff orts to out-
perform such rivals. At the same time, the Labor Exchange Law failed to make 
mandatory the use of the vocational offi  ces either for job seekers or for employers 
(as many had demanded). Th us, the vocational offi  ces had not only to overcome 
institutional rivals, but also, crucially, to convince their potential constituents of 
their worth. Th ese considerable pressures to improve vocational counseling en-
countered limits due to the strapped fi nancial situation of Germany at the time 
and to the challenges inherent to the tasks. In each area of reform—counselor 
training, vocational knowledge, the school questionnaire, and psychological eval-
uations—a common theme was also the tension between the desire, on the one 
hand, to apply scientifi c and exhaustive knowledge and, on the other, to achieve 
immediate, practical success.
Reframing the Skilled Worker: the Institutional and 
Psychological Origins of the German Vocational Training System
As these eff orts to improve vocational counseling made clear, employers’ atti-
tudes toward the Labor Administration and, even more crucially, their policies 
toward their workforces remained decisively important in the attempt to steer 
young people into skilled work. Employers did not view just the labor offi  ces’ 
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“bureaucratism” in selecting workers with skepticism. In the early 1920s, many 
doubted that selecting workers, or at least skilled workers, was of importance at 
all. To understand why this was the case—and why in the middle of the decade 
it suddenly changed—we fi rst must assess the state of German industry and the 
kind of “rationalization” it pursued in the years after the war.
Despite the extensive literature on Weimar Germany and its economy, only 
fairly recently has a convincing picture of German fi rms’ production strategies 
in the 1920s begun to emerge. When previous works addressed German indus-
try’s “rationalization” movement, they started from the universally held premise 
that rationalization was a homogeneous process resting on mechanization and 
deskilling.73 
In the harsh economic environment of post–World War I Germany, interest 
in rationalization, a rubric potentially including attempts to make virtually all 
aspects of life more productive, was exceptionally strong. Th e topic of rational-
ization was the subject of a broad public discussion throughout the 1920s,74 and 
various organizations, both public and private, promoted it in its various mani-
festations. In part with the support of such national organizations, and in part 
on their own, German companies were the primary movers of rationalization. 
Approaches to improving productivity varied from industry to industry and even 
from fi rm to fi rm. In the heavy industries such as coal, iron, and steel, many of 
the productivity gains came about through so-called “negative rationalization”—
shutting down unproductive operations and merging others. Mechanization also 
played an important role, for example, in the introduction of the pneumatic 
jackhammer in coal mining.75 Improvements in transportation within the fac-
tory, whether by adding motorized vehicles or reorganizing workfl ows, became a 
major focus in nearly all branches.76 In manufacturing, the most dynamic sector 
of the German economy since the late nineteenth century, considerable attention 
focused on developing new materials, such as high-speed steel for machine tools 
that were more productive77 and better motors and control systems.78 Undoubt-
edly, a major aspiration of many in the rationalization movement,79 inspired by 
the ideas of Frederick Winslow Taylor and Henry Ford and the breathtaking pro-
duction results of the latter’s automobile works,80 was to maximize the division of 
labor and to move to mechanized assembly line, or at least “fl ow,” production.
Yet despite the widespread enthusiasm in Weimar for “Fordism,”81 the actual 
pace of mechanization and introduction of assembly line work was, in fact, far 
slower than the contentious public debates at the time about “Rationalisierung” 
or the later de-skilling literature suggested.82 Particularly in the manufacturing 
sector, a number of factors set limits to the introduction of Fordist methods. 
In some of the most important production spheres, the nature of the product 
itself—whether machine tool or electrical motor—precluded substantial division 
of labor or mechanization. Due to trade restrictions imposed after World War I, 
in eff ect until 1925, and to the US success in increasing its share of world exports 
in manufactured goods, German companies, at least initially, had to focus on 
their own, much smaller, domestic market. Th is meant, compared to the US 
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competitors, much less opportunity to secure the stable consumption pattern 
necessary for economies of scale.83 In other ways, as well, German economic and 
social conditions did not make mechanized assembly line production seem suit-
able. As one commentator at the time expressed the diff erence between the US 
industrial pacesetter and Germany: “there, plentiful and cheap capital, scarcity 
of human labor and high wages, here, scarce and expensive capital, excess of la-
bor and wages that are only about 1/4 the American level.”84 Indeed, one of the 
conclusions that many of the numerous industry and union leaders who made 
pilgrimages to the US reached was that Germany, while it should adopt some of 
the New World’s innovations, must develop its own forms of rationalization.85
In almost all cases, companies chose, or learned from experience, to adopt 
mixed strategies that integrated improvements to physical and human capital. Even 
as more machinery was introduced, the skilled worker generally became more, not 
less, important. Th is was the case even in the so-called heavy industries.86
Th e trend was especially pronounced in manufacturing. Electro-technical 
products and non-electrical machines had been Germany’s leading exports dur-
ing its rapid industrial expansion in the three decades prior to World War I, and 
afterwards as well these industries were the most dynamic parts of the German 
economy. As the leading role of such men as Carl Friedrich von Siemens and Carl 
Köttgen in the National Productivity Board suggested, these industries were at 
the forefront of eff orts to rationalize German industry. In both industries, ratio-
nalization entailed substantial “learning processes.”87 In the early postwar years at 
Siemens, as at many other fi rms, the guiding principle of rationalization was the 
central collection of information, development of best procedures, and imple-
mentation. Th e “work bureaus,” established in the company’s major factories be-
tween 1919 and 1921 to coordinate production,88 and the “production-technical 
conferences” held since early 1921 to coordinate across the factories exemplifi ed 
the drive for centralized control. 
Th e impediments to rationalization in Germany along US lines, however, 
were signifi cant. In Siemens’ production of electric motors they included:
[T]he particular nature of the motor construction, which resulted from the production of a 
multitude of types of motors in changing series; the technical-constructive evolution of the 
motors which in the 1920s and 1930s was “completely fl uid” due to the switch in machine-
making to the electric single- or multiple engine drive; the highly diff erentiated demand for 
electrical motors, which hindered a reduction in the variety of types and in special models; 
the strong competition for market advantages among the various motor-producers, which 
prevented quick progress in the norming and standardizing work; the signifi cant propor-
tion of work-by-hand requiring the highest precision; the technical-constructive backward-
ness in machinery and ancillary equipment, when compared to the achievements of the 
new hard-metal machine tool blades; and fi nally the shifting sales situation and the health 
of the economy.89
German machine-building companies often opted for a middle strategy of fl ex-
ible rationalization, which aimed to take advantage of mechanization and reorga-
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nization to the extent that these did not reduce the fi rms’ abilities to respond to 
frequently changing market conditions.90
 Contrary to contemporary fears about (and some later assessments of ) the im-
pact of Fordism, German manufacturing’s strategy of fl exible rationalization did 
not lead to a net replacement of skilled workers by unskilled ones. Purely quanti-
tatively, the proportion of skilled workers remained the same or, if anything, rose 
during the 1920s. Th e second and third national surveys of workforce composi-
tion, conducted in 1907 and 1925, described an increasingly skilled workforce. 
While the prewar census showed unskilled workers to be 41 percent of the total, 
by 1925 this fi gure had fallen to 34 percent.91 Of the young men born in 1901, 
who thus entered the workforce in the fi nal, wartime, years of the Empire, nearly 
equal proportions had only an elementary school education (37.6 percent) and 
a supplemental crafts or industrial apprenticeship (38.4 percent). By compari-
son, in the mid 1920s, the percentage of those joining the workforce who had 
completed an apprenticeship had risen to 52 percent.92 Th e 1920s witnessed an 
unprecedented wave of foundings of company training centers for apprentices.93 
Th e more detailed studies of particular fi rms and industries confi rm these im-
pressions of an increasingly well-trained, or at least not deskilled, workforce. At 
Siemens in the late 1920s, slightly more than two-thirds of all workers had com-
pleted a three or four year apprenticeship or its equivalent in on-the-job training, 
and in total, 40 percent were “highly qualifi ed.”94 In the following decade, when 
the electro-technical industry more generally began to survey its member fi rms, 
the latter reported that more than 70 percent of their workers were skilled or 
semi-skilled.95 At Bosch, too, in the 1920s, the proportion of unskilled workers 
declined generally. As one index of this development, the number of unskilled 
male workers as a percentage of the entire workforce at Bosch declined steeply 
in the years after 1925: from 17.5 percent in 1926, to 12.5 percent a year later, 
and 11.4 percent in 1928.96 Th e composition of the workforce at the machine-
producer MAN’s Augsburg factory followed a similar pattern. Th e percentage 
of skilled workers climbed slightly between 1920 and 1930, rising from 47.5 
percent in 1920 to as much as 55 percent in 1927 and falling back to 50 percent 
in 1930, during the Depression. Th at of unskilled workers dropped steeply, from 
34 percent of the workforce in the fi rst year to 15 percent in 1927 and 14 percent 
in the fi nal year. Th ese untrained workers were replaced by the fast-rising propor-
tion of semi-skilled workers, whose share of the workforce rose from 18.5 percent 
to 30 percent to 36 percent.97
Th e importance of skilled and semi-skilled workers to the German fi rm and 
economy is not captured adequately in the fi gures alone. Of great importance were 
the employers’ subjective evaluations of the gelernt or angelernt worker’s role in the 
production process and their assessment of the trained worker’s potential contri-
bution to the fi rm. Th e way industrialists conceived of their workers mattered.
Th e case studies of rationalization cited above suggest that employers’ thinking 
on this subject evolved over the course of the 1920s. A debate took place within 
German machine-manufacturing about whether its future lay with “special” or 
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“universal” machines, that is, with machines that could perform only single, uni-
form tasks and hence required only unskilled or, at most, semi-skilled labor-
ers or conversely with machines that could be reconfi gured to perform multiple 
tasks, thus requiring skilled workers.98 In fact, the debate was not new. As we 
saw, around 1900, German industry was ambivalent about its future production 
strategies.99 Th e emphasis on mass production during the war and progress in 
norming had appeared to boost one side. As German industry by the mid 1920s 
increasingly realized that it must opt for a “fl exible rationalization,” its machine-
tool sector obliged by producing machines in the middle range between special 
and universal. Initially, German machine-manufacturers “regretfully identifi ed” 
this inability to move fully to mechanized “fl ow” production as “a further nega-
tive consequence” of Germany’s particular market conditions. Th en, however, 
manufacturers began to recognize the “innovative potential of human labor … 
the specifi cally elastic potential of human labor, the productive ability to adapt to 
changing demands, its multifaceted applications and uses.” It was only because 
the German machine-tool industry (and by extension, other manufacturers as 
well) proved unable to implement full-scale fl ow production that it had the op-
portunity to identify the potentialities of human labor.100 Likewise, Bosch, when 
confronted with the US automobile industry’s mass production methods, “turned 
a liability into an advantage” by consciously specializing in individual and special 
fabrications,101 which required skilled workers. At Siemens, company manage-
ment had not always recognized the skilled worker’s importance, but there oc-
curred in the fi rm “a central insight of the managers, dawning at the end of the 
1920s, into the unchangingly high signifi cance of the male skilled worker.”102
Th e rationalization of German fi rms in the 1920s did not produce, then, a net 
“deskilling” of the German workforce, but to the contrary made the Facharbeiter 
appear all the more vital to the German variety of capitalist production. Ger-
man employers did not immediately recognize the potential value of the skilled 
worker, but rather did so only after their thinking had evolved, though on this 
matter the scholars provide few concrete details and diff er as to the timing of the 
transition.
As welcome as these recent revisions of our picture of German industry in 
the Weimar period have been, they fail to adequately convey the abruptness 
with which German industry’s thinking about the “human factor” of production 
changed in the mid 1920s, which did not refl ect simply a gradual reassessment 
on the basis of accumulating evidence, but in many cases occurred as a “Gestalt-
switch” in employers’ perceptions.
In the years after 1924, German employers increasingly began to see their 
work ers diff erently. Th e change in perception of the worker, especially the skilled 
worker, the abruptness of the switch, and the continuing resistance to it were 
all subjects of frequent comment by industrialists and others. In June 1924, the 
National Productivity Board (RKW) devoted a session to the “training of young 
workers in the broadest sense,” one of the earliest (semi) public discussions of 
the issue. Th e fi rst speaker, the head of the Association of German Engineers, 
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Con rad Matschoss, distinguished between the new US “Fordist” style of produc-
tion and the German. Th e former trained its workers as quickly as possible for 
a particular, constantly repeated activity; the latter aimed to develop “quality 
work ers.”103 Another participant, Dr. E. Toussaint, a professor of engineering at 
the Berlin Technical University and industrial consultant, assailed the view that 
the development in the mechanical industry would eventually make the trained 
worker “superfl uous.” Anybody familiar with the issue, he insisted, would “long 
since” have recognized that the opposite would more likely be the case and that it 
would be only a matter of shifting trained and capable workers to new positions. 
“In many cases,” Toussaint concluded, “the most thorough exploitation of the 
machine could only be guaranteed if a thinking Facharbeiter used it.”104 
Th e following year, the head of the Berlin vocational counseling offi  ce deemed 
it “an encouraging sign that so soon after the [military] collapse [the economy] 
has heeded the call to awake: ‘Above all, highest achievements in work and in the 
products of work must help to free us from the pressure of conditions brought 
about by the outcome of the war.’” As a result, “in all vocational branches to-
day the call for ‘quality young-workers’ goes out.”105 Somewhat later, one of the 
leaders of the psychotechnical movement, Hans Rupp, concurred: “Th e convic-
tion that the greatest care must be devoted to the training of the workers has 
gained broad ground since the war. One recognizes more and more that for us 
in Germany strength and growth lies in superior work and therefore in the most 
careful training of the workers.”106 In an article entitled “Man and Technology,” 
Matschoss burdened his own profession with some responsibility for the previ-
ous disregard for the worker: “We engineers, in particular, in the indefatigable 
work for economic-technical progress, for too long failed to make the fact clear 
to ourselves that we in our industry, which is based on this technology, can never 
dispense with man. Man and technology, man and machine belong insolubly 
together.”107
As these comments have suggested, many perceived the interest in the Fachar-
beiter to be a new, or at least newly urgent, phenomenon. Th e director of the Work-
ing Committee for Vocational Training put the matter in historical perspective:
Th e fact that the vocational training of the workers is closely related to the productivity of 
the economy has been recognized for decades, if only at fi rst by small circles, and practically 
useful work has been derived from this knowledge. New is the sudden dissemination of 
these insights and the systematic way and energy with which these tasks are tackled, which 
have appeared so forcefully on the level of economic and social-political issues.108
Th e new view of the value of the skilled worker spread rapidly after the mid
1920s, but it did so only by overcoming persistent contrary beliefs. In describing 
the “young industrial worker in the modern factory,” an offi  cial of the Prussian 
Trade Ministry still felt obliged to brand as “false” the thesis “that in the future 
we can make do almost exclusively with untrained workers.”109 Schürholz be-
lieved it necessary to “oppose the opinion that the skilled vocation in industry 
has largely become extinct due to increasing mass production and the infl ux of 
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perfected machines.”110 By 1930, the conviction that Germany’s economic fu-
ture, though it undoubtedly would include more and better machines, lay in 
the hands of its skilled workers had displaced such doubts. A reviewer of the 
National Productivity Board’s volume on “Suitability and Quality Work” could 
confi dently assert: “Value-work of the greatest perfection is the goal of German 
industry. A detailed justifi cation of this position is today no longer necessary.”111 
Likewise, a leading functionary of the Association of German Employers’ Orga-
nizations referred assuredly to the “growing attention and estimation paid to the 
‘human factor’ in the economy.”112
Why, though, did the turn to the Facharbeiter take place when it did, in the 
mid 1920s, and why did it take the form it did, that is, as a relatively sudden 
paradigm shift and conversion? Th e scholarly inattention to these issues means 
that our answers can be only fairly speculative.
By the mid 1920s, the unskilled worker had come to seem increasingly bur-
densome to German employers in several ways. Th roughout the postwar period, 
but especially after the end of infl ation, he had exhibited turnover rates higher 
even than before 1914, in some regions and industries reaching annually well over 
100 percent.113 Th anks to the massive infl ux of unskilled workers into unions 
and to the greater bargaining power of the latter, signifi cant wage compression 
occurred between unskilled and skilled workers after the war. Th e relative rise in 
unskilled workers’ wages made investment in worker training all the more attrac-
tive.114 Based on their experiences in the war, employers had concluded that the 
unskilled worker was also far more likely than the skilled one to be politically 
radical and hence a potential source of disruption to the factory’s smooth opera-
tion. Finally—and this concerned employers less directly and only in so far as 
they had to bear collective fi nancial burdens—the unskilled worker constituted 
a disproportionate share of Weimar’s pool of unemployed people, which grew 
steadily after 1924 with only brief respites. Th e alternative to a high-skilled work-
force, then, seemed increasingly unattractive.
For the fi rst few years after the armistice, however, a variety of alternatives still 
seemed possible. Th e extension of wartime policies, the postwar infl ation, and, 
from late 1922, hyperinfl ation temporarily permitted a remarkably smooth tran-
sition to peacetime production, but only by cloaking German industry’s true 
conditions in the haze of a depreciating currency, which gave their exporters a 
(constantly growing) advantage.115 In addition, the German demobilization pol-
icy, which prevented companies from releasing workers and perpetuated binding 
wage-mediation procedures, had signifi cant eff ects on wage development, produc-
tivity, technical innovation, and investment strategies, further clouding employers’ 
perceptions about future conditions.116 As we saw above, German employers of-
ten seemed rather uncertain about what qualities made a good worker. Th e nec-
essarily painful adjustment, which in the other belligerent nations had occurred 
soon after the end of the war, took place in Germany only from 1924 on, after 
a new currency and agreement on reparations restored monetary stability to the 
country and after the demobilization restrictions were removed. With German 
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companies having to sell their goods in a hard currency for the fi rst time in years, 
competition in export markets stiff ened considerably.117 German employers had 
to take stock of their position in new domestic and international environments.
Almost certainly, the most salient feature of the new international economic 
situation, the one to which both the German educated public and its employers 
paid the most attention in the middle years of the 1920s, was the spectacular 
growth of the US economy and its new forms of mass production.118 As has 
been mentioned in connection with Carl Köttgen’s infl uential book on Economic 
America, the stream of German industrialists who visited the stations of US suc-
cess after 1924 returned to their own country with two basic lessons. German 
industry would have to adopt some important innovations from the US; how-
ever, for a number of reasons, Germany also would have to pursue its own kind 
of rationalization. Numerous references in the burgeoning discussion at this time 
about German “quality work” suggest that the US system of production served 
as spur for the German industrialists to reconsider where their relative advantage 
lay.119 German industry would prosper or at least survive, not by competing with 
the US in the mass production of cheap goods, but in the more skilled manufac-
turing of higher-quality products.
 German industry’s turn to the skilled worker, as sudden and fraught with 
urgency as it was, bears the marks, not of a gradual accumulation of evidence and 
shifting of views, but rather of a reframing of thinking.120 Certainly, as we have 
seen in earlier chapters as well as in this one, even before the mid 1920s Ger-
man industry, or at least parts of it, had already begun to devote more thought 
and resources to worker training. Important stages in this development were the 
discussions of the 1870s about apprenticeships in handicrafts and industry and 
DATSCH’s work after 1908. Yet as numerous commentators suggested after the 
mid 1920s, until then “the vision in economic and fi rm life focused on the whole 
too much on drawing the material (physical goods and machine power) into the 
circle of business considerations,” while the “element that shapes the material, 
namely the working human, … has been excessively overlooked.”121
Th e focus on the “material” was, given developments since the turn of the 
century, in many respects understandable. Tremendously impressive or at least 
promising improvements, nearly all of them emanating from the US, had oc-
curred in technology and organization. Frederick Winslow Taylor’s development 
of fast steel in the 1890s had begun a cascading revolution of improvements in 
machine-tool design and use. Perspicacious German engineers not only adopted 
the new materials and methods for their own companies, but also, after 1907, 
promoted them more broadly through the trendsetting journal Workshop Tech-
nology. In chapters 2 and 3, we described the great enthusiasm among German 
engineers and industrialists for the new technologies, methods of organizing pro-
duction, and, especially from 1917 on, for agreeing on industry wide norms.
Th e dominant themes of the early rationalization movement—machine-
productivity, calculation, and control—could not but infl uence German indus-
trialists’ views of the worker.122 Of course, it is true that concurrent with these 
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eff orts, some German employers (even the same ones, such as Ludwig Löwe) 
were engaged in improving the training of skilled workers: DATSCH (1908) 
was founded only a year after Workshop Technology. Yet as the managing direc-
tor of the Working Committee for Vocational Training noted in 1926, until the 
recent wave of attention, the importance of the skilled worker’s training only had 
been recognized by “small circles.”123 If the early rationalizers thought of the “hu-
man factor” in production at all, they quite naturally transferred the patterns of 
thought from materials, technology, and organization to this other sphere. Th at 
is, they thought in terms of calculation, control, and standardization. Th e human 
worker could be seen at best simply as an accessory to the machine, at worst as a 
potential source of disruption, as “sand in the gears.”124 Even when an advocate 
of rationalization became more interested in the worker, the conception of the 
worker remained mechanical. Th us, in 1913, the leading engineer of the German 
rationalization movement, Schlesinger, suggested that German industrialists, 
having spent suffi  cient time addressing technological and organizational matters, 
should concentrate now more on the human side of production.125 As late as 
1920, however, Schlesinger—like many other psychotechnicians—still saw the 
human factor largely as a potential disturbance, as something to be diminished 
as much as possible:
Th e most favorable separation of fundamentally diff erent jobs means that the workshop of 
mass production makes do in far and away the majority of cases with semi-skilled workers, 
whose work-abilities depend little on experience and specialized knowledge and even less 
from high intellectual abilities. Rather, the sensory abilities of eye, ear and joints combined 
with a certain degree of attentiveness will suffi  ce. Th e infl uence of attentiveness and of 
tiredness declines the more it becomes possible to remove the strain on humans in these 
regards by making the machines self-operating.126
Th e (re)discovery of the potential contribution of the skilled worker in the 
mid 1920s did not occur, then, only as the result of gradual shifts in thinking. 
Th e “sudden spread”127 of these ideas depended at least in part on a reframing 
of industrialists’ views of the skilled worker, whose character qualities they now 
saw as potentially making a positive contribution to the company’s success, who 
became, indeed, the source and guarantor of German “quality work.”
Th e new view of the skilled worker not only stirred discussion of Germany’s 
comparative advantage in the world economy, it also spurred German industry to 
cooperate to put training on a fi rmer, standardized basis. Its initiatives took place 
against the backdrop of fi rst delays in, and then ultimately the postponement of, 
national legislation on vocational training. By the middle of the decade, observ-
ers had serious doubts whether the laws ever would be enacted, although eff orts 
continued. Leading manufacturers, inspired by the new convictions regarding 
the importance of the skilled worker, decided to act regardless of the legislative 
outcome. One initiative, DINTA, has been extensively studied, but the more im-
portant projects of DATSCH and its Working Committee on Vocational Train-
ing (Arbeitsauschuss für Berufsausbildung) have received hardly any attention.
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Th e founding of the German Institute for Technical Labor Training (DINTA128) 
in 1925 has received more attention than the other two organizations in the 
scholarly literature.129 In May 1925, in a speech at a gathering of the Association 
of German Iron and Steel Industrialists, its chairman Albert Vögler diagnosed 
that German employers had been ignoring the most important element in the 
production process: the worker.130 Th e speakers Vögler then introduced outlined 
the tasks of a new organization, which German heavy industry (coal and iron 
producers) would launch several months later. 
DINTA developed and propagated an array of programs and measures con-
cerned with the role of the worker in the company and beyond. In addition to 
worker training, which would shape the incoming workers, DINTA promoted 
a range of steps to appeal to current, older workers, by strengthening the “fac-
tory community”131 and gaining the workers’ allegiance for the company. Th ese 
included, most importantly, company newspapers, which DINTA set up or pro-
vided; suggestion-schemes to encourage the workers’ input into factory opera-
tions; and a variety of recreational and welfare policies pertaining to the laborer’s 
after-work and home life. DINTA’s eff orts quickly met with an enthusiastic re-
sponse, thus revealing many German employers’ growing interest in the “human 
factor” of production. Within a year of its founding, DINTA was training nearly 
forty engineers and foremen from Ruhr heavy-metal fi rms at its headquarters in 
Düsseldorf and had established twenty-four apprenticeship training workshops 
in other mining and metallurgical companies. DINTA published nearly twenty 
company newspapers. By the end of the decade, between 150 and 300 fi rms re-
lied, at least in part, on DINTA for their apprentice training and more than fi fty 
produced company newspapers with its help.132
Th e most comprehensive treatments to date of DINTA have had trouble ex-
plaining the organization’s rapid success. Th eir accounts refer to its eclectic ap-
peal, the tireless propagandizing of its leader Karl Arnhold, and, most centrally, 
its political resonance with anti-Marxist conservatism.133
Such claims for the central role of politics in DINTA’s appeal can account 
for only part of the organization’s success and have overshadowed other aspects 
of its work. Th e motives of the DINTA men, after all, were not necessarily the 
same as the motives of the DINTA clients. In fact, considerable evidence sug-
gests that fi rms were more interested in practical matters than in politics. Why, 
in the absence of direct benefi ts, should individual fi rms be interested enough 
in national political developments to invest considerable resources in the latter? 
Would fi rms not have been far more concerned with their own well being? Joan 
Campbell’s and Mary Nolan’s own evidence suggests that they were, or at least 
that DINTA leadership itself believed they were. Th us, Campbell suggests that 
Arnhold made “great eff orts to obscure” DINTA’s political program and instead 
emphasized “rational considerations” and “the economic benefi ts to be derived 
from his educational innovations,” precisely in order to appeal to the employers 
and even to labor.134 Indeed, before DINTA’s founding, German entrepreneurs 
“had proven insuffi  ciently responsive” to the appeals of a future Arnhold aide that 
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they should concern themselves with the workers’ well being for philosophical-
political reasons. It was only later, when he appealed to the employers’ self-interest, 
that he “got a hearing in industrial circles.”135 Given the fi rms’ interest in DINTA’s 
comprehensive, multi-year programs for training skilled workers, it seems doubt-
ful that employers were not interested seriously in “what and how” the workers 
were taught, as Campbell implies. Apprentice training and education, accord-
ing to Wolfgang Muth, was “the area on which the DINTA concentrated its 
main eff orts” during the Weimar period.136 Given German industry’s new em-
phases in their production strategies, apprentice training and education were the 
most likely reasons for DINTA’s success—even if not the sole raison d’etre of its 
founding.
Th e overestimation of DINTA’s political appeal has obscured not just its role 
in training skilled workers; more signifi cantly for present purposes, it has kept 
scholarly attention focused on DINTA to the exclusion of two other organi-
zations. DATSCH and, closely tied to the same, the Working Committee for 
Vo ca tional Training, did not promote themselves as vigorously as Arnhold did 
DINTA. Yet in the long run, DATSCH and the Working Committee proved to 
be of far greater signifi cance for the German variety of capitalism than DINTA.137 
Th e creation of the Working Committee, in particular, which only recently has 
begun to receive appropriate scholarly attention,138 can be regarded as one of 
the decisive institutional steps in the creation of the modern German vocational 
training system. After the establishment of the Labor Administration and com-
prehensive vocational counseling earlier in the decade, this standardized system 
of vocational training formed the third basic strand in the German project to 
optimize the workforce.
When DATSCH was founded in 1908 under the auspices of the Associa-
tion of German Engineers and the Association of German Machine-Building 
Organizations, it initially aspired to coordinate centrally the technical training 
at machine-building schools.139 By 1911, however, it had already expanded its 
eff orts to the training of skilled workers in the machine and iron industries. With 
the assistance of industrial giants such as Siemens, AEG, and MAN, DATSCH 
promulgated guidelines for the organization of apprenticeship training, the legal 
status of the apprentice, and the practical and theoretical training in the “me-
chanical industry.”140 Still, before the war, the emphasis remained on the theo-
retical side of training.141 Th e numerous affi  liated industrial associations helped 
to disseminate widely these recommendations. After the war-induced interrup-
tion of its activities, DATSCH turned its attention increasingly to the content 
of practical training of skilled workers. Borrowing materials from leading com-
panies, the DATSCH staff  developed course plans for such central vocations as 
machinist, constructive machinist, prototype-carpenter, and former. Th rough 
its own publishing division, DATSCH distributed posters, slides, and looseleaf 
pages displaying the technical specifi cations and, in clear diagrams, the “what and 
how” of basic industrial procedures, such as soldering, milling, and drilling.142 
After a lull in the early 1920s, DATSCH’s sales to fi rms of these vocational teach-
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ing materials nearly quadrupled between 1924 and 1931, jumping from 40,000 
to 150,000 Reichsmark.143
DATSCH’s activities, especially after the war, in establishing standard training 
and work procedures for the most important industrial vocations prepared the 
ground for the founding in the summer of 1926 of the Working Committee for 
Vocational Training, which nonetheless represented a true watershed in the cre-
ation of the German vocational system. Th e establishment of the Working Com-
mittee not only by DATSCH, but with the backing of the National Association 
of German Industry and the Association of German Employers’ Organizations, 
meant that the two most important industrial employer groups had commit-
ted themselves to improving and standardizing worker training and that they 
now had a forum dedicated exclusively to this task. When, in 1927, the leading 
handicrafts organizations joined the Working Committee, thus burying decades-
old diff erences with industry over control of vocational training, all of the major 
employer groups were now engaged.144
In addition to the participation of the most important economic interest 
groups, the sense of mission and the comprehensive mandate of the Working 
Committee distinguished it even from the earlier eff orts of DATSCH. In the 
inaugural issue of the Working Committee’s journal, Technical Education, which 
became the fl agship of the movement, the chairmen of the new body, the major 
industrialists Ernst von Borsig and Gottlieb Lippart, argued for the central role 
of the worker in the production process:
In the widest circles it has gradually come to be recognized that the competitiveness of our 
industry depends not only on the technical and organizational perfecting of the production 
apparatus, but to no lesser degree on the best-possible use of the available human forces. 
Everywhere one recognizes that the most valuable good which Germany, robbed of so 
many natural resources, possesses is human labor power.
However, even more important was investing in the development of human 
capital:
It is not enough, though, that one uses most economically the people who are integrated 
into the production process; rather, it is above all necessary that the abilities of those who 
are to participate in the production process are raised to the maximum and developed in 
the most versatile way already before they enter the economic system.145 
Th e chairmen’s distinction—between, on the one hand, distributing existing 
human resources and, on the other, cultivating new talents—succinctly captures the 
two approaches to optimizing the German workforce analyzed in earlier chapters.
Th e chairmen underscored the sweeping and systematic mandate of the Work-
ing Committee, “which will comprehensively treat all the great questions of the 
vocational training of an industrial worker which are suited for a centralized 
regulation.” In an article entitled “Our Tasks,” the director of the Working Com-
mittee, F. Schürholz, delineated more concretely the work ahead. Th e very fi rst 
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task, the prerequisite for all further systematizing, was to “defi ne” all vocations. 
Only on the basis of such a clarifi cation could the substantive coordination of 
training be undertaken and vocational “profi les” created, which would describe 
(and prescribe) the relevant activities of each job and the apprenticeship train-
ing necessary in each of these according to the DATSCH courses. Perhaps most 
crucially, the qualifying exams, “which infl uence the quality of the training and 
determine the extent of the demands made of the testee,” needed to be made 
largely uniform throughout the country.146 
Th ough Schürholz proposed the standardization of training and testing in 
the context of a commentary on the draft of a law on vocational training, it 
soon became clear that German industry’s goals in this regard did not depend 
ulti mately on legal measures. When the proposed law fi nally foundered in 1928, 
the Working Committee and DATSCH continued, and even accelerated, their 
work.147 Over the following years, they turned out dozens of vocational profi les, 
training plans, and exams for the most important industrial vocations. Th e eff orts 
from the mid 1920s by German industry, with the support of key government 
ministries, to systematize training procedures mark a decisive turning point in 
the formation of the overall German vocational system as it exists to this day.148
For the other strand of the German vocational system—the vocational counsel-
ing movement, whose promoters in the Prussian Trade Ministry were determined 
not only to establish universal vocational counseling, but to encourage as many 
young men as possible to become skilled workers—German industry’s renewed 
commitment to the skilled worker had a signifi cant impact. Most importantly, it 
facilitated vocational counseling’s dealings with industry. For in the second ple-
nary meeting of the Working Committee, on 29 January 1926, it agreed “actively 
to support the work of the vocational counseling stations” and recommended 
that these offi  ces and the industrial representatives cooperate locally.149 As noted 
above, the endorsement by industry’s highest representatives greatly facilitated 
the work of the vocational offi  ces, which now appreciatively acknowledged lo-
cal employers’ enhanced interest in their services.150 Th anks to industry’s redis-
covery of the skilled worker, its earlier mistrust of the “bureaucratic” vocational 
counseling offi  ces was mitigated and, from 1926 on, these offi  ces operated in 
a signifi cantly more hospitable environment. Th eir success in attracting young 
school-leavers refl ected the new cooperation. Between 1924/25 and 1927/28, the 
number of visitors to vocational counseling rose from 307,000 to 438,000, an 
increase of more than 40 percent.151 As a savvy vocational counselor had noted, 
if the Berufsberatung offi  ces controlled the apprenticeship positions—which they 
increasingly did—“the youths and their parents will follow.”
After the war, the government advocates of a program of skilled work faced 
daunting tasks, despite—indeed often because of—the establishment of a na-
tional Labor Administration. A whole new bureaucracy had to be created. Voca-
tional counseling lacked trained personnel and relevant materials. In the absence 
of legal authority compelling job seekers and companies to use vocational coun-
seling, the latter had to fi nd other ways to achieve Totalerfassung. Above all, be-
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cause it had become attached to the labor offi  ces, vocational counseling suff ered 
from a reputation for bureaucracy, mass operations, and indiff erence, and hence 
it lacked trust among important constituents, most importantly employers. In 
response, vocational counseling endeavored to improve its services and earn the 
trust of its constituents—by training counselors and developing knowledge of 
vocations; cultivating relations with schools; and employing applied psychology.
Th ese steps, however, would not have been suffi  cient to boost signifi cantly the 
number of skilled workers—especially given the failure of legislation on a na-
tional system of vocational training—if German industry itself had not clarifi ed 
its own views of its workforce. Beginning in the middle of the decade, many Ger-
man industrialists became less enamored of visions of centralized, rationalized 
control. Instead, when the fog of the postwar restrictions and infl ation had lifted, 
they became more convinced that the skilled worker would be an irreplaceable 
part of a policy of fl exible rationalization. Th e resulting cooperation to standard-
ize vocational training and greater willingness to work with the vocational coun-
seling offi  ces set the stage—barring any unforeseen disruptions—for a signifi cant 
expansion of Germany’s skilled workforce.
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Chapter 5
THE NAZI CONSOLIDATION 
OF THE HUMAN ECONOMIES

Within just a couple of years of German industry’s rediscovery of the skilled 
worker and the permanent legal establishment of the Labor Administration, eco-
nomic and political tidal waves threatened to sweep them away. Th e Depression 
beginning in 1929 meant that neither companies nor individuals, for whom im-
mediate survival was at stake, were willing to invest much in training for the 
long-term future. Likewise, the Labor Administration had to redirect the bulk of 
its resources earmarked for vocational counseling toward the simple sustenance 
of the growing legions of unemployed. Th e rise to power of the National Social-
ists overturned more than simply the corporatist structures of the Labor Admin-
istration. Th e new regime’s radical methods and goals—especially its focus on 
expansionary war—raised doubts about the future of all of the previous policies, 
including the vocational programs launched just a few years earlier.
Th e Great Depression
Only a few years after DATSCH had begun its work on standardizing vocational 
training and after the Reichsanstalt had been founded, the prolonged economic 
slump and unprecedentedly high unemployment that began in 1929/30 threat-
ened the viability of all aspects of the German human economies. Even for an 
economy inured to unemployment, the scale of the downturn was dizzying. By 
the winter of 1931/32, six million Germans, fully one-third of the workforce, 
Notes for this section begin on page 174.
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were unemployed.1 Only the US slump could compare; never before had an in-
dustrial nation experienced such an economic crisis.
Th e Depression cast the future of the Labor Administration, whose legal 
framework had been set up only a couple of years before and which had only be-
gun to unify the divergent practices of its constituents, in doubt. Th e sheer scale 
of the unemployment renewed questions whether an insurance system could 
work at all:2 designed to be in fi scal balance when an average of 700,000 were 
unemployed,3 the Reichsanstalt found itself paying claims to several times that 
number. Some politicians even called for the replacement of the Reichsanstalt by 
a state offi  ce funded by tax revenues.
Th e surge of unemployment upended the balance between the several branches 
of the Labor Administration. More generally, in terms of the underlying thrust of 
the workforce projects, the crisis signifi cantly strengthened the tendency to em-
phasize order and centralized control at the expense of individual development. 
Th e unemployment wing absorbed an increasing share of all of the resources, to 
the detriment of job placement and, especially, vocational counseling. Vocational 
counseling also lost resources when the overburdened unemployment and job 
placement wings laid claim to its personnel. Wherever one looked, vocational 
counselors were occupied with “writing lists, fi ling documents and dispensing 
certifying stamps” to the unemployed, in short, “with all possible things, just not 
vocational counseling.”4 But the most demoralizing development for vocational 
counselors and the movement’s supporters were the outright attacks made upon 
that branch of the Labor Administration by critics within the Reichsanstalt. Many 
charged that a decade of vocational education and counseling had not been able 
to prevent the worst economic crisis in modern German history.5
Within the labor offi  ces, vocational counselors saw themselves engaged in daily 
struggles for “full recognition.”6 Potentially of more consequence, in the public 
discussion about cutbacks in the Reichsanstalt, a former head of a labor offi  ce pub-
lished a call for the “radical reduction of job placement and vocational counsel-
ing.”7 Several representatives of the labor unions to the Reichsanstalt’s governing 
administrative board even proposed the elimination of vocational counseling al-
together.8 As the headquarters’ chief of vocational counseling said at a meeting on 
23 January 1932, “everywhere vocational counseling is in a diffi  cult position.”9
Th e vocational counseling statistics confi rmed this generally gloomy picture, 
though not across the board. On the positive side, the number of visitors to 
vocational counseling offi  ces dropped only marginally and, due to the declin-
ing number of school-leavers, vocational counseling actually managed to attract 
a growing proportion of youths.10 Much more ominous, however, was the fact 
that the number of apprenticeship placements had fallen from 176,000 in the 
Reichsanstalt’s fi rst year to 98,000 by 1931/32; the proportion of visitors to voca-
tional counseling who entered a training position thus fell from two-fi fths to one-
quarter.11 Responsible for this alarming trend was German employers’ reluctance 
to take on apprentices during the economic crisis.
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If the economic crisis curtailed the ability and willingness of individual em-
ployers to train workers, it infl icted even more harm on German employers’ col-
lective eff orts to promote a vocational system. In the face of immediate threats to 
its members’ economic survival, the Working Committee on Vocational Train-
ing, which had been the coordinating body of these eff orts, suspended its ac-
tivities indefi nitely. Th e affi  liated German Committee for Technical Schooling 
(DATSCH), which depended for most of its funds on contributions from its 
members, reported in September 1931 that the “diffi  cult conditions of the time” 
had forced its instructional materials service, which distributed training plans, 
tests, etc., to companies, to accept a “very great restriction” of its activities to only 
the most urgent tasks.12 Th e next months, the darkest of the Depression, raised 
doubts about the organization’s survival. DATSCH’s chairman began his New 
Year’s greetings for 1932 with foreboding:
Words for the new year cannot pass over the problems and the problematic of our days. Th e 
fateful question about the existence of German essence, of German culture, stands threat-
eningly over the work of the “German Committee” as well. Will it be possible to continue 
to work organically on the multi-wing building of the technical education system?13
By the fall of the same year, DATSCH was contemplating a suspension of its 
activities, at least for the time being.14
National Socialism and Increasing Coercion 
in the Human Economies
Th e economic crisis that threatened to disrupt the German labor force projects 
also helped to bring Hitler and the National Socialists to power. Scholars in re-
cent decades have reached consensus about some aspects of the economy under 
National Socialism.15 Th e Nazi leadership cared most deeply about a few political 
goals, in particular preparing the country for, and leading it in, war. In order to 
stay in power and pursue that main end, the regime needed to succeed in over-
coming the economic slump and mass unemployment. Above and beyond these 
aims, visions of a new domestic order assumed only a secondary importance and 
may have even been mutually contradictory. Th ough by no means in total con-
trol of the state, the Nazis moved the country and the economy in the direction 
of their main political objectives. Nonetheless, the chaotic nature of the regime, 
along with undercutting the eff ectiveness of policies and opening the door for 
radical experiments, could provide opportunities for independent behavior by 
other actors. Depending on the importance of an issue to the Nazi leadership and 
the balance of forces at a given time, public ministries and other agencies might 
pursue their own policies. Industry lived under the constraints of an increasingly 
managed economy, weighing short-term opportunities and risks against long-
term strategies of success.
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How did the German human economies—the Labor Administration, espe-
cially its vocational counseling wing and the eff orts to systematize vocational train-
ing—fare under the Th ird Reich? Th e most immediate eff ect of the new regime 
was to alter the internal and external political environments of the institutions 
of the vocational system. In the interest of overcoming an obvious impediment 
to their longer-term goals, namely, high unemployment, the Nazis also began to 
turn the Labor Administration into a more openly coercive instrument.
Th e National Socialists’ assumption of power in 1933 meant both change and 
continuity for the organizations behind the German labor optimization projects. 
At the Reichsanstalt, the Nazis eff ected a “coordination,” dissolving the supervi-
sory bodies composed largely of union and employer representatives and, in the 
spirit of the Führer-principle, making the administrative head at each of the three 
levels sole arbiter.16 Th e personnel of the Labor Administration, who came dis-
proportionately from the unions, SPD, Catholic Center, and liberal parties, suf-
fered signifi cant purges. If overall 2 percent of all bureaucrats lost their positions 
due to the 1933 Law on Civil Service, in the Labor Administration, the fi gure 
was 19 percent.17 Some of the more important fi gures from the pioneering gen-
eration of vocational counselors and psychologists were forced out or left because 
they were politically or religiously unpalatable to the new regime.18
Despite this purge, a surprising degree of continuity was maintained in the 
Reichsanstalt across the political gulf of 1933. Crucially, the head of the Labor 
Administration since 1922 and of the Reichsanstalt since 1927, Friedrich Syrup, 
continued in offi  ce. Many others, including Walter Stets, who in 1923 had drafted 
the original national guidelines on vocational counseling, and at the time was 
head of vocational counseling in the important Landesarbeitsamt Rhineland, re-
mained in their positions from the pre–1933 period as well.19
Nazi Party membership by itself did not necessarily mean a change in sub-
stance, as was illustrated by the case of the new national chief of vocational 
counseling, Johannes Handrick. Handrick was a party member,20 yet during his 
four-year tenure, he did not reveal himself to be a partisan fi gure. At lower lev-
els, some fervent individuals might reshape personnel profi les in their districts. 
In the Berlin Land offi  ce, for example, the new head of vocational counseling 
re ported in 1935 that, due to the previous paucity of vocational counselors in 
his district and the overall expansion of the service beginning in 1934, he had 
hired 90 percent new staff  “since the assumption of power.” In the last business 
year, in a change from 1933/34, he had hired as vocational counselors “only such 
personalities whose National Socialistic reliability was a given, if this could at all 
be humanly determined.”21 However, none of the reports from the other Land 
offi  ces nor the tenth-anniversary report on the Reichsanstalt even alluded to such 
wholesale turnover or to political criteria for hiring, suggesting that Berlin may 
have been an exception.22
Inevitably, the regime’s new ethos and the lingua tertii imperii permeated the 
Labor Administration to some extent, as they did nearly every German institu-
tion. Th e Nazis sought to endow the long-standing German reverence for work 
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with even greater pathos.23 Th e highest Party authorities expressed their resolve to 
conquer Germany’s economic woes in military terms: the eff ort to end unemploy-
ment became the “battle for labor,” job placement became “labor deployment,” 
and “vocational counseling” became “vocational steering.” At the Reichsanstalt’s 
new administrative school or “schooling camp” near Berlin, which began host-
ing six-week training courses for labor offi  ce presidents and others in June 1935, 
“comradely” activities such as common sleeping quarters and early morning ex-
ercises, along with explicit political lectures, were intended to foster a collective, 
National Socialistic spirit.24
Yet in the day-to-day aff airs of the Labor Administration or vocational coun-
seling, the new vocabulary did not become the norm. Nor does the corres-
pondence among vocational counselors reveal a particularly vibrant Nazi spirit. 
Of course, as argued earlier, a concern for overall effi  ciency, dirigiste measures, 
and even military models always had coexisted with—at times, dominated—
attention to individual welfare and choice in the German Labor Administration. 
Th e Nazi military ethos—when it did fi lter down to the labor offi  ces—repre-
sented a shift of emphasis and appearance, but not something fundamentally 
new.25
Th e other major pillar of the vocational system, the employers organized in 
DATSCH, also preserved much of its earlier substance. Soon after their acces-
sion to power, the Nazis, as part of their eff orts to “coordinate” and ultimately 
better control all areas of society, had consolidated the employers’ groups into a 
new organization with a quasi-public status. Th ey merged the various employ-
ers’ organizations—the Reich Association of German Industry (Reichsverband der 
deutschen Industrie) and its affi  liates—into what, after several reorganizations and 
name changes, became the Reich Group Industry (Reichsgruppe Industrie). Th e 
latter was then loosely combined with the successor to the German Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce, the Reich Economics Chamber (Reichswirtschaftskam-
mer), to become the Organization of the Producing Economy (Organisation der 
gewerblichen Wirtschaft), which the Economics Ministry recognized as the offi  cial 
representation of industry’s interests.26 As contradictory as the judgments in the 
scholarly literature are about the overall eff ects of this merger and affi  liation with 
the Ministry of Economics,27 in the realm of vocational training, as we shall see, 
industry acted with even greater unity than before.
DATSCH did make apparent concessions to the new regime. It accepted 
Gottfried Feder, one of the National Socialists’ chief economic ideologues and a 
senior minister in the Economics Ministry, as “honorary chairman.”28 Referring 
to the new regime, DATSCH claimed that it had “immediately acknowledged 
the new events” and invited several party members, including a representative of 
the German Labor Front, a Party organization with ambitious plans to remodel 
German work relations and the working class, to join its supervisory board. As 
articles in the August and September 1933 issues of Technical Education subtly 
suggested, however, these concessions to the party did not alter DATSCH’s basic 
commitment to its program of economic, and not political, measures.29
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As long as the regime was still consolidating power, labor policies largely were 
concerned with the challenge of conquering mass unemployment. To this end, 
the new power holders utilized a variety of strategies, including increasing co-
ercion in the labor market. During the fi rst two years of Nazi rule, unemploy-
ment fell by more than half, from 35 percent in January 1933 to 17 percent two 
winters later, and 13 percent in the summer and fall of 1935.30 Still, the recovery 
remained fragile and uneven: even as the overall level of joblessness fell, alarm-
ing pockets of high unemployment remained in the large cities.31 To improve 
the balance in the recovery, but also—so it was claimed—to serve the regime’s 
longer-term goal of restoring a balance between the nation’s industrial and agri-
cultural sectors,32 measures in 1934 and 1935 gave the Reichsanstalt new powers 
to control the allocation of labor. Two laws allowed the Labor Administration to 
prevent companies from hiring workers in high-unemployment areas if the work-
ers recently had moved there or if they recently had been employed in agriculture, 
as well as from hiring young workers (under twenty-fi ve) at the expense of older 
ones. In 1935, a monopoly law fi nally brought the remaining independent job 
placement offi  ces, which had been tolerated by the 1922 Labor Exchange Law 
and 1927 Reichsanstalt legislation, under the control of the Labor Administra-
tion.33 While these measures were limited in important ways—applying only to 
selected cities, exerting largely indirect pressure on employers, or sanctioning a 
de facto monopoly that had long existed—the extension of the Reichsanstalt’s ex-
plicit powers still gave a preview of the more sweeping changes that would occur 
after 1935, in particular, in 1938.
Th e manpower distribution measures also revealed the mounting tensions 
among offi  ces competing for infl uence over labor policy, as well as the continu-
ing alliance between the Labor Administration and the Ministries of Labor and 
the Economy, on the one hand, and industry, on the other. In the second decree, 
which was partly a response to proliferating eff orts by Nazi Party cells to pressure 
employers into hiring party loyalists, the Economics and Labor Ministries as well 
as the Führer’s deputy declared that the Reichsanstalt alone was responsible for 
labor allocation.34 Th e following year, as interference by Party offi  ces, and in par-
ticular by Robert Ley’s Labor Front, in job placement and vocational counseling 
continued, a law was promulgated, making the Reichsanstalt the sole authority 
in these matters.35 Th is directive, which gave wide latitude to employers’ needs, 
followed, as Syrup put it, “the thought-processes” of a joint communiqué issued 
by the Reichsanstalt and the head of the united industrial groups in June 1934 on 
the necessity of close cooperation between the two sides.36 Th is constellation of 
forces—the Labor Administration and the Ministries of Economics and Labor 
allied with industry, more or less openly, against Party offi  ces—would continue 
to shape the development of the Labor Administration and vocational system 
throughout the Nazi period.
Th e Nazis’ gradual extension of coercive measures continued even after the 
situation on the labor market fundamentally had changed. Th us, the next, more 
serious, step in controlling the labor market occurred in 1935, not in response 
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to the sinking though still high unemployment, but to the fi rst signs of a wor-
rying lack of skilled workers. Th e law of February 1935 introducing workbooks 
for all laborers and salaried employees primarily was intended to give employers 
and the labor offi  ces greater control of workplace turnover, which had begun to 
rise again in some sectors. In order to take on a new job, the worker was required 
to present his workbook, which his previous employer controlled. Th e Labor 
Administration’s frequent admonitions to adhere to this policy, however, sug-
gested its limited eff ectiveness in lowering turnover. Furthermore, contrary to 
plan, which had foreseen a year to implement the scheme, it was only by 1939 
that all 20 million workbooks had been distributed. In the future, the workbooks 
might also serve another purpose, by giving the regime a complete statistical over-
view of the workforce.37 Each employee’s workbook listed such information as 
his age, health, marital status, training, skills, and previous employment; the local 
labor offi  ce kept a registry of all workbooks and copied their data on card fi les. 
Th e workbooks alone would prove to be an inadequate tool to restrict workplace 
turnover, and in the following years, as the job shortage gave way to a worker 
shortage, new measures proved necessary—both on the part of the Labor Admin-
istration and other authorities and of employers.38
Despite their limitations, the workbooks represented a new degree of state 
control of labor movement, or at least the aspiration to achieve the same. Later 
in the decade, as we shall see, the statistical overview allowed by the workbooks 
would be put to use in an attempt, of unparalleled ambition but only modest 
success, at macroeconomic allocation of the workforce. Th e fact that workbooks 
were fi rst introduced in the armaments and construction industries refl ected the 
emergence in these sectors, as early as 1934, of shortages of skilled workers in 
some regions.39 By the following year, when continued growth and especially the 
reintroduction of conscription sharply slashed the number of available young 
men, the shortages had spread throughout the country and to an increasing num-
ber of industries. We now examine the eff ects of the tightening labor market 
on the vocational training system—which occurred, contrary to the increasingly 
coercive measures just discussed, without Nazi Party involvement.
“Th e Great Cooperative Endeavor”40
While the Labor Administration, at the Nazis’ bidding, turned to dirigiste mea-
sures to combat unemployment and then labor bottlenecks, employers’ associa-
tions led the way in reviving and extending the project of the previous decade to 
create a standardized vocational training system. As in the 1920s, long-term eco-
nomic and demographic assessments provided the motivation; the new political 
circumstances facilitated the collective action, if largely indirectly. In this eff ort, 
the employers would again fi nd willing partners among important government 
agencies. Compelled by the new regime to act with greater coordination and rec-
ognizing the movement toward more compulsion and centralization in the labor 
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market, employers apparently sought to make the best of the situation by turning 
these trends in their own favor.
In the spring of 1934, as the fi rst signs of an economic turnaround manifested 
themselves, the president of the Reich Estate of Industry had made known his 
organization’s conviction that “today more than ever quality-work”—and hence 
the training of apprentices—was of signal importance for the long-term recovery 
of German industry.41 Th e Estate’s subcommittee on industrial training identi-
fi ed the issue as “ever more urgent” in most branches and, in the words of Dr. 
Herbert Studders, a board member of the Estate, considered both quantitative 
and qualitative sides of the matter.42 It was the quantitative aspect that fi rst led 
to industry’s ini tiative, but these demands soon turned into a general eff ort to 
systematize vocational training.
Industry’s initiative, in the summer of 1934, combined a call for statistical 
data on vocational trends with a critique of the Reichsanstalt. Pointing to the vola-
tility in recent years of economic trends and the resultant diffi  culty of projecting 
the numbers of workers required, the leaders of DATSCH asserted that a more 
eff ective vocational counseling program needed a thorough statistical analysis of 
the current labor situation and prediction of the future dynamic.43 Such statistics 
would serve as the basis for organizing a new “cooperation of all public offi  ces in-
terested in vocational counseling.” Unthinkable a dozen years earlier, it was now 
industry that was advocating centralized public control. Where the new central 
offi  ce would be based, the industrial leaders suggested in a provocative swipe at 
the Reichsanstalt, remained to be decided.
Th e Reichsanstalt was not slow to respond. In the next edition of Technical Edu-
cation, the head of vocational counseling, Johannes Handrick, while acknowledg-
ing the general validity of DATSCH’s complaints and the diffi  culty of reliable 
predictions in recent years, reminded his interlocutors that such a central offi  ce 
already existed: the Reichsanstalt had been working determinedly on these ques-
tions for years and had been designated as the “strategic headquarters for the 
labor battles of the new state.” Handrick ended his response, though, on a con-
ciliatory note by encouraging a cooperative venture between DATSCH and the 
Reichsanstalt to enable a centrally steered vocational counseling program.44
Out of this exchange would grow the endeavor, jointly borne by German 
industry through DATSCH and the German Labor Administration over the sub-
sequent decade, to standardize and coordinate the elements of the German voca-
tional training system. Th e project drew substantially on each side’s eff orts of the 
1920s to systematize vocational training and counseling, respectively. Yet in this 
second phase of work on the human economies, industry and the Labor Admin-
istration cooperated more closely than before in developing standards that united 
both vocational counseling and training into a single system and that would 
become an enduring part of the German economy.
Cooperation began almost immediately, as a DATSCH committee on voca-
tional counseling gathered in November 1934 for its inaugural meeting.45 In a 
sign of the increasingly close links between industry and the Reichsanstalt, Han-
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drick, the national head of vocational counseling, chaired the committee. Already 
at this fi rst meeting, however, the focus shifted from statistics to “clearly distin-
guished vocational profi les,” which all agreed were a prerequisite for any quanti-
tative analyses. Resuming the work of the Working Committee and DATSCH 
from nearly a decade earlier, the committee decided, was now “an urgent task.” As 
the diffi  culty of statistical projections of future economic needs became clearer,46 
work on vocational profi les as the pivot of a coordinated system of vocational 
training and counseling took center stage. A lead article in the February 1935 
Technical Education on “Th e Vocational Profi le” posited that “[t]he signifi cance 
which the most complete possible inclusion of all vocational activities in the 
form of vocational profi les has for the planned training of apprentices and hence 
for the entire economic praxis—this cannot be overstated.” Th e profi les would 
provide the most basic guidance for the apprenticeship training. Of far greater 
importance, however, than the signifi cance of this work in directly improving the 
quality of individual training, according to the article, which echoed the argu-
ments made in the mid 1920s, was its role in overcoming the informational and 
coordination problems undermining collective action; namely, the standardiza-
tion of the profi les and, based on them, also of the training and the exams would 
permit the smooth fl ow of labor around the country. Only with such guarantees 
of standard quality could every apprentice be certain that he might be hired by 
other employers, in other regions; and only then could employers be confi dent in 
hiring someone trained elsewhere.47
Not only did it solve the information problem, but the cooperation itself also 
strengthened the employers’ organizations, such as the Chambers of Trade and 
Commerce, and the mutual expectations that made fi rms’ compliance more likely. 
Even as several Nazi laws restricted the freedom of workers to move from job to 
job and region to region, industry and the Labor Administration were cooperat-
ing to create a system of mobile skilled labor.
In its work on vocational profi les, DATSCH began where the Working Com-
mittee had begun in the mid 1920s, with the centrally important skilled met-
alworking positions, and it drew on the latter’s work. It concentrated initially 
on skilled vocations, all of which required a three to four year apprenticeship; 
only later in the decade would it take on the trickier task of standardizing the 
“several thousand” semi-skilled positions, which spanned a much greater range 
of training schedules. By the spring of 1935, DATSCH could publish its fi rst 
ten profi les.48 Th ese limited themselves to describing the “task area” and both the 
necessary and the desired “capabilities” of the workers.
In the course of the same year, DATSCH committees began to engage in a 
fl urry of activity, extending the work on standardization to the other aspects of 
vocational training: the practical training in the fi rm and the courses in the voca-
tional school, as well as the completion exams.49 Important issues—such as the 
exact relation of the “basic vocations” of training to the more specifi c positions in 
the economy and the proliferation and nature of training for semi-skilled voca-
tions—remained subject to lively debate, but the participants regarded their work 
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as an “evolving enterprise” and carried on. By early 1936, DATSCH had pub-
lished two dozen profi les of the most important “basic vocations.”50 Although the 
question had not been overlooked completely in the fi rst two years of DATSCH’s 
renewed eff orts to systematize vocational training,51 it was only in the subsequent 
years, in particular 1936 to 1939, that attention would turn to an additional ele-
ment of the vocational profi le—to the “demands” and “suitability demands” upon 
candidates for a vocation.
An historic agreement within industry lent all of this standardizing work im-
mediate practical relevance. In July 1935, the Reich Group Industry and the 
Asso ciation of Chambers of Industry and Trade agreed to establish for the fi rst 
time industry’s own formal vocational certifi cation system, independent of that 
of handicrafts, which since the 1897 revision of the Commercial Code had had 
a monopoly on certifi cations.52 Th e vocational profi les, training plans, and com-
pletion exams being developed at the time were to be incorporated formally into 
the “apprenticeship contract” between the fi rm and the trainee. Th is step by in-
dustry, taken with the approval of the Economics and Labor Ministries and in 
expectation of a future legal regulation of the matter, began to draw to a close 
the long-running dispute between industry and crafts over the latter’s monopoly 
over accreditation, a dispute which, as we have seen, already had been partly 
resolved in the late 1920s by the cooperation of the two sides in the Working 
Committee on Vocational Training. A 1938 decree of the Reich Education Min-
ister would fi nally put the industrial completion exams on the same legal footing 
as Handwerk’s.53 Within several years in the mid 1930s, the industrial training 
system had acquired not only standardized content, but also fully fl edged formal 
accreditation. Close monitoring by local Chambers of Industry and Trade pre-
vented serious free-riding and ensured that fi rms in fact took on their fair share 
of apprentices. A decade after German industry had become fully conscious of 
the potential value of the skilled worker and had initiated a project to standard-
ize training, a second round of these eff orts in the mid 1930s eff ectively had 
launched the “German skills machine.”
In all of this, industry and key ministries, in particular, the Labor Administra-
tion and the Reich Economics Ministry—the same groups that had promoted 
the fi rst round of vocational consolidation in the mid and late 1920s—were the 
main motors of reform. But while the Nazi regime intervened directly in the 
vocational system only minimally, it played an important indirect role. Not only 
did the new authoritarian atmosphere dampen at least open disputes and, along 
with the enforced organizational consolidation, encourage more concerted ac-
tion; also of importance in bringing employers together and in forging the al-
liance between them and the key governmental ministries was the threatening 
behavior of a particular Nazi organization: Robert Ley’s Labor Front.
Even in a regime characterized by the active political entrepreneurship of its 
subordinate agencies, Robert Ley and his Labor Front stood out for their relent-
less quest for power.54 In its eff orts to play a central role in Nazi labor and social 
policy, the DAF pursued numerous avenues to reshape labor relations at the com-
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pany level, including, prominently, worker training and selection. In substance, 
important DAF goals—such as promoting skilled work and inculcating worker 
loyalty to the fi rm—were congruent with company policy and even drew on 
corporate social policy.55 In 1933, the DAF absorbed DINTA, which from 1925 
had served heavy industry in its “fi ght for the souls” of its workers. However, the 
DAF’s broader political ideology and, in particular, its claims for “total control” 
from the outside frightened even many of DINTA’s former backers, who insisted 
on company prerogative.56
Th e struggle between the DAF, on the one hand, and much of industry and its 
allies in the state ministries, on the other, over control of vocational training began 
early in the Nazi regime and continued, despite repeated eff orts to exclude the 
DAF, into the early 1940s. Ley’s organization employed an array of strategies to 
shape company training: the DINTA-successor within the DAF continued to off er 
its services to companies and also to gain a foothold in the local chambers of indus-
try, which oversaw accreditation; DAF’s vast publishing empire produced a stream 
of materials on the topic; its questionnaires about training policy put pressure on 
companies to fall into line with the DAF; the Reich Vocational Competitions—in 
which companies could vie, through their apprentices’ work, for the DAF’s com-
mendation—and other competitions encouraged fi rms to adopt DAF standards.
In response to the DAF’s continuing encroachments upon the fi eld of voca-
tional training, Economics Minister Schacht in September 1935 cemented the 
already close relationship between industry and the Economics (and Labor) Min-
istry. Citing “the signifi cance of technical-economic training for the economy,” 
Schacht, in conjunction with the Minister of Education, gave DATSCH offi  cial 
status as his advisory body.57 In 1938, DATSCH was given an even more secure 
position when it was re-baptized as the Reich Institute for Vocational Training. 
Th is protection would prove highly useful to DATSCH in the coming years, 
for after 1935, the Labor Front’s eff orts to infl uence vocational training would 
become only more strident. Between 1935 and the outbreak of war in 1939, a 
central fi eld of competition between DATSCH and DAF was in the provision 
of vocational materials—profi les, course material, exams—to companies and 
chambers of industry.58 It was only the outbreak of war and the decision of Her-
mann Göring, the head of the Four-Year Plan, in December 1939, which fi nally 
secured the Economics Ministry’s—and private industry’s—ultimate control of 
vocational training.59 In the intervening years, however, the Labor Front’s relent-
less activity decisively spurred the standardization work by industry and the min-
istries through DATSCH and deepened the alliance between the two.
Th e Flourishing of Vocational Training and—
as a Result—of Vocational Counseling
In the years 1934/35, industry not only made crucial advances in reviving and ex-
tending its project of standardizing vocational training system, but it also began 
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off ering an increasing number of apprenticeships, not least thanks to the concur-
rent organizational work. Th e rise in the number of open positions employers 
registered with the labor offi  ces from its nadir in the years 1931/32 and 1932/33 
no doubt refl ected a number of factors. In addition to the appeals by the Reich 
Estate of Industry and the Labor Front to devote more resources to training, the 
general improvement in economic conditions from 1933 onward made employ-
ers more willing to off er apprenticeships. Yet the rapid increase from fewer than 
130,000 positions in 1932/33 to 219,000 the next year and nearly 300,000 in 
1934/35, when unemployment still hovered well above 10 percent, surpassed 
the number of apprenticeships off ered in the best years of the Weimar recovery 
(255,000 in 1927/28) and cannot be attributed to the general economic climate 
alone.60
Th e growing cooperation between industry and the Labor Administration, 
which was spurred not only by their shared goal of creating a high-skilled work-
force, but also by their common opposition to the German Labor Front, extended 
to practical matters of vocational placement. Th anks to agreements assuring em-
ployers more infl uence in the labor offi  ces, fi rms became more willing to report 
open positions.61
Even more important than the improved atmosphere between the two sides, 
however, was the underlying shift in companies’ willingness to train workers as 
a result of the creation of common standards of vocational training. In an essay 
in Technical Education in July 1936, a leading representative of the Reich Group 
Industry emphasized the decisive role of the organizational work: “[F]or industry 
until now clear legal bases for an impeccable training and education of the indus-
trial youth have been lacking. A responsible attitude on the part of many indus-
trial fi rms has always existed.… But today for the fi rst time the conditions have 
been created which allow German industry to solve these tasks on its own.”62 Th e 
response of German industry would be so strong, in fact, that by 1938, it would 
off er more apprenticeships than there were job seekers. Before we turn to this 
development and its eff ects on vocational training and selection, we must fi rst 
explore the state of vocational counseling in the fi rst years after the Depression.
Th e archival materials documenting vocational counseling in these early years 
have, unfortunately, almost all been lost. Still, a collection of reports by the state 
offi  ces from 1935 provides us with a snapshot of the state of aff airs two years into 
Nazi rule and economic recovery. Th e reports unanimously described a general 
effl  orescence of vocational counseling during the course of the previous two years. 
In the previous year, in response to “the signifi cance which vocational counsel-
ing has gained in the new state”—that is, to the combined eff ect of the Nazis’ 
rhetorical embrace of the ennobling value of work, their promises to restore a 
healthy balance to the country’s economic order, and the longer-term prospect 
of national mobilization for war—as well as simply to the increased number of 
visitors, the Reichsanstalt headquarters had approved a signifi cant increase in the 
number of vocational counselors.63 Over several years, the number of counselors 
would double from 600 to nearly 1200.64 Several of the Land reports suggested 
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that an important part of this increase helped vocational counseling expand into 
rural areas, where it until then had been largely absent.65 Most importantly, as 
already mentioned, the number of school-leavers consulting with the vocational 
counseling offi  ces was rising rapidly. Th e total number of visitors had more than 
doubled in just two years, from 394,000 in 1932/33 to 601,000 a year later, and 
848,000 in 1934/35. Roughly 70 percent of young Germans now visited the 
vocational counseling offi  ces before they left school, while a hundred thousand 
older people also availed themselves of the service.66 How had vocational coun-
seling been so successful in approaching its long-held goal of a “total inclusion” 
of all job seekers?
No single reason, the reports from 1935 suggest, was alone decisive. However, 
a small number of factors appear to have been important in nearly all states. To a 
far greater extent than earlier, parents had become convinced of the importance 
of sending their children—or, more accurately, accompanying them—to voca-
tional counseling. Several offi  ces attributed this welcome change to their own 
assiduous eff orts to woo the adults through “parent evenings,” and press and 
even radio coverage.67 No doubt, other, more diff use, factors also made parents 
increasingly eager to have their children visit vocational counseling. Th e general 
economic revival of these years had inspired a cautious optimism, which, along 
with the needs of industry for specifi c kinds of workers, infl uenced youths’ and 
their families’ decisions about what to do after completing school. “A clear ef-
fect of the currently observable economic climate and of the scarcity of skilled 
workers,” the South-West state offi  ce reported, “is also that the desire to undergo 
an apprenticeship dominates by far the majority of male youths.”68 Th e Bavarian 
offi  ce wrote “with satisfaction” that parents “more than previously desire for their 
youths a skilled, or at least a semi-skilled, vocation,” and concurred with the 
South-West Germans that unskilled work was becoming ever less attractive or 
signifi cant.69 Indeed, the new enthusiasm among youths for particular “fashion-
able” vocations—especially those in the metalworking sector, which was expand-
ing rapidly due to the incipient Nazi rearmament, but also perhaps as a result of 
the regime’s martial values—had grown so powerful that several state offi  ces per-
ceived new dangers. Pointing to the fact that among male youths “access to the 
metal vocations dominates over everything else,” the South-West offi  ce warned 
of a “uniformization of the vocational ideal among youth, which is not unalarm-
ing.”70 Th anks to the more favorable economic climate, in the new state, the Ba-
varian offi  ce reported, a new “vocational ethos” had taken hold of the young.71
More tangible factors, such as who controlled access to jobs, played an even 
more important role in boosting vocational counseling nearly to the level of “to-
tal inclusion.” As the vocational offi  ces had forged closer ties with employers, they 
had gained control of increasing numbers of apprenticeship positions, creating 
a powerful incentive for parents and youths to visit. Th e wish for closer coop-
eration, beginning usually with vocational counseling, but also at times with 
employers,72 was mutual; the initiative to collaborate, though paralleling the im-
proving ties at the national level, came also from the local level. In many states, 
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the vocational offi  ces and employers’ organizations, especially in handicrafts,73 but 
also in industry, had formalized their relations in agreements about apprentices. 
Th e employers promised to obtain their trainees only through the labor offi  ce’s 
vocational counseling service; the latter, in turn, agreed to attend to fi rms’ needs. 
By the mid 1930s, then, the relationship between two of the main pillars of the 
human economies, the Labor Administration and employers, signifi cantly had 
been deepened.
Th is collaboration between the labor offi  ces’ vocational counseling and local 
employers’ groups, like the cooperation on the national scale that had infl uenced 
it, emerged from several sources. It built on the ties established from the mid 
1920s on, when employers’ groups recognized the utility of a centralized, coor-
dinated distribution of trainees for the purpose of a standardized apprenticeship 
system. After the disruption caused by the Depression, these eff orts seemed in the 
mid 1930s even more imperative: the economic boom and demographic shortfall 
combined to make the shortage of skilled workers even more threatening. As at 
the national level, local conditions shaped by the new regime helped to realize 
this cooperation, even if unintentionally. Nazi measures to take greater control of 
economic life, including restrictions on the free movement of labor, gave employ-
ers an incentive to try to infl uence the terms of state (or outside) infl uence by 
taking the initiative. Moreover, as several of the state reports indicated, the cre-
ation by the Nazis of strengthened employer organizations, even at the local level, 
signifi cantly aided eff orts to reach agreement with the vocational offi  ces.74 Such 
organizations were usually more committed than the individual employers to cre-
ating the collective good of universally recognized vocational skills. In addition to 
such centripetal forces of the new regime, its centrifugal tendencies also indirectly 
spurred such cooperation between employers’ organizations and the vocational 
counseling offi  ces. Just as at the national level, the threat of interference by the 
German Labor Front moved the Reich Estate of Industry and the Economics 
and Labor Ministries to form a defensive alliance, so too at the state and local 
level DAF activity inspired a reaction. Almost all of the state reports commented 
on friction between vocational counseling and the Labor Front over apprentice 
selection, which, given industry’s own troubles with Ley’s organization, created 
further bases for cooperation between vocational offi  ces and fi rms.
As a result of the local agreements on trainee selection, the number of positions 
crafts and industry registered with the labor offi  ces increased proportionately 
even faster than did the number of school-leavers using vocational counseling. 
While between 1932/33 and 1934/35 the number of visitors to vocational coun-
seling increased by 115 percent, that of apprenticeships rose by 131 percent. 
If one wanted an apprenticeship—which ever more young people did—it was 
increasingly clear where one needed to turn.
Other factors, both of older and more recent origins, augmented the increased 
trust of parents, the desire of the young for skilled positions, and the coopera-
tion between employers and vocational counseling offi  ces. Most importantly, as 
the reports concurred, the schools were now cooperating fully with vocational 
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counseling. Th e turning point in the often contentious relationship had come 
with the 1930 agreement between the Reich Ministries of Labor and the Interior 
on the cooperation of the schools and vocational counseling offi  ces, the eff ect of 
which was stymied in the short-term by the distortions of the Depression. By the 
mid 1930s, all of the state vocational offi  ces reported that schools had ceased to 
“regard vocational counseling as a competitor, or at least as an annoying organiza-
tion,” as the Berlin offi  ce had put it. Instead of performing their own apprentice-
ship placements, as many had previously done, schools now assisted vocational 
counseling, above all by delivering “entire classes” to the labor offi  ce.75
Another, newer, organization also aided vocational counseling. Th e Hitler 
Youth and its female counterpart, the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher 
Mädel), according to all of the state reports, were proving to be a valuable re-
source in a manner similar to that of the schools. Th e Hitlerjugend offi  ces were 
eager to “deliver” youths to vocational counseling, as Saxony reported; they also 
supplied their own evaluations of the boys and girls. In some regards, the Hitler 
Youth proved more useful to vocational counseling than even the schools. With 
the former, vocational counseling often established direct and personal ties, as 
counselors frequently assumed responsibility for vocational matters within the 
new organization. Also, at least one state vocational offi  ce appreciated the par-
ticular value of the Hitlerjugend’s reports on the children, since “especially the 
vocational wishes [can be] discussed in quite some depth in the rather free atmo-
sphere of the HJ.”76
Th e Four-Year Plan and the Deepening of 
the “Great Cooperative Endeavor”
Hitler’s decisions in the summer and autumn of 1936 to promote Germany’s 
autarky and mobilize its economic resources for a war in several years’ time would 
ramify throughout all parts of its economy.77 Th e Labor Administration, voca-
tional counseling, and vocational training were no exceptions. Indeed, before 
the total war eff ort (1942–1945) made fi nding workers and soldiers per se the 
paramount challenge, the vocational system was deemed to play a vital role in 
Germany’s war preparations. More directly than in the period of 1934/35, the 
regime now exerted infl uence over vocational matters, in particular by mandat-
ing Totalerfassung of all school-leavers and apprenticeship positions. Within the 
Labor Administration and within industry, however, satisfaction with develop-
ments most likely mingled with nervousness over the regime’s dirigisme and long-
term goals.78 But the changes often only accelerated trends already underway, 
or implemented aspects of the Labor Administration program that were present 
earlier, if only in potential form.79 As we saw, the project of creating a high-
skilled workforce proved largely compatible with the Nazi regime’s political aims, 
whether overcoming mass unemployment, promoting autarky, or leading the 
country into war.
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Refl ecting Hitler’s decision in the summer of 1936 to accelerate the country’s 
preparations for war, the Four-Year Plan redirected resources to create domestic ca-
pacities in supplies critical to war, in particular synthetic oil and rubber and metals. 
Th e head of the Four-Year Plan organization, Hermann Göring, rapidly became 
the dominant power in the economic realm. Typically for the regime’s im provisa-
tional nature, which was nowhere so apparent as in economic policy, Göring ap-
pointed the president of the Reichsanstalt, Friedrich Syrup, and an infl uential state 
minister in the Labor Ministry, Werner Mansfeld, to lead the Four-Year Plan agen-
cy’s “Labor Direction” offi  ce. Th e Reichsanstalt and Labor Ministry thus came to 
serve the Four-Year Plan, while also continuing to function outside it.80
If the rearmament since 1934 already had contributed to shortages among some 
skilled workers,81 the much vaster military and autarky programs of the Four-
Year Plan, at a time when the number of school-leavers was still declining, en-
sured that the scarcity of labor became a major and persistent problem for the 
regime and the economy. Th roughout the period of war preparation (and during 
the war as well), the regime’s primary response to this challenge was to impose 
ever-greater controls on the movement of labor, including on the entry of young 
people into vocations. It is telling that the fi rst directives Göring’s offi  ce issued 
for the implementation of the plan pertained to Germany’s supply of skilled la-
bor, obliging metal and construction fi rms with more than 10 employees to train 
a pro portionate number of apprentices.82 In the short run, this directive, as well 
as others issued at the same time,83 may have, in fact, restricted the freedoms of 
employers little, as they were “purposefully elastically” formulated, frequently not 
enforced by the overburdened labor offi  ces, and, in any case, intended more as an 
“urgent appeal” to the employer’s sense of duty than as real limitations.84 Still, it is 
clear that the employers (and the Reichsanstalt and ministries) correctly interpreted 
the writing on the wall as indicating that in future, the regime would intervene 
more directly in fi rms’ and individuals’ decisions about vocation and work.
Recognizing the new state of aff airs and anticipating the future, the Labor 
Administration and the employers’ umbrella group, the Organization of the Pro-
ducing Economy, almost immediately took steps to deepen their cooperation. As 
President Syrup explained to his state and local offi  ces, the requirements of the 
Four-Year Plan now compelled the two organizations “to cooperate even more 
closely” than they had in the past on the Arbeitseinsatz, and especially on securing 
a suffi  cient supply of skilled workers.85 All levels of the Labor Administration, 
Syrup instructed, should extend and deepen the already existing ties to the cor-
responding employers’ groups.
Barely more than a month later, the highest representatives of the Reichsanstalt 
and industry gathered for two days to reach a more detailed understanding on 
their cooperation “regarding the selection and application of youths in industrial 
fi rms.”86 Almost certainly, a central purpose of the meeting was symbolic: by re-
viewing the organization and methods of vocational counseling, the composition 
of the German workforce, and the eff orts of DATSCH to systematize vocational 
profi les and materials—all of which was assuredly known already to those pres-
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ent—the participants reaffi  rmed the groups’ prior work and alliance. Now, more 
publicly than before, the leaders of the Labor Administration and employers’ 
groups sanctioned and promoted the cooperative endeavors undertaken, with 
less fanfare, in the previous three years. Of a piece with this demonstrative pur-
pose were the repeated subtle repudiations of interference by the German Labor 
Front.
While the exigencies of adapting to the Four-Year Plan prompted the meeting, 
longer-term concerns imbued the discussions. Th is was evident not only in the 
reviewing of work done by the Labor Administration and DATSCH in the previ-
ous three years, or even since the mid 1920s, but also particularly in the presenta-
tion on the “Development of the Structure of the Labor Force in Industry” by 
Dr. Studders, a director of the Reich Group Industry. Beginning his analysis with 
handicrafts, Studders proceeded to explain why, contrary to expectations regard-
ing the eff ects of the division of labor and mechanization, the “quality worker” 
had continued to play a central role in German industry. After his review of his-
torical developments, Studders concluded by looking to the future: the creation 
of the means for securing a supply of skilled workers—the joint project of the 
Labor Administration’s vocational counseling and industry—was “only possible 
through careful work extending over long periods of time.”
Th is commitment in early 1937 by a representative of the Reich Group In-
dustry to the long-term project of developing a high-skilled workforce, it should 
be noted, comports with analyses of employers’ reactions to the Four-Year Plan. 
Ever cautious about making long-term investments based on what appeared to 
be highly unpredictable political decisions, German industry did not make any 
signifi cant reassessments of its production strategies in response to the Vierjahres-
plan.87 In a published commentary on the January 1937 meeting, the director 
of vocational counseling at Reichsanstalt headquarters, Johannes Handrick, em-
phasized the long-term nature of the endeavor even more forcefully than had 
Studders. He placed the Four-Year Plan’s requirements in the context of the co-
operation between the Reichsanstalt and employers that had been going on “for 
a long time.” In addition to the plans for promoting autarky, Germany’s limited 
number of young people entering the labor market meant that “the distribution 
of the youths must be undertaken with careful thought in the future.” A “further 
reason” for the cooperation of the two sides was the rebuilding, by industry, crafts, 
and trade, of the “entire vocational training system.” Handrick summarized the 
balance between short- and long-term considerations:
If for the moment it is largely a question of satisfying the demands of the Four-Year Plan, 
beyond the Four-Year Plan employers and the Reichsanstalt, perfectly in accord with the 
Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan, must strive to create a working population with which 
the new tasks, whatever they may be, can be mastered at any time without diffi  culty.88
Th e January 1937 meeting, then, served the important function, during politi-
cally turbulent times, of signaling the mutual commitment of all parties to the 
long-term project of developing Germany’s skilled workforce.
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As part of this reaffi  rmation, each side demonstrated its willingness to com-
promise in the interest of an even closer relationship. Building on the previous 
state and local agreements between employers’ organizations and labor offi  ces 
about the recruitment of apprentices and acknowledging the current trend to-
ward more outright state control, the national industrial organization now “ap-
proved a total vocational counseling,”89 i.e., making use of the service obligatory 
for all school-leavers. Th e employers insisted, however, that the fi rm must retain 
the ultimate decision about hiring. More generally, the employers repeatedly in-
voked the crucial importance of the businessman’s trust in the vocational coun-
selor’s judgment. Th e lack, or weakness, of this confi dence, they said, was largely 
responsible for whatever reservations still remained.
For its part, the Reichsanstalt, whose vocational counselors always had preferred 
gaining employers’ confi dence to resorting to compulsion, acknowledged the sig-
nifi cance of this factor. Handrick concluded his remarks by expressing the hope 
“that the work of vocational counseling in all parts of the Reich may earn the un-
qualifi ed trust of the German economy.” As we shall see later, even after the regime 
did in fact apply to vocational counseling the “compulsion” that the employers 
had hoped to preempt, the Reichsanstalt continued to seek the employers’ trust.
Over the course of the next year, the cooperation between the Reichsanstalt 
and the employers (and the Economics Ministry) did become “ever closer.” Be-
tween 1 July 1936 and 30 June 1937, as the labor offi  ces’ already substantial access 
to school-leavers inched ever closer to “total inclusion,”90 the number of appren-
ticeships registered at the offi  ces soared by more than 25 percent, from 395,000 
to 507,000.91
Th e parties to the vocational counseling/training compact sought to realize the 
terms of their cooperation. Instructions by the Reichsanstalt headquarters to its 
state and local offi  ces and by the Economics Ministry to the Organization of the 
Economy defi ned the new framework: all fi rms were to obtain their apprentices 
through vocational counseling; the industrial examination boards were to include 
a member of vocational counseling; when the vocational counseling offi  ce had 
doubts or questions about the quality of training at particular fi rms, it should 
turn for advice to the local chamber of industry and trade.92 Th e arrangements 
necessary for this “deepened cooperation,” however, could still vary consider-
ably, as the reports by the various state and local organizations showed.93 By the 
late summer, the Reichsanstalt and the employers’ organization both were push-
ing for a uniform, binding regulation for the entire Reich.94 For the employers, 
one of the most important concerns, as had already become clear in the January 
1937 meeting, was the reliability of vocational counseling’s selection of trainees. 
Th us, in a communication from the Reich Economic Chamber to the Economics 
Ministry on 28 May, the former wrote: “[We are] currently occupied with the 
task of making the cooperation between the Organization of the Economy and 
the Reichsanstalt as close as possible. Th ereby we are especially paying attention 
to the question of the pre-selection [of apprentices] for entering a vocation. In 
connection with this, the suitability-tests of the vocational offi  ces of the Reich-
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sanstalt will … also be gone into.”95 When the Organization of the Economy and 
the Reichsanstalt planned their meeting on a binding national agreement, vo -
cational counseling’s suitability tests were the sole specifi c item on the agenda. 
In addition to a general presentation by the Reichsanstalt on “principles of the 
labor allocation policy and its application to the steering of the vocational choice 
of the school-leaving youth,” the Labor Administration’s only other topic was to 
be: “Ways of determining the suitability-structure of the youths and matching 
them to the vocations.” Th e plan for the meeting spelled out in some detail what 
industry was interested in hearing from the Labor Administration: “From which 
source does the vocational counselor gain his knowledge for determining the vo-
cational suitability in each individual case. Th e role of the suitability-examination. 
Th e gathering of such information demonstrated in practical examples. Conse-
quences for the assignment to the vocations.”96
Th e Nazi regime’s increasingly obvious willingness to employ coercive mea-
sures to prepare the labor force for war and the tightening supply of workers 
inspired some of the main forces behind the projects to optimize the German 
workforce, including the Labor Administration and employers’ organizations, to 
deepen their already substantial cooperation. Even with the prospect of an in-
creased legal mandate, the Labor Administration showed itself solicitous of in-
dustry’s demands for securing suitable workers.
Th e Laws of Totalerfassung
Th e ever more critical bottleneck in the supply of entrants to the labor market in 
1937/38 inspired a number of responses, including laws granting vocational coun-
seling truly “total inclusion” for the fi rst time and statistical plans for the national 
distribution across vocations, but they also included a recognition of the need to 
shift the emphasis away from “quantitative” to “qualitative” vocational policies.
Ever since 1934/35, when the number of unemployed had begun rapidly to 
drop and the fi rst cases of regional shortages of skilled workers appeared, concern 
had mounted over Germany’s dearth of workers. Th e sense of urgency became 
suddenly sharper in the winter of 1937/38—like the Gestalt-switch of the mid 
1920s, another case in which perceptions about the workforce underwent rapid 
change. For the fi rst time, the number of apprenticeship positions reported by 
fi rms to the labor offi  ces may have equaled, or even exceeded, the number of 
suitable candidates, leaving no reserves.97 By mid 1938, according to an estimate 
in the Reichsarbeitsblatt, Germany already was missing half a million workers.98 
Compounding the problem, numerous “fashionable vocations”—particularly in 
the metal industries—drew excessive numbers of applicants, while less glamor-
ous, but vital, occupations suff ered recruitment shortfalls.99 Th e signs of a grow-
ing scarcity of young skilled workers in the winter of 1937/38 propelled the 
Labor Administration to attempt to gain more direct control of the labor force, 
according to Walter Stets’ later account.100
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Two important decrees of 1 March 1938 recast the Reichsanstalt’s role in match-
ing young workers and apprentices with employers, though not as radically as 
it fi rst might appear. Th e “Order Regarding the Registering of School-leavers” 
made it mandatory for all youths leaving school to register with their local labor 
offi  ce. Th e second decree obliged employers to obtain approval for all apprentice-
ships.101 With these decrees, vocational counseling achieved what it had sought 
since its beginnings though by other, non-compulsory, means: the “total inclu-
sion” of both young workers and apprenticeship-off ering employers. Compared 
to 1937/38, when 70 percent of all school-leavers immediately had visited voca-
tional counseling, in the fi rst year after the decrees came into eff ect, 86 percent 
did.102 Th e number of trainee positions for males that fi rms registered with the la-
bor offi  ces jumped in the same period by nearly one-third.103 Beyond these quan-
titative indices, the ethos and self-perception within the Reichsanstalt changed 
as well. “Th e task of the previous vocational counseling,” Walter Stets explained 
later, “was transformed into steering young workers.” Previously, when many 
more apprenticeship positions than youths existed, vocational counseling mainly 
had “advised and helped” individuals; now the emphasis would be on “securing 
young workers for the individual vocations” as part of a “total steering of young 
workers.”104 Th e latter phrase—Nachwuchslenkung—tended to replace the term 
vocational counseling, if never exclusively or offi  cially.
Yet we must not exaggerate the rupture caused by the March 1938 decrees. A 
Totalerfassung of all youths and all apprenticeships always had been the goal of 
the vocational counseling movement. It is true that for the faction of vocational 
counseling that had insisted that the service earn the trust of its users, the creation 
of a legal compulsion must have seemed regrettable. However, well before 1938 
or even 1933, the same advocates of vocational counseling’s triumph by virtue 
of its superior quality had banned competition by commercial agencies and used 
other, softer forms of coercion, most notably the agreements with the schools on 
“delivering” students to vocational counseling, to approach Totalerfassung. Oth-
ers in vocational counseling always had favored legal mandates.105
Nor was the shift in the declared mission of vocational counseling—from 
advising and helping to steering—unprecedented or particularly radical. From 
the beginning, proponents of vocational counseling had insisted on a harmony 
between the two aspects: helping the individual fi nd the place for which he was 
best-suited, and consequently where he would be happiest and most productive, 
was to promote the advantage of the economy. Conversely, by seeking macroeco-
nomic balance, and hence by steering less suitable applicants away from crowded 
vocations and toward other fi elds, vocational counseling also would be protecting 
the individual from a lifetime of disappointment. Stets noted that the change was 
more gradual than fundamental: “Both tasks were always present; the emphasis 
shifts, however, from the one side to the other.”106
Th e achievement, as a matter of fact, of a (near) Totalerfassung also was not due 
solely to the decrees of 1938. In the previous fi ve years, several factors boosted 
the proportions both of the school-leavers and the employers using vocational 
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Table 5.1 Th e Growth of Vocational Counseling in the 1920s and 1930s
Year
# of School- 
Leavers









1922/23 235,000 138,000 
(89,000 for males)
94,000
1923/24 421,000 140,000 251,000 134,000 
(89,000 for males)
96,000
1924/25 602,000 194,000 307,000 179,000 
(127,000 for males)
130,000
1925/26 375,000 172,000 
(123,000 for males)
132,000
1926/27 426,000 207,000 
(144,000 for males)
156,000
1927/28 438,000 254,000 
(179,000 for males)
176,000
1928/29 390,000 213,000 
(144,000 for males)
147,000
1929/30 315,000 399,000 197,000 
(137,000 for males)
134,000
1930/31 298,000 406,000 163,000 
(111,000 for males)
119,000
1931/32 606,000 283,000 387,000 124,000 
(83,000 for males)
98,000


















































Sources: Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1926, nr. 21, 367-9; Reichsanstalt, Zehn Jahre, 39-40; Reichsarbeitsblatt, II, 
1937, nr. 36, 401; Reichsarbeitsblatt, Nichtamt. Beilage: Achter Bericht der Reichsanstalt fur die Zeit vom 
1 April 1935 bis zum 31 Marz 1936, 36f.; Reichsarbeitsblatt, V, 1940, nr. 28, 482-3; Reichsarbeitsblatt, V, 
1942, nr. 29, 542; Reichsarbeitsblatt, II, 1939, nr. 34, 442f.; Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1939, nr. 8
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counseling—especially the employers’ establishment of uniform standards of 
training, which dramatically increased their willingness to train apprentices, and 
the ever-closer cooperation of employers and vocational counseling. In the three 
years before the new rules came into eff ect, the percentage of students consulting 
with vocational counseling immediately upon leaving school had already risen 
from 48 to 70 percent.107 Even without the help of legal obligations, in the next 
few years vocational counseling might well have approached “total inclusion” of 
all youths, even if more slowly.
Th e proportion of employers who registered their apprenticeships with voca-
tional counseling also had risen steeply before 1938, as refl ected, at least partly, in 
the total number of trainee-positions listed.108 Indeed, relations between the La-
bor Administration and the employers demonstrated more clearly than anything 
else that the decrees of March 1938 did not represent a fundamental rupture. 
Th e role of the employers in promulgating the legislation remains unclear. On 
the one hand, given their dislike of unilateral state intervention, they might have 
disapproved of the nature of the orders, preferring an agreement between the two 
sides. On the substantive issue, however, the employers would have found little 
to criticize. Th e newly forged vocational system presupposed such coordination, 
something the employers trusted the Labor Administration to provide. Political 
threats to employers’ control of their workforces, whether emanating from the 
German Labor Front or the Four-Year Plan, and the economic disadvantages of 
having to compete for labor in an increasingly tight market made cooperation 
with a friendly public agency increasingly appealing.
For years, the employers’ organization had encouraged agreements between 
its local and state branches with the labor offi  ces on trainee placements. In the 
fall of 1937, they had sought a binding national agreement guaranteeing the 
comprehensive reporting now mandated. In an internal memorandum on the 
“Basic Principles of the Cooperation between the [Employers’ Organization] and 
the Reichsanstalt,” which circulated within their organization just a month before 
the March decrees, the employers called for a “planned, complete steering of 
all the vocations of the producing economy.” For the purpose of a “reasonable 
selection among the youths and a corresponding regulation of the vocational 
deployment,” the memo called for “the registering by fi rms with the vocational 
counseling offi  ces of the entire demand for youths for apprenticeships.”109 It is 
not unreasonable to think that this memo, and any negotiations with the Labor 
Administration that grew out of it, may have played a role in preparing the de-
crees promulgated three weeks later.
While the orders obliged all youths to visit the local vocational counseling 
offi  ce, they did not create “compulsory vocations,” by compelling the youths to 
accept the offi  ce’s suggestion of a vocation and off er of a trainee position. As Stets 
went to some length to emphasize, in contrast to the labor conscription of adults, 
the training of youths would have such long-term consequences for their lives 
that the ultimate decision had to be left to “the responsibility of the youths and 
their parents.”110 Th e relations between vocational offi  ces and youths remained, 
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then, much as they had been before March 1938: while the Labor Administra-
tion abjured “direct compulsion,” as Stets revealingly put it, its recommendations 
carried great weight. Vocational counseling, intent on gaining its clients’ willing 
cooperation, had worked over the years to earn their trust. More importantly, its 
control—more comprehensive now than ever before—over access to the coveted 
apprenticeships could give vocational counseling a kind of “indirect compul-
sion,” if it chose to apply it.
Again, however, it was the relation between the employers and the Reich-
sanstalt that demonstrated the greatest continuity. “Recent discussions,” the em-
ployers’ organization wrote to the Reichsanstalt shortly after publication of the 
decrees, had produced “agreement that in the practical carrying-out of the [order 
on fi rms’ demands for apprentices] the existing agreements on cooperation be-
tween the [two sides] shall for now not be changed or replaced by new ones.”111 
Firms, like the youths interested in apprenticeships, though compelled to report 
all openings for apprentices to the labor offi  ces, retained ultimate authority to 
accept or reject the labor offi  ce’s candidates. For the employers, more than for 
the youths, this freedom existed not only on paper, but also, to some extent at 
least, in practice. Th e most telling evidence of continuity in the relation between 
the Reichsanstalt and the employers after March 1938, however, was the fact that 
the Labor Administration—at least partly for the sake of earning the trust of the 
employers—continued and even expanded its eff orts to improve and standardize 
its methods of selecting workers.
Two kinds of vocational strategy, one quantitative and one qualitative, fol-
lowed from the “total inclusion” achieved after March 1938. First, total registra-
tion permitted the Reichsanstalt for the fi rst time to attempt the quantitative 
planning of distribution across the vocations. In a confi dential memo to the state 
offi  ces on 31 October 1938, President Syrup announced the implementation 
of the fi rst national vocational plan. Because in 1938 the “distribution of ap-
prentices and young workers had not matched national-political requirements,” 
access to vocations with less signifi cance in this regard would have to be reduced 
and youths would have to be steered into the most important vocations. For a 
number of “vocational groups,” the memo provided national guidelines in the 
form of precise fi gures expressing the percentage of current workers to be hired 
as apprentices. When the test run of 1938/39 suggested to the Reichsanstalt that 
such measures were “feasible,”112 the Administration prepared a full-scale plan 
for 1940.
Th e onset of war in September 1939, though, forced the postponement of its 
implementation, and the state and local offi  ces continued to rely “in a practical 
manner” on the preliminary plan of 1938 and its results. In 1941, when the 
Reich sanstalt fi nally implemented, and made public, a full-scale national plan, the 
Labor Administration itself claimed only moderate success: it had basically suc-
ceeded in “coming closer to the goal” of the plan, with only one “complete fail-
ure,” in mining. However, the director of vocational counseling tried to dampen 
expectations (or concerns), emphasizing the “limits of such a plan:”
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Fundamentally, it must be remembered … that such a quantitative plan of distribution for 
apprentices and young workers can only provide guidelines.… Th e purpose of the plan can 
thus not be to determine the need for apprentices and young workers with mathematical 
precision, but rather it must place the need in relation to the available number and thereby 
pay attention to what is achievable.
Th e main purpose of the plan could be achieved not in a single year, but only 
over “longer periods of time”; it applied not to single vocations but to vocational 
groups; monitoring the “line of development,” not inevitable shorter-term varia-
tions, was the point.113 Publication of the plan even had sparked “various cri-
tiques and fears,” inspiring the Minister of Labor himself to emphasize the merely 
general, long-term, and non-compulsory nature of the quantitative targets.114 
Th e hope of implementing a planned distribution of apprentices to the diff erent 
industries and vocations met, then, with only limited success.
Along with quantitative planning, the other vocational strategy consciously 
promoted once “total registration” was achieved with the March 1938 decrees 
aimed to improve the quality of vocational measures. Allocation and quality, of 
course, had been seen as the central—and complementary—elements of voca-
tional reform ever since the seminal Prussian edict of 1919. Now augmented by 
its new legal mandates in the midst of ever-tighter labor markets, the Labor Ad-
ministration pursued both goals with a new boldness. Its offi  cial goals became the 
“securing of a quantitatively appropriate supply of apprentices and young work-
ers for the individual vocations,” and “securing the quality of the training in the 
individual skilled and semi-skilled vocations” as well as “securing the precondi-
tions in the person of the young person who is to be trained.”115 Even before the 
various limits to precise quantitative planning had become evident, however, the 
qualitative aspects were becoming increasingly important.
As early as 1937, when the possible dimensions of Germany’s future shortfall 
in manpower became clearer, it was already a commonplace notion that the na-
tion would have to compensate for the missing workers by qualitative measures. 
At the meeting of industry and the Reichsanstalt in January 1937, the head of 
vocational counseling characterized the belief that Germany had unlimited re-
serves of youth as a “fateful error.” Th e already quite limited numbers would “sink 
steadily in the next few years.” As a result, but also because the talents were not 
at all evenly distributed, the “allocation of youths must in future be carefully 
undertaken.”116 In his preview of the fi rst year of full-scale implementation of 
the national vocational plan—thus, even before the Reichsanstalt dampened ex-
pectations of the quantitative side—Walter Stets underscored the mounting sig-
nifi cance of one of the qualitative aspects: “Especially in light of the decline in 
numbers of youths, determination of the vocational suitability gains a greater 
signifi cance than ever before. Only by taking suitability into account can the 
necessary productivity increase be achieved.”117
Th e eff orts to improve the quality of the vocational system, we have noted, 
were intended to include two facets: along with the monitoring of the suitability 
of apprentices there was the goal of securing thorough, high-quality training in 
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the fi rms. As for the latter, the role of the Labor Administration, which had no 
relevant expertise, remained quite limited—the labor offi  ces relied on the recom-
mendation of the local chambers of industry and trade, when deciding on fi rms’ 
requests for apprentices.118 Vocational counseling’s eff orts concentrated on the 
other aspect: assuring the suitability of the apprenticeship candidates. Two strong 
currents moved the Labor Administration to expand its eff orts in this regard: 
its aim to gain or secure the complete cooperation of private industry, which 
remained a predominant motive for the Reichsanstalt even after it had obtained 
the legal mandates of “total inclusion,” and the needs of the regime for optimal 
use of Germany’s quantitatively limited manpower resources for its own strate-
gic purposes. Th ese currents led to a joint eff ort by the Labor Administration 
and industry, which, by 1939, produced Germany’s fi rst system of psychological 
profi les of vocations and fi rst uniform series of psychological tests.119 Th e “great 
cooperative endeavor” continued to fl ourish even during the years of mandated 
Totalerfassung.
Continuity in the Vocational System 
During the Phase of Blitzkrieg, 1939–1941
When one is considering the German economy and homefront, even to distin-
guish the fi rst years of the war from the rest and to characterize them as part of the 
Blitzkrieg-phase may seem to be taking sides in the historiographic debate about 
Germany’s mobilization.120 In the sphere of vocational counseling and training, 
at least, the original thesis of a Blitzkrieg-economy seems to apply: remarkably 
little changed after the outbreak of war in September 1939. Of course, as we 
noted earlier, the Labor Administration did play a central role in recruiting and 
distributing foreign civilian workers, slave laborers, and POW-workers. Indirectly, 
the importation of something on the order of 10 million foreign workers,121 
who performed almost exclusively unskilled work, allowed German workers to 
concentrate on skilled work and hence was crucial to maintaining the program of 
creating a skilled workforce even under the exceptional circumstances of the war. 
However, the advocates and administrators of vocational counseling and training 
had no direct involvement with these programs.
Within several weeks of the invasion of Poland, the Reichsanstalt and the em-
ployers’ Reich Economic Chamber, together with the Ministry of Economics, 
issued decrees ordering that vocational training also continue even during war-
time. On September 25, the Labor Administration/Ministry122 instructed its of-
fi ces that while wartime demanded some concessions, “vocational training will 
be maintained during the present situation as well. Th e development of highly 
qualifi ed young workers remains necessary, should be promoted even more for 
the great state-political economic realms. Correspondingly, steering the school-
leaving youth into the vocations is of great signifi cance under current conditions 
as well.”123
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Only a few days later, the Reich Chamber of the Economy issued similar 
guidelines, which were expressly approved by a decree of the Economics Minis-
try. “Fundamentally,” they said, “the war economy must not lead to a reduced 
hiring of apprentices for skilled or semi-skilled positions.”
In these decisions, the lessons of the previous war—lessons about the long-term 
eff ects of short-term calculations—loomed large. Th e explanations by offi  cials 
were full of references to the dire postwar results of the failure to train workers 
properly during that earlier confl ict.124 Industrial interests echoed the appeals of 
the ministries:
Such a fundamental orientation of our vocational youth-training [i.e., one oriented to 
“state-political goals” above and beyond the interests of individual fi rms] means that its 
development must be kept apart from all changes of narrow economic, but also of war-
economic, considerations.… Vocational training is planning for the long-term.125
Published in the now semi-offi  cial fl agship journal of the vocational training move-
ment, such a reminder was a rallying call for industrial fi rms to stay the course.
Th e long-term orientation did not just mean that vocational counseling and 
training would continue more or less as before. As the Reichsinstitut explained, 
the great project of organizing and standardizing vocational materials, such as vo-
cational profi les, training plans, completion exams, and suitability requirement 
profi les, would continue as well.126 Th e committee on suitability requirements 
continued to meet regularly; by February 1940, the requirements for a further 
thirteen vocations had been determined, bringing the total to 78.127 In April, the 
committee agreed on eight more profi les,128 and in June on another fi ve.129
A Nazi Economic Neuordnung?
If anything might have permanently redirected the thrust of work on the Ger-
man vocational system, it was not the limited war-economy of 1939/40, but the 
prospect of a “New Order” of the European economy opened up by Germany’s 
dramatic triumphs in the spring of 1940. After the territorial gains of 1938 and 
1939 in Central Europe, the swift conquest of the Benelux countries, Denmark, 
Norway, and—most importantly—the “arch enemy” France made the Nazis 
masters of an imperium stretching from the Pyrenees to the Arctic Circle and the 
edge of the Baltic region. In the fl ush of victory, Göring commissioned Econom-
ics Minister Funk to draw up an overall blueprint for the Neuordnung; even as 
circumstances delayed the development of this single plan, numerous Party and 
state offi  ces, leaders of the economic organizations, and individual fi rms prepared 
formal plans for the new German-dominated Europe, or at least reassessed their 
options.130 For many, no doubt, as Peter Hayes suggested about I.G. Farben, Nazi 
economic policies now assumed for the fi rst time “an air of permanence.”131
What impact did the prospect of a Nazi Neuordnung of Europe have on the 
ministries’ and employers’ thinking about the vocational system—which de-
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pended, given the necessary investments of time and resources, on assessments 
of longer-term conditions? Since the mid 1920s, a consensus on the value of Ger-
many’s human capital had held sway, despite apparent variations in the economic 
outlook. Now, at the apparent dawn of a Europe dominated by Greater Germany, 
how did the prospects of a Neuordnung—in particular, of a potentially vast, uni-
fi ed market suitable for mass production and hence unskilled work—aff ect the 
vocational project?
Contrary to the wishes of Party advocates of a continental, race, and war-cen-
tered autarky, Hitler had granted supporters of at least some form of reintegration 
of the “Greater German Economic Sphere” with world trade the leading roles in 
planning.132 Th e Economics Minister had entrusted the task to the former head 
of export-promotion, who enjoyed close ties to industry.133 Without comment-
ing on the likely future state of the Grossraumwirtschaft or its relations to the rest 
of the world, the Minister of Labor and the Labor Administration’s head of voca-
tional counseling reiterated the argument that, in light of Germany’s long-term 
shortage of workers, vocational training remained of paramount importance.134 
In this, they were supported by a frequent rival, the German Labor Front, which 
regarded Germany’s small (and shrinking) labor force as the economy’s main 
problem, concluding that “the development of human labor power” was “one of 
the most urgent investment tasks.”135 Nor did the Labor Front’s, nor even Adolf 
Hitler’s, occasional advocacy of mass consumption as a means of spurring greater 
productivity or as a vehicle for social integration prompt any signifi cant measures 
to introduce mass production throughout the economy,136 which might have led 
to a reevaluation of the German vocational system.
Among some leaders of the economic self-administration, however, the pos-
sibilities of the Greater German Economic Sphere appeared to encourage spec-
ulation, if only temporarily, about new forms of production. At a speech to 
industrialists in Dusseldorf in early December 1941 (i.e., when it still appeared 
that Germany would shortly control a vast region extending to Moscow and even 
the Urals), Herr Frenz, one of the Organization of the Producing Economy’s 
experts on vocational training, drew a direct link between the potential market’s 
size, new production methods, and workers’ qualifi cations:
Th e greater European area provides the German economy with relief in obtaining raw ma-
terials, and in the conditions of production and distribution. It allows many fi rms the pos-
sibility of a greater specialization, of mass production and sales and thereby of a previously 
unknown increase of their productivity and competitiveness.… Vocational training should 
not be understood to mean simply the training of skilled or semi-skilled workers. Especially in 
the past few years, this area has expanded considerably. Th e question of the simplest, shortest 
and most purposeful training for the other categories of young workers as well, the training 
and rapid schooling of low-skilled workers, will have to be considered precisely in regard to 
the changes in production methods that result from the Greater Economic Sphere. Th ese 
[changes] will bring about shifts in many fi rms from one-piece and skilled work, as has 
been the case until now, to mass, semi-skilled, and unskilled production. As a result, a cor-
responding shift in the need for workers will occur.137
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We cannot know whether Frenz’ views would have become commonplace 
among businessmen (not to mention the ministerial advocates of vocational train-
ing), if the Red Army had not stopped the Wehrmacht before Moscow in those very 
days, thereby ending the Blitzkrieg and enveloping the outcome of the war—and 
hence the future of the Greater Economic Sphere—in uncertainty. We do know, 
however, that even at the apogee of Nazi military success, most businessmen still 
took a far more cautious view of future changes than Frenz’ comments implied.
As recent studies of company behavior during the Th ird Reich have shown, 
industrial leaders by and large maintained their earlier reserve, born of their un-
certainty over the Nazis’ long-term intentions, even into 1940/41. Neil Gregor’s 
description of Daimler-Benz’ unwillingness to make major decisions based on the 
prospect of a vast new domestic market can stand in for numerous other studies:
[D]espite the adoption of an expansionist policy [into production of military equip-
ment]—which in the context of the war economy was the result of unavoidable political 
pressure as much as long-term strategic planning—the company’s successive responses to 
the changing military and economic situation were still characterized by a high degree of 
caution and uncertainty, and by a reluctance to commit itself to long-term decisions in a 
war in which short-term events could very rapidly change the position of the Reich and 
with it the company.138
Th e most compelling evidence, however, for German fi rms’ ongoing com-
mitment to vocational training was their persistently high, even rising, demand 
for apprentices. In 1940, the demand for male skilled and semi-skilled trainees 
had, admittedly, declined slightly, compared to the previous year, from 582,600 
to 558,000. Given the fi ghting and concomitant disruptions in April and May 
1940, when the new class of apprentices entered service, the fall-off  was not sur-
prising. In 1940, as in 1939, the number of apprentices requested by fi rms still 
outnumbered the available school-leavers by 150,000. Th e next year, though, 
German employers asked for 627,100 male trainees for skilled and semi-skilled 
positions, more than a 10 percent increase over the previous year. Two hundred 
thousand positions—virtually one-third of the requests—could not be fi lled. As 
German armies appeared to conquer a vast new empire in the east, the Labor Ad-
ministration could comment with evident satisfaction on the employers’ “great 
willingness to train.”139
Th e Vocational System in the Period of Total War: 
Disrupted, not Disabled
After the end of the Blitzkrieg outside Moscow in late 1941, the Nazi regime 
had to fi ght a diff erent war. Its attempts to remold its military, but in particular 
its economy, for a war of attrition as well as the growing specter of defeat ex-
acerbated fi ssiparous tendencies within the regime and cost it support among 
important social groups.
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A vastly increased production of war materiel was the key to the new strategy. 
To achieve this, the regime had to mobilize untapped reserves of labor—which 
the military also needed for its new units—or make current workers more pro-
ductive. Th e corresponding measures and the encroachment of the war on Ger-
man territory, especially in 1944 and 1945, could not but aff ect the German 
vocational system. Conscription into the army and into other tasks in production 
drew down the vocational system’s own personnel; especially in the fi nal year of 
the war, Allied bombing and the dispersal of production (and hence training) 
facilities made the normal routines of vocational placement and training more 
onerous. Beyond these debilitating eff ects, the “rationalization” of production 
encouraged by Fritz Todt and then Albert Speer, the powerful ministers in charge 
of armaments production,140 aimed, in part, to introduce mass production meth-
ods, which would require far fewer skilled workers.
Th e fi rst sort of eff ect, whether due to the withdrawal of personnel or the im-
mediate consequences of Allied actions, was, of course, a serious disruption, but 
its impact would not necessarily last long past the war’s end. Th e rationalization 
of production, involving signifi cant investment in machinery for mass produc-
tion, on the other hand, might have meant a more permanent shift in German 
production methods—and hence in the vocational system. In fact, several coun-
tervailing pressures mitigated the degree of conversion by German industry. 
Th ese pressures came from within the Nazi Party and within the state ministries. 
Resistance to change came also from German industry. In the period of total war, 
the German vocational system was disrupted, but not transformed.
Th e military crisis of the winter of 1941/42 convinced Hitler to agree, with 
a decisiveness and consistency he demonstrated increasingly rarely, to a major 
reorganization of the German war economy. In February 1942, he approved an 
unprecedented centralization of control in the hands fi rst of Fritz Todt and then 
of Albert Speer.141 Th e reforms introduced by Todt and Speer included, most im-
portantly for our purposes, eff orts to simplify and standardize weapons systems; 
awarding contracts to the most effi  cient producers; and measures to improve 
productivity at the factory level, including the increased use of mass production 
methods.142
Th ere can be little doubt that Speer’s reforms contributed to the signifi cant 
increases in the German economy’s arms output from 1942 to 1944.143 However, 
a number of factors continued to limit the impact of Speer’s eff orts to reform the 
economy, especially the expansion of mass production. Th ough Todt and Speer 
had achieved an unparalleled centralization of control of the war economy, that 
command was never complete, nor unequivocally supported by the Führer. “A 
defi ning quality of German labor policy in the war,” Walter Naasner argues, was 
the leadership’s reluctance to demand maximal sacrifi ces of the workers. Con-
cerns for domestic peace may explain why “only halfhearted attempts” in this di-
rection were made.144 Th e decisions in February and March 1942, precisely when 
Speer was launching his program of rationalization, to utilize Soviet civilian labor 
extensively beguiled the Nazi leaders with the possibility of resolving their labor 
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and production problems without imposing signifi cant burdens on the German 
people. By comparison, other forms of labor policy, including transforming Ger-
man production methods, now seemed less urgent.145
Further impediments to Speer’s program of rationalization came from the 
Wehrmacht, from within the Party, and from still potent state ministries. A key 
precondition for the mass production of weapons was to reduce both the number 
of variations of each type of weapon or support system and their quality. Consid-
erable progress was made in this regard, yet even Richard Overy admits that many 
of these changes were implemented only very slowly. Not only did the armed 
forces resist the reduction and simplifi cation of their weapons and in fact continue 
to interrupt production runs with frequent design changes,146 many armaments 
fi rms did as well, as Lutz Budrass has shown for the airplane industry.147
Th e Nazis’ regional satraps, the Gauleiter, blocked or at least slowed some as-
pects of the rationalization. As part of the eff ort to mobilize all remaining resources, 
the Nazi leadership in March 1942 had established yet another labor-related of-
fi ce, the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment (Arbeitseinsatz), which 
was occupied by Fritz Sauckel. In July 1943, Sauckel combined the functions of 
the regional Reich Labor Guardians and those of the Land labor offi  ces in new 
Gau labor offi  ces.148 Th e new position strengthened the hand of the Gauleiter, 
whose power bases were at least partly local, in resisting any closings of smaller, 
less effi  cient fi rms ordered by Speer’s organization.149
Finally, as a growing number of studies of companies’ perspectives and behav-
ior during these years suggests, to a considerable extent fi rms continued to resist 
signifi cant interference in their production methods. Even under conditions of 
total war, businesses had to weigh and balance short-term opportunities and dan-
gers against their assessments of the likely future conditions in which they would 
be operating. Especially in regard to investments in capital, including human 
capital, fi rms oriented themselves particularly according to their assessments of 
mid- to long-range conditions, which by 1942 or 1943 included the growing 
likelihood of a future without the Nazis.150 Detailed studies of the machine tools 
and airplane industries confi rm that, even when faced with pressures to turn to 
mass production, fi rms largely continued their long-term strategies of combin-
ing skilled work and automation for the sake of fl exibility in future markets.151 
Especially toward the end of the war, companies “hoarded supplies and skilled 
workers without any inhibitions.”152
Firms’ interest in preserving their core resources, despite the short-term allure 
of unskilled mass production for the total war eff ort, manifested itself in their 
persistently high willingness to engage in apprenticeship training. Th e number 
of positions off ered in 1941 had risen by more than 10 percent compared with 
the previous year; even in 1942, the fi rst year of serious eff orts to increase output 
of materiel, employers off ered more positions than ever before.153 It was only in 
1943 that the overall number of apprenticeships on off er declined for the fi rst 
time, and then only marginally. Th e number of apprenticeships for semi-skilled 
positions, in fact, still climbed. In terms of occupied positions, the year 1943 saw 
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just a 1.8 percent decline in skilled apprenticeships, but a 6.9 percent increase in 
semi-skilled positions.154 Reports solicited by the Reich Economic Chamber in 
the fall of 1944 about the state of vocational counseling throughout the country 
revealed the debilitating eff ects of the war, but also the continuation of training 
virtually until the very end. “Th e number of male apprentices has been reduced 
due to the early call-ups, as has that of examiners due to induction into the Wehr-
macht and the Volkssturm,” the summary concluded matter-of-factly. Allied bomb-
ings reduced work intensity; in regions near the front, the loss of territory had 
reduced the area to be tended to and the necessary work of bringing equipment 
to safety made regular training and exams “seldom possible.” Still, “the chambers 
and fi rms in these areas are trying everything in order to carry on with vocational 
training.” In areas less aff ected by the fi ghting, “basic apprenticeship training is 
being performed according to plan.”155
All along, offi  cial policy had been to uphold vocational training no matter 
what the fortunes of war or the state of the war economy. In March 1943, the 
head of the Arbeitseinsatz, Fritz Sauckel, had reiterated the regime’s support for 
the apprenticeship system. Th e order exempted trainees from the January edict 
mobilizing further labor reserves for the total war. Its language and stipulations 
suggest that it belonged to the measures meant to reassure the German middle 
classes made uneasy by the January edict and the ensuing closings of fi rms. “Vo-
cational training is necessary for securing the needed supply of Facharbeiter, who 
will be urgently required both today and in the future.” Th e labor offi  ces were to 
fi nd new positions for those apprentices aff ected by fi rm closings.156 Th roughout 
1943 and 1944, the Reich Economics Ministry urged fi rms to maintain appren-
ticeship training.157
Not only did companies try to maintain their training, to the extent that was 
possible; the work on standardizing the vocational materials also continued into 
the period of total war. In February 1942, the Reichsinstitut (DATSCH) had 
agreed, upon the suggestion of Reich Group Industry, to restrict its work to ma-
terials “important for the war,” and primarily to training plans.158 In May of that 
year, however, a report showed that between 1 June 1941 and 30 April 1942, the 
Reichsinstitut had completed twenty-seven suitability profi les and still had four 
“in progress.”159 By early 1943, just as Sauckel was issuing the edict on general 
mobilization, the Economics Ministry reinvigorated the Reichsinstitut, commis-
sioning it to revise all vocational training plans for all sectors with the exception 
of Handwerk.160 At the end of the year, an air raid on Leipzig destroyed all of the 
publisher’s stock of vocational materials, which thereafter eff ectively limited the 
work of the Reichsinstitut.161 Still, in April 1944, there were reported to be “311 
recognized Lehrberufe and 249 recognized Anlernberufe,” with eight and fi fteen 
more vocational profi les, respectively, “in progress.”162 It was only in October 
1944—when US and British forces already were driving far into France and the 
Russians were breaching Germany’s eastern borders—that the Economics Minis-
try fi nally ordered the “basic halt” of all work by the Reichsinstitut, in light of the 
“total war eff ort.”163
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Between May and July 1944, Kurt Bernhard of the Reichsgruppe Industrie 
widely circulated a paper, which obviously dealt with the postwar situation: “Sug-
gestions for the Alteration of the Distribution of Youths to Industrial Vocations 
as well as of the Training and Examining Procedures used until now.” In language 
that echoed numerous appeals made throughout the entire interwar period, and 
indeed since the late nineteenth century, Bernhard urged that quality had to 
compensate for missing quantity. “It must always be recalled that the youths 
are our most valuable good, which we must treat with exceptional care.” Even the 
untrained should be turned into semi-skilled workers. Old-fashioned training 
methods, deriving from a time in which unlimited numbers of youths were avail-
able, must be altered, Bernhard urged, apparently more forcefully struck by the 
desiderata of the actual training (and perhaps the disarray at the end of the war) 
than by the previous work ordering and standardizing the vocational system.164
In December 1944, in the fi rst of a series of discussions with regional industri-
alists, Bernhard consulted with Berlin employers about the shape of the postwar 
vocational system. Th e questions he posed suggest both the issues that remained 
unresolved or newly opened, after the dislocations of total war, but also the broad 
agreement that persisted through it:
1)  Do you consider the current numerous division of vocations (at present circa 300 Lehr-
berufe and 250 Anlernberufe) to be appropriate, or do you think a reduction in number 
is possible and appropriate?
2)  Do you think the separation of skilled and semi-skilled vocations is at all right, or 
should there in future only be Lehrberufe? ...
3)  Do you think that for the majority of skilled vocations a long apprenticeship (3–4 years) 
is generally appropriate, or does a training period of generally 2 years suffi  ce?
4)  How do you picture the future training and education of those youths characterized 
until now as “untrained?”165
Neither the Depression nor the accession to power of the National Social-
ists ultimately derailed the projects of developing a high-skilled workforce. Th eir 
militaristic style of politics and untroubled resort to coercive measures to combat 
mass unemployment diverged from the spirit of the earlier Labor Administra-
tion, but the break was not nearly as sharp as some scholars have suggested.
Developments of ultimately greater importance for the long-term future of 
the projects to optimize the workforce took place independent of direct action by 
the Nazis. In the fi rst years after the Depression and the change of power, decisive 
steps were taken to revive, consolidate, and complete important human econo-
mies. Employers, in cooperation with state ministries and the Labor Administra-
tion, resumed and expanded their work, begun the previous decade, to create 
standardized vocational profi les and other materials as the bases of a national 
system of skilled labor: the “great cooperative endeavor.” Th e success of these 
eff orts led fi rms to off er ever more apprenticeships. Th e Reichsanstalt’s vocational 
counseling participated in the work to standardize vocational materials, which 
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became the bases of its own work and served to bind the Labor Administration 
and private employers more closely to each other. As a result of their control of 
an increasing share of the apprenticeships off ered by private industry, the number 
of which was climbing rapidly, the vocational counseling offi  ces now attracted a 
proportion of all school-leavers that was rapidly approaching “total inclusion.”
Both new and old elements inspired this work on the optimization projects. 
Th e new elements—most importantly, a political climate that encouraged greater 
discipline and initiatives to preempt outside interference; more unifi ed employ-
ers’ organizations; threats from other claimants to leadership in vocational mat-
ters—certainly contributed to the remarkable speed of the organizational work. 
It was the older elements, however—namely, the employers’ organizations’ and 
vocational counseling’s jointly held goal of creating a high-skilled workforce on a 
national scale, and (primarily) the latter’s aim of steering every young person into 
the most suitable vocation—that accounted for the underlying philosophy and 
direction of the work in the mid 1930s.
Th e “great cooperative endeavor” of offi  cials in the Labor Administration and 
Economics Ministry and employers’ organizations to create a unifi ed vocational 
system continued—and even accelerated—in the shadow of war after 1936. Th e 
legal establishment of Totalerfassung in March 1938 did not mean that the Labor 
Administration cared any less about gaining the confi dence of employers. Th ese, 
in turn, had learned to appreciate the Labor Administration’s eff orts—and also 
knew they must accommodate themselves to the coercive politics of the day. In 
1934/35, the focus of work in the human economies had been on establishing 
standards for vocational training, the success of which had led to rapidly in-
creasing numbers of industrial trainees—and visitors to the vocational counsel-
ing offi  ces. After 1936, when the tightening labor markets put a premium on 
qualitative measures for improving the vocational economies, the focus of the 
cooperative endeavor shifted to vocational counseling.
Th e work to standardize—and hence permit the completion of—the voca-
tional system in the mid to late 1930s represented a revival and extension of the 
work begun in the decade after World War I. Th is time, the employers clearly took 
the initiative—not only in standardizing vocational training, but also in pushing 
for an eff ective, nationwide system of vocational counseling. Th e Labor Admin-
istration and Economics Ministry were happy to cooperate with such an eager 
partner for a goal they too shared.
Compared to the oftentimes contentious and unsteady progress of the opti-
mization projects made in the 1920s, the consolidation of the vocational system 
beginning in the mid 1930s came about quite rapidly. Politically, the climate cre-
ated by the Nazi regime conduced (thanks to both its centripetal and centrifugal 
forces) to bring the employers, the Economics Ministry, the Reichsanstalt, and 
the Labor Ministry together even more closely than previously. Economically 
and demographically, the rapid return to full and even over-employment put a 
premium on the optimal employment of each worker—by placing him according 
to his talents and by developing the latter. In this, the Nazis, on the one hand, 
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and the Reich ministries and employers, on the other, could agree—even if their 
ultimate aims diff ered in signifi cant ways.
As had the Depression a dozen years before, the period of total war from 1942 
to 1945 disrupted, but did not fundamentally transfi gure, the German voca-
tional system. If anything, the war, by its very destructiveness, would make that 
system seem all the more necessary. At the end of this World War, the Germans 
would face a situation very similar to the one in 1918: it was easy for them to 
believe that they had little on which to rely but their own talents.
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Chapter 6
THE LABOR ADMINISTRATION 
IN THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE

In the summer of 1945, after the Allies had defeated and occupied Germany, 
few Germans could be certain about their own, or their society’s, future. Th e 
country faced even bleaker prospects than those of 1918: this second world war 
had come home to Germany, turning cities to rubble and destroying infrastruc-
ture and industrial capital, as the fi rst one had not. Th e human losses—of killed 
and wounded soldiers and, for the fi rst time, targeted civilians—had been even 
greater than the carnage of 1914 to 1918. Millions of homeless people, displaced 
or expelled from central Europe, threatened to overwhelm available resources. 
Above all, Germany’s future status—its borders, its political constitution, and 
its economic system—lay, at least for the foreseeable future, in others’, in the 
Allies,’ hands. At the time, few could imagine what kind of Germany, what kind 
of economy and vocational system, would emerge in 10 or 20 years time.
Th e War’s Aftermath1
Amidst the ruins of postwar Germany, the reconstruction of a national Labor 
Administration and system of vocational training, like the future of much else 
in the defeated and occupied country, only could have seemed a distant and un-
certain prospect. In the event, the road to the establishment in 1952 of the new 
Labor Administration, the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosen-
versicherung, would be fi lled with delay, power struggles, and debate. And yet, in 
Notes for this section begin on page 215.
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retrospect, it is clear that no signifi cant opposition or alternative to a reconstitu-
tion ever presented itself.2 As had been the case since the 1920s, the support for 
a Labor Administration was broad among the nascent interest groups and the 
political parties. At the local and state levels, labor offi  ces resumed their activi-
ties as soon as they could. Th e reconstitution of the vocational training system, 
which also encountered delays and perhaps more serious challenges to employers’ 
power, though not to the system per se, followed a similar path: the local bodies, 
the individual companies, and chambers of industry, resumed—or, in fact, sim-
ply continued—earlier patterns; organizing nationally took longer. 
Even as the Allies assumed all political authority in conquered Germany, Ger-
man administration, particularly at the local level, continued to operate.3 How-
ever, the labor offi  ces now faced even more obstacles to eff ective service than 
they had in the waning years of the Th ird Reich, when conscription into the 
army of their own personnel, the regime’s interventions in the economy, and the 
breakdown of transportation and bomb attacks had disrupted work. Surprisingly, 
perhaps, the fact that most industrial production had ground to a halt was not 
itself directly responsible for the labor offi  ces’ problems:4 despite their produc-
tion problems, employers continued—as they had throughout the war—to seek 
a high number of apprentices. Rather, the labor offi  ces had to overcome many of 
the same obstacles that hampered industrial production (though not industrial 
training). A report of the vocational counselor in Bielefeld from August 1945 
described the constraints under which his offi  ce had to work and the necessity of 
continuing the simplifi ed forms of counseling and psychological testing he had 
developed in the last three years of the war:
In the current emergency condition of the local economy, it is hardly possible to con-
sider individual vocational interests, not to mention fi ne gradations in ability. Examination 
rooms are not available and cannot at present be set up. Extensive psychological exami-
nations would be premature given the large quantitative question of putting youths to 
work.… [G]iven the current transportation conditions the reestablishment of a supra-
district testing station appears at present completely impossible.5
Addressing the human costs of the war, which the Bielefeld report also men-
tioned, diverted many of the remaining resources from vocational counseling’s 
previously central purposes of advising and placing school-leavers. Adults, es-
pecially returning POWs, expellees, the war-wounded, and those compelled to 
change vocations or in need of further training, fl ooded the vocational counsel-
ing stations. In North Rhine-Westphalia in 1946/47, for example, such “older 
advice-seekers” made up nearly 60 percent of the offi  ces’ total caseload.6 
Despite their fi rms’ low output and the bleak prospects for improvement at 
least in the short-run, German employers sought to hire and train large num-
bers of school-leavers. In North Rhine-Westphalia in 1946/47 and 1947/48, for 
example, companies’ requests of the labor offi  ces for apprentices “exceeded con-
siderably” the number of available trainees. In the fi rst year, 159,000 candidates 
faced 177,000 openings; in 1947/48, the respective fi gures were 177,000 and 
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183,000.7 In the face of conditions detrimental to producing goods for sale, in 
particular the lack of a stable currency, fi rms turned their eff orts to restoring 
and enhancing their capital, in both its material and human forms.8 As they had 
under the perhaps equally, if diff erently, challenging conditions of wartime pro-
duction, German fi rms planned for a long-term future in which, they expected, 
a high-skilled workforce would be one of their greatest assets.
Compared to the concrete requirements and goals of the local and state labor 
offi  ces and of companies, the Weltanschauung of political parties and the popu-
lace played a much smaller role in the reconstitution of the workforce optimiza-
tion projects, at least in the fi rst years after the war ended. For the great majority 
of Germans, exhaustion and the practical, daily challenge of making do amidst 
the ruins and shortages precluded much political engagement or refl ection about 
the distant future.9 To the extent that the Allies permitted them, the early Ger-
man political decisions did not rely on a mass-basis, but instead on elites of Wei-
mar and even the late Kaiserreich.10
Supporters of the Labor Administration found in the postwar German out-
look reasons to be optimistic about their institution’s future, as well as loom-
ing challenges. For those Germans who could aff ord to think about more than 
simply making ends meet, print media, and in particular magazines, early on 
began a lively public debate about the nature and causes of the recent catastrophe 
(however defi ned) and the path to Germany’s recovery. Th ough the answers and 
prescriptions often varied, a persistently strong theme in these early years was the 
call for ethical renewal, both of the individual and of society as a whole. Individu-
als sought new or, more often, old sources of value and orientation. Th ey turned 
to religion, but also to work and vocation, which in addition to satisfying com-
pelling material needs also “could serve as a new life-philosophy.”11 Th e yearning 
for individual orientation to some higher purpose, which might include devo-
tion to work, fi tted well with aspects of the Labor Administration’s program of 
vocational counseling—such moral grounding had been at least one of the goals 
of many of the original proponents of vocational training and counseling in the 
Kaiserreich and Weimar Republic. However, at least in the discussion in the fi rst 
years after 1945, the emphasis had shifted away from the economic and toward 
the spiritual role of skilled work.
As for remaking society, a broad, if vague, consensus united many leftists and 
Christians who favored some form of socialism.12 Likewise, Germans from across 
the political spectrum held that the nation, if it ever were to emerge from its cur-
rent catastrophic state, must use and mobilize its human resources as eff ectively 
as possible. Even the “Ordoliberal” architects of West Germany’s “social market 
economy,” while fi rmly rejecting socialism, embraced the need for a Labor Ad-
ministration that would steer people into skilled work.13 Unlike the prior postwar 
period, however, after 1945 there were few explicit calls for Menschenökonomie, 
and certainly little of the earlier fervor.
Support for some form of socialism was congruent with a Labor Adminis-
tration run in the public’s interest. Of concern to offi  cials in the labor offi  ces, 
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however, were the criticisms of centralization and bureaucracy in general, which 
many Germans associated with Nazi rule and blamed for the destruction of hu-
mane (or religious) values.14 More particularly, the Labor Administration itself 
had become associated in many people’s minds with the open dirigisme of the 
Nazi period, just as the heavy hand of the labor offi  ces in World War I had earned 
them popular enmity.15 Th e pressures resulting from these attitudes on the part 
of the public, to emphasize the individual, almost ethical aspect of vocations and 
vocational counseling and to personalize the bureaucracy, would play some role 
in the coming years in eff orts to highlight vocational counseling’s connection to 
the individual. As it had in the past, Berufsberatung found itself torn between the 
means of “complete inclusion” and the desire to win the confi dence and coop-
eration of its actual and potential clients in order to achieve the goal of a highly 
skilled workforce. 
All in all, then, in the fi rst years after World War II, the Labor Administration 
could build on broad support for its general mission of controlling and improving 
the workforce, while some aspects of implementation remained more contested. 
Compared to the situation after 1918, the urgency of the labor force projects had 
faded somewhat—if only because the collapse now encompassed so many aspects 
of life and because occupied Germany’s fate rested to a much greater extent in 
others’ hands. However, the institutions of the human economies, scattered cri-
tiques notwithstanding, were much more fi rmly in place.
Soon after the end of the war, higher levels of the Labor Administration also 
were reconstituted. Between 1945 and 1948, Allied restrictions, German politi-
cal struggles, and simple practical considerations determined a heterogeneous 
sequence and pattern of reviving the bodies important to the workforce projects. 
However slowly the supra-local organizations arose, their reestablishment virtually 
went uncontested, refl ecting the broad support among relevant German circles 
as well as among the Allies. Only the British, whose new Labour government 
envisioned a more centralized Germany with strong elements of a planned econ-
omy, created zone-wide Offi  ces, including one for Labor, in addition to state 
ministries.16 As a result of this administrative decision, as well as the Rhineland’s 
traditionally leading role in vocational counseling and its central position in the 
economy of the incipient West German state, the British Central Offi  ce for La-
bor became the basis for the future West German Labor Administration. Th e 
delays in reestablishing a unifi ed national Labor Administration meant that—as 
so often in the past—state and local offi  ces, as well as the British Central Offi  ce, 
shaped the practices of the human economies and, especially in their dealings 
with local employers, assured a high degree of continuity. 
One of the few existing discontinuities, the lack of corporatist governing 
boards, spawned tensions within the incipient Labor Administration. In 1946 
and 1947, the attempts by some Social Democratic politicians and union leaders 
to gain decisive infl uence over the Labor Administration seemed, to key fi gures 
within the Central Labor Offi  ce of the British Zone, to pose a threat to its mis-
sion. Unhampered by any corporatist governing boards, the Social Democratic 
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Labor Ministers of such important Länder as North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower 
Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein applied obviously political criteria in selecting 
the presidents of the state offi  ces.17 Indeed, the head of the Zonal Central Of-
fi ce objected that the North Rhine-Westphalia Labor Minister had called several 
meetings of Social-Democratic directors of local labor offi  ces in order to give 
them “political instructions.” If this were not stopped, the Zonal chief warned, 
other parties would do the same and the Labor Administration would be split into 
political camps.18 A related dispute arose over whether labor offi  ce fi gures could 
be active members of unions.19 While the head of the Zonal Offi  ce was willing 
to pay some attention to political affi  liation in hirings (“otherwise, strong attacks 
could be expected from the parties and unions”), it was the British Occupation 
authority that insisted most forcefully upon the strict neutrality of labor offi  ce 
members.20 Th us, without permanently alienating any party, the emerging Labor 
Administration in the British Zone began to reestablish important characteristics 
that had distinguished the Labor Administration in the Weimar period and that 
had not been violated fully even under the Nazis: a principle of relative non-
partisanship and support from across the political spectrum.21 A substantial con-
tinuity of personnel from the Weimar and Nazi periods strengthened the incipi-
ent Labor Administration’s dedication to the national cause of creating a high-
skilled workforce.22
Th e Central Offi  ce for Labor in the British Zone regarded itself, as we have 
mentioned, as the precursor to a restored nationwide Labor Administration, in 
which view it found the full support of the British.23 It swiftly took the initia-
tive in preparing and systematizing materials for vocational counseling, includ-
ing psychological testing. Th ese eff orts shed light on the thinking and motives 
within the Labor Administration during these tumultuous years. Th ey demon-
strate that, after some initial pathos-inspired, religiously colored idealism, more 
concrete goals, including—most pragmatically of all—the need to win the co-
operation of employers, reasserted themselves. In addition to this form of con-
tinuity, the Central Offi  ce’s eff orts to create uniform standards and methods for 
vocational counseling formed a direct bridge between the Reichsanstalt and the 
future Bundesanstalt, as those eff orts drew on the systematizing work of the late 
1930s and would provide the blueprint for the Bundesanstalt’s vocational coun-
seling and psychological service. 
Within months of the war’s end, the work of coordinating and preparing ma-
terials for vocational counseling had begun, fi rst at the state level, and then at the 
Central Offi  ce. In February 1946, Julius Scheuble, who was the head of voca-
tional counseling in the most important state of the British Zone, North Rhine, 
and would later become the fi rst president of the reconstituted Bundesanstalt, 
called the fi rst of several meetings to revive work at the state level.24
In July, the British established the Central Offi  ce for Labor in Lemgo, with 
Scheuble as its director. Citing the “especially diffi  cult task of vocational counsel-
ing at present,” Scheuble two months later organized the fi rst zone-wide confer-
ence on vocational counseling. As Scheuble explained later to his British superiors 
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(and presumably to those at the conference), the “most important task” of his 
agency’s vocational counseling unit was “the new formation of a skilled labor 
force calibrated to the needs of a peace-time economy.”25
 Even after the British Zone’s Central Offi  ce was absorbed into the new Bizonal 
Administration for Labor that summer and thereby lost jurisdiction over voca-
tional counseling,26 eff orts to systematize vocational counseling and psychological 
testing continued. Th e states, above all North Rhine-Westphalia, pursued both 
the Central Offi  ce’s project as well as their own work, which they had carried on 
in parallel to the Central Offi  ce’s. From early 1947, the North Rhine-Westphalia 
labor offi  ce had organized and encouraged training sessions for its vocational 
counselors and regional “working groups” to consider the future tasks and meth-
ods of vocational counseling.27 Th anks to the energetic activity of these sessions 
and working groups, North Rhine-Westphalia, which since Weimar had boasted 
easily the densest network of vocational counseling and psychological testing sta-
tions, further cemented its leading role in the nascent Labor Administration. 
Along with much continuity, the discussions in the working groups (and else-
where) in North Rhine-Westphalia also revealed some shifts in thinking about 
the purpose and future of vocational counseling. In the fi rst years after the end 
of hostilities, the leaders of the state labor offi  ces could be as profoundly shaken 
as anybody by the magnitude of events. Th e head of vocational counseling for 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Karl Pardun, opened the fi rst training session with pa-
thos-fi lled refl ections on the moral crisis of the times and the requisite character-
istics of the vocational counselor:
Th e power of trust and mutual respect, the power of awe and of love for all living things 
must grow in the soul of the vocational counselor … It is necessary to lead [the advice-
seeker] to responsibility, to behavior appropriate to his nature and to the courage to duty; 
[the counselor must] help the individual to be guided again into the correct, living relation 
to himself, to other men and to whatever new human order is created.28
With the passage of time, however, such high-minded goals gave way increas-
ingly to more pragmatic concerns, such as reestablishing ties to employers and 
securing vocational counseling’s role in the new political landscape of the Federal 
Republic. In Schleswig-Holstein, the leading vocational counselor convinced his 
superiors to approve such eff orts without reference to any “higher” values. Th e 
skewed relation between individual vocational wishes and real economic pros-
pects necessitated a selection of apprentices, he observed matter-of-factly.
In 1947 and 1948, the relevance of employers loomed ever larger in the discus-
sions among vocational counselors. “Th ere are no legal means to prevent compa-
nies from doing suitability-tests,” Pardun had to inform the vocational counselors 
of North Rhine-Westphalia. “Th ese eff orts of the fi rms can only be overcome by 
better performance [of the labor offi  ces].”29 Beyond achieving a high-skilled work-
force, which companies that tested candidates presumably were contributing to 
in any case, the vocational counselors now embraced Totalerfassung per se as a 
goal. Vocational counselors in the “Cologne Circle” raised the issue at their meet-
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ing in April 1948. “In all districts,” as the protocol of the meeting put it, “there is 
an increasing number of requests by economic organizations to have their young 
workers suitability-tested [by vocational counseling.] Attention must be paid that 
the monopoly position of the vocational counseling in this regard is preserved 
and that not every arbitrary institution performs suitability-tests.”30 Th e leading 
fi gures of the state vocational counseling offi  ce apparently concurred with the 
assessment at another counselors’ meeting that the percentage of suitability tests 
“must in future be increased ten-fold [from 2 percent to 20 percent] especially in 
light of the eff orts of the large companies to achieve self-suffi  ciency in the realm 
of performing suitability-tests.”31 By 1948, then, even before the rapid revival of 
the German economy and the establishment of a new political framework in the 
Federal Republic, vocational counseling was again grappling with the challenges 
that had long shaped its strategies: accommodating the wishes of employers in 
the interest of maintaining its own control of the selection and placement pro-
cess, and deciding whether Totalerfassung was a means to achieve a high-skilled 
workforce or, as it increasingly seemed to be, an end in itself.
Th e Vocational System within the Social Market Economy and 
Federal Republic: Totalerfassung Challenged and Maintained
In the years 1948 to 1952, the essential institutions of the labor force projects 
were restored (in West Germany) at the national level, including a central Labor 
Administration in the form of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeits-
losenversicherung. Th ey proved compatible—at least for several years—with the 
newly introduced “social market economy” and the Federal Republic’s political 
constitution. Th e Labor Administration again also overcame, for the time being, 
challenges to its goal of total control of the labor market.
Th e Bizone’s Economic Council and administrative offi  ces, established in June 
1947 and signifi cantly reformed in early 1948, were regarded, if still not offi  -
cially acknowledged, by Germans and the participating Allies as a forerunner of 
a future German government.32 In its two year existence, the Economic Council 
laid the groundwork for the economic system of West Germany, often without 
much fanfare and within the limits set by the Allies and by state prerogatives.33 
Th e institutions of the human economies also assumed clearer contours, though 
important decisions were put off  until after the founding of the new state.
As had been the case after World War I, support for an organization of the la-
bor market and for systematic vocational counseling (and training) reached across 
virtually all parties—in sharp contrast with the vitriolic debates about other eco-
nomic questions. Th e “basic tendency of the [Economic Council] to reestablish 
achievements of the Weimar Republic was especially pronounced in the fi eld of 
Labor Administration.”34 Th e Germans’ wishes, in fact, outstripped the Allies’ 
willingness to establish central bureaucracies: throughout early 1948, the Eco-
nomic Council pleaded for the establishment of a sixth Bizonal offi  ce—for “La-
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bor and Social Aff airs”—only to be rebuff ed by the Allies on the grounds of 
limitations imposed by the Potsdam agreement. When an Administration for 
Labor fi nally was created by Allied fi at in August 1948, it bore responsibility, as 
had the Reichsanstalt, for job placement and unemployment payments. However, 
against German wishes, the Administration for Labor had no jurisdiction over 
vocational counseling, which remained in the hands of the states.35 Also, the 
fi nal status of the system of unemployment insurance, which had provided the 
fi nancial underpinnings of Reichsanstalt, remained, like the other kinds of social 
insurance, to be decided by the parliament of a new German state.36 Finally, 
the incipient ministries for economics and labor continued their struggle over 
responsibility for vocational training, a confl ict that only would be settled in 
1952, when the Economics Ministry reasserted its control. External forces and 
jurisdictional disputes continued to stymie German wishes for a unifi ed Labor 
Administration, which would include vocational counseling.
In June 1948, the nearly simultaneous introduction by the Allies of a new 
currency and the approval by the Economic Council of measures to set free the 
prices for most goods as well as wages marked a momentous turning point in Ger-
many’s postwar economic development. By ending state controls in these areas, 
which the Nazis had introduced in 1936 and which the Allies had continued 
since 1945, the liberalization of prices and wages appeared to spell the end to 
hopes for widespread planning in the economy, which in the fi rst years after the 
war had been in the ascendance. Th ey represented the triumph of a resurgent, 
though modifi ed, liberalism—Ordoliberalism.37 However—and this discrepancy 
has gone unnoticed in the scholarly literature—the liberalizations of mid 1948 
left untouched a core area of the German economy: aside from the lifting of wage 
controls, the labor market remained subject to “administration.” In part, as we 
shall see, this only partial liberalization derived from the fact that the Allies had 
insisted that decisions about the future of the German insurance systems, one of 
which, of course, supported the Labor Administration, be made by a newly con-
stituted German parliament. Yet the Allies’ injunction was not suffi  cient cause 
to block Erhard’s implementation of the liberalization measures even before the 
military authorities had given their approval.38
In part, even among the advocates of liberalization, there were many who 
believed it could be introduced only in stages. Th ey believed that elements of 
planning still would be necessary for some time to come. Th us, Erhard’s prede-
cessor as director of the Bizonal Economic Administration, Johannes Semmler, 
had acknowledged that, “we will quite certainly need a planned economy for [an-
other] twenty years—even we who reject the basic premise of a state-run planned 
economy.”39
Th e intellectual drafters of blueprints for the social market economy had only 
marginally and timidly included the labor market in their plans for reform.40 Th e 
Labor Administration’s goal of creating a high-skilled workforce fi tted perfectly 
with two fundamental changes the Ordoliberals made to pure laissez-faire policy: 
the state could intervene in the market if it did so in a “market-conforming” way, 
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i.e., for the sake of preparing people for the free market, and a successful capital-
ist system presupposed economically and psychologically independent partici-
pants.41 It is revealing of the special place of the labor market in the emerging 
economic order that during the very days when the Economic Council passed 
the measures liberalizing much of the German economy, it also voted to create 
an Administration for Labor.42 Th e breadth of support for this law—it was spon-
sored jointly by the Christian Democrats and Christian Social Union, the Social 
Democrats, the Liberals, and the Catholic Center, which together represented 47 
of the 52 delegates to the Economic Council—gave an indication of the German 
consensus in support of the Labor Administration. Even the proponents of a largely 
liberalized social market economy still drew the line in front of the labor market.
Th e promulgation a year later of the Basic Law establishing a Federal Ger-
man Republic changed little in terms of the Labor Administration and the other 
workforce optimization projects, at least in the short-term. Th e Basic Law did not 
prescribe a particular economic system for the Bundesrepublik, in eff ect leaving 
in place the decisions already taken by the Economic Council and Allies (So-
ziale Marktwirtschaft, currency reform) and allowing future parliaments to make 
changes (by a two-thirds majority).43 In accordance with German tradition, it left 
the determination of the “labor order” to the federal government,44 paving the 
way for the future reestablishment of a national Labor Agency. However, several 
articles of the Basic Law pertaining to basic individual rights—which the Parlia-
mentary Council had placed at the beginning of the document in response to 
the Nazi regime’s trampling of those rights—potentially had a bearing on the 
Labor Administration. Th e very fi rst words of the Federal Republic’s founding 
document—“Th e dignity of man is inviolable”—put down a claim, however ab-
stractly, on the basic orientation of the new state. Unlike in the Nazi period and 
to some extent even in the Weimar Republic,45 in the West German Federal Re -
public, the state was to serve the individual, and not vice versa. However, the im-
plications for specifi c realms of life of this general commitment remained as yet 
undetermined. In regard to the Labor Administration, the Federal Republic’s com-
mitment to the priority of the individual would have an impact only after several 
years, especially after Germany’s economic conditions had dramatically improved.
Th e abstract pledge to uphold the dignity of the individual both undergirded 
and expressed itself in the more specifi c “basic rights” of the Grundgesetz.46 One 
of these—the “freedom of choice of a vocation” contained in Article 12—ap-
peared likely, in conjunction with a change of Allied statute, to have an immedi-
ate, signifi cant eff ect on the Labor Administration. We turn, therefore, to the 
challenge Article 12 and the ending of a legal basis for compelling school-leavers 
to report to the labor offi  ces posed to the Labor Administration’s goal of “total 
control” of the labor market. By overcoming this challenge, at least for the time 
being, the Labor Administration was able to maintain its original program of 
Totalerfassung well into the 1950s.
By early 1949, several months after Erhard’s liberalizations and as the Parlia-
mentary Council deliberated, the leaders of the Labor Administration recognized 
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that “the foundations of vocational counseling were buckling.” Some kind of “re-
orientation” was necessary.47 Th ey were casting an anxious eye on the anticipated 
end of vocational counseling’s legal mandate compelling school-leavers to report 
to the labor offi  ces. Th e mandate had been introduced by the Nazis in 1938. Af-
ter the defeat of Germany, the Allied Control Commission’s Order Nr. 3, issued 
on 17 January 1946,48 had extended those controls into the postwar period for 
the simple sake of maintaining order. Faced with the likelihood that the framers 
of the German constitution would seek to guarantee individual freedoms in the 
labor sphere as part of the overall commitment of the new Republic to individual 
rights, the vocational counselor Pardun sketched out vocational counseling’s op-
tions and prospects. “Th e question now is whether the external means (require-
ment to register, etc.) should be defended or not. Th e core issue is freedom or 
compulsion.” Pardun elucidated the two options: “Liberalism off ers the free play 
of forces. It demands therefore only an informational role for vocational counsel-
ing. Others start from the idea of government steering [of labor forces], in order 
to harmonize the interests of the individual with those of the collectivity. For 
this, purely mechanical means (for example, [new] legal determinations) would 
be necessary.” In fact, however, Pardun appeared to advocate yet another option: 
“Th e third way would be that of individual counseling, personal responsibility [of 
the counselor], and social welfare. Th at would be the genuine commitment [of 
the counselor], that would be trust in one’s own work and the trust of the em-
ployers. If vocational counseling must take this path, then it is important that it 
start off  down this road even today.”49 With the end of the Labor Administration’s 
legal mandate—the “external means”—for Totalerfassung looming, a leading vo-
cational counselor advocated strengthening what he might have dubbed “internal 
means”: appealing to school-leavers through a more personalized service.
Four months later, after the Basic Law had, as expected, established freedom 
of vocational choice, leading vocational counselors from throughout the Federal 
Republic convened to consider the implications for the Labor Administration. 
Th e position they settled on incorporated elements from all three of Pardun’s 
options. Article 12 of the Basic Law, they acknowledged, “clearly and with direct 
legal eff ect” guaranteed the freedom of the worker in his choice of vocation, 
workplace, and training station. “All administrative limitations of this freedom 
cease.” However, the obligations imposed by the 1946 Allied Order upon em-
ployers to register all openings and obtain permission for new hirings were, for 
the time being, still in force.
Th e consequences the counselors drew suggested that, in the view of the Labor 
Administration, the goal remained largely the same as it always had been—steer-
ing as many people as possible into skilled work and control of the labor market. 
Th e means and emphases, however, might have to be adapted to the new cir-
cumstances. Th e sole responsibility of the Labor Administration for vocational 
counseling and apprenticeship placement,50 the assembled noted, continued un-
aff ected by Article 12. Above and beyond its monopoly status, the Labor Admin-
istration intended to maintain its access to all fi rst time job seekers, though it now 
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dropped the word Total, which aroused unwelcome associations. “Th e planned 
Erfassung of the advice seekers, especially the school-leavers, remains an important 
task of vocational counseling, even if the legal means ([the 1938 law and the Allied 
Control Commission’s Order Nr. 3]) should be abolished.” Th e main instrument 
of Erfassung would be an institution that even before the introduction of legal 
compulsion in 1938 had been the lynchpin of the Labor Administration’s eff orts 
to achieve total inclusion: “this task,” the summary of the meeting continued, “will 
have to be solved above all in closest cooperation with the school.”
In its dealings with the advice-seeker, the counselors agreed, the Labor Admin-
istration would have to make some, albeit minor, modifi cations. Th ey insisted 
that vocational counseling always, in fact, had respected the freedom of voca-
tional choice. Generally, “for the goals and essential methods of vocational coun-
seling, which in principle already have built on the idea [contained in] Article 12, 
no fundamental changes result.” However, the counselors did acknowledge the 
advantages of Pardun’s “third way.” Th ey agreed that:
in carrying out its economic and social tasks, vocational counseling will once again have 
to place clearly in the foreground the social purpose of care for the vocational fate of the 
advice and help-seeking people. Th is eff ort must be clearly expressed in the methods of vo-
cational counseling as well: they must apply reserve in emphasizing administrative powers 
and primarily rely on means of pedagogical infl uencing of the vocation-seekers and of the 
parents or guardians, as well as on the sincere cooperation with all agencies engaged and 
interested in the same questions.
Th e counselors specifi ed what the shift in emphasis from administrative pressure 
toward “infl uence” would entail in more practical terms: “Vocational informa-
tion, individual counseling, suitability-testing, and subsequent vocational care 
must therefore be constantly deepened and expanded.”51 By expanding and im-
proving such services, the Labor Administration would tend more—or be seen to 
tend more—to the individual now placed at the center of the new state’s political 
order. At the same time, and in fact by precisely these means, vocational counselors 
hoped still to be able, now by less obviously authoritarian methods, to continue to 
fulfi ll the goal of steering all school-leavers into appropriate skilled jobs.
After the Basic Law annulled the previous compulsory powers of the Labor 
Administration, good relations with the schools and, to a lesser degree, improve-
ments in vocational counseling’s services focusing on the individual became the 
means of the Labor Administration’s Totalerfassung. From the 1920s and espe-
cially after the 1930 agreement between the Ministries of Labor and the Interior, 
the schools had played a critical role in “delivering” students to the labor offi  ces: 
they had supplied the latter with “student cards” containing personal information 
and evaluations of every single pupil, teachers had accompanied entire classes to 
the labor offi  ce, or vocational counselors had come to the schools. Now, in the 
absence of a legal mandate, the Labor Administration would rely even more on 
such forms of cooperation to reach all school-leavers. Th us, state and local labor 
offi  ces negotiated with the corresponding school authorities in order to reaffi  rm 
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or update the agreements made two decades earlier. In North Rhine-Westphalia, 
the state labor offi  ce and Ministry of Education reached agreement in August 
1949, with the latter reminding all school authorities of the validity of the 1930 
guidelines and invoking “the importance of cooperation between school and 
vocational counseling.”52 Shortly before this agreement, the head of vocational 
counseling in North Rhine-Westphalia explained to his counselors the signifi -
cance of reaffi  rming the guidelines on cooperation: “Th e requirement according 
to the Order of 1 March 1938 for school-leavers to register and to use [vocational 
counseling] may in future no longer be in eff ect. Th rough the guidelines on 
the cooperation between school and vocational counseling, the Erfassung of the 
school-leavers appears secured.”53
Th e new circumstances also had inspired vocational counseling to seek new 
means of addressing the individual counsel-seeker and “infl uencing” his choices. 
Over the next two years, a committee of state offi  ce representatives, often in con-
sultation with members of the Federal Ministry of Labor,54 would prepare the ma -
terials of the future psychological service of the Bundesanstalt. From early on, it 
was agreed that the future Federal Labor Agency should have a central psychologi-
cal unit.55 Th e work in the late 1930s on national standards for psychological 
testing, culminating in a series of standardized tests, already had established the 
precedent of concerted action on a national level. After the war, fi rst the Central 
Offi  ce in Lemgo and then the North Rhine-Westphalia state offi  ce had resumed 
this work, in both cases with the aspiration to achieve national standards for vo-
cational psychology. In light of the threat to Totalerfassung and the resulting im-
perative of gaining the cooperation of school-leavers with the help of more indi-
vidualized counseling (while continuing, of course, to serve employers), the leading 
vocational counselors could agree on the utility of a central psychological service.
Reestablishing a National Labor Administration
All of these negotiations were predicated on the restoration of a national Labor 
Administration, which, in one form or another, all political parties in the Eco-
nomic Council, the Parliamentary Council, and then the fi rst German Bundestag 
favored.56 In early 1950, the Free Trade Union (DGB) and the employers’ asso-
ciations had issued a joint proclamation containing their common vision for the 
Bundesanstalt.57 Joint control of the labor market, imposed on the employers by 
the socialist ascendance in the immediate aftermath of World War I, was some-
thing industry’s leaders, who stood to gain from the corporatist arrangement, had 
in the meantime learned to like.
After wrangling over re-opened issues, such as the balance of power in the 
Bundesanstalt between the two social partners, on the one hand, and the public 
authorities on the other, which doomed the government’s fi rst bill to create a 
Bundesanstalt in 1951, a compromise was reached the following year.58 In March 
1952, a Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung came 
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into existence, which, in virtually all respects, resembled the original Reichsanstalt 
(that is, in its incarnation until 1934, when the Nazis ended the self-administra-
tion by unions and employers). Like its predecessor, the Bundesanstalt would 
consist of a headquarters, state, and local offi  ces; at each level, representatives of 
unions, employers, and public authorities would have an equal say on the gov-
erning boards. Finally, the federal Labor Ministry would have the right to ap-
prove the Bundesanstalt’s overall budget. Bundesanstalt headquarters would be in 
Nuremberg; its fi rst president would be Julius Scheuble, the former head of the 
British Zone’s Central Labor Offi  ce.
In other ways, as well, the Bundesanstalt represented continuity. As the 1952 
law pertained only to organizational matters, but did not revise the 1927 law on 
job placement and unemployment insurance, the latter remained, for the time 
being, in eff ect. Th e Ministry of Labor and, later, the Bundesanstalt itself began 
to deliberate over the draft of an update to the 1927 law on job placement and 
unemployment insurance—at fi rst, in parallel with the negotiations over reestab-
lishing a Labor Agency, and then after the Bundesanstalt had come into exis-
tence.59 Until the 1927 law was updated, its guidelines on vocational counseling 
still would apply. Th ese accorded as much importance to a macro-economically 
sound distribution of workers as to the interests of the individual. In any case, as 
we have seen, legal determinations often were not decisive when it came to the 
practices of vocational counseling.
An innovation of the 1952 law and the Bundesanstalt was the creation of a 
psychological service within vocational counseling. Its origins lay in the delib-
erations over the role of the Labor Administration under the changing circum-
stances of the postwar period that we traced above. While its supporters clearly 
hoped it would be an eff ective instrument for coordinating and improving vo-
cational counseling’s use of psychology on a national scale, their hopes would be 
disappointed for nearly a decade. Rather, vocational psychology would continue 
to be applied in a highly decentralized manner and remain intimately tied to 
the interests of local employers, as had been the case from the start of the Labor 
Administration. Before we turn to the state of vocational counseling in the years 
1953 to 1955, we must characterize briefl y the postwar course of the other side 
of the workforce projects: the system of vocational training, where the story also 
largely was one of continuity.
Th e Institutions of Vocational Training
Perhaps even more than in the case of the Labor Administration, the reconstitu-
tion of a nationally standardized system of training high-skilled workers enjoyed 
virtually unanimous support. In the fi rst years after the war, the administrative 
division of the country into occupation zones, Allied restrictions on forming 
business associations, and the general problems of communication and organiza-
tion limited eff orts in this direction. Still, as we have seen, individual companies 
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responded to the lack of an eff ective market before the currency reform by in-
vesting in worker training in preparation for the future. Helping to coordinate 
company eff orts were the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, which long 
had played the key role at the local and regional levels of the vocational system, 
displayed considerable continuity across the divide of 1945, and proved excep-
tionally eff ective in the fi rst postwar years.60 As restrictions were lifted, employers’ 
associations formed bizonal, and later national, organizations to work on voca-
tional training. In the summer and fall of 1947, various Chambers of Industry 
and Commerce formed the Offi  ce for Industrial Vocational Training (Arbeitsstelle 
für gewerbliche Berufserziehung) and a corresponding Offi  ce for Commercial Vo-
cational Training (Arbeitsstelle für kaufmännische Berufserziehung). Both contin-
ued the work of DATSCH to standardize vocational materials. 
In May 1951, at the prodding of the Federal Economics Ministry, all of these 
groups, as well as the Association of German Industry (BDI), the German Trade 
Unions Congress (DGB), and several ministries, agreed that “an urgent need exists 
to establish a central institute for vocational training.”61 In November, the various 
institutes merged into the Offi  ce for Business Vocational Training (Arbeitsstelle für 
betriebliche Berufsausbildung), which the other major employers’ organizations—
the Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie and the Bundesvereinigung deutscher Ar-
beitgeberverbände—joined in 1953.62 Th ey thereby established a unifi ed organi-
zation concerned with developing standards and materials for vocational training 
and certifi cation, similar to the Working Committee on Vocational Training (Ar-
beitsausschuss für Berufsausbildung) in the second half of the 1920s and DATSCH 
and the Reichsinstitut für Berufsausbildung in the 1930s and war years.
German employers’ associations not only reestablished a central institute dedi-
cated to the standardized vocational system, but they also urged the retention of 
a system of Totalerfassung of all school-leavers. In mid 1949, the Chambers of In-
dustry and Commerce in all three zones “demanded obligatory use of vocational 
counseling—[even] with a basic freedom of vocational choice.”63 For their part, 
the employers’ associations reached an agreement with the Federal Ministry of 
Labor in early 1950 to report all open positions to the labor offi  ces, even after the 
legal compulsion to do so had lapsed.64 As had been the case since the beginning 
of the Labor Administration, however, the commitments of the central employ-
ers’ associations would not in practice fully bind local employers—who still had 
to be wooed by the local labor offi  ces.
Th e Practice of Vocational Counseling 
in the Bundesanstalt, 1953–1955
Th e following snapshot of the practice of vocational counseling in the fi rst half of 
the 1950s captures a scene not very diff erent from that in the mid 1930s or even 
mid 1920s. It shows that, despite the founding of the Bundesanstalt and of a psy-
chological service within its vocational counseling wing and despite the several 
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changes of political system, important aspects of the human economies remained 
much the same as they had been at their fi rst institutionalization.
Faced with the end of the legal mandate for Totalerfassung, as we have seen, 
leading vocational counselors pinned their hopes for maintaining a nearly “total 
inclusion” on two other instruments: above all, on the already well-established 
connections of the labor offi  ces to the schools, but also on a more individualized 
vocational counseling system, including improved vocational psychology. In fact, 
cooperation between labor offi  ces and schools worked very well throughout the 
fi rst half of the 1950s (and later). As they had since the 1920s, the labor offi  ces 
utilized the schools in a number of ways, varying from place to place, in order “to 
secure the Erfassung” of nearly all school-leavers. For most labor offi  ces, “school 
cards” sent directly from the schools to the labor offi  ces provided the latter with 
basic data on every school-leaver. On the basis of these “seamless documents,”65 
the offi  ces could invite all students for visits. Often, they did not have to rely on 
such invitations, because schools assured the labor offi  ces a much more system-
atic kind of access. Classes were sent en masse to vocational counseling, or the 
counselors came to the schools.66 As a result, in the early 1950s, nearly 95 percent 
of all school-leavers still visited vocational counseling.67
As had been the case from the very beginning of the Labor Administration and 
comprehensive vocational counseling and under every political regime and legal 
framework, the local labor offi  ces cared intensely about earning the trust—and the 
apprenticeship openings—of local employers. Hence, regardless of headquarters’ 
(often halfhearted) injunctions to the contrary, the practice of vocational coun-
seling and psychology at the local level largely was oriented toward the wishes of 
local employers. In violation of the central offi  ce’s policies, local offi  ces often tested 
directly for an employer, including testing apprenticeship candidates he already 
had selected. Indicative of the intimate relations between vocational counselors 
and employers, these exams frequently were conducted on company premises.68
Th e purpose and practices of the Labor Administration in 1955 would have 
been quite familiar to an observer in 1935: the Totalerfassung of nearly all school-
leavers, who were to be matched to appropriate skilled jobs, and the local offi  ces’ 
dependence on close ties to employers. Yet, the parallels also would have been 
deceiving; for, under the surface, the ground upon which the Labor Administra-
tion rested was shifting. Th e unparalleled economic growth of the 1950s and 
early 1960s was already undermining the economic, social, and cultural bases of 
Totalerfassung.
A Silent Social Revolution
As people and as Germans, the leaders of the Labor Administration, like millions 
of their countrymen, no doubt rejoiced in the unparalleled economic growth that 
began in the early 1950s. Between 1950 and 1960, real GDP grew annually by 
an astonishing 8.2 percent.69 Th e rate of unemployment fell steadily, with only a 
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brief setback in the “downturn” of 1957/58,70 from 10 percent in 1950 to 1 per-
cent a decade later.71 After four decades with little economic growth or politi-
cal calm, the Bundesrepublik’s combination of democratic stability and incipient 
prosperity hardly could fail to impress the men of the Labor Administration. In 
no small measure, it had been the Labor Administration, along with the Prussian 
and Reich economics ministries and the employers’ organizations, which had laid 
the groundwork for the Wirtschaftswunder—by helping to create the “German 
skills machine,” which was based on steering a high proportion of the population 
into skilled work, in the decades after World War I. Th e creators and backers of 
the optimization programs rightly could claim some credit for what they saw 
unfolding around them in the West Germany of the 1950s.
Yet by the mid 1950s, many in the Labor Administration were worrying that 
the economic dynamism unleashed in the Economic Miracle could pose a serious 
challenge to their agency’s role in the labor market. Th ey were concerned about 
both mounting public criticism of the Labor Administration and employers’ and 
job seekers’ increasingly independent behavior in the ever-tighter labor market.
By the second half of the 1950s, German attitudes toward authority were begin-
ning to change, if still only slowly.72 A “skeptical generation” of youths took the 
lead, looking askance at their elders’ acceptance of authority fi gures and the state 
apparatus.73 Th e press gave voice to this increasingly assertive German public. As 
early as 1954, with the unemployment rate dropping steadily, leading fi gures of the 
Labor Administration uneasily registered journalistic and other critiques of their 
work.74 A report from a vocational counselor in Munich, which circulated widely 
within headquarters, argued that even in a vocational counseling offi  ce regarded as 
among the best, “the voices from public and private circles that negatively criticize 
it—without being especially ill-willed toward vocational counseling—are numer-
ous.” Th e counselor herself concurred with the critiques, citing the size of the of-
fi ce, its emphasis on quantity over quality, and its bureaucratic sluggishness.75 Of 
course, these were precisely the charges that had been leveled at the labor offi  ces 
since their inception. But now toleration of this kind of authority was dwindling. 
“In a changed and changing world,” another counselor acknowledged, vocational 
counseling “must present another face than it did during its early days.”76
Th ere were other signs as well that the Labor Administration cared increasingly 
about its public “face.” An ongoing discussion between the central offi  ce and the 
largest Landesarbeitsamt, in North Rhine-Westphalia, over the proper role of par-
ents in the counseling meetings confi rmed the growing weight of public opinion. 
Th e representatives from North Rhine-Westphalia reproached headquarters for 
maintaining “an out-of-date steering standpoint [i.e., in which vocational coun-
seling strongly infl uenced vocational choices].” Th eir explication of the charge 
was revealing of the ultimate source of their worries: “If such comments [i.e., those 
of headquarters in favor of steering] became known to the public, one could ex-
pect the sharpest protests.”77 Th e main concern of the counselors from North 
Rhine-Westphalia, then, was not about the practice itself, but about the public’s 
reaction. Out of the same concerns, high offi  cials now vigilantly kept an eye out 
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for any negative reports in the press.78 At the September 1955 meeting of the ad-
ministrative board, the President of the Bundesanstalt, Julius Scheuble, reported 
his concern that the public had the “false perception” that due to the declining 
unemployment rate, the importance of the Labor Administration as a whole also 
was reduced. Given the undiminished and still central functions of vocational 
counseling and job placement, Scheuble suggested, the Bundesanstalt might have 
to make its case more eff ectively to the public.79
Th e Labor Administration’s worries in the mid 1950s were not limited to the 
growing public perceptions of it as a coercive, bureaucratic, and increasingly su-
perfl uous agency. Th e surfeit of work opportunities was changing the behavior 
of the Bundesanstalt’s main constituencies—job seekers and, above all, employ-
ers—as well. Employers were seeking ever more workers; moreover, because of 
the decline in the birthrate during the war years, the number of youths entering 
the job-market would decline between 1953 and 1960 by 30 percent.80
Table 6.1 Th e Number of School-Graduates, 1950–1960
1950:
Grade School (Volksschule), age 14 638,000
Middle School (Mittelschule), age 16 14,000
High School (Gymnasium), age 18–19 30,000
 Total:  682,000
1951:
Grade School  672,000
Middle School  16,000
High School  28,000
 Total:  716,000
1952:
Grade School  635,000
Middle School  20,000
High School  25,000
 Total:  680,000
1953:
Grade School  700,000
Middle School  28,000
High School  20,000
 Total: 748,000
1954:
Grade School  773,000
Middle School  32,000
High School  25,000
 Total:  830,000
1955:
Grade School  700,000
Middle School  32,000
High School  25,000
 Total: 757,000
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt. Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1950–1960 
(Stuttgart, 1952–1962).
1956:
Grade School  620,000
Middle School  46,000
High School  29,000
 Total: 695,000
1957:
Grade School  541,000
Middle School  49,000
High School  37,000
 Total: 627,000
1958:
Grade School  507,000
Middle School  51,000
High School  41,000
 Total: 599,000
1959:
Grade School  444,000
Middle School  57,000
High School  48,000
 Total:  549,000
1960:
Grade School  390,000
Middle School  57,000
High School  52,000
 Total: 499,000
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As a result of the impending labor shortages, in 1955, the Federal government 
concluded an agreement with Italy about importing workers.81 As the Landesar-
beitsamt in North Rhine-Westphalia reported in June 1955, there was “no longer 
any unemployment to speak of … Combing of the unemployed has already mo-
bilized the usable forces.”82
Th e combination of a booming economy and declining numbers of school-
leavers created a seller’s market for labor. Th e new conditions galvanized the labor 
market parties to view their prospects in a diff erent light, a shift that occurred 
rather suddenly, in 1955, when all sides appear to have realized that they were now 
operating under changed economic circumstances.83 Workers generally sought 
new and better positions with increasing frequency. In July, the President of the 
Bundesanstalt reported his concerns that “in recent months turn-over has in-
creased rapidly.”84 “As a result of the favorable development of the labor market,” 
he suggested several months later, “supplying workers [to fi rms] has become a par -
ticular problem of the Bundesanstalt.”85 Firms complained about “poaching.” Th e 
good news reached school students and their parents as well, inspiring in many 
a widespread exuberance or, in the Labor Administration’s eyes, carelessness. 
“Among youths and parents,” the head of vocational counseling in North Rhine-
Westphalia and soon for all of West Germany, Karl Pardun, warned in early 
1956,
there has taken hold a short-circuited acceptance of the off ered “position” without deeper, 
more mature vocational considerations; an unsteady jumping to further job off ers; [and, 
somewhat contradictorily,] a selectively provisional application to several fi rms. [But one 
also observes] one-sided vocational wish-formation in the direction of the usual “fashion-
able vocations;” an even greater striving for the large companies; here and there as well a 
relaxing of the willingness to study in the fi nal year, due to the generally-known impression 
that employers need [all of ] the school-leavers and will hire them regardless.86
Th e attitudes manifested by the young exemplifi ed the “silent social revolu-
tion”87 in the wake of the economic miracle. Like many adults around them, the 
school-leavers were increasingly demonstrating “an enormously increased con-
centration on personal advancement and material improvements in their living 
standards.”88 Hitherto unknown opportunities for individual choice and self-
defi nition were eroding old habits—of deference to tradition, authority, and fam-
ily; of acquiescence in one’s place in established social milieus; and of concern for 
security above all. Germans’ outlooks in 1950 and in 1960 appeared to lie worlds 
apart.89
Of even greater concern to the leadership of vocational counseling than new 
ambitions of young job seekers, however, was the behavior of the people whom 
the labor offi  ces had all along spent the most energy wooing—the employers. 
“Between fi rms,” the head of vocational counseling in North Rhine-Westphalia re-
ported in early 1956, “a sharp competition for young workers has suddenly arisen, 
which seems to have abandoned the previously customary forms and consider-
ations … What is remarkable about it are the ever advancing eff orts to preempt 
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each other in gaining new workers.”90 At roughly the same time, the president of 
the same state offi  ce had characterized fi rms’ behavior in striking, clinical terms: 
“Th e shrinking number of school-leavers has led in some economic circles to a 
certain psychosis, which expresses itself in premature off ers of apprenticeships and 
frenzied advertising measures, particularly in newspaper notices.”91 Vocational 
counseling in the spring of 1956 would be “quite burdened,” the president warned, 
“by the attempts of fi rms and public employers to gain access to the schools … and 
to select their apprentices quite early.”92 In addition to newspaper ads, the desper-
ate fi rms employed all means of personal contacts to school directors and teachers 
and even held out additional perquisites to appeal to graduating students.93 In the 
Labor Administration’s eyes, such activities only produced “unease, uncertainty, 
disturbances, and disruptions of the work in the fi nal [school] year.”94
Above and beyond the eff ects on the school-leavers, the ever more desper-
ate search by companies for apprentices threatened vocational counseling more 
existentially. As the head of vocational counseling in North Rhine-Westphalia re-
ported, due to companies’ competition over school-leavers, “the vocational coun-
seling centers are being … impatiently pressured or bypassed.”95 Th e proportion 
of each year’s graduates entering skilled or semi-skilled apprenticeships continued 
to climb, from 46 percent in 1950 to 55 percent a decade later, and 64 percent in 
1966,96 while the Labor Administration’s numbers moved in the opposite direc-
tion. Th e proportion of school-leavers visiting the vocational counseling offi  ces 
was dropping, in fact, only slowly: from 95 percent in the early 1950s to 84 
percent in 1963.97 But the Labor Administration saw the writing on the wall: To-
talerfassung—the lynchpin of administered vocational counseling—was eroding. 
It was possible to foresee a day when vocational counseling would be irrelevant. 
Prompted by such trends and by academic studies such as Helmut Schelsky’s 
Working Youth, Yesterday and Today,98 which cast doubt on the eff ectiveness of the 
labor offi  ces in infl uencing vocational choices, a member of the Bundesanstalt’s 
Administrative Board even dared to raise the question of in which form and to 
what extent the agency in the future would be able to conduct job placements 
and vocational counseling.99
In the face of such challenges to the Totalerfassung of all school-leavers—and 
hence, as many saw it, to the Labor Administration itself, at least in its current in-
carnation—the Bundesanstalt responded defensively at fi rst. Above all, it sought 
to protect what long had been its prime channel of complete inclusion and, since 
the end of legal compulsion in 1949/1951, had become absolutely irreplaceable—
the labor offi  ces’ connections to the schools. In early 1955, the Bundesanstalt’s 
headquarters inquired of its state offi  ces whether they had agreements with the 
state ministries of education pertaining to fi rms’ “recruiting” in schools. When it 
turned out that only the LAA of Schleswig-Holstein had reached an understand-
ing with the education ministry banning independent activity by employers in 
the schools, headquarters disseminated the text of that state’s agreement to the 
other state offi  ces and “recommend[ed]—if it has not occurred already—that a 
similar agreement be reached” in each state.100
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Th e Labor Administration’s Reluctant Response to a Changing Society
In the face of employers’ seemingly insatiable need for workers, the multiple 
channels for recruiting, and school authorities’ diff erent sets of interests, how-
ever, such administrative measures as banning company recruiting proved to be 
diffi  cult to enforce,101 if and when they were enacted at the state level. Eff orts to 
stem the tide would continue for years, but the challenge posed to Totalerfassung 
by the dynamic economy and the ambitions it had awakened also produced a 
fundamental reassessment of the Labor Administration’s role, although only after 
bitter battles lasting several years. Th at the unprecedented growth of the German 
economy after 1950 and its social and psychological concomitants were the ulti-
mate (though not sole) causes of the end of Totalerfassung and the transformation 
of the Labor Administration becomes clearer if we compare a political challenge 
to Totalerfassung in the fi rst half of the 1950s with one in the years after 1955.
We saw earlier how the Labor Administration’s legal means to compel indi-
viduals and companies to report to the agency disappeared after 1949 and 1951, 
respectively, and how the Bundesanstalt still was able to maintain Totalerfassung 
by other means. Yet the new constitutional freedoms and the emerging demo-
cratic culture of the Federal Republic did embolden some, even within the Labor 
Administration’s governing boards, to advocate that the Bundesanstalt abandon its 
comprehensive goals and compulsory practices. An eff ort to update the original 
1927 law on job placement and unemployment insurance, both for the concrete 
purpose of regularizing the treatment of war-wounded and, more generally, for 
the sake of making the Bundesanstalt more “modern,” provided the opportunity 
to reconsider the ethos and aims of the Labor Administration. Truly committed 
reformers, however, were hardly numerous or vociferous. Th e Ministry of Labor’s 
drafts of a new law in 1951/1952 deviated little from the Weimar model: it em-
phasized the macro-economic role of the Bundesanstalt, saying “the vocational 
choice is, above and beyond the individual’s fate, for the economy and society 
of decisive importance … Th anks to the provision of suitable and suffi  ciently 
numerous young workers, the economy shall be enabled to perform its tasks.”102 
In fact, it was the Bundesanstalt’s governing board, composed equally of union, 
employer, and government representatives, which appeared to cast doubt on the 
Labor Administration’s larger role and compulsory tactics. Th e board’s review 
criticized the draft law for “putting the economy before people,” for containing 
phrases, such as “according to plan,” which “sounded like a centrally administered 
economy” and might be the basis for a system of labor deployment.103 Th ese 
critiques, however, must be understood in light of the role they almost certainly 
were meant to play in another struggle going on at the time over the Labor Ad-
ministration.104 Th e underlying concern of the unions and employers was not the 
excessive scope of the Labor Administration’s powers, but who controlled them. 
Between 1950 and 1952, it will be recalled, the central government, the states, 
as well as the unions and employers engaged in fi erce negotiations over the orga-
nization of the Bundesanstalt. One of the most contentious issues was the infl u-
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ence of the federal government over the Bundesanstalt, an infl uence that both the 
unions and employers feared might grow. When the unionists and employers 
on the governing board criticized the “labor market political” spirit of the draft 
law, they did so out of fear that any legal reinforcement of such public functions 
would strengthen further the government’s role in the Labor Administration to 
their own detriment. For this reason, the board rejected the draft’s language on 
“labor market politics.”105 Th e Free Trade Union’s Walter Henkelmann drew the 
connection even more clearly, when he qualifi ed the unions’ support for “a far-
reaching role of the Labor Administration in the labor market and a monopoly 
for it in job placement and vocational counseling.” In connection with the law 
re establishing the Bundesanstalt, he warned against language under which “the 
public authorities could possibly derive from [this responsibility] a right of co-
administration over the Bundesanstalt.”106 A further piece of evidence that in the 
early 1950s neither the unions nor the employers objected to Totalerfassung and a 
de facto—though not de jure—role of the Bundesanstalt in coordinating the labor 
market was that, after the revision of the Labor Administration law was shelved 
for the time being, all sides appeared to be content to work within the original 
1927 law. In the early 1950s, a challenge to Totalerfassung and the compulsory 
sides of the Labor Administration—one mounted mainly for tactical reasons—
faded after only a brief existence.
By the mid 1950s, on the other hand, the economic and social environment 
dramatically had begun to change. In the now booming economy, companies’ 
ever more desperate pursuit of school-leavers was eroding the de facto infl uence 
of the labor offi  ces and gradually was altering perceptions about the relationship 
of the individual to authority. In this new atmosphere, a challenge to the tradi-
tional goals and methods of the Labor Administration could have quite diff erent 
eff ects. 
Th e challenge came in January 1956, when the so-called Federal Deputy for 
Economic Effi  ciency in the Bureaucracy presented his report on the Bundesanstalt. 
Th e latter’s own administrative board had requested the evaluation of the Anstalt’s 
effi  ciency two years earlier, almost certainly without any idea of what the even-
tual repercussions would be. Th e Deputy’s report found the Labor Administra-
tion wanting in several ways and made corresponding recommendations without 
drawing any sweeping conclusions: overall, it found that the Bundesanstalt had 
too many employees, especially too many who were not on the “front lines.” As 
a result, he recommended a 25 percent cut in their number. Furthermore, its 
employees were not well enough educated or trained and they were too special-
ized; in numerous respects, the Bundesanstalt was overly centralized. Th e Deputy 
recommended, among other things, that non-profi t placement agencies be given 
more responsibilities.107
If one were to judge simply on the basis of these admittedly painful, but by no 
means fatal, suggestions for reform, the response from within the Bundesanstalt 
might have seemed hard to explain. Among vocational counselors in Schleswig-
Holstein, the head of the Bundesanstalt’s psychological service reported, rumors 
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about the still restricted report “cast an atmosphere of depression” over a training 
session. Th e counselors “feared for the fate of vocational counseling and hence for 
the future of their own careers.”108 In a similar vein, the presidents of the state of-
fi ces reported that the Deputy’s analysis had “spread considerable unease among 
the employees of the Bundesanstalt.” Many, they feared, might migrate to other 
bureaucracies.109 Th e import of the Deputy’s critiques disrupted relations at even 
higher levels: President Scheuble’s reaction at a meeting of the administrative 
board was so ferocious that it touched off  a “crisis of trust,” from which Scheuble 
never fully would recover.110 None of these responses would seem proportionate 
to the suggestions in the Deputy’s report, if one did not know of the pessimism 
already gathering within the Labor Administration by the mid 1950s.
Th e Bundesanstalt’s governing boards111 appeared to recognize that the Dep-
uty’s report provided the occasion for a more fundamental reassessment of their 
agency’s mission and practices, and they took the initiative in expanding the re -
evaluation beyond the report’s scope. According to the consensus in the execu-
tive board, the Deputy’s report “created a whole new situation.”112 In addition to 
“administrative-technical” reforms—the board regretted that President Scheuble’s 
fi rst response had not proposed even any of these—“more fundamental consider-
ations” would be necessary. Th e response to the Deputy’s report by no means could 
be limited simply to administrative-technical and administrative-organizational 
measures; “rather, the Bundesanstalt faces signifi cant administrative-political de-
cisions.”113 As the presidents of the Landesarbeitsämter correctly perceived, “the 
main question that is principally being discussed is the total cost of the Bundes-
anstalt today.” Th is they linked, however skeptically, to the new conditions in the 
economy: “Th e argument that each can fi nd his own job is partly correct.”114
Th e nature of the transformative “administrative-political decisions” the gov-
erning boards envisaged became clear as early as the fi rst meeting of a joint re-
form commission of the two bodies, established to formulate the Bundesanstalt’s 
response to the Deputy’s report, which convened on 26 July 1956. Th e commis-
sion members unanimously condemned the aim and methods of Totalerfassung:
Th e procedure so far of schematically registering all school-leavers through the school-cards 
was unanimously rejected by the commission members. Th e fi lling out of the school cards 
in school without knowledge of the parents, the teacher evaluation [of the pupil], and 
the evaluation of the school-doctor as part of this Erfassung were judged to be unaccept-
able, especially as the so-called evaluations for inexplicable reasons are kept secret from the 
school-leavers and their parents or guardians. Th e use of the discipline of the school for 
the Erfassung of the school-leavers is not the right way to arrive at a vocational counseling 
based on trust.
In consequence, at its fi rst meeting, the commission was able to agree on a 
radical revision of vocational counseling’s mission: “Th e individual counseling of 
the school-leavers must occur on a voluntary basis with the participation of the 
parents. Th e practice until now of the schematic Erfassung of all school-leavers 
through the use of the school-card must be immediately ended.” Instead, the Bun-
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desanstalt’s vocational counseling should “in future concentrate more on its core 
task[:] the best possible counseling of the individual youth and of the fi rms.”115
Before we examine the contentious and drawn-out battle that ensued over the 
reform commission’s radical proposal to end Totalerfassung—which by no means 
occurred “immediately”—we briefl y turn to the positions and motivations of the 
four relevant groups with a say in shaping Bundesanstalt policy: the employers, 
the unions, the Bundesanstalt leadership itself, and the federal government. Why 
did these interests now support a radical revision of a policy that they long had 
supported, or at least tolerated—if, in fact, they now did support the revision?
Th e unions were the most decisive advocates of a new ethos of vocational 
counseling. Yet, even among them, the end of Totalerfassung was not a univer-
sal goal. Th e unions had supported the Labor Administration’s policies into the 
early 1950s. Even in 1956, in the deliberations of the Free Trade Union (DGB) 
in preparation for the reform commission meetings, some members had ex-
pressed support for maintaining Totalerfassung. Yet they represented by now only 
a minority.116 It would be wrong to succumb to the temptation to characterize 
the majority who were in favor of reforming the Bundesanstalt as the long-term 
supporters of the rights of individual job seekers. In the annual reports and at 
the Congresses of the DGB and such powerful unions as IG Metall from the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, such concerns were largely absent.117 Rather, one 
should view the unions’ new commitment to the individual worker in light of 
the unions’ own anxieties and reform eff orts. By the mid 1950s, the more af-
fl uent lifestyles and the opportunities for individual advancement provided by 
the Wirtschaftswunder seemed likely to undermine former class solidarity and 
eventually to “deproletarianize” the German working class.118 Across the decade, 
the unionized share of the workforce declined signifi cantly.119 A path-breaking 
study of the “worker’s picture of society” by the sociologists Heinrich Popitz and 
Hans Paul Bahrdt revealed a working class that felt as distant from its union 
bosses as from the capitalists.120 Beginning in the second half of the 1950s, such 
potential threats to the unions’ strength inspired a host of measures designed to 
gauge workers’ attitudes and to win their hearts for the unions.121 Th e union sup-
port for an end to Totalerfassung and for a more individual-centered vocational 
counseling itself resulted, then, from the societal changes unleashed in Germany’s 
unprecedented economic growth in the 1950s. 
Th e employers’ position was even more complicated. Since the mid 1920s, the 
employers’ organizations had been staunch backers of the Labor Administration’s 
Totalerfassung, which they saw as a necessary complement to the vocational train-
ing system they were supporting; if the latter off ered a mechanism of providing 
a collective good (a skilled workforce), Totalerfassung promised to be a neutral, 
non-competitive means of distributing those talents. After World War II, the 
employers’ organizations had insisted on the restoration of comprehensive vo-
cational counseling. As late as December 1955, seemingly with at least some 
advance knowledge of what the next month would bring, the German Industry 
and Trade Federation (DIHT) had implored the President of the Bundesanstalt to 
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maintain, and even expand, comprehensive vocational counseling, despite the ac-
tions of the DIHT’s individual members. “It would be fateful,” according to the 
DIHT, “if, in a time in which the shortage of youths increasingly endangers clear 
thinking in the companies, the objective instrument of vocational counseling 
no longer fully came to bear, because the vocational counselors suff ered in their 
eff ectiveness due to [personnel] cutbacks.”122 Even this comment, however, ac-
knowledged a problem for the employers’ organizations in their defense of com-
prehensive vocational counseling: in the overheating economy of the mid 1950s, 
individual employers, by their scramble to fi nd workers by whatever means nec-
essary, were undermining the collective agreement.
After January 1956, the employers’ organizations had to acknowledge the new 
circumstances, at least partially. In the face of mounting public critiques of the La-
bor Administration, which drew attention to the confl ict between such methods 
as Totalerfassung and the liberal rights and spirit of the new state, the employers’ 
representatives to the Bundesanstalt’s reform commission joined the unanimous 
call for truly voluntary use of vocational counseling. In May 1956, as the discus-
sion within the Bundesanstalt about its future policy was just commencing, the 
DIHT representative urged vocational counseling to consider a reorientation of 
its eff orts that would allow it still to play a macro-economic role while acknowl-
edging the dynamism of the economy and the new individualist ethos.
Generally, vocational counseling would have to become more aware of its counseling func-
tion—alongside that of placement—not only vis-à-vis the youth but also the fi rm. In the 
coming years, the apprenticeship placement will inevitably recede, since the contractual 
partners [i.e., worker and employer] will to some extent fi nd each other without the help 
of apprenticeship placement. Th e job of vocational counseling will then in many cases be 
restricted to counseling the contractual partners. Th is counseling function is the primary 
and main task of vocational counseling—in other countries, usually the only role. Th e 
labor offi  ces see their role often too one-sidedly in terms of placement. 
Th e DIHT representative added a veiled threat: one “would have to seek an-
other solution, if the public vocational counseling did not fulfi ll its function as a 
counseling institution.”123
But the DIHT position advocating a simultaneous intensifi cation of counsel-
ing and relaxation of the Bundesanstalt’s administrative hold over young job-
seekers was apparently not the only view among the employers’ groups. Th ough 
none of the employer representatives to the reform commission explicitly advo-
cated the retention of Totalerfassung—a position that by this point was politi-
cally untenable—the drawn-out debates over the details of a reformed vocational 
counseling suggested that at least one camp among the employers believed it 
could delay change, perhaps indefi nitely. After the seemingly smooth and deci-
sive discussion at the fi rst meeting of the reform commission, subsequent negoti-
ations over the details of a new vocational counseling policy bogged down. As the 
unions saw it, the employers were split over the advisability or necessity of truly 
far-reaching reforms. Th ose opposed, the union negotiators feared, hoped to use 
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delaying tactics in order to save the school-card, and hence Totalerfassung.124 Th e 
divisions among the employers were refl ected in an impassioned, but also some-
what ambiguous, public appeal issued in September 1956:
[Th e employers’ Working Committee on Vocational Training] pointed out with great em-
phasis that attempts that aim to reduce the eff ectiveness of the German vocational coun-
seling are at present especially disadvantageous for the young workers as well as for the 
employers. Th erefore they must be countered with all strength. Th e increasing scarcity of 
youths makes a careful counseling of the youths more necessary than ever.125 
After looking at the unions and the employers, we come to the third interest 
group. Th e leadership of the Labor Administration and its vocational counselors, 
who would be aff ected most immediately and personally by a transformation of 
the Bundesanstalt, approached the issue initially with a mixture of subtle resis-
tance, innovative speculation, and resignation. Th e fi rst meeting of the leading 
vocational counselors called to discuss the Deputy’s report refl ected these am-
bivalent reactions, suff used by a general consternation. Th e head of vocational 
counseling in the Bundesanstalt, Valentin Siebrecht, established a framework for 
the discussion by acknowledging what no one any longer dared deny: that on the 
basis of the Deputy’s report, a “new orientation was appropriate” and that free-
dom of vocational choice was a fundamentally guaranteed right.126 Despite these 
avowals, Siebrecht’s and others’ comments suggested the limits to vocational 
counselors’ readiness at this time to abandon the role they had played (or aspired 
to play) for more than three decades. “Fundamental considerations of the limits 
of the tasks of vocational counseling,” Siebrecht argued, “must start [from the 
postulate] that the vocational integration of youths is a social-political task. Both 
the youths and the economy are dependent on vocational counseling; therefore it 
must be suggested to them that they should use [vocational counseling].”
Th e means of such “suggestion” was not an explicit topic at this fi rst meet-
ing of leading vocational counselors. For the Governing Boards’ reform commis-
sion only would make Erfassung through the schools the central issue a month 
later. But the counselors did acknowledge that persuasion and appeal through the 
quality of their own work now would play much greater roles,127 thus returning 
to ideas prominent in vocational counseling circles shortly before the founding of 
the Bundesanstalt, when Totalerfassung had seemed to be in imminent jeopardy. 
Still, over the course of the following years, the Labor Administration itself would 
prove to be a persistent brake on rapid reform, even as it accepted certain realities 
of the democratic and increasingly affl  uent state—and developed a new raison 
d’etre for itself.
Th e fourth group, the federal ministries whose representatives sat on the Bun de-
sanstalt’s governing boards, remained largely in the background during the debates 
of these years. As occasional interventions suggested—such as when the Ministry 
of Labor in 1959 fought to maintain the confi dentiality of the teacher evaluations, 
which by this point had become the fi nal sticking point of reform128—the gov-
ernment tended to favor retaining aspects of the Bundesanstalt’s macro-economic 
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steering role. In a time of growing public criticism of the Labor Administration’s 
bureaucratic nature, compulsory methods, and apparent superfl uity,129 however, 
the government hardly dared to advocate openly for its traditional role.130
Indeed, it seems clear that all of the parties, no matter how much some of them 
may have hoped to preserve Totalerfassung, recognized that by the late 1950s, 
West German society—West Germans—were in the midst of rapid economic 
and social change, which made a simple perpetuation of the old Labor Adminis-
tration impossible. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain why the Bundesanstalt’s 
governing boards took the occasion of the Deputy’s report in 1956 to initiate 
their own reform process, which went well beyond the administrative reforms 
suggested by the Deputy. It would be preferable, they may have thought, to be at 
the forefront of changes that would come one way or another. It was, then, not 
the Deputy’s report alone, but the combination of its critiques with the changes 
in German society brought about by the Wirtschaftswunder that had “created a 
whole new situation” for the Labor Administration. Th is perception also would 
explain why the resistance to change had to take more subtle forms. Despite the 
resounding call “immediately” to end Totalerfassung, which the fi rst meeting of 
the commission of the governing boards had sounded, its offi  cial dismantling 
took several years and occurred in stages.
Relinquishing Totalerfassung
Negotiations over the details of new binding guidelines for vocational counseling 
gave the opponents of reform an opportunity to regroup and challenge the initial 
apparent consensus in favor of immediate, sweeping change. Below the seemingly 
glacial pace they were able to impose on the reform process, however, the key issue 
of the Labor Administration’s relations to the schools proved amenable to quicker 
change. It fi nally resolved itself into separate questions, making piecemeal reform 
easier. And generally, the drift was away from Totalerfassung and toward greater 
concentration on the individual counsel-seeker.
Despite fi erce rear-guard resistance from within vocational counseling and the 
governing boards, in February 1958, more than two years after the Bundesanstalt 
had begun its reform deliberations, Nuremberg ordered an important innovation 
in the relations between the labor offi  ce, the school, and the school-leaver. All 
labor offi  ces were now to send the families of school-leavers a “parental letter,” 
which would explain the importance of the choice of vocation, the voluntary na-
ture of vocational counseling, the help that the labor offi  ce could off er, and, fi nally, 
the procedures for gathering information about the student.131 Furthermore, the 
schools were to send the school-card to the parents, who could decide whether 
to fi ll it out so that the school could pass it on to the labor offi  ce.132 With these 
steps, which the Bundesanstalt acknowledged were necessary “to win the parents 
for the use of vocational counseling and apprenticeship placement,” the Labor 
Administration signifi cantly loosened its grip on its means of Totalerfassung.
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Th e Bundesanstalt’s “positive experiences”133 after the promulgation of the 
policy of more fully including parents no doubt eased the transition and relieved 
some of the Bundesanstalt’s worries. Even when a third party—parents—had to 
be included in the channel from the schools to the labor offi  ces, the latter’s access 
to the students did not suff er and may even have improved thanks to the parents’ 
interest. In the short-run, the apparent success of this transition to a more open 
style encouraged the Bundesanstalt to imagine that the change in policy might be 
less painful than expected. By early 1959, even some members of the governing 
boards were coming to think that the Labor Administration could at the same 
time be more modern, democratic, and responsive to the wishes of its clients and 
still maintain a de facto comprehensive role in the labor market. Th ey hoped 
that “in practice, to the greatest possible extent, individual counseling should be 
utilized, the school involved, and the individual expressive value of [the school’s] 
comments upheld [i.e., their confi dentiality maintained].” Such practical suc-
cess, it was thought, would be compatible with the voluntary nature of visits to 
vocational counseling and the parents’ right to decide, which would be “secured 
in principle.”134
After the Bundesanstalt had compromised on the routing of the school-card, 
seemingly without detrimental eff ect on its practical success, the debate focused 
increasingly on the second aspect of the schools’ role in “delivering” their students, 
the confi dentiality of teachers’ evaluations. Th ough state ministries of education 
blocked new guidelines, the leadership of the Bundesanstalt, which originally had 
been most committed to the old model, by now recognized that the survival of 
vocational counseling depended on gaining the public’s, and especially parents’ 
and school-leavers’, trust. To this end, it no longer sought unhindered access to 
the school-leavers through the schools. By 1960, under the impression of a se-
ries of legal rulings establishing the individual’s rights vis-à-vis the Bundesanstalt, 
it even had accepted that “ultimately the right of guardians to see [the school 
evaluations] cannot be denied.”135 Finally, in August 1961, the new guidelines on 
individual vocational counseling, which emphasized the voluntary nature of the 
service, the participation of parents, and the non-confi dentiality of the teacher 
evaluations, were promulgated.136 By its own channels, West Germany’s increas-
ingly democratic and litigious culture was making bureaucratic control on the 
scale of the Labor Administration’s Totalerfassung ever less viable.
Weaning itself from the program of Totalerfassung had not come easily to the 
Bundesanstalt. Th e dynamic times of 1950s West Germany—both economically 
and socially/politically—however, made some transition unavoidable, a need that 
the leaders of the Labor Administration grudgingly recognized. A number of 
fac tors eased the transition considerably, including prominently the belief that 
the Bundesanstalt simply might modify its means of interacting with its clients, 
while still maintaining—“in practice”—a comprehensive, or nearly comprehen-
sive, role in the labor market. Over time, however, this hope would prove eva-
nescent. From the late 1950s, the proportion of school-leavers who visited the 
labor offi  ces would drop, even if only slowly. While in 1952 the labor offi  ces had 
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attracted nearly 95 percent of all school-leavers137—as high a percentage as in the 
late 1930s, when such visits were compulsory—by 1963, the fi gure had sunk to 
84 percent.138
Th e slow decline of the degree of Erfassung was not the only measure of the 
Bundesanstalt’s loosening hold on the German school-leavers. Th e widening gap 
between counseling and apprenticeship placement revealed another aspect of the 
fading of Totalerfassung: the percentage of youths obtaining their apprenticeships 
through the labor offi  ces dropped even faster than the proportion seeking advice. 
As we shall see in the next section, youths increasingly consulted with the labor 
offi  ce, but no longer relied on it for a position.139 Slowly, but inevitably, the La-
bor Administration was losing its grip on the young job seekers. As we show in 
the following section, however, the administrative end and then slow fading out 
of Totalerfassung by no means meant that the Labor Administration now lacked a 
role in the still vibrant economy and democratic polity of the 1960s.
Th e Labor Administration Transformed: the New Clients
Th e emergence of a new role and style for the Labor Administration, like the 
ending of Totalerfassung, took time. For more than a decade, the two processes 
overlapped and conditioned each other. As with the passing of the Labor Adminis-
tration’s traditional methods, the birth of a new purpose and ethos occurred at fi rst 
not as systematic reform, but almost unnoticed, in response to social shifts; only 
later did the renewal of the Labor Administration become a conscious program. 
Th e underlying condition that eroded Totalerfassung, the unprecedented wealth of 
Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, also greatly smoothed the transition of the La-
bor Administration to new tasks, for the Bundesanstalt’s own overfl owing coff ers140 
in these years allowed it the freedom to develop new roles and capabilities.
A major trend, from the early 1950s on, was the growing importance for the 
Bundesanstalt’s vocational counseling of so-called “diffi  cult cases.” Th ese included 
adults who had lost their jobs in declining industries and needed retraining, war-
wounded, other rehabilitation cases, and the physically or psychologically handi-
capped. As a proxy of the development in vocational counseling as a whole, one 
may look at the fi gures of the psychological service, where the proportion of 
handicapped clients alone rose from a mere 2 percent of all cases in 1950 to nearly 
20 percent by the mid 1960s (and would continue to rise thereafter).141 Several 
factors, whose signifi cance shifted over time, contributed to the rising number 
of “diffi  cult cases.” Th e human costs of the last war continued to burden West 
Germany well into peacetime, as often physically and otherwise crippled POWs 
returned from the Soviet Union throughout the early 1950s. Th e 1953 Law on 
the Severely War Damaged made their reintegration into the workforce, if at all 
possible, a central goal; the vocational counseling of the Bundesanstalt, which had 
fought other welfare providers for a stake in such reintegration eff orts,142 would 
play a role in deciding whether, and how, the person could be (re)trained.
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Other laws of the now rapidly expanding German welfare state also channeled 
ever-greater numbers of “diffi  cult cases” to the vocational counseling offi  ces. In 
1956, the revised Law on Job Placement and Unemployment Insurance expressly 
aimed to help handicapped people more generally assume jobs—which the Bun-
desanstalt executive board correctly perceived would “bring the Bundesanstalt a 
considerable additional burden.”143 Subsequently, the 1961 Federal Welfare Law 
expanded the range of handicaps qualifying for support and established a legal 
right to support. On top of the workers in need of rehabilitation and a subse-
quent change of vocations,144 whose number had “increased rapidly in the previ-
ous year,” the Bundesanstalt expected the new Welfare law to “expand the task 
area of caring for physically handicapped youths.”145
Th e expansion of welfare programs for the handicapped and for rehabilitating 
workers resulted in part simply from the generous humanitarian impulses of a 
public and political parties in whose eyes the booming economy and overfl owing 
public treasury made fi nancial restraint seem less compelling.146 Especially in the 
second half of the 1950s, however, when the shortage of workers was becoming 
most acute, the eff orts to integrate the handicapped and others also, and perhaps 
more importantly, followed from economic considerations. Firms desperate for 
workers now were willing to hire people they might have rejected earlier. As early 
as December 1954, the Bundesanstalt had initiated nationwide “inspection mea-
sures” for the purpose of uncovering any usable workers among the small numbers 
of long-term unemployed. In his instructions, which focused exclusively on the 
value of these workers to employers and the economy generally, the Bundesanstalt 
President had instructed his offi  ces “actively and generously” to use all available 
means in the fi elds of vocational educational and retraining measures.147 In a 
sign of the shifting priorities, the pacesetting state of North Rhine-Westphalia, in 
1958, instructed its psychological service to give priority to evaluating the handi-
capped.148 During the second half of the 1950s,149 until the more rapid infl ux of 
foreign workers began slightly to alleviate the worker shortage around 1960, the 
Bundesanstalt’s eff orts to place the “diffi  cult cases” in work had macro-economic, 
as well as welfare humanitarian, roots. In this period of transition in the Bunde -
sanstalt, the congruence of traditional economic and new humanitarian purposes—
and, in this case, the reliance of both upon individualized counseling150—may 
well have facilitated the broader shift in the Labor Administration’s approach, 
from Totalerfassung and steering to selective counseling and helping. 
As early as 1956, even as many still defended the traditional encompassing role 
of the Labor Administration, others had a better sense of where the institution’s 
future might lie. At the fi rst meeting of LAA presidents called to discuss the Dep-
uty’s critiques of the Bundesanstalt, the main offi  ce’s comments, though still only 
about job placement, and not yet about vocational counseling, suggested a pos-
sible new role in a dynamic economy: actively helping those who, for whatever 
reason, could not succeed in the affl  uent society. Th e idea that each now could 
fi nd his own work was “in part correct,” the offi  cial acknowledged. However, 
“there are many who are simply not capable of this, as they cannot connect to the 
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labor market ... Th e initiating and active task of job placement is not recognized 
in the [Deputy’s] report.”151 In the future, the offi  cial’s comments suggested, the 
Bundesanstalt increasingly would fi nd its purpose in helping these less-capable 
individuals, which almost certainly would require long-term contact and care.
Th e steadily growing importance throughout the 1950s and early 1960s of 
helping those the Economic Miracle left behind was not the only source of a new 
role for vocational counseling (and the Labor Administration more generally). Th e 
emerging demands of the more successful themselves would provide, especially 
after about 1960, abundant new tasks as well. As we have seen, the Bundesanstalt 
was pleasantly surprised that rerouting the school-card and including parents 
more did not reduce participation levels. Th e prospects for individuals opened up 
by the booming economy—something that neither this generation’s parents or 
grandparents had known—did in fact increase the desire for personalized advice. 
As scholars have noted, the nascent optimism of Germans in the mid and late 
1950s was mixed with lingering insecurity born of decades of turmoil.152 School-
leavers’ attitudes evolved, as they increasingly believed in the permanence of the 
good economic times. If an early reaction still had been the hasty scramble for 
the fi rst best position, by the beginning of the second half of the decade, students 
and their parents were taking the trouble to examine their options more closely. 
“Th e tensions between supply and demand for young workers,” the Bundesanstalt 
reported in 1956, “strengthened in the youths, who have become more refl ective, 
their parents, and guardians the demand for comprehensive, objective informa-
tion on the individual vocations, their work conditions, suitability demands, and 
the developmental possibilities.”153 Th e following year’s report noted that the 
youths and parents’ demand for “objective instruction and thorough personal 
consultation through the public vocational counseling has risen.”154
By the late 1950s and especially in the 1960s, after a decade or more of growth 
largely had erased doubts about its permanence, the burning issue on many peo-
ple’s minds was Aufstieg—getting ahead. As early as 1958/59, the Bundesanstalt 
reported that “the incredibly large supply of apprenticeships has aroused … many 
unrealizable wishes and hopes and has led to an even stronger shifting of vo-
cational-wishes … As a result of the favorable economic development and the 
eff orts surrounding the alternative educational path,155 interest in information 
about possibilities of vocational advancement has grown even more.”156 By the 
early 1960s, the desire for Aufstieg had become an omnipresent theme of reports 
from local, state, and federal vocational counseling.157 Th e Bundesanstalt no lon-
ger regarded the phenomenon as a disturbance of its proper tasks—as it still had 
in the late 1950s—but as a welcome new fi eld of activity. For this interest in 
personal advancement, which the dynamic economy of the 1950s and 1960s had 
engendered, and the accompanying thirst for guidance largely were responsible 
for the fact that the proportion of school-leavers visiting the labor offi  ces declined 
only slowly after the end of Totalerfassung. Perhaps of still greater importance by 
now, the Labor Administration perceived a close connection between helping in-
dividuals and its own image among a mobilized, increasingly demanding public, 
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which, by the early 1960s, the Bundesanstalt was very eager to please. Th is new 
dependence emerged, for example, at a November 1961 meeting of leading vo-
cational counselors, where the leadership described criticisms made by the public 
and the Bundesanstalt’s response. Among other steps, “a signifi cant task in this 
connection is the job- and vocational promotion of both those limited to voca-
tional rehabilitation and those willing to advance.… It belongs to the tasks of a 
modern job placement to inform the public systematically about such facts and 
connections—managing public relations.”158 
As with the signifi cant expansion of programs for the disabled, the Bunde-
sanstalt’s cultivation of its new role in addressing individuals’ interest in upward-
mobility benefi ted from the ample resources now at its own and the government’s 
disposal. Individual Aufstieg was becoming a public concern. In his 1957 proc-
lamation inaugurating the new government, Chancellor Adenauer for the fi rst 
time had emphasized the necessity for the economy of promoting the vocational 
supplementary training of adults, especially for small and mid-sized fi rms, as well 
as the social-political signifi cance of the vocational advancement of the individ-
ual adult worker.159 Th e funding for the government’s Program for the Advance-
ment of the Dependent Middle Classes not only grew rapidly, but also mirrored 
the ever-more prominent role of the individual: at its inception in 1959, the 
program channeled its funds to training centers; in 1962, the grants and loans 
began to be given directly to individuals. As the Bundesanstalt explained it, “the 
guiding thought of the advancement program is, from now on, to place every 
ambitious worker in a position to achieve the vocational supplemental training 
that matches his abilities.”160 In 1965, the Federal Government enshrined in law 
the individual’s right to counsel and aid in his eff orts at vocational advancement, 
for which the Bundesanstalt was to be responsible.
Th e care of those left behind by the economic miracle and services for the 
great numbers of individuals made ambitious by the same growth helped to com-
pensate for the loss of the Labor Administration’s program of Totalerfassung and 
distribution. Even before the Bundesanstalt consciously identifi ed and cultivated 
the new tasks as the core of its new raison d’etre (from around 1960), they had 
begun to reshape vocational counseling. In addition to developing such concrete 
new fi elds of operation (which could counter the claims that the Labor Adminis-
tration was authoritarian or superfl uous), the Bundesanstalt also responded to the 
public criticisms of it as an ineff ective bureaucracy. 
Th e Labor Administration Transformed: Effi  ciency and Scientifi cness
Like its services for new clients, the Bundesanstalt’s eff orts to become and to seem 
more effi  cient and more “scientifi c” emerged fi rst somewhat haphazardly and 
only after around 1960 as a conscious program of reform. It was certainly no ac-
cident that in the late 1950s, just as the Bundesanstalt was subjected to persistent 
critiques from the public and press for being too concerned with quantitative 
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criteria, it launched several ambitious projects designed to improve the quality of 
its counseling, as the vocational counselors in the late 1940s had recommended.
In 1957, the Bundesanstalt commissioned the University of Würzburg’s psy-
chological institute to evaluate its psychological tests.161 Two years later, it began 
a massive and ultimately unsuccessful project to assess scientifi cally the psycho-
logical requirements of a single, model vocation: the typesetter.162
Up to the end of the decade, the projects to improve vocational counseling’s 
methods had been isolated endeavors, and they had lacked the full backing of the 
governing boards.163 Between 1959 and 1964, fi nally, eff orts to put vocational 
counseling’s methods on a more scientifi c basis, to make counseling—and the 
Bundesanstalt generally—more effi  cient and eff ective, gradually coalesced into a 
program of reform meant to adapt the Labor Administration to a newly dynamic 
society.
By 1959, at the latest, the leadership of the Bundesanstalt recognized the se-
riousness of their predicament, as well as what they perceived to be the only 
potentially suitable response. At a meeting on the “psychological training of job 
placement personnel,” the vice-president of the Bundesanstalt and head of job 
placement and vocational counseling described the situation in dire terms.
It is to be feared that the personnel of the Bundesanstalt are not fully aware of the situation 
[i.e., the implications of full-employment]. Job seekers must come to the labor offi  ce and 
leave it with the impression that they are being treated well and correctly. For that, trust 
is necessary. Th ere is the danger of a “bureaucractic relation” of the unemployed or job 
seeker to the Bundesanstalt.… To the extent that unemployment declines, it will become 
an existential matter for job placement that we achieve a better relationship of trust with 
the public. 
Th e psychological training of personnel, which was intended both to give 
them a greater knowledge of vocations and jobs and to improve their interactions 
with the clients, should contribute to such trust. In April 1961, vocational coun-
seling implemented “Guidelines for the Selection, Acceptance, and Training of 
Vocational Counselors,” both raising the entry-level requirements and improving 
and standardizing training.164 Th e governing boards also were coming to see the 
potential importance for the Bundesanstalt’s relations to the public, and hence for 
its future, of improved, more scientifi c methods and organization.165 In February 
1961, the Administrative Board’s Committee on Youth Questions had decided to 
“discuss fundamental questions pertaining to vocational counseling on a contin-
ual basis.” In October, the Committee endorsed the ongoing research in Tübin-
gen into “psychological vocational knowledge” and even took the unusual step of 
encouraging the Bundesanstalt leadership to increase its request for funding.166 In 
November, vocational counseling presented the Committee with a detailed and 
ambitious plan of current eff orts to improve the quality of its work.167
In the following years, headquarters and the governing boards approved fur-
ther measures to improve and even expand vocational counseling. By 1963, the 
central administration and the governing boards, the head of vocational coun-
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seling could report with satisfaction, were “considering a gradual expansion of 
vocational counseling.”168
Th e chief benefi ciary of the eff ort to improve vocational counseling was its 
psychological service. In 1962, the executive committee began to consider a 
long-term expansion of the service.169 Members of vocational counseling and the 
psychological service cultivated ties to the unions and employers’ organizations 
for the purpose of gaining approval for an eff ort to put psychological testing on 
a more “scientifi c” basis and to expand the service.170 Already in 1961 and 1962, 
the psychological service had established two working groups to consider “gen-
eral and fundamental questions” and diagnostic procedures of the psychological 
service.171 In July 1966, the working groups were put on a more permanent foot-
ing, when the governing boards approved the establishment of the psychological 
service’s own unit for “developmental and fundamental work.”172 For the fi rst 
time, its headquarters achieved centralized control of its fi eld offi  ces.173 And the 
psychological service grew prodigiously. If the number of psychologists already 
had grown from 85 in 1957 to 106 in 1963,174 a decade later the number had 
almost tripled to nearly 300.175 Th e Bundesanstalt’s psychological service was now, 
after that of the US armed forces, the second largest in the world.
Germany’s strategic security and, especially, its spectacular economic growth 
in the 1950s and into the 1960s had undermined fundamental preconditions of 
one half of the German human economies, as they had arisen after World War 
I. While the vocational training system continued more or less as before, the 
dynamic conditions of the Wirtschaftswunder eroded the Labor Administration’s 
system of complete inclusion, which seemed to an increasingly assertive public 
and press inappropriate for a free society and superfl uous as well. All the same, 
as the traditional role of the Labor Administration became ever less tenable, new 
tasks presented themselves. Over time, the Bundesanstalt learned to accept its role 
as a service agency for the less fortunate of the economic miracle, as well as for 
the many individuals newly interested in personal advancement. An important 
part of the Bundesanstalt’s makeover was its eff ort to improve its eff ectiveness and 
to become—or at least to cultivate an image of being—more scientifi c, which it 
hoped would enhance its credibility among what was now its most important 
audience—the German people. 
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CONCLUSION
Th e Age of Organization

The familiar dates and concerns of modern German history help us little to un-
derstand the Labor Administration and its program to control and improve the 
German workforce. Th e turning points were not 1933 or 1945, but 1910, when 
the Law on Job Placement gave preference to neutral, public control of the labor 
market, and 1961, when the Labor Administration fi nally abjured Totalerfassung. 
Other pivotal moments included 1916, when the turn to total war prompted 
the authorities to create the fi rst centralized network of labor offi  ces and greatly 
heightened the sense of national threat, and 1925, when German industry began 
to commit itself to producing a high-skills workforce.
Nor did the Labor Administration project replicate the uncontrolled, cata-
strophic chain reactions occurring in other realms of the fi ssiparous German so-
ciety. Irreconcilable confl icts of interest and murderous ideologies played no role 
here. Certainly, interest groups fought over access to labor and jobs, but increas-
ingly these clashes led before and during World War I to all sides preferring or 
at least tolerating some kind of neutral intervention. Th e corporatist framework 
of the Labor Administration, which the major interests easily lived with even 
after their cooperation in other areas had ended, cemented this modus vivendi. 
Rather than major confl ict, the astonishing continuity of the Labor Administra-
tion resulted from two basic areas of consensus. During these decades, Germans 
agreed that their nation was at risk, whether from domestic strife or from outside 
threats. Complementing this consensus about the goal of national survival was 
widespread, passionate belief in the best, indeed only, means to overcome the 
threat. Germany had to optimize its workforce, by “organizing” and improving 
it. Th e unanimous or nearly unanimous approval of the legislation undergirding the 
Labor Administration—laws in 1910 (Job Placement), 1922 (Labor Exchanges), 
1927 (Unemployment Insurance), and 1949 (restoration of the Labor Admin-
Notes for this section begin on page 231.
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istration)—attests to this widespread support. However, the salience of the goal 
(saving the nation), its relationship to the means (optimization), and fi nally, the 
balance between diff erent forms of optimization (organization and improve-
ment)—all of these aspects changed continually, especially with the onset of total 
war in 1916.
Th e roots of the Labor Administration project stretched back to the 1890s, 
when Germany was in the midst of its fi rst economic miracle. Th e main challenge 
in this era was domestic stability. Unprecedented internal migration and urban-
ization overwhelmed city resources and made control of access to jobs and work-
ers the subject of increasingly bitter disputes between agriculture, industry, and 
labor. Reformers and politicians from across the spectrum pinned their hopes 
for a resolution on the neutral “organization” of the labor market, an aspiration 
fueled by the real successes of technocratic control in other areas (corporations, 
state-building, science) and the apparent inevitability of democracy. Th e unani-
mously supported 1910 Law on Job Placement gave public labor offi  ces priority 
over commercial or partisan ones and anticipated the former’s eventual “predom-
inance.” As yet, however, the authorities took no steps to centralize control of the 
labor market, though some interest groups (SPD, labor offi  ce movement) called 
for exactly that.
Not only matching men and jobs, but improving the workforce was also on 
the agenda of the authorities. Th e Prussian Ministry of Trade pioneered eff orts to 
encourage more young people to enter apprenticeships and more industrial fi rms 
to train them. A skilled workforce, the ministry and its allies believed, promised 
much: it would assure Germany’s success in foreign markets; at the same time, 
the embourgeoisement of the working class would provide another path to domes-
tic stability. Not organized from above, such stability would rest instead on the 
economic, and thus political, independence of individual Germans, a necessary 
condition for a sustainable democracy. However, before World War I, indeed, 
before the mid 1920s, authorities and industry did not stake out as clear a path 
in worker training as in the case of job placement. Germany’s booming economy, 
at least until 1914, made the urgency for reform appear to be weaker than in 
do mestic matters. Additionally, German manufacturers themselves remained am-
bivalent about the future of their workforces. Many discounted the role of the 
skilled worker and instead were enamored of an “American” vision of productiv-
ity, built around technology, mass production, and scientifi c management.
Despite their diff erences, the two projects of labor force reform already were 
demonstrating some mutual affi  nities of purpose and means even before World 
War I. Th e backers of vocational training aimed to improve not only Germany’s 
economic power, but also its domestic stability. From the turn of the century, as 
Germany’s international rivalries heated up, many social reformers and politicians 
extended the purpose of reform beyond domestic stability to also include the 
country’s strategic power, moving from “Christian” to “national socialism.” Th e 
boosters of skilling and individual improvement, on the other hand, began to 
adopt ideas about the best means available from the “organization” camp. Th eir 
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1910 call for a national system of vocational counseling thus emphasized the 
necessarily “comprehensive” nature of such measures.
World War I recast Germany’s labor force programs. Th e total mobilization 
in the second half of the war established the infrastructure of a central, nation-
wide authority to distribute labor most effi  ciently. Politically, the contributions 
of labor to the war eff ort meant that its union and political wings, the most 
adamant advocates of public control of the job market, would hold great sway 
afterwards. More importantly, the loss in the war united nearly all Germans in 
the feeling that they were an embattled nation. For the next forty years, foreign 
adversaries or economic calamity, and sometimes both, threatened the country’s 
very survival. While many deep disagreements festered and some exploded in 
Weimar Germany, the need to mobilize the workforce for the sake of national 
survival found widespread, indeed, nearly unanimous, support. For Germany’s 
opponents, France and Britain, by contrast, the war was devastating, but it did 
not produce a national trauma as it did in Germany. It was no accident, then, 
that in those countries the war did not redirect and concentrate previous eff orts 
to control and improve the workforce.
In addition to elevating the goal of survival, the war greatly reinforced previ-
ous convictions about the best means as well. Th ey would involve “organization,” 
the conscious steering of resources, and more ambitiously, “Totalerfassung,” the 
manipulation of all resources. Survival and organization intrinsically were con-
nected, for the latter presupposed a purpose, a telos of Totalerfassung. And no goal 
could be as motivating as survival.
Concretely, this consensus produced the Labor Administration, a Weimar-era 
institution that would survive largely unchanged for almost four decades. Th e 
Administration enjoyed a monopoly on job placement and aspired to the “com-
plete inclusion” of all movements in the labor market. Tensions persisted between 
organization and improvement: the Administration’s job placement and voca-
tional counseling wings, subscribing to these diff erent visions of optimization, 
mistrusted each other. Yet the latter, in its eff ort to create a high-skills workforce, 
had become one of the staunchest defenders of Totalerfassung.
For all of the bureaucrats’ eff orts, the project of skilling the German workforce 
only took fl ight when German manufacturers saw its value. In the mid 1920s, 
after wartime restrictions fi nally had lapsed, the fog of an infl ationary mark given 
way to the hard realities of a new currency, and the Germans recognized the 
challenge of US mass production, leaders of German industry reevaluated and 
reconceptualized the potential contribution of skilled workers. Even as eff orts to 
draft a law on vocational training foundered, manufacturers launched an eff ort 
to standardize and signifi cantly expand vocational training and certifi cation. Th e 
German “skills machine” began to roll.
Both labor force projects, now tightly intertwined, fl ourished in the anarchic 
authoritarian Nazi state. After it had conquered mass unemployment, the new 
regime wanted a labor force of highly skilled workers to compensate for the coun-
try’s quantitative defi cits vis-à-vis future military opponents. Th e encroachment 
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by hyperactive Nazi deputies, such as Robert Ley, on the prerogatives of both the 
Labor Administration and industry spurred both to cooperate even more closely. 
By the late 1930s, the Labor Administration’s vocational counseling had fi nally 
achieved near-Totalerfassung of boys and girls leaving school. It cooperated closely 
with industry to ensure that the latter now off ered more apprenticeship positions 
than there existed people to fi ll them.
After a second, even more devastating war, not much changed—at least at 
fi rst. Despite constitutional promises of the free choice of vocation, the restored 
Labor Administration used its old methods—above all, cooperation with the 
schools—to ensure itself the same level of “complete inclusion” it had achieved in 
the late 1930s. By now, there was much less enthusiasm for “organization” than 
there had been after the fi rst war. Indeed, there was a new hunger for individual 
responsibility. However, Germans still felt themselves an embattled nation. If the 
Labor Administration could no longer promise national regeneration, as it had 
after World War I, at least the familiar institution promised an orderly domestic 
labor market.
By the mid 1950s, fi nally, the strategic security provided by Germany’s place 
in the western alliance and, especially, the unfamiliar experience of sustained eco-
nomic growth in the economic miracle ended the Labor Administration’s forty-
year-old labor project. In the face of an eff ervescent seller’s market for labor, the 
Administration reluctantly had to abandon its hold—its Totalerfassung—on the 
German workforce. Hundreds of thousands of young West Germans continued 
to fi nd apprenticeship positions on their own. Th e two sides of the Labor Ad-
ministration project—controlling the workforce and giving it skills—had come 
undone. Th e skilled workforce created with the help of the Labor Administration 
no longer accepted the terms of Totalerfassung. Workers, increasingly thinking of 
themselves as middle-class Bürger—as the boosters of vocational counseling and 
training had long hoped—now could help themselves.
A paradox is evident: one period of economic dynamism ended the project of 
organizing the labor force, just as another, sixty years earlier, had witnessed its 
birth. What had changed in the meantime? Answering this question helps us to 
place the Labor Administration projects in the larger perspective of Germany’s 
tortuous modernization.
In several ways, both of the dominant features of the age of organization—the 
sense of national embattlement and the confi dence in organization itself—had 
lost their motive force by the 1950s. Germany was, and felt, more secure. After 
two wars and defeats, the second as decisive as possible, the country was no longer 
the focus of fears in a continent brimming with rivalries. Rather, Germany was 
increasingly well ensconced in the security sphere provided by the United States. 
Certainly, the Cold War spawned its own worries—but these fears Germany did 
not have to face alone. Domestic dangers also seemed less threatening, as both 
extreme right and extreme left had been discredited. Th e single most divisive eco-
nomic trend from earlier—the growth of socialism—belonged to the past. If the 
fi rst economic miracle around 1900 had fueled the growth of the SPD and the 
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socialist unions, the second was doing precisely the opposite. Th e heady sense of 
individual opportunity in the 1950s and 1960s—deproletarianization—began to 
unravel the ties binding socialist organizations together. While alarming down-
turns had repeatedly (1873–80, 1891, 1900–1902, 1907–1908) interrupted the 
earlier period of growth, the economy expanded after 1950 for more than fi fteen 
years before the fi rst, mild recession hit. In addition to this steadiness of growth, 
the sheer levels of affl  uence and technology mattered as well. Th e economy had 
not grown quickly between 1914 and 1950, but it had grown. After taking care 
of the basic necessities (housing, food, clothing), the average worker in 1950 had 
25 percent of his income available for discretionary expenditures and in 1970, 
he would have as much as 40 percent—rather than the 10–20 percent he had 
had around 1900.1 By the 1950s, new or newly cheap technologies—car, radio, 
television—held out the promise of individual enjoyment. Not least, industry’s 
“great cooperative endeavor” with the Labor Administration since the 1920s and 
1930s to build a vocational system now yielded more attractive apprenticeship 
positions than could be fi lled. Th e economic growth around 1960, as opposed 
to that around 1900, brought many working-class Germans to the threshold of 
middle-class aspirations and even lifestyles.
Like the threat of national peril, the promise of organization also had waned 
by the 1950s. Th e reality of the Labor Administration itself hardly demonstrated 
the eff ectiveness of centralization on a large scale. Despite Totalerfassung and the 
single, ineff ectual attempt around 1940 to implement a national vocational plan, 
forty years after the founding of the Labor Administration, its business of job 
placement and vocational counseling remained largely a local aff air, with local 
Arbeitsämter determining how to woo local employers.
More generally, the turbulence and suff ering of the decades since 1914 had 
spread doubts about the desirability of organization per se. Its main supports in 
fact were implicated deeply in the failures of those years. Earlier, the march of 
science had seemed to demonstrate the superiority of expert knowledge, poten-
tially in any realm. Th e real achievements of large enterprises, above all, the na-
tion state, justifi ed the growing confi dence in organization. But both had failed 
since 1914, and their joint failure had led to the very worst developments of 
the mid twentieth century. States had become authoritarian or totalitarian and 
plunged their people into terrible war. Th ey had turned science to the production 
of terrifying new weapons and the abuse of individuals in the name of collective 
purifi cation. Understandably, after 1945, organization held much less appeal for 
many Europeans than it had earlier. Or at least it did for Germans: both the 
French and the British governments now tried to organize their labor services on 
a comprehensive basis. Few German politicians and opinion-leaders argued after 
the defeat of the Nazis, as Friedrich Naumann had half a century earlier, that 
“[a]ll relations are pervaded by the thought of organization, that is, the regulation 
of the masses.” Instead, many of them longed, however vaguely, for a society in 
which individuals were more robust, their rights “untouchable,” as the Basic Law 
put it.
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Th ese shifts in sentiment did not lead, as we have seen, to the end of the Labor 
Administration overnight. However, when the economy began to expand again 
and job seekers exulted in their opportunities, there was little support for main-
taining the traditional Labor Administration. Th e intellectual shift away from or-
ganization and toward the individual, already in the air, now found confi rmation 
in the lived experience of millions of upwardly mobile Germans.
If ideational constellations around organization and individual independence 
long sustained the Labor Administration projects, who were the most important 
carriers of those ideas? Who stood behind the age of organization and who, if 
anybody, behind its demise?
Even more than was the case in other policy arenas, elites drove the Labor 
Administration project from beginning to end. Th e political parties repeatedly 
and unanimously (or nearly so) had sanctioned the creation of the Labor Admin-
istration. In the crucial years after 1918, unions and industrial associations also 
put their imprimatur on the corporatist compromise. Yet it was not these partisan 
groups so much as those elements standing above party—or at least claiming 
to—who forged the German human economies. Modernizing bureaucrats from 
the Reich Interior (and later Economics and Labor) and Prussian Trade Minis-
tries pushed fi rst and hardest for a labor administration, complete inclusion, and 
universal vocational counseling and training. In the Kaiserreich, whose Reichstag 
lacked the right to initiate legislation, this was bound to be the case. But even in 
Weimar, when the groundwork for these projects was laid, long-serving minis-
try offi  cials provided the necessary continuity of vision and detailed knowledge, 
while ruling coalitions and ministers changed regularly. Th e same applied even 
across regime boundaries. In the last year of World War I, the Prussian Trade 
Ministry had helped to shepherd a law on vocational counseling into eff ect. Even 
after the Kaiserreich fell in the revolution and the ministry came under the infl u-
ence of the liberal German People’s Party, the same high-level bureaucrats used 
the authority of the old law to pioneer universal vocational counseling in the new 
Germany.
Above all, when the laws remained silent, the bureaucrats played a key role 
in implementing their plans. Th is was the case with Totalerfassung, which, aside 
from the period of 1938 to 1951, had no legal backing. Th e Labor Administra-
tion had to compensate for its legal impotence—and, after 1949, even its viola-
tion of the spirit of the Basic Law—by obtaining the cooperation of the schools. 
Nor was a national law achieved in regard to vocational training.2 Here too it 
was up to the bureaucrats from the Prussian Trade Ministry and later the Reich 
Economics Ministry to cajole industry and Handwerk into crafting a national 
sys tem of training.
By contrast with these ambitious modernizing bureaucrats, ordinary Germans 
stood out for the longest time thanks mainly to their silence. In the dynamic 
economy of the Kaiserreich, and throughout the 1920s and even into the 1930s, 
the majority of them found jobs and chose vocations without any intervention 
from the authorities (World War I was an exception, of course). Once the net-
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work of labor offi  ces was established after the war, many Germans gave generic 
support to their mission. Th ey thought the nation, in fact, did need to husband 
its human resources. However, many of those who had occasion to visit their lo-
cal labor offi  ce criticized its “bureaucratism.” Too often, people were not treated 
individually, according to their abilities and preferences, but merely according to 
their place in line. In the years of consistently high unemployment (even before 
the Depression), when the labor offi  ce might have knowledge of or access to one 
of the rare, coveted jobs, this grumbling did not pose a serious threat to the Ad-
ministration. Additionally, at least in regard to fi rst time job seekers, the Labor 
Administration was in the 1920s and 1930s assiduously building its key instru-
ment of “complete inclusion”—its connection to the local schools. Th e compul-
sions of the Nazi era, especially the 1938 laws of Totalerfassung, only crowned a 
development long underway. And even grumbling now became risky.
In the early years of the Bundesrepublik, most Germans evinced the same mixed 
reaction they had for the previous decades. Th ey cursed the offi  ces’ size and ano-
nymity, but apprenticeship seekers, in particular, had almost no other alterna-
tives. Besides, their teacher would take them to the labor offi  ce en masse, or the 
counselors would come visit their classroom. For the average German, the Labor 
Administration was never an especially beloved institution, but during the period 
from the 1920s to the 1950s, it became a fi xture of working life, tolerated, at 
least, by most.
In the late 1950s this changed. Th e Labor Administration had helped to create 
a nation of skilled workers. Now, in the economic boom, those increasingly inde-
pendent, middle-class citizens dared to reject or simply bypass their institutional 
forebear. Th e obsolescence of the Labor Administration—perhaps planned by its 
founders, at least those advocating a program of skilling, but now regretted as a 
self-infl icted wound by many within—thus marked a stage in the coming of real 
German democracy, what Tocqueville would have called its democratic social 
state.
Notes
 1. Görtemaker, Die Geschichte, 175–76; Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte, 1866–1918, vol. 1, 312
 2. One would be, fi nally, in 1969.
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